MULTINATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY COUNCIL

COALITION BUILDING GUIDE

CHANGE 1

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PREFACE

This Guide was prepared for the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC). The MIC provides a multinational environment for identifying and articulating actions that, if nationally accepted and implemented, would contribute to more effective coalition operations. It serves as a senior-level, executive body for member nations to address and resolve interoperability issues. Membership at the time of publication of this Guide includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The overall goal of the MIC is to provide a venue for exchange of relevant information across national boundaries to support the warfighter in coalition operations. It is intended to promote a responsive dialogue among the key elements of interoperability: operational planners, defence policy analysts, and experts from the command, control, communications, computer and intelligence community. It is not intended to duplicate or to subsume other interoperability working groups or fora.

The MIC creates and provides guidance to subordinate multinational interoperability working groups (MIWGs). A MIWG is task-oriented and outcome-based in its approach to exploring issues concerning coalition interoperability. The MIWG on Doctrine, Plans, and Procedures (DPP) prepared this Guide for the MIC.

The purpose of this Guide is to define and address the Coalition Building process as it applies to multinational military operations. It seeks to identify essential factors that the Lead Nation and the coalition commander and staff should consider for the effectiveness and efficiency of the coalition. The Guide concentrates on the strategic and operational levels of combined joint operations.

Every effort was made to reach consensus on the issues addressed in this Guide. In those few instances where any difference remains, the divergence is explained in footnote format and recorded as a national reservation immediately following the Executive Summary. The endnotes section also reflects national reservations where appropriate.

This Guide does not constitute official policy or doctrine, nor does it represent a definitive staff planning or military decision-making guide. It is offered to assist MIC member nations and their potential partners in serving together in future coalitions, and to assist other MIWGs in their exploration of related interoperability issues. Unlimited local reproduction and distribution is authorized.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The purpose of this Guide is to define and address the Coalition Building process as it applies to multinational military operations. It offers the following definition of a Lead Nation:

   ‘The Lead Nation is that nation with the will and capability, competence, and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as Functional Lead Agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical subfunctions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.’

2. The selection of a Lead Nation will occur within the international strategic context as a coalition begins to form. It is assumed that coalition operations will be conducted in accordance with a mandate recognized under international law originating with such an authority as the United Nations Security Council. This recognized ‘civil authority’ will most likely act to initiate or approve the coalition activity under consideration, as well as to define overarching objectives and the desired end state. It is further assumed that this same entity would designate, or accept the offered services of, a Lead Nation. The Lead Nation must be willing and capable of assuming the role. It must be able to organize consultation on and the development of the coalition’s political objectives, act as sponsor and spokesman for the coalition’s operations in the world community, lead coordination and building of consensus during the coalition’s planning and execution phases, and be competent to carry out the anticipated operation. It must above all be a politically acceptable choice for the other coalition partners. The latter is likely to include consideration of the Lead Nation’s ties to and interests in the specific region or conflict and its acceptability to the regional actors involved. International political consultation and control of the operation needs to be carried out through an appropriate council of national leaders duly empowered by their respective governments. A preponderance or operationally significant share of the overall force contribution is a clear factor in selection of a Lead Nation; however, that nation must also possess the strategic and political attributes required to sustain a coalition, or the coalition effort is likely to fail.

3. Implications for planning and mission execution at the operational level are considered next. A generic model of coalition planning is proposed, in which a multinational planning cell(s) is created within the planning system of the Lead Nation. The related process of matching resources to objectives and of providing logistic support for a coalition operation are discussed, to include the need for early agreement on financial commitments and the desirability of creating a centralized coalition logistics task force or coordination cell.

4. The Lead Nation’s responsibilities and options for creating an effective command and control architecture are examined. It is concluded that on the operational level, the Lead Nation at a minimum is responsible for providing the overarching framework for command. The coalition command structure may be characterized by a dominant Lead Nation staff organization, by an integrated staff in which multinational subordinate forces represent a mix of nations leading specific segments of the coalition, or a combination.
5. The Lead Nation will coordinate for, create, or provide communications and information management structures. The coalition partners must be brought into the planning process early and interact continuously to anticipate and solve problems likely to arise from a lack of compatibility among partners’ organic command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) equipment. Non-technical issues such as disclosure and releaseability policy will affect interoperability as well. Increasing standardization among likely coalition participants in advance of a crisis is a key action that could be undertaken now.

6. Differences in doctrine, organization, equipment, training, etc. demand a robust liaison structure to facilitate operations. Military personnel possessing regional language capabilities, cultural awareness, and experience in working and training with other countries’ militaries are potentially invaluable to the multinational commander in establishing liaison.

7. The Lead Nation will normally provide the commander of the coalition forces. The most flexible and responsive command authority under which the coalition commander can act is to have national forces assigned to and under his or her operational control. Factors affecting the transfer of and execution of this transfer of authority are considered.

8. Although coalition participants may have similar political mandates, each nation is likely to bring to the coalition a different set of national Rules of Engagement (ROE) reflecting each nation's unique political and legal interests and its reason for entering the coalition. Some national ROE will be relatively free of constraint, while others may be severely restricted. Commanders of deployed forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE development process. Consensus on standardized ROE should be sought, but may not be achievable. The commander must reconcile differences as much as possible and seek to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their national policies.

9. The interaction between coalition forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is potentially crucial to the success of operations. The coalition commander will most likely require specific command and staff arrangements for the management of civil-military interface and cooperation.

10. Doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way military forces think about, train for, plan, and execute operations. Coalition partners using very different national doctrines will have problems harmonizing their efforts, even if they enjoy a high degree of technical interoperability. Finding ways to harmonize doctrine is an important means to ensure improved coalition operations. NATO, for example, is developing a hierarchy of Allied Joint Doctrine dealing with multinational operations; this and other existing and developing multinational doctrine should be explored and tapped for applicability to coalition operations. The Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) recommends that NATO Allied joint doctrine be generally adopted as a guide to planning and conducting multinational coalition operations.

11. The success of an operation may well depend on the training performed prior to and during the operation. The best way to develop an effective coalition force from national units is training. Force integration training continues once the command arrives in the operational area, based on specific requirements and functions. Force integration training should include, at a minimum, exercises to rehearse the operations order and related actions.
Standing Forces provide a sound basis for training a multinational force, i.e. Standing Naval Force Atlantic, EUROCORPS, NAEWF etc.

12. This Guide concludes that requirements for coalition interoperability may start with, but must ultimately transcend, the relatively ‘simple’ questions of equipment commonality and compatibility to include interoperability in the non-materiel realm. This requires considering all factors impacting interoperability, to include doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, people, and facilities. Planning for and achieving maximum interoperability in the non-materiel aspects of military operations can and should be a key focus of multinational cooperation initiatives.

National Reservations to This Guide

i France believes there may be instances in which there will be created a ‘group of Lead Nations’ – this is certainly possible if one nation has the strategic lead, one has the operational lead, and one the tactical lead, for example. Another instance would be a ‘division of labour’ among nations at any or all of the levels to take advantage of some special efficiency or capability. This Guide does not explore that level of complexity. France believes that this definition should read as follows:

‘The Lead Nation, or group of Lead Nations, is that nation with the will and capability, competence and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as Functional Lead Agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical sub-functions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.’

ii France does not agree with wording which suggests that a body other than the United Nations can act to sanction coalition actions such as those described in this Guide.

iii Germany supports the French national reservation in footnote ii above. In accordance with German principles, operations can only be executed within the framework of international organisations and on a sound legal basis (preferably a UN mandate) German troops may contribute to adhoc-coalition operations.
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
COALITION BUILDING GUIDE

Purpose

1. This Guide addresses the coalition building process for multinational military operations. It seeks to identify essential factors to help guide a Lead Nation (LN), the Coalition Force Commander (CFC) and the coalition staff as well as give a common framework for the participating militaries of the coalition nations. This Guide is neither policy nor doctrine but is meant to assist along with other established military documents in planning and execution of coalition operations. It was prepared by the Doctrine, Plans, and Procedures (DPP) Multinational Interoperability Working Group (MIWG) for the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC).

Background

2. In October 1999, the Six-Nation Council on Interoperability (now the MIC) created the DPP MIWG and directed that it undertake an investigation of the LN Concept for the organization and conduct of multinational coalition operations. This was pursuant to a May 1999 seminar and command post exercise (CPX) conducted by the Council’s Coalition Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) MIWG. The latter produced a recommendation that the Council recognize the ‘planning assumption’ that future coalition operations will (or should) be organized around the LN Concept. Following the Council’s transition to the current MIC organization, a DPP meeting was held in April 2000. The United States was given the lead for writing and coordinating a White Paper on the subject, utilizing the May 1999 report on the subject as a starting point. That White Paper, published in December 2000 and updated in June 2002, provided the basis for this Coalition Building Guide (CBG).

CBG Change Proposal Process

3. The CBG is a living document that should change based on lessons learned from coalition operations, experimentation, technological advances which enhance aspects of coalition interoperability and communications and other doctrinal changes from participating nations. The process to change this publication follows:

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1 This guide use established NATO Allied Joint doctrine as a basis. NATO doctrine is the “default” doctrine for a MIC lead coalition unless the LN specifies the military doctrine to be used. If a LN chooses to use other than NATO doctrine it must ensure all participating coalition partners have access to the doctrine in use. Operating Procedures and tactics, techniques and procedures will be prescribed by the LN.
a. Any member nation of the MIC may suggest a change to the CBG.

b. Change suggestions are forwarded to the DPP MIWG no later than 45 days prior to a scheduled MIWG meeting.

c. The DPP secretary will review the change, using line in-line out procedures incorporate the change into the current CBG and send the change to the members of the DPP MIWG for review.

d. The DPP MIWG will discuss the proposed changes during the working group and make a recommendation the CAPSTONE MIWG to accept, reject or modify the change during the MIWG meeting.

e. The CAPSTONE MIWG can choose to follow the recommendation of the DPP MIWG, open the topic for discussion with all working groups or delay a decision until the change can be reviewed further by the working groups.

f. Should the CAPSTONE MIWG choose to delay the decision, the working groups will agree upon a timeline for comment prior to the end of the meeting.

g. The DPP MIWG secretary will collect comments and present the finding to the DPP Chair who will communicated with the CAPSTONE Chair, the consensus opinion.

h. The DPP Chair and The CAPSTONE chair will approve the final acceptance or rejection of the change. The CAPSTONE Chair will brief the MIC on the recommendation.

i. The change will be incorporated upon approval of the MIC.

Key Assumptions

4. Key assumptions are:

a. Future military operations are increasingly likely to be multinational in character.

b. A multinational operation may be carried out within an established alliance framework or through the formation of a coalition.

c. There is a common recognition by the members of the MIC of a growing need to be better prepared for coalition operations.

d. In most cases, coalition operations will be facilitated by the selection of a LN, the definition and responsibilities of which are explored in this Guide.
Each MIC member recognizes that it may be called upon to perform the role of LN in future multinational operations.

There will be a recognized international organization or entity (e.g., the United Nations (UN)) that provides sanction and oversight for the coalition activity being considered.\(^\text{2}\)

### Levels of Activity

This Guide adheres to the four-tiered political-strategic-operational-tactical paradigm for the direction of operations. The political level includes both the recognized “civil authority,” whose mandate underpins the multinational operation, and the political control of the operation shared by coalition members. The strategic level encompasses broad politico-military national and coalition or coalition interests; plans, policies, security objectives, and guidance; and the use of national and multinational resources to accomplish objectives. Politico-military issues at this level generally focus on the best use of a nation-state’s instruments of national power to accomplish national, or coalition objectives. The operational level concerns the planning, conduct, and sustainment of major joint campaigns and operations to attain objectives within theatres or areas of operations, and links the strategic and tactical levels. At the tactical level, battles, engagements and other military actions are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives. This Guide is focused upon the strategic and operational levels.

### The Political Level

Besides interoperability, which allows operational efficiency, political consensus is a necessary condition for coalition success. Political consensus depends on at least three conditions.

#### a. Legitimacy

Based on a defined endstate, international law and a clear mandate. Normally a recognized international ‘civil authority’, such as the UN would act to initiate or endorse the coalition activity under consideration. This same entity would either designate or accept the offered services of a LN. This ‘civil authority’ would also provide political guidance, endorsement of coalition strategic goals, and endorse the desired end state.

#### b. Lead Nation

Lead Nation (LN) is a nation with the will and capability, competence and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the LN, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as functional lead agent(s) to

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\(^\text{2}\) **NATIONAL RESERVATION:** France does not agree with wording which suggests that a body other than the United Nations can act to sanction coalition actions such as those described in this Guide.
provide and/or coordinate specific critical subfunctions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels. The LN assumes responsibility for planning and execution of an operation. The CFC, staff, Command, Control, communications and Information’s (C3I) structure, doctrine and logistic co-ordination of the force will normally be provided by LN. Other nations can assign contributions to this force, and fulfil some staff positions in the LN’s staff.’

c. **Political consultation allowing all participating Nations to be part of the decision making process.** With a firm legal basis and a designated LN, in depth political consultation is made possible through the creation of a political authority in which each Nation will be represented at an appropriate level (e.g. Ambassador). Military participation in this process should be provided by a corresponding military authority.

d. **Political control through all phases of the operation.** Political direction of the operation will be carried out through the political authority. The LN should coordinate these political and military activities, implement decisions and report to the international community. Functional links between the political and military authority should be established as appropriate. In particular, the political authority would be responsible for

3 (a) To avoid possible confusion, it must be noted that this definition differs from but is roughly analogous to terms utilized in NATO. The ‘LN’ referred to here would be recognizable within NATO as the ‘framework nation,’ whereas ‘functional lead agent’ would correspond to a nation within NATO which is designated as a ‘LN’ for functional specialty support. NATO’s AJP-3, Allied Joint Operations defines ‘framework nation’ as follows. ‘Forces based on a Framework Nation are commanded by an officer of that nation. A significant proportion of the staff and the headquarters support will come from the framework nation; its working language is of that nation. Staff procedures, although based on Alliance standards, will also reflect those of the framework nation. In practice, however, once command and staff teams work together, procedures may incorporate the “best ideas” of the contributing nations.’

(b) **NATIONAL RESERVATION:** France believes there may be instances in which there will be created a ‘group of LNs’ – this is certainly possible if one nation has the strategic lead, one has the operational lead, and one the tactical lead, for example. Another instance would be a ‘division of labour’ among nations at any or all of the levels to take advantage of some special efficiency or capability. This Guide does not explore that level of complexity. France believes that this definition should read as follows:

‘The LN, or group of LNs, is that nation with the will and capability, competence and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the LN, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as Functional Lead Agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical subfunctions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.’

4 NATO Allied Joint doctrine is the default doctrine for MIC lead coalition operations.

5 According to NATO’s AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, LN logistic support might be separately carried out by a nation without being responsible for the total planning and execution of an operation.
selecting or endorsing a strategic military option and for providing the initial military
direction to the coalition commander.

7. In the conduct of operations, political control would be exercised by providing directives to the
coalition commander in accordance with individual Nations’ intent and ROE. These directives
may be guided by periodic reports on the progress of the operation and situation assessments
from the coalition commander.

The Strategic Level

8. The strategic level encompasses broad politico-military national, coalition plans, policies,
security objectives and guidance, as well as the use of national and multinational resources to
accomplish objectives. Selection of the LN enables the development of the military strategic
options and the corresponding operational level planning by initiating the multinational planning
process. At the strategic politico-military level, nation-states are influenced by internal and
external factors that shape national interests. The convergence of National interests is one of the
main objectives of the political and military authorities. They play a key role in establishing an
appropriate decision making process among coalition-nations, linking together the consultation
and planning processes. It is in this strategic context that the LN will be selected from among the
members of an emerging coalition.

9. It is assumed that some recognized international ‘civil authority’ — i.e., an organization or entity
such as the UN — will act to initiate or approve the coalition activity under consideration. In this
case, it is further assumed that this same entity would either designate or accept the offered
services of a LN. While it is possible that a coalition might decide to proceed with an operation
independent of a broader sanctioning authority, such a decision may render it objectionable or
even legally impossible for some potential coalition members to take part, and may jeopardize
public support for the operation. In either case, however, the ultimate selection of the LN is
dependent upon the political consensus within the coalition and/or the broader sanctioning
authority.

10. Obviously, the prospective LN must seek or consent to the role. This will require the existence,
or generation of, the national will to take on the task, meaning the internal political and popular
desire to become involved in a particular coalition operation. This is likely to involve the
consideration of vital or important national interests in the security, economic, political, and/or
cultural spheres. Existence of such interests and the concomitant will to undertake action in their
protection are likely to be important criteria and even driving forces in the selection of a LN.

11. Political and military authorities will establish an effective consultation process to assist the LN
in establishing and promoting a strong political position in the international strategic context.
The consultation process includes routine reports and updates as previously discussed as well as
a concerted effort to sustain the political consensus necessary to see the operation through to its conclusion.

12. It will also be necessary for the LN to assume overall coordination of operational planning, to take strategic mission guidance from the political authority, and to develop a concept of operations and an operations plan to fulfil the mission. These documents will be approved by the political authority. (Further implications for planning are discussed later in this Guide). It is incumbent upon the LN to promote unity of effort for the coalition to include political and public advocacy, legal coordination, and information sharing.

13. The LN must further be capable of providing for the overarching C2 (C2) functions of the coalition military operation. In all probability, this will entail a requirement to coordinate for, create, or provide the appropriate C2 architecture for the operation, down to the operational level and possibly including operational component commands (CCs). In particular, the LN designates the military commander.

14. The above discussion obviously ‘raises the bar’ for selection of a LN beyond the level of national will and interest, to include consideration of what might be termed “national competence” to undertake the role. A demonstrated record of coalition leadership and experience in coalition operations is definitely a plus as well. The level of acceptability or suitability of a potential LN will increase if the LN is recognized by other nations as possessing these or other appropriately unique capabilities.

15. The criteria discussed thus far suggest that a LN must possess a level of national influence in the world community and appropriate capabilities to undertake the mission. Beyond this, however, the LN must also be politically acceptable to others in the coalition and/or the region in question. Regional ties to parties in conflict, for example, may be a plus or a minus depending upon the situation. If a potential LN is not perceived to be an ‘honest broker’ by parties to a regional conflict, for example, it might not then be the best choice despite its possession of other qualities.

16. The selection of a LN might be the result of a simple question of level of commitment, i.e., a situation in which a given nation has committed or pledged the largest commitment of forces and/or an operationally significant force or capability to a given situation. This is probably the most simplistic formulation, although there is logic to the idea that the nation with a preponderance of forces (or some indispensable capability) may be most capable of providing the necessary overarching C2 and support structures required to sustain an operation. In the final analysis, however, this nation must be politically acceptable to coalition partners and capable of sustaining strategic-level political consensus. If it is not, unity of effort will suffer at best; at worst, there will be no sustainable coalition.

17. The first task for the LN is to develop strategic guidance and build political consensus for that guidance. Although it is not normally considered a ‘type of planning’, the development of
strategic guidance is a key consideration for coalition operations. One of the major functions of the LN is to organize mechanisms for consultation in order to achieve political consensus among Coalition members, and between the coalition and recognized international authority or entity (e.g. the United Nations) sanctioning the operation. This process must produce strategic level guidance in order for the CFC to proceed with planning. Strategic guidance should define the coalition’s objectives and overall political-military approach, and coordinate strategic direction for planning and executing coalition operations. It should additionally specify the scope of the coalition’s mandate, any constraints or restraints on Coalition operations and the desired end-state.

18. In summary, the LN must be willing and capable of assuming the role. It must be able to facilitate the development of the coalition’s political objectives, broad consensus, strategic guidance; act as sponsor and spokesman for the coalition’s operations in the world community, lead coordination and building of consensus during the coalition’s planning and execution phases, and be competent to carry out the anticipated operation. It must above all be a politically acceptable choice for the other coalition partners. The latter is likely to include consideration of the LN’s ties to and interests in the specific region or conflict and its acceptability to the regional actors involved. A preponderance of force contribution is a clear factor in selection of a LN; however that nation must possess the strategic political attributes required to sustain a coalition, or the coalition effort is likely to fail.

The Operational Level

Definition

19. The operational level is ‘the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations’.6 Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events.

20. The complexity of operations increases especially where there is a significant presence of non-military participants who will likely be reluctant, even hostile to the perception that they are functioning in a close or supporting role with the military. In all circumstances, the commander of a task force is placed at the centre of a 3-dimensional web that extends upward to the strategic

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6 Amended definition from AAP-6.
level, downward to the tactical level and laterally to a range of military and civilian groupings and organization.

Operational Principles

21. Although there is a common agreement on the importance and relevance of the principles, they are not absolute and the operational situation may demand greater emphasis on some of them rather than others. For commanders the principles are important guidelines in formulating and selecting a course of action and in commanding and controlling operations.

22. An understanding and knowledge of key principles for coalition operations, which have proved successful in past conflicts, is the starting point in doctrine development. These principles are not absolute and nations may place greater emphasis on some rather than others, but there is common agreement on their importance and relevance. The operational situation may demand greater emphasis on some of them rather than others, for example, the principles of surprise and concentration of force may have a different connotation in a Peace Support Operation (PSO) than their application in the context of a full-scale combat operation.

a. **Definition of Objectives.** Joint multinational operations should be directed towards clearly defined and commonly understood objectives that contribute to the achievement of the desired end-state. The mission and objectives should be defined with absolute clarity before operations begin. When an objective has been identified as the ‘main effort’, all joint activity should be directed towards its achievement. 4 key questions should be considered in the process of defining the objectives and the end-state:

   (1) What is the mission purpose?

   (2) What criteria constitute mission accomplishment?

   (3) What are the exit criteria?

   (4) Who declares success or victory?

b. **Unity of Effort.** Operations depend on cooperation in order to coordinate all activities to realise the maximum combined effort. Military forces achieve this principally through **unity of command**, which provides the necessary cohesion for planning and execution of operations. It is achieved by vesting the authority to direct and coordinate the action of all forces and military assets in a single commander. In a complex operational environment the commander is also striving to achieve coordination with the other instruments of power. Unity of command is rarely possible when dealing with non-military agencies, so **unity of purpose** is more appropriate; where goodwill, a common purpose, clear and agreed division of responsibilities, and an understanding of the
capabilities and limitations of others, are essential elements of achieving unity of purpose and achieving the maximum collective effort.

c. **Sustainment.** Planning for sustainment comprises making all administrative arrangements necessary for the successful implementation of the operation plan, including logistic and personnel support. Ensuring a sound administrative baseline should be part of operational planning from the outset. Logistics will often be one of the most important factors in the development and selection of courses of action.

d. **Concentration of Force.** Combat power should be concentrated at the decisive time and place to achieve decisive results. Superior force is not just a matter of numbers but also of fighting skills, cohesion, morale, timing, selection of the objectives and the employment of advanced technology.

e. **Economy of Effort.** In the absence of unlimited resources, it will be necessary to take risks in those areas that do not meet the primary objectives. The principle of economy of effort recognises that, if decisive strength is to be applied in the areas where it will have most effect, achievement of those objectives cannot be compromised by diversions to areas of lower priority. Thus economy of effort implies the employment of resources in such a manner that a commander’s primary objectives can be achieved.

f. **Flexibility.** Plans should be sufficiently flexible to allow for the unexpected and to allow commanders freedom of action to respond to changing circumstances. This requires an understanding of the superior commanders’ intentions, flexibility of mind, rapid decision-making, good organization and good communications. Flexibility also demands physical mobility to allow forces to concentrate quickly at decisive times and places.

g. **Initiative.** Initiative can be developed and fostered through trust and mutual understanding and by training. It is about recognising and seizing opportunities and solving problems in an original manner. For a climate of initiative to flourish, a commander should be given the freedom to use initiative, and should in turn encourage subordinates to use theirs. Commanders should be encouraged to take the initiative without fearing the consequences of failure. This requires a training and operational culture which promotes an attitude of risk taking in order to win rather than to prevent defeat.

h. **Maintenance of Morale.** Commanders should give their command an identity, promote self-esteem, inspire it with a sense of common purpose and unity of effort, and give it achievable aims. High morale depends on good leadership, which instils courage, energy, determination and care for the personnel entrusted.
i. **Surprise.** Surprise is built on speed, secrecy and deception and is fundamental to the shattering of an adversary’s cohesion achieving results that are disproportionate to the effort expended.

j. **Security.** Security enhances freedom of action by limiting vulnerability to hostile activities and threats. Active and passive security measures help to deny critical information to an adversary. They assist deception and help counter offensive actions.

k. **Simplicity.** Simple plans and clear orders minimise misunderstandings and confusion.

23. In addition to the principles identified above, which apply to all operations, predominate campaign themes such as peace support\(^7\) or humanitarian aid may also require the consideration of a number of other principles:

a. **Impartiality.** Some operations should be conducted impartially, in accordance with its mandate, and without favour or prejudice to any party.

b. **Consent.** The degree of acquiescence to the presence of a force charged with a PSO mission. Consent will vary in time and space horizontally across all elements of the population and vertically within the hierarchies of the parties to the conflict.

c. **Restraint in the Use of Force.** Commanders and their forces use a measured and proportionate application of force sufficient to achieve a specific objective. Constraints and restraints on the circumstances in which, and the ways and means by which, force may be used may be established in the mandate as well as by international law, domestic law of the force providers and, in certain circumstances, Host Nation (HN) law.

d. **Perseverance/Long-term View.** The achievement of the political end-state in an operation will require a patient, resolute and persistent pursuit of objectives.

e. **Legitimacy.** The legitimacy of an operation and the wider perception of that legitimacy will increase support within the international community, contributing nations, and the involved parties, including the civil community in the Coalition Joint Operation Area (CJOA).

f. **Credibility.** For a Joint Force (JF) to be effective, it should be credible and perceived as such by all parties. The credibility of the operation is a reflection of the parties’ assessment of the force’s capability to accomplish the mission.

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\(^7\) Commonly known as Peace Support Operation: ‘An operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of United Nations Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, peace building and/or humanitarian operations.’ AAP-6
g. **Mutual Respect.** The respect in which a JF is held will be a direct consequence of its professional conduct and how it treats the parties to a conflict and the local population.

h. **Transparency.** The JF’s mission and concept of operations should be easily understood and obvious to all parties. Failure to achieve common understanding may lead to suspicion, mistrust or even hostility.

i. **Freedom of Movement.** Freedom of movement is essential for the successful accomplishment of any operation; the JF should be free at all times to perform its duties throughout the designated JOA.

**Multinational Coalition Operations Considerations**

24. **Advantages of Multinational Cooperation.** Whilst the reasons may vary for establishing a commitment to a common military goal, the aim is usually to accomplish an objective that a nation could not achieve unilaterally or to achieve through multinationality a more efficient result. Depending on the circumstances, there may be differing degrees of national interest at stake and upon this depends the strength and nature of the contribution to the multinational operation. Nations participating in multinational operations do so for reasons that are viewed as nationally advantageous in political and military terms. Contributions must therefore be judged not only on the capability of the forces provided but also by the full range of political and military benefits they bring to the multinational coalition operation. The political advantages of multinational cooperation include sharing political risks, demonstrating economic, diplomatic, military or political support to other regions and influencing national and international opinion.

25. The military advantages are that cooperation adds both depth (strength in numbers) and breadth (additional capabilities) to a force as well as providing access to national or regional logistic resources and in certain circumstances, access and share to high value information and intelligence products. Finally it enables an efficient use of logistic resources.

26. **Challenges of Multinational Cooperation.** However well a force is organised, multinationality poses a number of key challenges whose resolution is crucial to military effectiveness and hence the success of the campaign. These include the formation of an effective command system, an intelligence system which can draw and share data from a number of multinational and national sources, the existence of national caveats on employment that may affect the utility of force elements, and a logistic system that acknowledges national responsibilities for support but also caters for multinational needs.

27. Multinational command may lead to slower response times than purely national command arrangements and the speed and quality of decision-making may become adversely affected. Such detrimental effects can be minimized through the adoption of common doctrine and
procedures plus realistic training. Multinational command requires an attitude of mind that is international in perspective. Differences in force capabilities and operating procedures may impact on a multinational force’s ability to operate effectively. Some of the challenges that may need to be addressed are:

a. **Interoperability.** The complexity of an operation will determine the appropriate level of interoperability and the composition of the force will determine interoperability standards that are to apply. A lack of interoperability in the areas of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities is likely to have a negative effect on force cohesion and capability. Procedural and tactical differences present the force with situations where units from different services and/or nations may not be able to work effectively together. Language differences present communications problems that may result in differences in interpretation of the mission or assigned tasks. Technical difficulties can cause a lack of system compatibility. Inability to exchange information, intelligence, technical data, or communications can result from a lack of interoperability and national security concerns. Inability to use common sources may degrade logistic capabilities and thus affect the sustainability of the force. Joint and multinational forces must have interoperable combat identification procedures and capabilities to minimise the risk of fratricide and enhance operational efficiency.

b. **Force Protection.** Nations have different Force Protection (FP) philosophies, policies and priorities. Essentially the differences focus on the ultimate reason for FP, the physical protection of a national contingent itself plus supporting elements, or enabling the force to conduct its mission unimpeded by the actions of an adversary. In a multinational force these differences must be reconciled into an overall Coalition FP policy otherwise an adversary can exploit them.

**Stages of a Joint Operation**

28. A joint operation normally consists of a number of stages, some of which occur at the military strategic level (e.g. force generation). Typical stages at the operational level, which may overlap and can occur at the same time depending on the situation and mission, are:

a. Development of a campaign plan/OPLAN.

b. Force preparation, including build-up, assembly and pre-mission training.

c. Build-up of logistic support, including HN support.

d. Deployment to the area where operations are to be conducted or the reinforcement of in-place forces.
e. Execution of operations.

f. Operation termination and military post operation activities.

g. Re-deployment of forces.

h. Campaign analysis - doctrine evaluation and lessons learned.

29. The CFC should have, within the constraints, the greatest possible freedom of action in the planning and execution of operations in a designated CJOA. All stages of an operation require continuous coordination and review. Except where specifically restricted by agreements with nations, the CFC may reassign operational command and/or forces under his command as deemed appropriate. The following guidance applies: ‘all command relationships must facilitate the smooth transition of all stages’.

Command Factors

30. **Intent.** The CFC will be personally concerned with making the major decisions regarding the employment of his force and in steering the situation to his advantage, which might include deciding not to act. The CFC who is proactive and more versatile than his opponent should gain the winning advantage. Regardless of what he decides, it is essential that he communicates his intent to his staff and CCs, so they can prosecute their actions in the right context. A commonly used tool by the CFC is the intent schematic which can portray, in a number of ways, the effects he wishes to achieve within the CJOA. Commonly, either a matrix or a geographical representation is produced showing where and when he wishes various effects to happen.

31. **Mission Command.** Within the principle of mission command the CFC should seek to ensure that his Component Commanders (CCs), his Chief of Staff (COS), the functional heads in the Coalition HQ and the commanders of the subordinate formations and elements are all given appropriate freedom to act. How this is then implemented downwards will vary according to best practice in each of the sub-elements. The CFC’s direction should include, as a minimum, a clear statement on how he sees the operation unfolding. The CFC should also identify those operational level decisions, which rest with him, while offering maximum latitude to his subordinates in how they conduct their tactical activities, battles and engagements. Thereafter, while encouraging feedback to ensure balance is maintained, he should expect Component Commanders (CCs) to determine their implied tasks and keep him, and each other, informed of progress. In turn, they should disseminate their own operation orders to support the part they have to play along the various lines of operation as detailed in the CONOPS. The CFC should insist on regular situation reports and should seek advice from the CCs in order to inform the operational level decisions that he has to make. This does mean that under exceptional circumstances, usually where fleeting opportunities for decisive exploitation present themselves, CFC may have to reach down to whatever level is necessary and take charge of the situation.
32. In broad terms, the CFC should address 3 key operational functions if he is to be successful:

   a. He should be capable of preparing and shaping the operational area, in all dimensions, in a manner most likely to enable him to achieve the military objectives at minimum cost.

   b. He should be able to successfully conduct the operation (which may or may not entail combat), ideally on his own terms and at a time and place of his choosing.

   c. He should preserve and protect the military power of his own forces until his mission is concluded—which may be well after termination.

33. Much of this can only be achieved by drawing together the constituent elements and components of the force, aided by a range of operational capabilities. Few, if any, of these activities are discrete. Shaping activities will continue throughout the entire operation. Relationships between the CFC and his CCs’ efforts, and the manner in which the emphasis and support can be shifted as the operation unfolds, are key to successful joint operations.

34. The CJOA is generally considered the environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to apply successfully combat power, protect the force and complete the mission. This includes the sea, land, air and space environments, the adversary and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, electromagnetic spectrum, and the information environment within the CJOA and areas of interest.

35. Increasingly, military activities cannot be planned or conducted in isolation. Other elements also impinge upon and influence the environment traditionally exploited by maritime, land, and air components. For example, space, computer networks and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), particularly in terms of the acquisition and control of information, are important constituents of joint operations.

36. Furthermore, there is now a greater range of actors and bystanders within the CJOA and possibly beyond, who will be involved in, or will influence, the course of operations. The need to integrate the efforts of the JF with those of other organizations (for example, International Organisations (IOs) and NGOs) implies a greater convergence of the military, diplomatic, economic and humanitarian efforts at all levels. The needs of the indigenous population are also likely to be inextricably linked to the mission. Finally, the activities of the JF will be under constant media scrutiny; in many cases both the media and a range of civilian organizations will be present before the JF has deployed.

37. The environment in which operations are conducted is becoming increasingly vague and blurred. The operational area can be described as having 6 overlapping and inter-related dimensions: the conventional 2 horizontal dimensions of the earth’s surface; the third vertical dimension of the air, sub-sea surface, sub-land surface and space; the 2 dimensions of the EMS and the networked
world; and time. The CFC will require access to all of these dimensions. This requires careful management to reduce possible conflicts and exploit opportunities. The dimensions will also, to varying degrees, be inhabited, occupied, influenced, and sometimes dominated by others beyond Coalition military forces, and not least by the adversary.

Preparing the Operational Area

38. At the higher strategic level, it will be vital that the wider operational environment has been prepared and shaped in a way that will support the conduct of operations. Primarily, the legitimacy of intended actions and the general support of the international community must be self evident to all. Achieving this state of affairs will depend to a large extent upon the political and diplomatic activity and direction through NATO from the nations that are involved in or directly supporting the operation. The solid stance of the international community will influence the adversary’s perception of his own chances of success, although it may not necessarily discourage him from pursuing his own aims.

39. At the operational level, the CFC should seek to prepare and shape the operational area in the CJOA by undermining the adversary’s will and attacking his cohesion. He should aim to erode the adversary's resolve, persuading him that military action is unlikely to be successful. To achieve this, the CFC and his staff will draw on Coalition intelligence assets in order to identify the adversary’s vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and then attack them. Offensive action (for example, interdiction) is just one means of shaping the operational area. Preparing the operational area also includes consideration of the overall information strategy which must consider boundaries that are not the same as those of the CJOA.

Command Relationships

40. The MIC uses the following definitions of OPCON and TACON8 found in the NATO Allied Administrative Publication (AAP)-6, ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’.

a. **Operational Control (OPCON).** The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units involved. Neither does it of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

b. **Tactical Control (TACON).** The detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.9

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8 AAP-6, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French).*
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41. Coalition operations must anticipate the possibility of varying national interests among the participating countries. Many nations may not agree or will be reluctant to relinquish command of their forces to another country or countries. On a case-by-case basis, national command authorities may place national forces under the operational control (OPCON) of a coalition commander. In such cases, there may remain *de facto* parallel chains of command, with part running through the coalition force and part through the respective national command authority (which may retain a ‘veto’). At a minimum, it is likely that under any command arrangement a national command element of some sort will already exist or will be established for each national contingent, and will continue to exercise administrative and other support functions during the operation. The coalition’s challenge is to arrange the best possible command relationships with its subordinate forces to ensure mission success.

42. The most flexible and responsive authority under which national authorities may provide forces to a coalition is normally to assign national forces under the OPCON of the CFC. The assignment of these national forces under OPCON may be qualified by reservations from the respective nations in accordance with their national policies. Further assignment to service component commanders in an OPCON status by the CFC is normally subject to approval by the respective national command authorities. Details should normally be spelled out in a transfer of authority agreement.

43. ‘Command, less-OPCON’ of national forces is retained by the nation and is exercised through its designated national contingent commander within the coalition force. The designated national contingent commander normally retains a responsibility to provide administrative support for his or her national troop contingent, to maintain contact with the parent government, and to advise the coalition commander on any action that would violate that nation’s policy.

44. Tactical control (TACON) is an option, but is a much more restrictive command relationship, which limits the flexibility of the multinational commander in employing the assigned force.

**C2 Terminology**

45. The terms C2 are closely related and regularly used together; however, they are not synonymous:

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9 Virtually identical definitions are also agreed within the ABCA Armies’ Standardization Office, thus extending them beyond the NATO arena. Additional information on ABCA and similar organizations:

- **ABCA Armies Standardization Program.** Founded 1947, ABCA produces standardization agreements and advisory publications to promote and aid interoperability among members’ land forces during coalition operations.

- **Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC).** Focused on standards and common procedures among Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, US, and UK air forces (includes naval and marine aviation).

- **AUSCANNZUKUS Naval C4 Organization.** Association of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, and United States to promote information exchange and interoperability among member nations in naval doctrine and standards.
a. **Command.** Command is the authority vested in an individual by the Coalition to direct, coordinate or control armed forces. It can be described (but not defined\(^\text{10}\)) as the process by which a commander impresses his/her will and intentions on subordinates to achieve particular objectives. It encompasses the authority and responsibility for deploying and assigning forces to fulfil their missions.

b. **Control.** Control is the authority exercised by a commander. It can be described (but not defined\(^\text{11}\)) as the process through which a commander, assisted by the staff, organises, directs and coordinates the activities of the forces assigned to implement orders and directives.

46. To exercise C2 authority in joint operations, a CFC and staff should use standardised procedures and the Coalition’s Communications and Information System (CIS). Together these procedures and the CIS form a C2 system that the CFC, the joint staff and their subordinates use to plan, direct, coordinate, control and support operations.

**Command and Control Principles**

47. **Unity of Command.** At the military strategic, operational and tactical levels of command, a fundamental tenet of C2 is unity of command, which provides the necessary cohesion for the planning and execution of operations. Unity of command is achieved by vesting the authority to direct and coordinate the action of all forces and military assets in a single commander. However, constraints may be placed on the use of national force components and supporting national assets.

48. **Continuity of Command.** Unity of command is further enhanced by continuity of command for the duration of an operation. In principle, ‘the person who plans should execute’; however, circumstances may not permit this. Command should be continuous throughout an operation. The higher command authority should arrange a succession of command.

49. **Clear Chain of Command.** The structure of a C2 system is hierarchical and should be defined and understood by all levels of command, so that at every level there is a complete understanding of command responsibilities up and down the hierarchy. Where necessary and appropriate, direction and orders to a subordinate commander may include tasks for specific force elements, subject to any limitation imposed by nations.

50. **Integration of Command.** The command structure should ensure that the capabilities of the nations, or those of several nations, could be brought to bear decisively to achieve the CFC’s operational objectives in the most effective way. Normally component commands (CCs), to

\(^{10}\) See the Lexicon.

\(^{11}\) See the Lexicon.
which national contingents contribute, are environmental or functional, but the specific task organization will be ‘tailored’ to each operation by the higher command. Integration between components is strengthened by a clear chain of command. If separate single national contingent headquarters are required, they should be established to complement the chain of command of the coalition force (CF). An efficient and comprehensive liaison structure, linking the CF HQ, all elements of the force, and other organizations such as Non-governmental Organizations (NGO) is an essential element of the C2 structure.

51. **Mission Command.** A CFC’s responsibility for mission accomplishment is indivisible, but delegation of authority to subordinates and their responsibility to act in support of the higher commander’s intentions are included in the decentralisation. Through mission command, commanders generate the freedom of action for subordinates to act purposefully when unforeseen developments arise and exploit favourable opportunities. Mission command encourages the use of initiative and promotes timely decision-making. Commanders who delegate authority to subordinate commanders need to state clearly their intentions, freedoms and constraints, designate the objectives to be achieved and provide the forces, resources and authority required to accomplish their assigned tasks. Although the emphasis given to a mission command style in the doctrine and practice of different services and nations may differ, CFCs and their staffs should employ the principle of mission command.

52. Successful mission command has the following prerequisites:

a. Commanders and staffs should concern themselves primarily with joint operational matters, taking account of component issues only as necessary.

b. The subordinate commander should fully understand the CFC’s intentions and what he is required to achieve, and be free to exercise initiatives based on that understanding.

c. There should be an active involvement in the doctrine development process by the nations and a common understanding of the operational doctrine governing the employment of forces. The latter can be achieved through peacetime training and exercises.

d. Trust, total confidence in the integrity, ability, and good character of another, is one of the most important ingredients. Trust expands the commander’s options and enhances flexibility, agility, and the freedom to take the initiative when conditions warrant. Trust is based on the mutual confidence that results from the demonstrated competence of each member.

53. Without unity of effort and the necessary trust to plan and execute a joint operation, there will be little chance of success. A mutual understanding of strengths and weaknesses provides the foundation of cooperation and trust, which is vital in the planning and successful execution of
operations. This should stem from the highest levels. Mutual understanding also rests on a common application of joint doctrine and procedures.

54. Familiarity with the procedures is best achieved throughout combined joint training. A common approach should be inherent in thought and practice; combined joint training should be undertaken whenever possible, but it is particularly important, should time be available, prior to any operation. The greater the degree of standardisation (in terms of both equipment and doctrine), the better the prospects are for fruitful cooperation, mutual understanding, and ultimately, for success.

Command and Control Structures

55. The LN will be responsible for establishing an effective C2 architecture, most likely down to and possibly including operational level CCs.

56. No single operational level command structure necessarily best fits the needs of all coalitions. Each coalition will create a structure that best meets the needs, political realities, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations. Political considerations may heavily influence the ultimate shape of a multinational command structure. However, nations participating should strive to achieve unity of command for the operation to the maximum extent possible, with missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all participants.

57. In formal alliances, national political objectives are addressed and generally subsumed within multinational objectives at the alliance treaty level. At least some degree of commonality in doctrine, some standardization in process, procedure, and materiel, and political consensus characterize alliances.

58. Within a coalition political considerations may weigh heavily in decisions regarding force composition, organization, and command arrangements. The various military forces involved may or may not have a degree of commonality in doctrine and operational concepts, and force compatibility may vary. National pride and cultural considerations may limit options for organizing a specific form of coalition command. Coalition missions and objectives may evolve over time, along with forces and force capabilities. Political objectives and limitations may also change, further complicating the tasks at hand. The strategic level commander must be attuned to such changes and adjust the command structure and training program to mitigate negative impacts where possible. The strategic level commander is designated as the Coalition Strategic Commander (CSC).

59. Regardless of how the force is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces will normally establish a national component headquarters of some sort to ensure effective administration of its forces. A logistic support element is ideally included in this component.
The national component provides a means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations to the multinational commander, and facilitate assignment and reassignment of national forces to operational multinational organizations.

60. Probably the least desirable command arrangement is a parallel command structure typified by the fact that no single overall force commander is designated. The coalition leadership develops means for coordination among participants to attain unity of effort. Exigencies of the political situation may dictate such an arrangement but, due to the negative impact on unity of effort and efficiency, parallel command structures are avoided if at all possible.

61. Formation of a fully integrated command structure greatly complements unity of command. However, this type of structure is more likely to typify command arrangements in a formally organized alliance. An example of such a command structure is found in NATO, where a NATO commander is designated from a member nation but the staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational composition. The key ingredients in an integrated command structure are that a single commander be designated, that the staff is composed of representatives from all member nations, and that subordinate commands and staffs are integrated to the lowest echelon necessary in order to accomplish the mission. This type of command structure may not be possible in an ad hoc multinational coalition operation.

Coalition Force Headquarters and Staff Functions

62. This publication assumes that a LN command structure is most likely to be adopted. At the operational level the LN is, at a minimum, responsible for providing the overarching framework for command. The first and most obvious requirement will be for the LN to provide the CFC for the multinational force. The LN would contribute significantly to setting up the overarching functions of a military operation, including C2, communications, intelligence and information management, since these contribute directly to the coherence of the operation. Functional areas that implicitly need to be provided or closely controlled by the LN include J5 planning, J3 coordination of operations and J9 civil military cooperation, although other staff contributions will be linked to the provision of capability.

63. Figure 1 illustrates a notional operational level command and staff structure, and is based on experiences in East Timor and elsewhere. In most instances the framework of the multinational headquarters will be based on an existing LN headquarters. Within this framework, staff from contributing nations will be integrated across the headquarters, although certain staff functions/divisions will be allocated to contributing nations to lead. This combination of a

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12 Combination command structures exist when both LN and parallel command structures exist simultaneously. This occurs when two or more nations serve as LN for a mix of multinational forces, such as the command arrangements employed by the Gulf War coalition in 1999.
mature and experienced staff and the broader perspective of coalition partners is essential in building effective coalitions. Staff training and rehearsals prior to operations are crucial.

**Staff Functions**

64. Of critical importance to coalition cohesion is the development of a close relationship between the CFC and the National Contingent Commanders (NCC). A NCC is a commander in his own right, but not in the same sense as the CFC. Although he does not share the same command responsibility or authority within the coalition, he must understand the operation to the same extent in order to provide effective advice. The role of the NCC is to support both the CFC and his national commanders, while informing his own national authority. He will hold the national ‘red card’ although may delegate elements to his contingent commanders within each component so that issues can be resolved early at lower levels with minimal impact on coalition cohesion. He will also guide and counsel his contingent commanders in building a strong relationship with their respective component commanders. Cohesion within the components is the bedrock of a successful multinational force.

a. In general terms, the role of the NCC is to integrate his own national contingent into the coalition force, promoting cohesion, trust and understanding while implementing his own nation’s policies and caveats. He will also act as a national figurehead and be a conduit back to his nation on tactical incidents and operational developments; matters of support to, and FP of, his contingent and media issues.

b. The NCC will implement national caveats although he will usually delegate elements to his national commanders within each component so that issues can be resolved early at lower levels, thus minimising the overall impact on coalition cohesion. Any issues that are likely to cause friction should be identified beforehand and discussed with the JFC in an effort to negotiate the problem away. In many ways the NCC’s success could be measured against the rarity with which he is forced to use the national veto.
Notes:
1. The operational level commander is designated the Coalition Force Commander (CFC).
2. It is likely that the staff in J3, J5 and J9 will be largely from the lead nation. The remaining staff divisions may be led by the other contributing nations.
3. Although certain intelligence assets will be available across the force, each nation is likely to retain a separate intelligence element. The role of the J2 staff is to provide as full and coherent an intelligence picture as national caveats allow. Wherever possible national restrictions should be minimized.
4. The Lead Nation will normally provide framework CIS assets and leadership of J6.
5. Multinational Logistic Centre (MNLC) - Cell for logistic coordination, not a component command. Contributing nations may deploy a separate National Support Element.
6. In the same way as the CFHQ, component headquarters are likely to be based on a single nation with integrated staff from national contingents. National contributions may be discrete, self-contained force packages (an armoured brigade) or individual capabilities (AAR). The level of multinationality will be dictated largely by the nature of the operation. The diagram depicts illustrative force elements within each component. Certain additional strategic capabilities (eg. SOF, TLAM, ISR etc), retained under national command, may be made available for specific operations to the coalition.
7. CFACC will control the CAOC, which will have clear linkages across all components.

Figure 1 - Notional Multinational Operational Level Command
65. The CFC usually has 3 principal advisers: the Chief of Staff (COS), the Political Adviser (POLAD) and the Legal Adviser (LEGAD). Beside these advisers the CFC can add additional functional advisers if required, such as a medical adviser (MEDAD) and the chief of PI office (CPIO).

66. **Chief of Staff.** The COS should be an experienced commander in his own right and, with the understanding he possesses, he coordinates the work of the staff divisions by giving clear direction and setting priorities, in effect acting as a master of ceremonies. He has particular responsibility for operations, operations support, plans, intelligence and the legal functions of the staff. He also coordinates and fuses the work of the wider HQ including the JF elements. It is his role to ensure the staff pulls together as a team and has good *esprit de corps*, making the headquarters feel more like a family than a large impersonal organization; this role is particularly important in a multinational environment.

67. **Political Adviser.** POLADs are civil servants selected to advise the CFC but they rarely form a cell or branch within the JF HQ. Principally they advise on:
   
   a. NATO policy.
   b. Local, national, regional and international political issues.
   c. Political issues specifically related to Coalition members, Partners, Non-NATO Coalition Member (NNCM), and Host Nations (HN).
   d. The relationship with IOs such as the UN as well as NGOs.

68. **Legal Adviser.** LEGADs can be either civil servants or military lawyers selected to advise the CFC. Principally they advise on:
   
   a. International law and mandates.
   b. Use of force and compliance with the relevant international law, primarily through Rules of Engagement (ROE).
   c. Judicial issues specifically related to Coalition members, Partners, NNCN and HN (HN).
   d. All legal matters arising from the presence of the JF in the CJOA.

69. **Personnel and Administration (J1).** The J1 staff’s principal role is to advise CFC and his staff on the personnel policies and manpower management systems and procedures established by national authorities for their force components. The J1 responsibilities include personnel management, accounting, entitlements and benefits, morale, welfare, recreation, postal services, safety, provost and discipline, prisoners of war, administration and casualty reporting. The J1
should also coordinate personnel matters with the personnel staffs of the national contingents and will usually establish a Joint Personnel, Resources and Finance Centre (JPRFC).

70. **Intelligence (J2).** The J2 staff is responsible for the provision of accurate, timely and relevant intelligence to meet the CFC’s operational and security requirements within the COA and maintaining situational awareness in the CFC’s Area of Interest (AOI) and Area of Intelligence Interest (AOIR). The J2 will usually establish a Joint All Sources Information Centre (JASIC).

71. **Operations (J3).** The essential role of the J3 staff is to act as the focal point through which the CFC directs the conduct of an operation, ensuring unity of effort and the most effective use of resources supporting immediate and planned operations. As such the J3 is responsible for establishing a Joint Operations Centre (JOC).

72. The J3 may comprise sections/cells that cover, maritime (MAROPS), land (LANDOPS) and air operations (AIROPS) plus sections/cells to cover special operation forces operations (SOFOPS), space operations (SPACEOPS), information operations (Info Ops), Psychological Operations (PsyOps), Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) activities, CIMIC, targeting coordination and refugee support, CBRN activities, CIMIC, targeting coordination, refugee support (REFSUP), Multinational Specialized Units operations (MSUOPS) and Military Police operations (MPOPS).

73. **Provost Marshall.** The Provost Marshall is the CFC’s advisor on security, order and discipline inside the force. Together with the MSU commander (if established), he is responsible for matters related to the civilian population security issues and police matters.

74. **Logistics (J4).** The J4 staff is responsible for assessing the logistics required for achievement of the CFC’s objectives and for ensuring that these support requirements are met throughout the operation. Based on this assessment, the J4 staff develops the logistic concept and plans in support of operations and coordinates the overall logistic effort. The size and complexity of operations, component participation and force contribution of the nations as well as the degree to which national and/or multinational logistics are to be integrated into the logistics concept may require specific logistic coordinating activities. If appropriate, an MJLC in support of the CFC’s logistics staff may be activated to coordinate support between CCs, National Support Elements (NSE), the HN and NGOs.

75. **Medical Support.** In order to ensure proper medical planning and support for the forces under command, the CFC needs a medical staff structure to enable him to make medical assessments and to plan and deal with national medical support. The MEDAD in a JF HQ is responsible for

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13 Detailed information is in AJP-2 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence’ and subordinate documents.
14 Detailed information in AJP-4 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics’ and subordinate documents.
15 Detailed information in AJP-3.10 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support’ and subordinate documents.
ensuring that the commander and his staff are properly aware of the health and medical implications of their actions and any issues connected to the operation. As a special staff officer, he maintains direct access to the commander.

76. Plans and Policy (J5). The J5 staff assists the CFC in the preparation of his campaign plan and the planning for future operations. It coordinates these planning efforts within the JF HQ and with higher, subordinate and adjacent commands and civil authorities. The J5 staff is responsible for establishing and forming the core of a Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG).

77. The J5 staff may sub-divide into advance planners and implementation planners. The advance planners will focus their effort on long-range analysis and subsequent required products. They will initiate and develop scenario-based plans in anticipation of a future event or circumstance that a JF/CJTF may face. Implementation planners act as the conduit between J5 and J3. They focus their effort on crisis response planning and initiate/develop plans in response to a current or developing crisis. They are responsive to tasks assigned by J3 and assist J3 in the transformation of OPLANS into OPORD, and continue to assist the J3 organization during plan execution.

78. Communications and Information Systems (J6). The J6 staff should ensure that adequate support is provided for operations and that interoperable Communications and Information Systems (CIS) procedures are used at all levels in the JF. Furthermore, J6 staff should be included in, for example the planning, coordination and execution of C3 architectures and in-JOA CIS systems to provide the capabilities necessary to enable the CFC’s C2 requirements. The J6 staff usually establishes a joint C3 support centre (JC3SC). Activities which are probably critical to the NATO CIS should be fully coordinated between the Info Ops cell, the JOC and JC3SC in the framework of the IOCB.

79. Civil-Military Cooperation (J9). The J9 staff is responsible for advising the CFC on the implications of all the activities undertaken which directly concern the relations between the armed forces, local government, civil population, IOs, NGOs and other agencies of the countries where the JF is deployed, employed and supported. J9 staff members are not necessarily individual specialists with skills applicable in a civilian environment. However, they should have broad military experience, understand CIMIC principles and procedures, understand the environment in which they will operate and understand the workings of NGOs and IOs. They should be capable of explaining military requirements to civilian organizations and vice versa. Finally, they should be able to carry out accurate assessments and provide tactical advice to the commander. The J9 staff usually establishes a joint CIMIC centre (JCIMICC) to coordinate CIMIC and related activities.

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16 Detailed information in AJP-5 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning’.
17 Detailed in AJP-6 (Under current development).
18 Detailed information in AJP-9 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation’.
80. **Public Information.** The PI office advises the CFC on all media-related matters, taking guidance on NATO’s overall Information Strategy from the highest political level through his line of command. To ensure synergy of effort, the PI offices will closely coordinate at all command levels with all other information disseminators and collectors, including Info Ops, PsyOps and Intelligence. However, it should be noted that, in order to safeguard the integrity, credibility and efficiency of NATO military PI, such close coordination should not result in either organizational or direct integration of PI with other tools of the common information effort.

81. A close liaison with the CIMIC staff should be maintained, and therefore PI staff are normally integrated in the JCIMICC in a separate Public Information Centre (PIC). The PIC will coordinate with the PI agencies of associated IOs in the JOA (e.g. the United Nations [UN] and the European Union [EU]). The PIC will interface with the international press and the local press, and will be responsible for implementing the public information strategy. The chief PI office is, in principle the commander’s spokesperson, and as such he will have direct access to the commander at all times. As the success and credibility of the spokesperson relates to continuous efforts and established trust with the media, frequent change of the commander’s spokesperson should be avoided.

**Liaison and Coordination**

82. Regardless of other specifics of the command and information structures established, differences in doctrine, organization, equipment, training, etc. demand a robust liaison structure to facilitate operations. During multinational operations, participating forces establish liaison early with forces of each nation, fostering a better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitating transfer of vital information, enhancing mutual trust, and developing an increased level of teamwork. Early establishment reduces the fog and friction caused by incompatible communications systems, doctrine, and operating procedures. Liaison is often accomplished through the use of liaison teams. These teams should be knowledgeable about the structure, capabilities, weapons systems, logistics, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, and planning methods employed within their own commands, as well as having regional (or partner-specific) training and experience. These teams can provide communications using systems that might not be shareable with some coalition partners. Non-military organizations — for example, host governments or the UN — could also be recipients of these services. Liaison teams can act as filters for the exchange of information consistent with national disclosure and dissemination policies.

83. Whether team members are language qualified or are provided interpreter support, understanding language, culture, and customs are key factors to successful liaison operations. Military personnel possessing regional language capabilities, cultural awareness, and experience in working and training with other countries’ militaries are invaluable to the multinational
commander in establishing liaison. Liaison requirements usually are greater than those for which most military formations are staffed, increasing personnel requirements. These requirements must be identified early in the planning process.

84. Coordination centres can also facilitate control of multinational operations, which require interaction with a variety of agencies, both military and non-military. A coordination centre can assist in C2 as well as to organize and coordinate a variety of functions, including logistics and civil-military operations. It can be the focal point for support issues, alert and warning, host-nation support, movement control, and training. As a coalition matures, the role of a coordination centre can be expanded to include command activities. Member nations provide a staff element to the centre that is comprised of action officers familiar with support activities such as those noted. Coalition nations should be encouraged to augment this staff element with linguists and communications capabilities to maintain contact with their parent headquarters. A central coalition coordination centre may be established as well as a number of functional coordination centres.

Civil-Military Interface and Cooperation in the Operational Area

85. The interaction between coalition forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is potentially crucial to the success of operations. The coalition commander will most likely require specific command and staff arrangements for the management of civil-military interface and cooperation.

86. The coalition will need to take account of social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental, radio spectrum management and humanitarian factors when planning and conducting military operations. Planning must take into account the likely presence of international, local national, and NGO with their own aims, methods, and perspectives. Another consideration is the presence of the mass media and the expectations of both the international and local communities that form part of that media’s audience. Effective relationships with a wide range of civilian organizations as well as local populations, governments, and military forces probably will be essential to future operations.

87. Civil-military interface and cooperation will require resources, arrangements, and activities in support of the mission, which foster liaison, coordination, and cooperation between and among the coalition force and key elements in the civil environment. This includes liaison, cooperation, and coordination with international and national NGOs, Private Volunteer Organisations (PVOs), and other agencies.

88. Civil-military activities typically are carried out with a view to the timely transition from military oversight of functions for which civilian organizations or authorities would normally be responsible. Civil-military activities should be an integral part of the coalition commander’s plan and be conducted in support of the overall mission and objectives. In general terms, therefore, the
purpose of civil-military cooperation is to help create and sustain conditions that support achievement of a lasting solution to a crisis.

89. In the civil-military realm, a coalition operation is likely to require a minimal capability to:
   a. Engage in joint planning, at strategic and operational level, with appropriate civilian bodies before and during an operation
   b. Carry out continuous assessments of the local civil environment to anticipate problems
   c. Provide liaison with civil bodies within the operational area
   d. Monitor conduct of civil-related activities by military forces, to include local contracting
   e. Work towards a timely transition of civil responsibilities to the proper authorities
   f. Provide the coalition commander and staff with timely and accurate civil-military advice

Some national militaries have extensive experience in civil-military operations, and/or are preparing specific civil-military interface and cooperation doctrine, along with cadres of specially trained personnel. Such background and capabilities should be identified early in the planning stages and, if appropriate, be made available to support the coalition operation. Additionally, HN resources and regional expertise must be considered and utilized

Operational Planning Process

90. Operational planning seeks to translate strategic guidance and directions into integrated military actions, carried out by coalition joint forces, to achieve the strategic objectives and desired political end-state within the political limitations and resource constraints. It begins with an analysis of the situation and the mission to develop a clear appreciation of what must be accomplished, under what conditions and within what limitations. Based on this appreciation, it then focuses on determining how operations should be arranged within an overall operational design. The operational design provides the basis for subsequent development of the operational concept as well as the detailed plan. Operational art is applied to determine how best to conduct operations (ways) using available forces and capabilities (means) to achieve the objectives (ends) efficiently and within acceptable risks. Key to the application of operational art is the ability to envision the employment of forces and their effects in time and space, to appreciate the realm of possibilities and to anticipate probable outcomes and their implications.
91. The planning architecture employed for coalition operations will, in most cases, be based on that of the LN\textsuperscript{19}. This architecture must provide the basic structure necessary to facilitate the timely, efficient and coherent development of CONOPS and OPLANs. The LN, as a minimum, is responsible for providing the overarching framework for consultation and planning. The LN, through the consultation process, will provide a coalition strategic-level CONOPS and OPLAN for review and approval. The Coalition Strategic Commander is responsible for translating political guidance into military strategic direction for Coalition forces, and for developing an OPLAN.

92. Operational planning will address the following major areas:

a. Conduct of operation to achieve strategic or operational objectives.
b. Force capabilities required conducting the operation.
c. Deployment of forces into the CJOA.
d. Logistical sustainment.
e. Control and use of operational information.
f. Arrangements for C2.
g. Cooperation with civilian authorities.
h. Force protection.
i. Medical
l. METOC

93. Operational planning may be carried out at different levels under varying circumstances and produce different outputs. In any case, the following basics are fundamental to any operational planning effort:

a. Understand the strategic aim or desired end-state, i.e. the purpose of the military action.
b. Understand the operational environment, including civil aspects.
c. Understand the capabilities, limitations and likely intentions of the adversaries or factions involved in a conflict.

\textsuperscript{19} AJP-5, Allied Doctrine for Operational Planning has an planning architecture familiar to all MIC member nations.
d. Focus on linking the military objectives to the desired end-state established by the higher command authority.

e. Implement the higher commander’s intent.

f. Orient on Centres of Gravity (CoGs) of adversary or factions.

g. Ensure protection of own CoGs.

h. Establish favourable conditions at decisive points.

i. Determine the forces required to set conditions necessary to achieve the objective and desired end-state. Clearly define criteria for measuring success in reaching the end-state.

j. Achieve unity of purpose and effort with forces assigned as well as in coordination with the United Nations and other international and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as required.

k. Achieve a coordination in the use of lethal and non-lethal capabilities.

l. Describe the sequence of related joint operations from initial entry through termination throughout the CJOA.

m. Provide direction, establish objectives, and assign tasks to subordinates as the basis for their planning.

n. Establish the task organisation of forces and command arrangements.

o. Ensure the provision of funding and adequate sustainment.

p. Make an overall assessment of the risks associated with the operation.

94. The coalition OPLAN translates the strategic concept into a joint and multinational plan for military actions by specifying how operations, logistics, and time will be used to attain strategic objectives. It may be necessary to develop one or more SUPLAN(s) to address all aspects of an operation in sufficient detail. These may include coalition SUPLANs (CSUPLANs) or national SUPLANs (NSUPLANs). Specific elements of the operation plan and a template for planning are included in Annex A, Appendix 5 and 6.

95. The ‘mechanics’ of this planning process will be simplified if coalition partners provide a ‘planning liaison cell(s)’ early to complement the LN’s planning staff. This applies at both strategic and operational levels, and extends to logistic as well as operational planning.
The actual steps and iterations in a coalition planning process may vary from case to case, however the stages describe below are a generic model, and are depicted in Figure 2.

a. **Stage I - Initiation.** Initiation establishes the requirement to conduct operational planning as well as the general planning direction and planning limitations.

b. **Stage II - Orientation.** Orientation analyses the situation to determine what must be accomplished to meet the higher authority’s direction and guidance as well as to precisely determine the mission and desired end-state. It focuses on the conduct of a thorough mission analysis. The principal products are a mission statement, an operational design and the Commander’s Planning Guidance (CPG).

c. **Stage III - Concept Development.** Concept Development determines how to accomplish the mission most effectively and efficiently. It focuses on developing and analysing different possible courses of action (COA) for accomplishing the mission, including the means required, in order assisting the commander in determining the best COA. The commander’s selected COA provides the basis for the development of a CONOPS and a supporting Statement of Requirements (SOR), which are the principal products of this stage.

d. **Stage IV - Plan Development.** Plan Development further identifies forces required to implement the Plan, organises their timely deployment into the CJOA and plans for their protection, training and sustainment. It includes co-ordination with other headquarters and nations. It results in a fully developed plan (or a family of plans as required), complete with Annexes for required functional areas, approved by the next higher authority.

e. **Stage V - Plan Review.** Plan Review ensures a plan remains valid, in terms of continuing requirements, policy and doctrine as well as viable in terms of feasibility, suitability and acceptability. It includes periodic reviews of a plan, which may identify required changes and result in new planning guidance.
Operation Execution

97. While CCs have the means by which military action can be prosecuted and delivered at the tactical level, their capabilities are most effective only when applied in concert. This is the principle of synergy, which is only achieved through effective integration, coordination and synchronization. In this capacity the role of the Coalition Force Headquarters (JF HQ) as the coordinator of the various component operations, is key. Having made his operation plan, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) will:

a. Apply the military resources allocated to him to achieve the assigned mission within any constraints imposed.

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20 For a detailed description of the planning process see Annex A
b. Identify and weigh up the effect of each action, in terms of the impact it will have on achieving his objectives, the risks that it entails, and the resources required for its success and means of minimising the risk.

c. Exploit the situation by adjusting and developing his plans in order to contend with changing circumstances and to take advantage of opportunities.

d. Re-visit the operational estimate at regular intervals or whenever there is a change in the operational situation or when Operation Effectiveness Analysis dictates a change in emphasis is required.

98. It is counter productive to try and over-regulate what is an inherently complex and chaotic activity; placing absolute faith in closely sequenced plans made in advance does not work. However, what is vital is the close synchronization of strategic, operational and tactical planning in the build-up, and to have a series of robust mechanisms in place to both keep the operation on track and to cope with the unexpected. An important and parallel consideration is to endeavour to keep the JF agile enough to cope with change in a responsive manner.

99. Most military operations consist of 3 generic phases: Preparation, Execution and Termination and Transition, although the execution phase itself may have sub-phases. It is not always possible to determine a point at which a specific phase starts or ends. This point in time can differ for each element participating in an operation. Also, an element conducting an operation can be confronted with several simultaneous different activities, or even with different activities from different phases. In other words, the conduct of an operation may be planned linearly and sequentially but its execution may appear to be chaotic and event-driven.
Preparation.

100. During the preparation phase, nations and, depending on Transfer of Authority (TOA), an assigned CFC will deploy the forces, establish Lines of Communication (LOC) and liaison with Host Nations (HN), IOs and relevant agencies. The CFC has to shape the CJOA in order to facilitate the actual conduct of the operation.

101. Steps the CFC may consider as part of the preparatory activities are:

   a. Establish C2 for the CF and communications arrangements with the CF HQs and the Troop Contributing Nations (TCN).
   b. Create and protect the LOCs.
   c. Coordinate the deployment of the forces.
   d. Build up the forces.
   e. Develop logistic support, including host-nation support (HNS).
   f. Prepare and execute combined training to integrate the forces within the CJOA.
   g. Sustain forces during build up and preparation for operations.
   h. Protect and secure the forces.
   i. Establish, when required, a liaison network.
   j. Conduct, when required, preliminary operations.
   k. Request an enabling budget and prepare a mission budget.

102. Many of the activities that are conducted during the preparation phase are not the CFC’s primary responsibility. Often he depends on CSC or the troop contributing nations (TCNs) to facilitate the activities of the CF. For example, the strategic deployment is predominantly a national responsibility, with the CSC in a coordinating role and the CFC only monitoring progress.

103. In addition, the CFC has limited influence over initial preparation and training of the national troop contributions, although he can be asked to issue directives and guidance on the focus of the preparation and training programme. After TOA of the national troop contributions, the CFC will be, among other aspects of the operation, in charge of the protection and security of the
forces, their build-up (including in-CJOA preparation and training) and, when required the conduct of preliminary operations.

104. A critical function of the LN will be the identification of ways and means available to achieve the strategic objective. This will translate into a matching of resources to the operational plan developed. This is likely to be an iterative process and one subject to considerable negotiation among the coalition members. The formation of a planning liaison cell(s) will also facilitate this process by providing a mechanism for exchange of detailed information regarding the capabilities of each partner and the willingness and/or ability of each to commit resources. Funding authority to support coalition forces and the financial commitments of each partner should be identified as early as possible and procedures developed to ensure that there will be no adverse impact on operations.

**Coalition Force Readiness Training**

105. For most coalition operations, multinational collective training prior to deployment will not be feasible. Therefore, this training will have to be completed upon arrival in theatre. As time available for this training remains the most valuable commodity available to coalition commanders at all levels, it is the responsibility of each TCN to prepare its forces prior to deployment to theatre.

106. The Coalition Force Readiness Training Plan will have two main objectives. First, it will prepare the TCN forces for battle. The units and formations of the TCN require the opportunity to conduct collective training with coalition nations in order to gain confidence and to integrate procedures and practices at all levels within the coalition. Second it provides Commanders with the opportunity to assess the readiness of their forces. This is especially important when units and formations are assigned to the coalition from nations that do not have a formal programme of exercises and exchange.

107. During force readiness training some of the primary training objectives should include:

a. Staffing and planning processes;

b. C2, communication systems and ISR procedures;

c. Specific operational TTPs (offensive, defensive, transitional operations);

d. Joint Fires planning and execution;

e. FP Measures;
f. Logistical support procedures;
g. Combat Identification; and
h. Medical evacuation and treatment protocols.

108. **Exercises.** The purpose of exercises is to integrate, synchronize, test, evaluate and assess operations, tactics, techniques and procedures. The principal objectives of exercises are to practice the C2 chain, initiate understanding for the CFC’s routines for control of the operation and practice Rules of Engagement (ROE). Exercises used for the purpose of deception and deterrence can have a considerable influence, especially as they usually attract wide coverage in the local and international media. Exercises may include the generation and deployment of reserves.

109. **Rehearsals.** The CFC should conduct a rehearsal prior to an operation. The aim of the rehearsal is to synchronize COA systems and to identify operational issues and concerns. This rehearsal allows for interaction between the CFC’s staff and the various component staffs across the full spectrum of the CONOPS and allows the CCs and selected CFC staff to brief their CONOPS and situational assessment. These efforts will collectively synchronize the CFC staff and the components in the execution of key military tasks during a given time period and identify issues and concerns. Rehearsals provide substance to the written OPLAN and provide the foundation upon which effective synchronization of the elements of the JF is based.

**Mission Execution**

110. In the planning phase, the CFC, acting at the operational level, will have identified the military conditions or end state required to achieve the strategic objective. He or she will then seek to structure activities, sequentially and simultaneously, so as to fulfil the military conditions for success. Execution consists of the application of the allocated military resources to sustain this sequence of actions. In the execution phase, the commander focuses on three fundamental processes. The first is essentially an intelligence function that seeks to determine the nature and extent of the threat or situation. The second is the employment of allocated resources and capabilities in order to create a favourable situation for execution. The third is execution of the operation to achieve the desired end state.

111. The CFC is responsible for:

a. Defining the concept of operations and operational objectives
b. Determining the sequence of operational activity in space and time
c. Establishing operational priorities

d. Harmonizing coalition military activities

e. Coordinating logistics support

f. Delegating authority to subordinate commanders as appropriate

g. Establishing a combined joint targeting system

h. Applying force or presence at decisive points

i. Coordinating the actions of subordinates to achieve integration of activities

j. Maintaining awareness of the region’s political, economic, cultural, and religious situation

k. Refining the operational plan as the situation develops

l. Refining the intelligence plan as operations progress

m. Executing prescribed public information policy

n. Keeping higher authorities informed of the situation

o. Requesting rules of engagement (ROE) changes as needed

p. Requesting the necessary administrative and logistic support to sustain operations

q. Resolving various issues related to coalition operations

r. Maintaining liaison and interaction with the local civil authority within the operational area, and with those NGOs and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) who may be engaged in the operational area

s. Estimating costs and monitoring funding

t. Establishing lessons-identified procedures for the operation

u. Maintaining accountability to the coalition for the outcome of operations.
Operational Management

112. **Monitoring Campaign Progress.** The measurement of success is a fundamental aspect of military operations that should be foremost in the mind of every commander. The CFC will have specified criteria for success in his CONOPS and OPLAN; these must be achievable and measurable. The aim is to take a broad view of the campaign and determine if the required effects, as envisaged in the campaign plan, are being achieved. This monitoring is much wider than observing whether an individual target has been destroyed. It is particularly relevant in activities where the emphasis is on changing the attitudes of the adversary rather than on his physical destruction. Whatever the nature of the campaign, the CFC should ensure that a monitoring and assessment process is rigorously conducted and that tactical level events do not distract his staff and so lose sight of the end-state. If correctly assessed, this process will allow the CFC to make judgements on:

a. **Apportionment.** The process should assess the likelihood of achieving individual DPs and so inform the CFC’s apportionment of effort between CCs.

b. **Contingency Planning.** The process should be able to gauge whether the campaign plan is on track and so identify the need for contingency plans, in the form of branches and sequels.

c. **Confirming Adversary Centre of Gravity.** The process should confirm that the correct COG and associated critical vulnerabilities have been selected. The CFC should be alert to the possibility that new vulnerabilities may be exposed, or those previously identified critical vulnerabilities may be too well protected to be attacked. Thus COG analysis should be an iterative process for planning staff and the COG should be reviewed periodically.

113. **Managing Lines of Operation.** Lines of operation depict the relationship between DPs and as such, they are a way of visualising the overall activity within a force, and coordinating and de-conflicting component activities. Careful management of lines of operation allows the realisation of the full potential of the force.

114. **Campaign Rhythm.** Where a commander can consistently decide and act quicker than his opponent, he will generate greater tempo and gain a significant advantage. Campaign rhythm should therefore be focused on enabling effective and timely decision-making within and between headquarters. It is the principal means by which time, information and activity are managed and directed at providing the right information at the right time so that the right decision can be made. It should never become a self-fulfilling prophecy - it is a means to an end,

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21 See AJP-5 for details of COG Analysis.
not an end in its own right. Campaign rhythm is the key in creating a ‘Command Advantage’, i.e. orders and directives that are designed to seek tactical opportunity plus a command structure that has a clear and common view of the situation can communicate quickly and direct operations.

**Termination and Transition**

115. Coalition operations inherently have both political and military goals, as such, exclusively military lines of activity will probably not achieve the strategic end state. While every campaign and major operation is directed towards a goal, at some point the military action is no longer the main effort. It may be necessary for one mission to terminate and be replaced by and other as part of a wider strategic plan. The term “termination” is in this context really more about transition than traditional notions of ceases fires and victory parades.

116. Coalition forces will eventually hand over responsibilities to other military forces, governmental agencies, or the HN government. Similar to a traditional “relief in place” the coalition forces will carefully plan, coordinate, and manage the transition.

117. The CFC should plan for termination and transition before deployment or as soon as possible during the initial phase. Transition between military forces may take the form of relief in place or a transition by function, such as medical, engineer services, communications, security and logistics.

118. The ultimate goal is to transition all functions performed by the CFC and the coalition forces in a smooth and orderly fashion. Some of the functions may develop into a combination of coalition, HN, intergovernmental and non-governmental activities during the as the transition advances. Once all transition activities are complete the coalition forces can depart.

119. The keys to a successful transitions can include:

   a. Conducting early planning with HN, IGO and NGOs.
   b. Establishing workable objectives, goals and end states
   c. Providing adequate intelligence and communication to all agencies involved in the transition.
   d. Ensuring unity of effort
   e. Harmonizing the civil with the military effort
   f. Establishing the appropriate C2 to manage the transition.
120. The CFC and his staff must consider the need to prevent a return to conditions that caused the crisis and required involvement of the coalition. The CFC in coordination with the political level of the coalition, and civilian agencies in the operational area must identify “high risk” transition points. These points occur when the CFC passes responsibility to an IGO, NGO or HN. It is incumbent on the CFC to manage these transition points to avoid the devolution of the situation.

Cross-level Functional Considerations

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

121. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) is ‘An operations-intelligence activity that integrates and synchronises the planning and operation of sensors and assets, and the processing, exploitation, targeting and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations’. ISTAR is a ‘system of systems’ that derives synergy through integrating Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition assets together with the Intelligence Process through a methodology of centralised coordination. ISTAR links intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance systems and sensors to cue manoeuvre and offensive strike assets, with particular emphasis on the timely passage of both critical and targeting information. The principal users of ISTAR are the Operations Staff, the Intelligence Staff and Targeting Staff.

122. An effective ISTAR capability will allow the commander to identify adversary weaknesses and enable him to make the decisions that will exploit those vulnerabilities. Systems that produce ‘coarse grain’ information will be used to provide a general picture of the adversary’s activity and will cue ‘fine grain’ systems that will permit the development of intelligence at the level of detail that the commander requires within his battlespace. ISTAR permits fleeting opportunities to be exploited and mobile targets to be monitored and tracked. ISTAR provides intelligence support to the commander from the inception of his decision making process, through the making of his plan and throughout the subsequent conduct of his operations. It is a key enabler of operational success.

123. The ISTAR architecture is structure that enables ISTAR. It encompasses the C2, common processes and communications that link the collection assets and their controlling organisations, analysis elements, the users of the product and the coalition information sharing (CIS) infrastructure, allowing these separate elements and systems to operate as a synergistic whole.

124. ISTAR Planning. The use of ISTAR collection assets must be carefully planned. This is not solely a J2 or ISTAR function but is one that requires involvement of staffs in many areas and across multiple levels of command. There must be strong linkage between the J2/ISTAR staff and the J3 staff to ensure consistency of effort. The allocation and tasking of ISTAR assets will be the responsibility of the J2/J3 staff.
125. **Multinational Operations.** The effective provision of intelligence support to multinational operations requires the ISTAR Process to be conducted in accordance with agreed common procedures for the sharing of information and for the co-ordination and use of ISTAR collection assets. During multinational operations, the intelligence product supporting that operation must be shared and early liaison should be initiated at the highest levels of the coalition to ensure that the intelligence operations of each participant are co-ordinated. Such procedures must be in place and ideally, must have been practised, prior to the commencement of multinational operations. Two broad approaches to the resolution of these problems are possible depending on the nature of the multinational operation and the participants:

a. **Integrated Information Sharing.** Under integrated information sharing, ISTAR collection assets, processes and personnel are fully integrated. This allows for the ready flow of information and intelligence and a synergy in the use of collection assets. It also reduces duplication and simplifies the dissemination of the product in formats that are readily useable by dissimilar national force elements. However, the releasability of sensitive national information and intelligence may cause difficulties for participants that will often only be solved through pragmatism linked to an understanding of the sensitivities involved.

b. **Parallel Information Sharing.** With parallel information sharing, different national ISTAR capabilities work separately, and often in parallel, with some integrated links to provide an ability to exchange information. This allows for national control of product, collection and security issues, but promotes duplication of effort and may lead to suspicion of the amount of knowledge not being released by partners.

**Targeting**

126. The CFC is responsible for establishing a combined joint targeting system. This system will undertake an analysis of adversary capability and make the recommendation and/or selection of those elements of capability whose destruction, degradation or negation would significantly advance the achievement of the coalition’s strategic objectives. The desired effect on the selected target may be achieved through either lethal or non-lethal means (eg. direct attack by conventional weapons to achieve destruction or information operation attack to negate/influence the target function).

127. The targeting process will normally be based on that used by the LN but would be expected to conform with the generic six (6) phase sequential model depicted in Figure 3.
128. The staff necessary to implement the targeting process could be drawn predominantly from the LN but ideally would be an integrated staff comprising suitably qualified personnel from all coalition member nations.

129. The national political imperative of each of the coalition members will vary. Moreover, some member nations may have international treaty / convention obligations that are different to other coalition partners. These differences may impose nation-specific limitations on the types of targets that can be engaged, the types of weapons that can be employed or the Rules of Engagement applicable to various types of target. Consequently, very close liaison between the Coalition Force Headquarters and the National Component Headquarters is imperative to ensure that only appropriate tasking is allocated to national components during the planning process.

Logistic Considerations

130. There is a clear need at the politico-military strategic level to use national resources efficiently and effectively. Moreover, new threats in the world have created the need for coalition partners to configure their forces for expeditionary operations. The logistic enablers at both the strategic and operational level are expensive and scarce resources. Nations’ attempts during multinational operations to support their own forces have proven to be costly and at times inefficient.

131. ‘Operationalizing’ the resources available translates into the process of building a logistics support architecture for the coalition force. Unity of effort is essential to coalition logistics.
operations. This requires coordination not only among the partner nations, but also with civil authorities in the operational area as well as civilian contracting agencies. The execution of coalition logistics is most likely to be effective if it is made a collective responsibility of the coalition force. When possible, mutual logistics support should be developed for effectiveness and economy of effort. Coalition logistics should be flexible, responsive, and predictive, and provide timely sustainment throughout the entire coalition force. The coalition logistic plan should incorporate the logistic requirements and capabilities of all forces to ensure sustained and synchronized execution. Consensus on coalition logistics issues and requirements should be formed early.

132. The creation of a centralized coalition logistics task force or coordination cell may provide economy of assets and system efficiency. Nations willing to participate in logistics burden sharing during multinational operations and take on responsibilities such as logistics lead responsibilities, could preclude duplication of effort. The coalition logistics staff should establish a planning group to define the extent of interoperability and capability for mutual logistics support that may exist among coalition forces.

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration

133. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOM & I)\(^\text{22}\) is the essential process that transitions deploying forces, consisting of personnel, equipment and materiel arriving in the CJOA, into forces capable of meeting the CFC’s operational requirements. RSOM & I of forces is fundamental to the concept of operations (CONOPS) that envisions the projection of mission-tailored combat power into and within a CJOA at the right time and in the right sequence. For this reason the JFC must prioritise and exercise coordinating authority and, where granted, C2 over the RSOM & I process.

134. During the build-up of forces, the CF will expand rapidly in size, which implies that the level of burden borne by the HN will increase dramatically. The CFC will endeavour to keep relations with the leadership of the HN as close and amicable as possible and maintain support for the coalition presence at a high level, assisted by public information initiatives. Under no circumstances should the coalition adversely influence life in the HN to such a degree that the public and political support within the HN is weakened or lost. This requires restraint, consideration for local customs and traditions and the flexible conduct of all activities by all members of the coalition.

135. The build-up of forces should also be used as a show of forces and power projection. It will directly influence an adversary’s behaviour and his situational awareness. The build-up of forces

\(^{22}\) Detailed information in AJP-3.13, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Reception, Staging, and Onward Movement* (under development).
should be closely considered in relation to Info Ops (presence, posture and profile). Therefore
the build-up of forces should be carefully planned and is not solely a logistic operation.

Reconstruction and Redeployment

136. The redeployment of forces after termination of an operation is a highly complex matter,
politically, militarily, economically and environmentally. It is not simply a case of reversing the
deployment plan, but rather a distinct operation in its own right. Redeployment may be directed
when operations have terminated or higher authority directs movement of the assigned force.
The CFC should give the same considerations to redeployment as for deployment in regard to
phasing of C2 and the desired order of departure.

137. Redeployment planning is directed towards the ordered and efficient movement of forces (units
or individuals) and equipment out of the CJOA. As a function of the overall redeployment,
recovery planning will be an integral part of the CFC’s plans. This section discusses recovery
planning, including tasks, responsibilities and coordination of redeployment planning.

138. One of the most important factors in planning the redeployment is timing. It will be extremely
difficult to formulate a redeployment plan before the end-state has either been achieved or
subsequent operations have been determined. Equally, it will reflect badly upon the conduct of
the operation if the redeployment is seen to be a rushed, poorly planned affair. Therefore, it is
vital that it is treated in the same thorough manner as the deployment and adequate time is given
to its planning and preparation.

139. Every operation has its own unique planning factors; however, the following factors apply to all
operations and will need to be considered at the redeployment planning stage:

a. Clear and detailed operational and logistic requirements to determine the scale of the
   redeployment.

b. The establishment of a planning team.

c. Residual commitments, for example specialist logistic personnel, may remain in the
   CJOA in an advisory capacity, e.g. to help reconstruction.

d. ‘Earliest move’ and ‘All out by’ timings should be clarified at the earliest stage to identify
   lead times and enable strategic lift planning to proceed.

e. The establishment of specialist teams to staff the hand-over of HN assets and to
   coordinate termination of contracts. It must be remembered that if the coalition has relied
   upon HNS, then a duty of care to the hosts exists. Every effort must be taken to ensure
that environmental, political or financial difficulties do not degrade the relationship with the HN.

f. Additional enabling force elements and specialists will probably be required to deploy to the CJOA to facilitate the redeployment.

g. Identifying the strategic movement assets to be made available by the TCNs.

140. Irrespective of how well the operation was conducted, a poor recovery, under full scrutiny of the media, may well be the lasting image of the operation. There may be considerable sensitivity about when and how planning is conducted, and its effects on own forces, local civilian and military morale. Also, HNS and multinational partners should be taken into account. It is therefore essential that the C2 of the recovery is planned in advance and given careful consideration. The CFC should retain OPCON of all assigned forces deployed in the CJOA throughout the operation.

Coalition Information Exchange Environment

141. An effective information sharing and exchange capability extends vertically, through national systems and horizontally, into the systems of other coalition nations. This information exchange ‘environment’ enables rapid transfer of information to appropriately designated receivers, whilst rigorously protecting information from unauthorised disclosure and release. The environment provides robust information assurance and network defence capabilities.

142. A Coalition Information Exchange Environments (CIEE) is ‘The aggregation of individuals, organisations, system capabilities, processes and infrastructure for the common purpose of creating and sharing data, information and knowledge necessary to plan, execute and assess coalition operations.’23 The CIEE provides the coalition the ability to rapidly share information, knowledge/ideas, reduce planning timelines and enhance coalition operations by enabling common shared situational awareness and collaboration at all levels. CIEE is addressed in detail in Annex C.

Communications and Information Management

143. It is incumbent upon the LN to coordinate for, create, or provide communications and information management structures organized so as to accomplish specific mission-related information-conveyance and processing functions. The appropriate planners from the various coalition partners must be brought into the planning process early and interact continuously to anticipate and solve a variety of problems likely to arise from a lack of compatibility among

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23 Ref C, Section 2.1. Adapted from USJFCOM’s definition for their Collaborative Information Environment. Although a National environment, functionally, it is mirrored with the CIEE. The CIE includes guards and protection services as would be needed in the CIEE. Consequently, and in order to remain aligned with US efforts, this definition should stand.
partners’ organic communications equipment. Non-technical matters such as disclosure and releaseability policy will affect interoperability as well. These effects are likely to hold true to varying degrees across the entire range of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

144. Increasing standardization among likely coalition participants in advance of a crisis is a key action that could be undertaken now to alleviate some of these problems. This does not necessarily mean that everyone must own the same equipment. Radios may be different but they should be interoperable. The same extends to tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) regarding communications and operations in general. Simply being able to adopt in advance the maxim that communications are established ‘higher to lower, left to right, supporting to supported’ could, for example, be a major standardization feat depending on the composition of the coalition.

145. The increasing demands of mobility and network-enabled capability can result in congestion of the radio spectrum which is likely to be exacerbated in coalition operations. This is another area in which a common coalition approach and advanced planning will be beneficial. Not only communications, but all uses of the radio spectrum must be carefully planned for well in advance and coordinated to maintain fighting capability and operational tempo.

146. To help avoid misperceptions, terms of reference should be developed between and among the contributor nations and the LN. Command relationships should then further be described in a written document such as the operations plan (OPLAN). An essential related issue concerns the timing of the actual transfer of command authority to the coalition commander, which should also be addressed in the OPLAN or some other document for absolute clarity. The earlier the coalition force gains control, the more flexibility it has in planning, training for, and conducting operations.

147. Once planning for a coalition operation has begun, the CFC of the multinational force should establish standard operating procedures (SOPs) whenever appropriate. These SOPs should be easy to understand and should address coalition procedures, not single nation procedures. Although the SOPs of the LN could be utilized to a great extent, the development of coalition SOPs would be preferable.

Rules of Engagement

148. The sanctioning civil authority should provide political direction and guidance to commanders by means of ROE within identified policy and legal constraints. Presumably, the LN will play an important role in the process of developing ROE.24

24 ROE are constructed in accordance with the goals and objectives of the operation under consideration, but must consider the constraints and restraints imposed by International Law and the Law of Armed Conflict. These include the principles and
149. ROE are directives to military forces and individuals that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which the use of force or other action may or may not be applied. ROE are intended to avoid ambiguity that could lead to a commander’s inadvertently violating national (or coalition) policy and objectives, or to a violation of international law through inappropriate action or reaction in a given situation. In regards specifically to international law, the Law of Armed Conflict, and other convention and laws to which coalition members may be subject, ROE only exist to give guidance and cannot by themselves guarantee the lawfulness of any action. It remains the commander’s responsibility to ensure that only the degree of force that is necessary, reasonable, and lawful in the circumstances is used. ROE are written as a series of prohibitions and permissions applicable to situations spanning the entire range of military operations.

150. Although coalition participants may have similar political mandates, each nation is likely to bring to the coalition a different national ROE reflecting that nation's unique political and legal interests and its reason for entering the coalition. Some national ROE will be relatively free of constraint, while others may be severely restricted. Commanders of deployed forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE development process. Consensus on standardization of ROE should be sought, but may not be achievable. It may even be necessary to tailor the employment of given troop contingents within the context of the ROE permissible to those contingents. The commander must seek to develop and request authorization for simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their national policies, and to reconcile national differences as much as possible. For the individual soldier to understand and implement ROE, they must be clear and simple. Trying to obtain concurrence for ROE from national authorities is a time-consuming process and should be addressed early in the planning process.

151. All nations in the coalition will be provided with ROE by their respective chains of command. Coalition ROE will be developed during the planning process. The latter will apply to all contingents. Subsequently, subordinate formations must develop supporting ROE. Where coalition ROE are prohibitive, they must be reflected in full. However, subordinate formations are not obliged to pass on the full range of permissions granted in coalition ROE. Subordinate ROE for any given national contingent must provide clear national guidance on the use of, or support provided by, other coalition nations’ weapons that might be prohibited or restricted in usage for that contingent.

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rules set out in the UN Charter, the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the provisions of treaties and agreements to which the coalition members are parties, and the tenets of customary international law. The majority of European nations, for example, have adopted the European Convention on Human Rights that has a significant impact on the use of lethal force in circumstances other than the inherent right to self-defence. A similar example is that nations that have agreed by treaty to forego the use of anti-personnel landmines will be constrained to include this prohibition in their ROE.
152. It is also essential that adjacent or mutually supporting formations and forces particularly understand each others’ ROE, as it cannot be assumed that each will react in the identical fashion to a given situation. This in turn can contribute to confusion, misperceptions, and even fratricide.

**Coalition Doctrine**

153. Doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way military forces think about, train for, plan, and execute operations. The NATO AAP-6, ‘*NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*’ (English and French), defines doctrine as the ‘Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.’ The principles and tenets of doctrine take into account all of the basic elements of a military force: weapons and other systems; skill levels; experience and training; deployment and sustainment capabilities; organizational issues; C2 philosophy and issues; and command arrangements. Doctrine deals primarily with extant capabilities. Doctrine is not about what is to be done, but about how it is to be accomplished. Doctrine is neither strategy nor policy, though it often influences and is influenced by both.

154. Coalition partners using very different national doctrines will obviously have problems harmonizing their efforts, even if they enjoy a high degree of technical interoperability. Forces operating on different fundamental principles will lack unity of effort, and could even work at cross-purposes. Areas where commonality of doctrinal approach is particularly critical include intelligence, C2, operations and planning, logistics, and communications. Subsidiary functions of FP, deployment, Coalition Combat Identification (CCID) ROE, and civil-military cooperation are also key. Finding ways to harmonize doctrine is therefore an important means to ensure improved coalition operations.

155. This is not entirely new ground. NATO has developed a hierarchy of Allied Joint Doctrine dealing with multinational operations; the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) agreed that NATO Allied Joint Doctrine, unless otherwise specifically directed by the MIC, is default doctrine for planning and conducting multinational coalition operations. Access to NATO doctrine is gained through the NSA protected website.25

**Lessons Identified**

156. Lessons identified are an essential element in learning from current coalition operations and in preparing for the next. A coalition HQ should establish a Lessons Identified Cell, from the outset of the coalition effort, whose raison d’être is to collect, analyse and share lessons amongst

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25 Annex F details procedures to access the NATO Standardisation Agency (NSA) protected website for non-NATO nations and bodies.
coalition members during the planning, deployment, conduct and handover or termination of operations. Lessons may be of immediate import, such as those concerning FP throughout the coalition, whilst others may be less urgent and could be analysed later in the mission, or on completion of the operation.

157. The Coalition lessons identified effort should be proactive, starting at the earliest stages of the coalition. Coalition lessons identified efforts should run in parallel with national efforts, allowing timely collection and sharing of lessons, whilst acknowledging national sensitivities. Lessons identified will be recorded in a permanent MIC database.

158. Lessons identified will become lessons learned largely through national processes affecting their forces. However, the CFC should not be constrained in immediately applying lessons identified as the situation dictates.

**Concluding Observations**

159. Requirements for coalition interoperability transcend ‘simple’ questions of equipment commonality and compatibility. Coalition operations may demand that maximum interoperable materiel interface be achieved even when commonality and compatibility are lacking. The subject requires consideration of all factors impacting interoperability, to include doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, people, and facilities. Planning for and achieving maximum interoperability in the non-materiel aspects of military operations can and should be a key focus of multinational cooperation initiatives.
ANNEX A - COALITION PLANNING

Scope

A1. This annex describes operational planning for coalition operations conducted within the framework of the Lead Nation (LN) concept. To a great extent, the planning process of the LN will drive the overall coalition planning process, however this Annex reflects the NATO Allied joint doctrine on operational planning. This annex is not intended to prescribe a mandatory uniform process, but rather draws upon common principles and practices\(^1\) to offer an overview of planning processes and principles, which may be applied to coalition operations.

Purpose of Planning

A2. Operational planning seeks to translate strategic guidance and direction into integrated military actions to be carried out by the coalition forces to achieve the strategic end-state and strategic objectives efficiently within the political limitations and resource constraints set by the nations in the coalition. Operational planning seeks to translate strategic guidance and direction into a scheduled series of integrated military actions, carried out by joint forces to achieve strategic objectives efficiently and with acceptable risks. It begins with an analysis of the situation and the mission to develop a clear appreciation of what must be accomplished, under what conditions and within what limitations. Based on this appreciation, it then focuses on determining how operations should be arranged within an overall operational design. The operational design provides the basis for subsequent development of the operational concept as well as the detailed plan. Operational art is applied to determine how best to conduct operations (ways) using available forces and capabilities (means) to achieve the objectives (ends) efficiently and within acceptable risks. Key to the application of operational art is the ability to envision the employment of forces and their effects in time and space, to appreciate the realm of possibilities, and to anticipate probable outcomes and their implications.

Types of Planning

A3. **Advance Planning.** Advance planning (also referred to as contingency planning) is deliberate planning conducted with the intent of addressing future security risks. Typically this type of planning is performed by a nation/nations or a standing regional alliance structure. The ‘on-the-shelf’ plans resulting from this process may provide the basis for coalition plan development dependant upon their applicability to the actual situation.

A4. **Crisis Planning.** Almost by definition, planning by a Coalition will be conducted in response to an actual or developing crisis. The immediate aim of the planning will be to achieve consensus at the political-military level in order to provide strategic guidance to the

\(^1\) This annex draws primarily upon NATO Allied joint doctrine to explicate these principles and practices.
Coalition Force Commander (CFC). Based on this guidance, the CFC will develop a military strategic-level Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for approval by the coalition nations’ civil and military authorities. The military strategic-level CONOPS identifies critical factors such as capability requirements (and associated caveats) and provides the basis for the Coalition Strategic Commander to create a military strategic-level Operations Plan (OPLAN). In turn, this allows the subordinate coalition operational-level commander(s), CFC, to prepare an operational level CONOPS and OPLAN. In addition, coalition military planners may develop Supporting Plans (SUPLANs) and subordinate plans. SUPLANs and subordinate plans should be consistent with the appropriate OPLAN and its annexes. This will ensure that they are consistent with the political guidance and authority applicable to the parent plan.

a. **Political Consensus and Strategic Guidance.**

   (1) Although it is not normally considered a ‘type of planning’ in a military sense, the development of strategic guidance is a key consideration for Coalition operations. One of the major functions of the LN is to organize mechanisms for consultation in order to achieve political consensus among Coalition members, and between the Coalition and recognized international authority or entity (e.g. the United Nations) sanctioning the operation. This process must produce strategic level guidance in order for the CFC to proceed with planning.

   (2) Strategic guidance should define the Coalition’s objectives and overall political-military approach, and coordinate strategic direction for planning and executing Coalition operations. It should additionally specify the scope of the Coalition’s mandate, and any constraints or restraints on Coalition operations.

b. **OPLAN**

   (1) An OPLAN is a detailed and comprehensive plan capable of execution, which has forces assigned and all necessary preparations undertaken for successful execution and attainment of the assigned mission. It will likely be necessary to develop the Coalition OPLAN as a single, theatre-wide coalition campaign plan, in order to ensure proper coordination, unity of purpose and economy of effort of all military activities involved in all aspects of Coalition operations.

   (2) The coalition OPLAN translates the strategic concept into a joint and multinational plan for military actions by specifying how operations,
logistics, and time will be used to attain strategic objectives. Through the OPLAN, the commander defines objectives; describes concepts of operations and sustainment; arranges operations in time, space and purpose; organizes forces; establishes command relationships; assigns tasks; and synchronizes the actions of forces and agencies in order to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. Once military operations are contemplated, operational planning becomes an on-going process. It should include consideration of related, simultaneous and sequential operations as well as potential follow-on branches to the original operation.

(3) **SUPLAN.** It may be necessary to develop one or more SUPLAN(s) to address all aspects of an operation in sufficient detail. These may include Coalition SUPLANs (CSUPLANs) or National SUPLANs (NSUPLANs). Examples of CSUPLANs might include schemes of deployment, logistics, communications, etc. In Coalition operations, it will, as a minimum, most likely be necessary for each nation to develop SUPLAN(s) to detail and define its contribution to the Coalition. Upon authorization of the CONOPS, SUPLANs are normally developed in parallel with the OPLAN rather than waiting for its completion.

(4) **Subordinate Plans.** Subordinate plans and any necessary related SUPLANS would be developed at all levels of the Coalition command structure, and as necessary by individual national contingents.

**Planning Architecture for Coalition Operations**

A5. The planning architecture employed for coalition operations will, in most cases, be based on that of the LN. This architecture must provide the basic structure necessary to facilitate the timely, efficient and coherent development of CONOPS and OPLANS. It comprises guidance, personnel and facilities, reference documentation and enabling tools available to assist Coalition commanders and staffs in the development of plans.

a. Guidance available first of all must include the overarching strategic guidance provided to the CFC. The LN must provide for the continuing exchange of political-level guidance and military advice throughout the planning process.

b. The core of the coalition force’s personnel and facilities will most likely be provided by the planning establishment of the LN. Each coalition partner, as a minimum, will provide a military planning liaison cell. Each cell will be actively engaged in the coalition planning process and provide a link to its respective national planning process. This applies at both strategic and operational levels, and extends to logistical as well as operational planning. These cells may be physically collocated or, through use of electronic communications and collaborative planning tools, work together in a ‘virtual’ manner.
Reference documentation is available from existing alliances, national sources and non-alliance international bodies. Specific reference material is listed in Appendix 6 to this Annex. Other resources may include:

(1) Pre-existing advance (contingency) plans and other ‘off-the-shelf’ plans developed by the LN and/or other Coalition members may provide the basis for crisis planning.

(2) This document and other MIC products.

(3) Enabling tools, such as the Coalition Wide Area Network(s), when available.

Planning Structure and Responsibilities

A6. It is assumed that Coalition operations will be conducted in accordance with a mandate recognized under international law originating with a recognized civil authority such as the United Nations Security Council. This recognized civil authority would most likely act to initiate or approve the Coalition activity under consideration, as well as to define overarching objectives and the desired end state. It is further assumed that this civil authority would designate, or accept the offered services of, a LN.

A7. The LN, as a minimum, is responsible for providing the overarching framework for consultation and planning. Through this process, the Coalitions’ strategic guidance and objectives will be developed. The LN, through the consultation process, will provide a Coalition strategic-level CONOPS and OPLAN for review and approval. The LN will probably be responsible for orchestrating continued liaison and reportage to the civil authority mandating the operation.

A8. The CFC is responsible for translating political guidance into military strategic direction for Coalition forces, and for developing an OPLAN. Once the latter is approved, the CFC provides direction to subordinate coalition commander(s) responsible for developing the operational-level CONOPS and OPLAN(s).

A9. Subordinate Coalition commands develop subordinate plans and, where appropriate, SUPLANs.

Introduction to Appendices.

A10. The appendix to Annex A describe in greater detail Operational Art, Operational Design, Campaign Design Concepts and the 5 stage operational planning process that begins with the recognition of a crisis, the initial formation of a coalition and the selection of a LN. for an in depth discussion see Allied Joint Publications – 5, Allied Joint Planning.
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A – OPERATIONAL ART

Introduction

A1.1. Operational Art can be described as the ‘the skilful employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, operations and battles’. It is an essential aspect of operational planning. It comprises the skills, imagination, creativity and intuition to plan and conduct the deployment and employment of joint multinational forces and capabilities, co-ordinated with non-military assets and activities, in a series of related operations over time and space to set military conditions that achieve the objective and the end state. No specific level of command is solely concerned with operational art. In its simplest expression, operational art determines when, where and for what purpose forces will conduct operations.

A1.2. Most military campaigns and operations are designed to wrest the initiative from an adversary. This requires a thorough understanding of the adversary’s system and psychology: such understanding may be difficult to gain; it is likely to come only after engagement and may take time. Once such understanding has been gained, it should be possible to maintain and exploit the initiative through a sense of urgency and determination to outwit the adversary. To achieve this, the commander should consider the manner in which the end state can be achieved. The major tools that he will use when planning his campaign or operation are described below. 1 However, the commander should continue to use the operational framework described earlier both before and during the conduct of the campaign.

A1.3. Operational art indicates considerations at the operational level which should reflect more than just the employment of procedures and techniques based on knowledge of doctrines and manuals. It should be applied with a broad knowledge and understanding of the complicated relations of all the factors influencing the planning and execution of a campaign:

a. It includes the effective use of campaign planning tools and seeks to ensure that commanders use forces, space, time and information effectively through the design of campaigns and operations. Such a design provides a framework to help commanders order their thoughts and understand the conditions for success.

b. It should take account of the full range of potentially simultaneous military operations, across the spectrum of conflict with predominant campaign themes shifting over time. This aids commanders and staffs in understanding that:

(1) All major operations are combinations of tasks executed simultaneously.

(2) Operations change over time.

1 These are covered in more detail in AJP-3(A).
(3) Operations conducted over one phase of a campaign directly impact on subsequent phases.

c. It also requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, a careful understanding of the relationship of means to ends and an understanding of the inherent and effective synergy that flows from properly coordinated joint operations.

A1.4. Operational art is applied during the operational planning process, in:

a. Formulating the overarching idea and intent for an operation and envisaging how operations will unfold.

b. Determining necessary links between the tactical employment of forces and the achievement of strategic and operational objectives.

c. Establishing critical lines of operations as a basis for sequencing and synchronising actions and effects.

d. Designing ways to achieve the end-state with appropriate means.

A1.5. **Ends, Ways and Means.** Operational art seeks to match ‘ends, ways, and means’ in planning and conducting operations. It requires that a commander and his staff appreciate the strategic context and answer three basic questions:

a. **Ends.** What conditions should be attained in the operational area to achieve the strategic objectives? If the political objective changes, as it sometimes will, over time or in response to changing events, that new objective will invariably create a requirement for a change in the plan or even a new campaign plan.

b. **Ways.** What broad approaches will establish these conditions? Which instruments of power combine within these approaches?

c. **Means.** What capabilities and other resources are available and should be applied, within established limitations, to produce these conditions? How are the military and non-military instruments integrated to achieve these conditions? The commander considers the nature of the force, what objectives are within its grasp, and the nature of the risks, and their possible mitigation, inherent in pursuing that objective with the given force.

A1.6. **Operational Ideas.** Operational Art demands creative and innovative thought to find broad solutions to operational problems, solutions that might be termed Operational Ideas. Its output is the source of the Commander’s Intent and subsequent Concept of Operations. The output represents the basis of the Campaign Plan and is further refined by the process of Operational Design. As such it is the domain of the commander and the foundation of a command-led staff system. There are three closely linked concepts which are especially useful in the formulation of Operational Ideas: Centre of Gravity (COG) Analysis, Campaign Fulcrum and the Decisive Act. The key to Operational Art is to identify
beforehand what is going to be decisive in bringing about the downfall of the adversary. Identifying that decisive act comes from an analysis of COG.

a. **Centre of Gravity Analysis.** The concept of COG originates from the interpreters of the Napoleonic system. Clausewitz, for example, in explaining what constitutes defeat, suggested that the COG was “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends... the point at which all our energies should be directed”. What is clear from common usage, and indeed from history, is that a COG is a strength. COG Analysis is a systematic process for identifying a COG and analysing them in terms of their critical capabilities, requirements and vulnerabilities. Military force alone is unlikely to defeat an adversary’s strategic COG in isolation so an important relationship exists between the strategic COG and the military COG at the operational level. Alliance strategy should harness all available assets and activities across the instruments of power and focus them on undermining the adversary’s resistance; his strategic COG. It is possible that at the strategic level the COG might be something physical, but is more likely to be a moral entity such as a leader, a ruling elite or strong-willed population: it is an adversary’s moral strength to resist the Alliance’s end state, and such moral resistance needs to be undermined, neutralised or defeated for a lasting peace. At the operational level a COG will normally be something tangible, something real that can be attacked; the key then is to find some element of the adversary’s system, upon which his plans depend. As well as identifying an adversary’s COG, and determining ways of attacking it, the commander should also assess his own COG in order that he can protect it.

b. **Campaign Fulcrum.** There is a stage in every contested campaign where one side starts losing and the other starts winning, where the tide turns and the initiative switches irreversibly. This will be caused by a number of issues acting in combination and, although difficult to predict in advance with any certainty, there is value in attempting to identify it to permit exploiting its potential. In a negative sense, it might be the result of, for example: a higher than planned consumption of critical and irreplaceable resources, a series of tactical reverses, and a change in political context. Successful commanders achieve the end state before there is a risk of reaching this state, or plan in order to avoid it. Intelligence, operations and logistic staffs need to liaise closely to identify, then plan to exploit, delay the onset, or minimise the effects of, campaign fulcrum.

c. **The Decisive Act.** Closely linked to the idea of campaign fulcrum is an associated concept, that of the decisive act or the decisive operation. In Clausewitzian terms this was the idea of a single, decisive battle; “…how we may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point”. Battles, engagements and activities are now viewed as steps towards a higher goal, but it is

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2 Ideally, there would be only one COG at the strategic and operational levels. This may prove simplistic when an adversary may have a number of sources of strength, and it is not immediately obvious which is the most critical.

3 For a detailed description of this process, see AJP-5, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning’, Chapter 3.
still important to try to find something, or a series of linked events, that will be
decisive within a campaign (although not necessarily immediate in impact), that
which causes an opponent to forever lose the initiative, and the sequence of actions
that, together, will bring this about - shaping operations leading to a decisive
operation.
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX A – OPERATIONAL DESIGN

A2.1. The Principal Elements of Operational Design. The application of operational art requires a sound understanding of many different operational design concepts and tools. They are useful in analysing strategic and operational factors, understanding operational requirements, enhancing creativity and imagination, and ensuring a logical relationship and balance between ends, ways and means. Operational Design is a process which further develops and refines Operational Ideas. Three things together comprise the principal elements of Operational Design: the Campaign Design Concepts (CDCs), the Operational Estimate, and the Campaign Plan. The Campaign Plan, which articulates the operational level commander’s overall scheme for operations, results from the Operational Estimate and is largely constructed using a number of theoretical building blocks collectively known as the Campaign Design Concepts.

Campaign Design Concepts

A2.2. Campaign Design Concepts. The CDCs are used to build the structure within which operations take place, and can be seen as a bridge between Operational Art and Operational Design. In seeking to conduct operations, battles and engagements in pursuit of the strategic objective, the operational level commander will design the plan of campaign around the CDCs, described below and their use in detail in AJP-5, which help him visualise how the campaign will unfold and manage the development of operations. The commander uses them to articulate a vision or concept of operational design, a statement of intent for the campaign plan and a command structure for executing the plan. In broad terms, the CDCs serve three purposes: to focus effort during the Operational Estimate, to help describe in campaign plans and directives what is required to be achieved, and to assist in monitoring the execution of a campaign or major operation.

a. **End-state.** The end-state is ‘The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved’.\(^1\) It is the political and/or military situation, which needs to exist when an operation has been terminated on favourable terms and should be established prior to execution. An understanding of the end state is a crucial element of any plan for without it there is no focus for campaign planning. All activities and operations should be judged against their relevance to achieving the end-state.

b. **Objectives.** Joint multinational operations should be directed towards a clearly defined and commonly understood objective that contributes to the achievement of the desired end state. In simplest terms an objective is an aim to be achieved. Commanders establish objectives at their level to focus the actions of subordinates and to provide a clear purpose for their tasks. Objectives are therefore established at each level of operations. It is likely that at the operational level objectives will require action from multiple instruments simultaneously, for example establishing a secure environment might require both military action and civil reconstruction. It is

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\(^1\) AAP-6.
a primary responsibility of joint commanders to coordinate military activity with that of other organizations, seeking unity of purpose in achievement of the objective.

c. **Centre of Gravity.** The COG is that element of the adversary’s overall capability or system that most resists the achievement of the Alliance’s end state and which, if defeated or neutralised, will lead inevitably to the achievement of our objectives. A COG is defined as those ‘characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight’. COGs exist at all levels of operations, and there may be more than one at any level. As well as determining COGs of adversary forces, it is also necessary to determine Alliance COGs and assess their vulnerability to attack by opposing forces in order to provide for their protection. The initial analysis of friendly and adversary CoGs requires constant re-appraisal both during the planning and execution phases of an operation, as does the protection of friendly COGs.

d. **Decisive Point.** While it may be possible to defeat or neutralise the adversary’s COG, it is more likely that a series of coordinated actions will be required; such actions are described as DPs: ‘A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment’. DPs are the keys to unlocking COGs and can be attacked directly by the commander designating the most important decisive points as objectives and allocating resources to protect, control, destroy or neutralise them. DPs are logically determined from the COG analysis process. DPs are arranged along Lines of Operation leading to the adversary’s COG. A DP can be a place, a precise moment or a distinctive characteristic or quality upon which a COG depends to maintain its freedom of action and power. They need not necessarily constitute a battle or physical engagement, nor need they have a geographical relevance. The ability to establish favourable conditions at decisive points allows the commander to retain freedom of action, maintain momentum and gain or retain the initiative.

e. **Line of Operation.** ‘In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity’. Lines of Operation establish the relationship, in time and space, between DPs and the COG and can be functional or environmental. Commanders use them to focus the instruments of power toward a desired end, applying force throughout the three dimensions of space, over time and in a logical design that integrates all the military capabilities of a joint force in order to converge upon and defeat the COG of adversary forces.

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2 AAP-6.
3 See AJP-5 for principles and advice on COG Analysis.
4 AAP-6.
5 AAP-6.
f. **Sequencing.** Sequencing is the arrangement of events within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the defeat or neutralization of an adversary’s COG. It usually is best to undertake simultaneous operations on multiple lines of operation to achieve synergy across all instruments of power and to overwhelm an adversary’s ability to resist; but within those lines of operation some operations will depend on the successful conclusion of others before they can be initiated. For example, forward operating bases may need to be secured before initiating offensive operations. A commander may also wish to sequence his operation due to lack of resources or capability, or to limit the risk. Once the overall sequencing of the operation has been determined, the commander may choose to divide his campaign into phases.

g. **Phases.** Phasing is a method of describing where an operation cannot be developed until set activities are complete or a change to task organization is required. Phases are sequential but may overlap, particularly in peace support operations. In some cases the beginning of a phase may be contingent on the successful completion of a preceding phase. The aim in phasing an operation or campaign is to maintain continuity and tempo and to avoid unnecessary operational pauses.

h. **Contingency Planning (Branches and Sequels).** For every action there are a range of possible outcomes that may or may not achieve conditions or effects desired. Outcomes that are more favourable than expected may present opportunities that can be exploited while outcomes that are worse than expected may pose risks that can be mitigated. However, the ability to exploit opportunities and mitigate risks depends first on anticipating such situations and second on developing contingency options for effectively dealing with them. Commanders should anticipate possible outcomes and ensure that options are provided in their operational planning in order to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing circumstances and to allow them to keep the initiative despite the actions of the enemy. There are two broad approaches to contingency planning, branches and sequels, which are developed both during initial campaign planning and during the execution of the plan.

(1) Branches are contingency options within a particular phase, planned and executed in response to an anticipated opportunity or a reversal within that phase, in order to provide the Commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative.

(2) Sequels are options for the next phase, one of which may be the next pre-planned phase. They are planned based on the likely outcome of the current operation or phase, in order to provide the Commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative and/or enhance operational tempo.

i. **Operational Pause.** An operational pause is a temporary cessation of certain activities during the course of an operation to avoid the risk of culmination and to be able to regenerate the combat power required to proceed with the next stage of the
operation. As activities cannot be conducted continuously, there may be a need for periodic pauses, while initiative is retained in other ways, perhaps in other environments and it is sometimes necessary to pause on one Line of Operation in order to concentrate activity on another. Ideally, the Operational Pause should be planned in order to minimise any overall loss of tempo. Implicit in the term ‘pause’ is the ability to re-activate the Line of Operation in order to maintain momentum and the initiative.

j. **Culminating Point.** Culmination has both offensive and defensive applications. In the offence, the culminating point is that point in time and location when the attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender and the attacking force should transition to the defence or risk counter attack and defeat. A defending force reaches its culminating point when it no longer has the capability to mount a counter offensive or defend successfully and is forced to disengage or withdraw or face defeat. Identification of the Culminating Point allows full exploitation of the event, or the planning of Operational Pauses in order to avoid it. Sequencing and phasing should be designed to ensure that operations by opposing forces culminate well before they can achieve their objective while ensuring that friendly operations achieve their objective well before any culmination.

k. **Termination and Transition.** Termination is a developing concept. Essentially it seeks to focus on what happens when the operational end state has been achieved - how to preserve that which has been gained, how to make it enduring. As military objectives may be achieved well before the strategic end state is realised (particularly in a peace support operation), a follow-on force may be required. This force may be the original force ‘rebadged’ under a new mandate and/or mission. Therefore, within campaign termination will be the need to transition from one campaign to another. This is a difficult and complex issue for which there is no clear set of rules or accepted practice; it may involve the merging of lines of operation, or the commencement of new ones and the cessation of others. It is a critical area that requires early consideration by the commander, and a great deal of discussion and consultation with superior command.

l. **Direct or Indirect Approach.** While it may be possible to defeat the opposing COG by direct attack, it is more likely that a series of operations at DPs will be required to neutralise it. There are two alternative approaches for dealing with opposing COGs:

1. **Direct Approach.** The direct approach is a linear, uninterrupted approach against an adversary’s COG, often by way of decisive points. This approach

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6 Termination is more than just ‘conflict termination’, although conflict termination is one example. An example is NATO’s involvement in Bosnia Herzegovina. The 1995 Implementation Force (IFOR) NATO-led mission under the UNSC 1031 mandate terminated and was replaced by a NATO-led multinational Stabilisation Force (SFOR) under a revised UNSC mandate 1088 in 1996. SFOR in turn terminated in 2004 and was replaced by an EU-led force under a new UNSC mandate 1575.
may mean engaging the adversary’s strengths (the protection of his COG and decisive points). The direct approach is appropriate when a force has superior strength compared to the opposing force and the risk is acceptable.

(2) **Indirect Approach.** The indirect approach seeks to exploit adversary force physical and moral vulnerabilities, while avoiding its strengths. The indirect approach is appropriate when a force is insufficient to operate directly against opposing COGs or critical strengths in a single operation, and instead should concentrate on exploiting the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities in a series of operations that eventually lead to the defeat of the COG.

m. **Criteria for Success.** For each objective the commander establishes criteria for success that provide measurable or observable requirements with respect to the essential conditions or effects that should be achieved, as well as any conditions or effects that cannot exist for the objective to be successfully accomplished.

A2.3. **The Operational Estimate.** The Operational Estimate is a military problem solving process which is applied to ill-structured problems in uncertain and dynamic environments against shifting, competing or ill defined goals, often in high stake, time-pressured situations. It combines objective, rational analysis with the power of intuition (a combination of experience and intelligence) and its output is a decision about a course of action. Guided and energised by the commander, the Operational Estimate is a mechanism designed to draw together a vast amount of information necessary for the thorough analysis of a set of circumstances, in order to allow the development of feasible courses of action and the subsequent translation of a selected option into a winning plan. It is, essentially, a practical, flexible tool formatted to make sense out of confusion and to enable the development of a coherent plan for action.

A2.4. **The Campaign Plan.** A campaign is defined as: ‘a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces’. The Campaign Plan, the practical expression of Operational Art, conveys the operational level commander’s vision for how he sees the operation unfolding and is translated into actionable detail by operations orders and directives. It is essential in providing the crucial common understanding across the joint force of the Commander’s Intent and his overall Conduct of Operations.

A2.5. **Concept of Operations.** This is the heart of the Campaign Plan and belongs to the CFC. His mind should be focused on forming the essence of the Campaign Plan, and then communicating it to his subordinates. The ultimate test being that subordinate commanders can act independently as though they were directly ordered by the CFC. A CONOPS has five main elements:

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7 See AJP-5 for detail.

8 AAP-6.
a. **Situation.** A description of the circumstances that have led to a requirement for the CONOPS. Where appropriate it would also include details of political objectives, limitations and assumptions.

b. **Mission.** A clear, concise definition of the purpose and nature of the operation, the responsible military commander, the operation’s location and likely execution timeframe. The CFC should write his CC’s missions personally. A mission should contain a clear, concise statement of the task and its purpose and expressed in terms of: *Who* (the subordinate command), *What* (what the command is to achieve), *When* and *Where* (the parameters) and *Why* (the purpose). Mission statements should always have a unifying purpose (i.e. the ‘in order to’) and these should fall logically out of the concept of operations. The unifying purposes of subordinates’ missions should, when collectively achieved, enable the CFC to achieve his own mission.

c. **Execution.** A description of the commander’s view of how the operation will be executed, detailing:

   (1) Planning assumptions.

   (2) A summary of the key elements of the mission analysis.

   (3) A summary of the commanders intent and purpose of the plan including military objectives, desired military end state and the criteria for success. The commander’s intent should focus on the overall effect the force is to have on the adversary. It should be a concise and precise statement of how the JFC intends to achieve the operational end state by defeating the adversary’s COG, and should not be a synopsis of the operation. In effect it provides the driving logic behind the whole campaign plan.

   (4) A description of how operations will be conducted and any phases envisaged.

   (5) A description of military key and supporting tasks.

   (6) A summary of force and capability requirements.

   (7) Identification of any coordination requirements with other operations.

d. **Service Support.** A description of the support requirements necessary for mission accomplishment, including outline concepts for logistics, CIS, movements, medical and host nation support.

e. **Command Arrangements.** A description of command arrangements.
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX A – STAGE I & II

INITIATION AND ORIENTATION

A3.1. The following summary describes the two stages of the planning model that occur at both the strategic and operational level.

A3.2. **Initiation - Development of Military Strategic-level Plans.**

A3.3. In consultation with coalition partners, the LN prepares a political-military estimate in response to the crisis. This estimate should take account of both strategic political and military factors, and seek to identify potential broad options for military responses. Coalition political and military authorities would then use this analysis to further examine the situation and assist in planning and decision making.

A3.4. Once Coalition consensus is reached on an appropriate response, the LN will develop strategic military guidance, in consultation with Coalition partners and the mandating authority. As a minimum, this guidance should include a clear description of political objectives, the broad outline of any military activity envisioned to achieve these objectives, and the desired end-state. It should also contain key planning assumptions and any constraints or restraints upon military operations or actions.

a. The first stage of strategic-level plan development is the military strategic-level estimate process. This includes Mission Analysis, followed by identification of various courses of action (COA) available. The Coalition Force Commander (CFC) is an integral part of planning and should maintain overall control throughout the process by providing Commanders Intent (see Appendix 3). The commander will select the preferred COA and develop a strategic-level concept of operations (CONOPS). This CONOPS is a brief and clear statement of how the Commander intends to accomplish the mission, to include the military end state desired. The CONOPS normally includes a situation overview, mission statement, outline concept for execution, force capability requirements, a service support concept, and key command and control arrangements. The level of detail should be kept to the minimum required to obtain CONOPS approval by the Coalition political leadership.

b. The next stage is CONOPS approval. In this case, the LN, through arrangements for strategic political-military consultation, facilitates review of the CONOPS by Coalition members. Upon reaching consensus and/or directing revision of the CONOPS as required, the Coalition authorizes the Coalition Strategic Commander (CSC) to move on to the next step, military strategic-level OPLAN development. (CONOPS approval is not a pre-requisite for beginning OPLAN development, but it is a pre-requisite for full development of the OPLAN).

c. In addition to Coalition approval of the CONOPS, a confirmation of capabilities and/or forces to be contributed should be obtained from participating Coalition
partners before full OPLAN development commences. This will be essential for the
production of an OPLAN that details force assignment and missions.

d. OPLAN development entails detailed planning and synchronization of operations
within the campaign. The OPLAN should translate strategic concepts into joint and
multinational plans for military action by specifying how operations, logistics, and
time will be used to attain strategic objectives. It will be incumbent upon the
Coalition Strategic Commander to identify any shortfalls in capability or force
contributions that seriously impede OPLAN development and/or execution.
Consultation must then ensue to address the shortfalls, or the OPLAN must be
modified to mitigate them.

e. In a process similar to that described in subpara ‘b’ above, the Coalition nations will
conduct consultation and review, comment on and reach consensus regarding the
OPLAN.

f. Upon OPLAN approval, the Coalition nations will then finalize any SUPLANs
required to effect their participation in the operation. (Development of SUPLANs
may begin in parallel with OPLAN development vice awaiting OPLAN approval).

g. Operational-level CONOPS and OPLAN development follow a similar process with
the initiating and approval authority vested in the Coalition Force Commander who
will issue direction to subordinate commander(s).

Orientation – Stage II

A3.5. The Estimate Process. The estimate process is central to the formulation of CFC’s OPLAN
and subsequent updating of plans in an Allied joint operation. However, the process has an
application at all levels of command. The framework of an estimate is standard, comprising
a mission analysis, the mission statement, a situation analysis, analysis of opposing force and
friendly COA, a comparison of opposition and friendly COA, selection and refinement of the
best friendly COA.

A3.6. The estimate must lead to a COA that is suitable, feasible and acceptable, leading to the
commander’s decision and his concept of operations. The weighting given to each aspect
during the process will depend on the overall mission, the intelligence assessments and the
prevailing circumstances.

A3.7. Mission Analysis\(^1\). The mission analysis is a logical process for extracting and deducing,
from a superior’s order and planning guidance, the tasks necessary to fulfil a mission. The
commander would establish what constraints and restraints apply and determine, as the
campaign progresses, whether further decisions are required. As such it is a dynamic
process which triggers and then regulates the remainder of the estimate. It is continued

\(^1\) Detail in AJP-5, Chapter 4.
thereafter as the situation and the mission are reviewed. The mission analysis is the first step in the process: it includes the determination of the higher command authority’s intent, the analysis of allied security and military-strategic direction, including short and long-term objectives to achieve the end state, pre-conditions for success, restrictions and any assumptions made.

A3.8. Strategic end-state objectives describe in broad terms what the Alliance intends to achieve through military action; military objectives describe what has to be accomplished militarily in order to get there. Once the commander determines what set of military conditions exist, then the focus shifts to how the force will, achieve that objective. The mission analysis should also include the specified and implied tasks, and determine priorities where appropriate. Completion of the mission analysis results in a restated mission for the force, i.e. a mission statement.

A3.9. **Mission Statement.** The mission analysis, having confirmed an understanding of the operation/mission directive issued by higher authority, and the capability of achieving the mission, leads to a reiteration of the commander’s mission statement. The Mission Statement is one of the key outputs of the Mission Analysis. It is formulated to provide a clear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be done, when it will take place, where it will occur, and why it is being conducted (e.g. the purpose of the operation). However, the Mission Statement does not state how the operation will be conducted. It is reviewed to ensure that it identifies the command’s mission-essential tasks required to achieve the higher authority’s objective and desired end state. The order of the elements of the mission statement may vary; the priority is clarity.

A3.10. **Analysis of the Situation, Adversary and Friendly Forces.** An analysis of the factors that affect the mission is conducted before potential COAs are evaluated. These factors are assessed under 3 broad headings:

a. **General Situation.** The general situation analysis should consider the politico-diplomatic short and long-term causes of the conflict. It should also consider political influences; economic, legal and moral constraints; international interests; the characteristics of the operational area; economic and social conditions; science and technology factors affecting the operational area. It should also ascertain strategic requirements (e.g. access to territory, territorial waters and airspace) and associated diplomatic, economic and information factors. Completion of the situation analysis has an important influence on the analysis of the adversary and friendly forces.

b. **Adversary Forces’ Situation Analysis.** The adversary forces’ situation analysis should consider the opposing forces’ location, capabilities and vulnerabilities. The analysis should include: an assessment of current and potential COA and their political and military intentions and objectives; the adversary forces’ military-

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2 See AJP-5, Chapter 4 for detail.
3 The commander would normally have available a formal intelligence estimate to which the analyst can refer.
strategic and operational advantages and limitations by defining its strategic and operational COG; the adversary force’s operational characteristics and assessed combat effectiveness.

c. **Friendly Situation Analysis.** The friendly situation analysis should follow the same pattern as for the adversary force. The commander would normally have available specific supporting estimates, including personnel, intelligence, logistic and medical/health care service support, C2 and communications plus public information estimates. Development of the possible friendly COA is derived from the foregoing analyses, and determines how the mission will be accomplished.

A3.11. **Operational Analysis and Design.** The next step is to perform the operational analysis and to develop the operational design. The process is described in detail in AJP-5. The analysis process should focus at this stage on the Campaign Design Concepts described in Appendix A2.

A3.12. **Commander’s Critical Information Requirements.** Properly developed information requirements ensure that subordinate and staff effort is focussed, scarce resources are employed efficiently and decisions can be made in a timely manner. The analysis of key factors will typically highlight gaps in information that are essential to planning and the commander’s decision making that cannot be covered by assumptions. The Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) identify information on friendly activities, adversary activities, and the environment that the commander deems critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and assisting in timely and informed decision-making. Commanders use CCIRs to help them confirm their vision of the battlespace, assess desired effects, and how they will achieve a decision to accomplish their mission or to identify significant deviations from that vision due to, for example, adversary actions. CCIRs must be linked to the critical decisions the commander anticipates making. They focus the commander’s subordinate commanders and staff’s planning and collection efforts. They are central to effective information management, which directs the processing, flow, and use of information throughout the force. CCIRs should be limited in number to ensure focus, and be continually reviewed to remain relevant. The OPG should manage acquisition of essential planning information by addressing these requirements in Requests for Information (RFI) to higher HQ and other agencies. Critical elements of information that will focus collection efforts should be recommended to the commander for approval for each phase of the operation. CCIRs are divided into three categories:

a. **Priority Intelligence Requirements.** Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) are ‘those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision-making’, particularly in selecting

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4 See AJP-5, Chapter 4.
5 See AJP 2.1 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures’.
6 AAP-6, ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’.
a COA; for example the enemy’s intentions, or an assessment of the enemy’s operational capability. These are further broken down by the staff in sequence into:

(1) **Specific Intelligence Requirements.** Once the PIRs are produced, the staff will break them down into Specific Intelligence Requirements (SIR) or an intelligence requirement that configures the PIR in current terms. Example: The PIR ‘How to Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment’ could have ‘How will paramilitary groups/organization interfere with or impede the operation?’ as an SIR.

(2) **Essential Elements of Information.** Once all the PIRs are configured with SIRs, the SIRs will be further broken down into Essential Elements of Information (EEI), which are the fine, detailed information required to give a complete answer to the related SIR. Referring to the above example, for each group, EEIs might be ‘Goals, leadership, membership, procedure, area of operation, and links’.

(3) The commander’s intelligence staff will, when the PIRs are approved, develop a collection plan.\(^7\) The collection plan is a dynamic document that drives collection and provides constant indications on the stage reached by the intelligence support, in a planned or ongoing operation.

b. **Essential Elements of Friendly Information.** Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) are the critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and therefore must be protected from enemy discovery. EEFIs can be thought of as key questions that are likely to be asked by adversaries and adversary intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities and activities critical to the ability of the adversary to accomplish their missions, and therefore must be protected from enemy detection. EEFIs determine which activities must be protected by friendly force OPSEC measures.

c. **Friendly Force Information Requirements.** Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) are information the commander needs to know about his own forces, which might affect the commander’s ability to accomplish the mission. This includes personnel, maintenance, supply, ammunition, and petroleum, oils, and lubricants status, host nation and national contingent experience and leadership capabilities and time for initial and full operational capability.

**A3.13. Initial Force Estimate.** An initial estimate of force requirements is developed by conducting a ‘troops-to-task’ analysis of the mission-essential tasks identified during the mission analysis. This estimate updates the preliminary force estimate made by the CSC in

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\(^7\) ‘A plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies’. (AAP-6)
the Military Assessment. It should be compared against force planning guidance, especially constraints, established at the political-military level and other estimates. This estimate will be further refined during the Concept Development stage. However, it allows informal inquiries to nations by the CSC concerning the potential availability of forces.

A3.14. **Mission Analysis Briefing.** The purpose of the Mission Analysis Briefing to the CFC is to review the estimate of the situation, confirm the mission statement, the operational design, as well as to refine the proposed Commander’s Planning Guidance (CPG) for own and subordinate HQs use. The briefing brings together all of the analysis developed by the commander and the OPG considered during the Orientation stage and confirms the commander’s guidance for concept development. The commander’s guidance focuses on his initial intent and may address possible friendly COAs. Based on the briefing and any additional guidance, the staff then finalises the CPG.

A3.15. **Commander’s Planning Guidance.** The output of the Orientation stage is the CPG, a formal document that serves to guide further planning by the staff and initiates and orients planning by subordinate HQs. Three key elements of the CPG are the desired end state, mission statement and commander’s initial intent. The commander’s initial intent reflects his vision of the operation in terms of its purpose and the essential conditions that must be set at decisive points in order to achieve the desired end state. He may articulate his assessment of his adversary’s intent as well as risks during the operation and direct specific COA to be developed or excluded.
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX A – STAGE III

CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT

A4.1. Concept Development begins with a review of the Campaign Planning Guidance (CPG) as basis for further staff analysis and the development of friendly Course of Action (COA). COAs are initially described in broad terms and tested for validity. They are refined through analysis, war gaming and comments by subordinate commanders in the spirit of parallel planning. The results of the staff analysis and comparison of the various COAs are presented with a recommendation to the commander in the form of a decision briefing. On the basis of the commander’s decision and any further guidance, the staffs refine the selected COA and produces a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and a Statement of Requirements (SOR), which represent the final products of this planning stage.

A4.2. Analysis of Factors Affecting Course of Action Development. A continuation of the staff estimate conducted during Orientation and based on a clear understanding of the mission-essential tasks, the OPG focuses on factors affecting how to set the most favourable conditions for their accomplishment. This requires a more detailed examination of time, space and force factors in the likely Joint Operations Area (JOA) as well as an estimate of requirements in the different areas to carry out mission-essential tasks. Staff estimates are developed in accordance with Functional Planning Guides for different functional areas.¹

A4.3. Development of Courses of Action.² COAs describe methods, in line with the CPG, for accomplishing the essential tasks of the mission. They implement the operational design by describing how to set conditions at decisive points in order to dominate an opposing Center of Gravity (COG), while protecting the Alliance’s.

a. The OPG begins by developing tentative COAs, which are outlines of potential avenues to mission accomplishment. Many COAs will be developed, and progressively refined through viability tests. It is at this stage the JFC will become involved as candidate COAs are briefed to him by his staff, or he chooses to intervene to guide and focus the OPG.

b. Once determined, viable COAs are further refined by adding sufficient detail to permit further analysis and wargaming. This COA refinement will include a detailed troops-to-task analysis for each mission-essential task associated with the COA. This will in turn inform force capability requirements.

c. Each candidate COA is further analysed using staff checks from different functional perspectives and, if time permits, wargamed against opposing capabilities and

¹ Detail in AJP-5, Chapter 4.
² Detail in AJP-5, Chapter 4.
potential opposing COAs; this may require the development of draft synchronisation matrices.

d. Each COA has a final viability check by checking whether suitable forces are available at the required readiness. If readiness states are inappropriate this may require the implementation of some form of crisis response measures similar to the Nato Crisis Response System (NCRS) described in AJP-5, which will need to be identified in the COA.

A4.4. **Course of Action Comparison**. Based on the commander’s selection criteria the Operational Planning Group (OPG) conducts a comparison of the resultant COAs to enable the selection of the most appropriate COA. The comparison includes the following aspects:

a. **Friendly vs Adversary Courses of Action**. An assessment of the relative effectiveness of each friendly COA against each adversary COA, drawn largely from wargaming.

b. **The Commander’s Courses of Action Selection Criteria**. Guidance that the Commander provides to his staff to assist his staff in determining which COA best supports the Commander’s Intent.

c. **Compare Friendly Courses of Action**. A comparison of the relative advantages of each friendly COA against the other friendly COA, based on wargaming, staff estimates and the Commander’s COA selection criteria.

A4.5. **Commander’s Input to Courses of Action Selection**. Often the solution to a problem will be apparent at an early stage to an experienced command team and by this stage the CFC will have certainly identified in his own mind a number of potential outline COA. There will have been a wide range of issues, which will have influenced his thinking. Some of the more difficult to balance are:

a. **Initial Dispositions**. There will almost certainly be a political need to ‘get there quickly and do something’. In trying to satisfy this imperative there is a danger that later options are collapsed or severely constrained, or the force becomes definitively committed. The character of a campaign will change, sometimes suddenly, and the force structure to deal with the opening phase, may not be right for subsequent operations. At the operational level the initial disposition of a force is a major consideration. This is particularly true for a large land force, which will often be difficult to redeploy within a JOA, and logistic basing, which is a potential limitation to the movement of forces. Air and maritime elements can provide alternatives, including sea basing, and keep options open. Consideration of this issue should not promote an overly cautious approach. In the right circumstances a bold decision can achieve an early effect that can be exploited later.

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3 This process is covered in detail by AJP-5, Chapter 4.
b. **Offence and Defence.** All defensive operations should be of a defensive-offensive nature; a static defence is bound to be defeated in due course. Any defensive posture consists of two main parts:

1. A system of defence which aims at netting, weakening, slowing up and eventually immobilising an opponent, and a large-scale counter attack designed to defeat or destroy.

2. In planning for defensive operations, the JFC should decide which areas are essential to him and which are vital to the success of the opponent’s offensive. He should then dispose his force to destroy the adversary when he launches attacks against these areas. However, only the offence can be decisive and the defensive phase of an operation should be viewed as transitory.

Offensive operations should be designed to seize and retain the initiative, and apply unremitting pressure on an adversary. Any offensive plan should set balanced and realistic objectives, be flexible enough to exploit success, robust enough to withstand setbacks, and will rarely be successful without the achievement of at least local air superiority. Adequate time for the training and rehearsals of force elements (which will all have different requirements, e.g. air tends to need less time) before major offensive operations is critical, especially in a multinational campaign.

c. **Compromise and Risk.** Good planning is an exercise in compromise. Resource allocation is the CFC’s decision and is where the biggest compromises are to be found. The CFC should recognise what has been compromised and move it away from discovery. Closely linked to the idea of compromise is risk. Risks are taken when needed in pursuit of operational aims, or when the consequences can be accepted. It is often possible to recover from a risk but not from a gamble, but the pay-off from a gamble is likely to be much greater. Risk concerns threats to the plan and the actual and perceived vulnerabilities to that threat. The CFC’s view of, and reaction to, these threats will be based on his experience and judgement, as well as detailed input from the staff. Ultimately, it is the CFC who will make the final decision on the levels of risk associated with his plan, although these cannot be considered in isolation. Any military action will have potential political, economic, environmental and humanitarian consequences; what may be a low risk option for the military may be high risk elsewhere.

d. **Concentration of Force and Economy of Effort.** These 2 Principles of Operations are of particular relevance to the operational level. Throughout the planning and conduct of the campaign, the CFC will be constantly reflecting on where he can concentrate his force (not the same as massing) to achieve the desired effect. The accurate identification of where he can be economical will be vital in order to permit concentration at the point of greatest impact.
e. **Simultaneity.** Simultaneity includes simultaneous activities within as well as between operations. Simultaneity offers the prospect of overwhelming an enemy with so many threats that not only is he unable to deal with any one threat, he is unable even to prioritise effectively. This should be balanced against historical examples of commanders who, in trying to be strong *everywhere*, failed to be strong *anywhere*. This suggests that simultaneity should be viewed as something that may create the conditions for decisive action but that, if persisted in too long, risks weakening the attacking force, perhaps fatally.

f. **Logistics and Administration.** Striking a balance between the provision of support to components and national contingents, the location and size of mobile and static stocks, at the same time as preventing over-insurance, is critical. This hinges on giving logistics staff enough knowledge at the right time to allow anticipation, which will in turn generate confidence and prevent over-insurance and an unnecessarily large logistic footprint. Reducing logistic drag while ensuring support is in the right place at the right time will affect the ability of a force to seize and exploit opportunities. This requires both static and mobile logistics to be focused on the combat organization, and quickly reorganised if necessary. Logistics capacity is a common thread through all the above issues and is a key determinant in the selection of a winning concept at the operational level. As such the administration and sustainment of the force requires leadership and direction of as high an order as any engagement, and should not be left solely to subordinate logistic and administrative staff.

A4.6. **Course of Action Selection.** Following presentation of the viable COAs, supported by staff analysis, recommendation and the COA comparison the CFC will decide on the best friendly COA that meets his operational objectives. This may require the commander to solicit advice from his subordinate commanders. The CFC’s decision may not be a simple selection of one of the offered COAs, he may decide to select a COA with or without modification, or combine various aspects of the various COAs into a new option, or direct that additional COAs be investigated.

A4.7. **Development of the Courses of Action into a Concept of Operations.** Following the Commander’s COA decision and guidance, the staff develops the chosen COA into a CONOPS. In general, the CONOPS:

a. Provides the commander’s appreciation of the situation, including key assumptions and Centre of Gravity (COGs), based on the direction and guidance received as well as his own mission analysis.

b. Provides the commander’s own assessment of COGs, decisive points, lines of operation and his analysis of risks.

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4 See AJP-5, Chapter 4 for detail.
c. Provides the commander’s mission statement.

d. Describes how the commander intends to accomplish the mission in broad terms.

e. Describes the employment of principal forces and capabilities in a sequence of major actions to accomplish specific objectives.

f. Provides a summary of the major forces and capabilities required to conduct the operation.

g. Informs subordinate commanders, HQ staff, and supporting agencies of the scope, nature and likely tasking required for their plans, including the need for development of Support Plans (SUPPLANs).

h. Provides an overview of the concept for administrative and logistical support for the operation.

i. Provides an overview of the command and control arrangements proposed for the operation, including major Communication and Information System (CIS) requirements.

j. Establishes the information policy, objectives and messages required to support the operations based on CSC’s Information Operations (Info Ops) and Public Information (PI) directives which are in turn based on the NATO Information Strategy.

A4.8. **Statement of Requirements**. As part of the CONOPS development process the staff develops a provisional Statement of Requirement (SOR) listing the force elements and capabilities required to implement the CONOPS, including the requirements of subordinate commanders.

A4.9. **Concept of Operations Approval**. The CFC forwards his CONOPS for approval to CSC together with his contribution to CSC’s provisional SOR. CONOPS approval is required before submitting a fully developed OPLAN. However, the staff may continue with the planning process and begin the Plan Development stage of the OPP.

**Commander’s Intent**

A4.10. **Visualisation**. For every mission, the commander determines what should be achieved and begins to develop plans for the force to accomplish the mission. This visualisation embodies the intent for the conduct and outcome of the operation. It is a mental picture of the current situation and intended end state, and how (based on the higher commander’s intent, on the information available and on intuition) to move from one to the other. The commander

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5 See AJP-5, Chapter 4 and Annex 4I for detail, AJP-3(A) for details of the force generation process.
should transmit this vision to subordinates in clear and simple terms through the articulation of the Commander's Intent which is a key part of the CONOPS. The Commander’s Intent is an expansion and expression of how a mission is to unfold. It is a clear and concise statement of a mission's overall purpose, the desired end state, and any essential information on how to get to that end state; it should be clearly understood by all subordinate commanders for adequate preparation of their own OPLANs and/or orders.

A4.11. **Focus on Results**. The intent defines the end state in relation to the factors of mission, adversary, operating environment, terrain, forces, time and preparation for future operations. As such, it addresses what results are expected from the operation, how these results anticipate transition to future operations, and how, in broad terms, the commander expects the force to achieve those results. Its focus is on the force as a whole. Additional information on how the force will achieve the desired results is provided only to clarify the commander's intentions.

A4.12. **Unifying Concept**. The Commander’s Intent is the unifying concept for all elements of the force. It provides an overall framework within which subordinate commanders may operate. It pertains even when a plan or concept of operations no longer applies, or circumstances require subordinates to make decisions that support the ultimate goal of the force as a whole rather than a set of sequenced events that may no longer reflect what 'makes sense' at that time or place. In this way Commander’s Intent enables Mission Command.

A4.13. **Enabling Mission Command**. In stating the intent, the issuing commander provides subordinates with the freedom to operate within the larger context of the mission, rather than within the restrictions of a particular CONOPS or scheme of manoeuvre. The Commander’s Intent provides subordinates with the flexibility to adapt their actions to achieve success. By focusing on the end state rather than sequential events, it allows commanders to operate with increased speed and efficiency in decision-making. This allows subordinate forces, and hence the whole force, to operate faster, and with greater agility, than the adversary. This keeps the adversary off-balance and unable to respond coherently. The end-state focus supports the initiative of commanders at all levels by freeing them to focus on the desired results, even when the CONOPS should be adapted to changing events, when communications are disrupted, or additional guidance or directives are lacking. The Commander’s Intent provides subordinates with the same opportunity of developing a vision of their end-state, as it supports that of the force as a whole.

A4.14. **Command Involvement**. Because of its criticality, it is essential that the commander personally prepares and delivers the intent. While time constraints and combat conditions may require the commander to deliver the intent verbally, possibly even by radio or electronic means, it is best when it is articulated to subordinates personally and in written form. Face-to-face delivery ensures mutual understanding of what the issuing commander

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6 See Chapter 5.
wants, and the provision of a hard copy provides subordinates with the foundation of their own planning.

A4.15. **Summary.** The Commander’s Intent provides the link between the mission and how the commander plans to accomplish that mission. The intent should be expressed in simple sentences that clearly state why the operation is being conducted, the desired military end state and criteria for success, the military objectives and how the force as a whole will achieve the end state.
APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX A – STAGE IV & V

PLAN DEVELOPMENT & REVIEW

Plan Development

A5.1 Following promulgation of the commander’s Concept of Operations (CONOPS), detailed planning of operations within the campaign is conducted by the staffs.¹ The purpose of the Plan Development stage is to identify further the forces required to implement the CONOPS, to provide for their sustainment as well as protection and to organise and coordinate their timely deployment into the JOA. It also includes the further elaboration of details in each functional area required to ensure the full integration and effective implementation of the CONOPS.

A5.2 Force Generation/Activation.

A5.3 Manpower Planning. Manpower planning produces a manpower SOR that identifies the manpower requirements for the in-place HQ/CJTF HQ as appropriate that are required to support the C2 of the planned force.

A5.4 Sustainment Planning. Based on the Force disposition, sustainment planning ensures that the logistic plan is sufficient to support operations, and that re-supply procedures will provide continuity of support throughout the operation.

A5.5 Force Protection.² Force Protection planning should develop requirements and identify all necessary measures to be taken and means to be used to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment, stocks, plans, orders and operations to any threat in all situations, in order to preserve the operational effectiveness of a force.

A5.6 Force Deployment.³ Although deployment of forces is a national responsibility, the CSC plays a leading role in coordinating deployment planning with the contributing nations, as well as the CFC.

A5.7 Plan Approval. The CSC after consultation at the political strategic level will gain approval for Operation Plans (OPLANs). All subordinate OPLANs and supplemental plans require the approval of the initiating authority.

Plan Review

A5.8 Overview. The purpose of the Plan Review stage of the OPP is to ensure that plans remain valid in terms of continuing requirements, policy and doctrine as well as viable in terms of

¹ See AJP-5, Chapter 4.
³ See AJP-5, Chapter 4 and AJP 3-13 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for the Deployment of Forces’. 
feasibility, suitability and acceptability. This stage contains two steps: Plan Review and Plan Evaluation.

A5.9 **Plan Review.** Plan Review has two major applications: Progress Review, and Periodic Review.

A5.10 **Progress Review.** During an operation, the plan must be continually reviewed. This is essential to ensure that required changes or branch plans could be incorporated into the plan in time to ensure the mission continues to be achievable. During an operation there will often be changes in the situation, which may necessitate the review of a plan, or higher authority may direct it. The maintenance of a running intelligence analysis will enable an accurate appreciation of the opposing force’s situation. In this case, the existing plans must be reviewed in terms of the new situation to determine if additional plans are required or if revisions to current plans will suffice. The review should focus on the new threat, availability/flow of forces, suitability of COPs, requirement for additional branch plans, etc. Once the review is complete, the Commander should be briefed along with any recommendations for action to deal with the changed situation. It must be kept in mind that any major changes or amendments to the plan will require renewed approval.

**Periodic Review.** All plans have a limited period of validity due to the changing circumstances upon which they were based. Periodic Review is the normal, periodic HQ activity to ensure plans remain valid.

A5.11 **Plan Evaluation.** Ideally, the analysis of plans should be conducted through a review of the plan, in detail and through exercises and war gaming. In terms of time and quantifiable results, the most effective is computer-assisted war gaming. However, an analysis by independent staff officers (i.e. officers not directly involved in plan preparation) can also evaluate the plan. These officers will use their experience and appropriate planning data. The availability and suitability of a war game and time will dictate the choice of review methodology.

A5.12 **Plan Revision.** If, as a result of a Plan Review or Plan Evaluation, requirements for major changes are identified, the staff should address these changes in the appropriate stage of the planning process. If time is limited, the review of the planning process may be abbreviated and confined to an assessment of the new situation, its potential effects on the current plan and include recommendations for any changes that may be required. These should be briefed to the commander during a revised Decision Briefing.

A5.13 **Revised Decision Briefing.** At this point in the process, the Revised Decision Briefing to the commander should be kept short and to the point. The following are the minimum that should be included:

a. Situation Update (opposing/own forces).

b. Effect on the current plan.
c. Potential changes to the plan.

d. Risks associated with the current plan (if changed, if not changed).

e. Recommendations.
ANNEX B - COALITION LOGISTICS PLANNING GUIDE

Introduction

B1. This annex is based on the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) tenet that a MIC nation will serve as the Lead Nation (LN). The LN will provide the political and military framework for the coalition, including the coordination of multinational logistics planning and subsequent execution in support of multinational operations. In accordance with paragraph 0161 of the main body, this guide generally uses NATO doctrine and terminology.¹

Purpose

B2. Individually, nations face significant challenges in deploying and sustaining their expeditionary forces. Historically, the participation of military logistics planners has been limited in the early phases of coalition and or multinational contingency planning due to security concerns or national policy. The ad hoc planning of many coalition operations does not generate the familiarity and trust conducive to management and execution of multinational logistics. Arrangements for cooperative logistics occur in many cases later during execution phases of an operation, which lends itself to redundant and perhaps unnecessary capabilities by all nations in an operational area, thus potentially creating a larger than needed logistics footprint and multinational competition for scarce in-theater resources. Consequently, this guide encourages the early and active participation of logistics planners in the coalition building process with the overarching aim of maximizing logistics cooperation among the coalition nations. In addition, these same motivating factors support a growing trend away from logistics as solely a national responsibility – the historical norm. While nations have ensured logistics effectiveness in troop support by “going it alone”, it is now recognized that efficiencies may also be achieved without sacrificing effectiveness through burden sharing and meticulous early planning. This Annex is intended to enable logistics planners at the strategic and operational level to achieve these objectives.

B3. This annex provides an overview of the principles of coalition logistics planning and its roles within operational planning.

Scope and Format

B4. The primary focus of this annex is on the strategic and operational levels of logistics planning and addresses the planning phase of the operational cycle.

¹ The complete list of applicable references can be found at the end of this annex.
B5. This annex is in three parts. Part 1 details the benefits and challenges of Multinational Logistics. Part 2 describes key issues to be considered during planning. Part Three describes logistics planning activities and outputs in each of the coalition building stages.

**Part 1 – Benefits and Challenges of Multinational Logistics**

B6. Multinational Logistics (ML) is a general term used to describe any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more countries or organizations in support of a multinational force. To permit the Coalition Force Commander (referred to hereafter as CFC) to execute his responsibilities for logistics effectively and efficiently, certain principles must be observed. These important principles have been developed by NATO with an operational focus and are described in greater detail in Reference D.²

B7. **Potential Benefits.** ML, in the form of centralized coordination, management of common-user logistic activities and multinational support arrangements, can significantly enhance the ability of the participating nations to effectively and efficiently deploy and sustain forces. ML potentially may:

a. Expedite and simplify logistics planning.

b. Speed force deployment, increase operational flexibility, and enhance logistic sustainment of the multinational forces.

c. Utilize in-theatre resources more effectively and efficiently through coordination of host-nation support (HNS) and theatre support contracting.

d. Reduce competition among nations for scarce resources.

e. Enable nations to contribute to the overall coalition logistics support plan according to their capabilities and strengths (without necessarily being self sufficient).

f. Optimise logistics footprint.

g. Reduce force protection requirements.

h. Drive enhanced interoperability.

² These principles are: Primacy of Operations, Responsibility, Authority, Cooperation, Coordination, Provision and Sufficiency, Flexibility, Simplicity, Timeliness, Economy, Transparency and Visibility, and Synergy.
B8. **Challenges to Multinational Logistics.** Planners must be aware of the following constraints and challenges to ML. Ongoing planning between nations responds to these challenges; however, some are likely to remain constraints for the foreseeable future. During an emerging crisis, early engagement and collaboration between national logistics planners will help overcome these challenges. During peace time, coalition exercises and training that set objectives to overcome ML constraints and challenges will also be helpful.

a. Nations may be reluctant during the force generation process to commit logistics forces to support the overall multinational operation. This reluctance can complicate the timely establishment of ML arrangements that are crucial for streamlining support from the outset of the operation. Advance planning and early involvement in the mission planning cycle can aid in overcoming this reluctance.

b. Most nations lack the deployable logistics assets to support both their own forces and to provide additional logistics units for general support of the coalition. The establishment of bilateral/multilateral arrangements with other nations and the involvement in the formation of multinational logistics support units can overcome these deficiencies.

c. Lack of a pre-established ML planning capability leads to disorganized multinational logistics operations, which in turn adversely impacts the effectiveness and efficiency of logistic support, especially during initial stages of operations. Advance planning before the advent of a crisis can develop outline organizational strategies for the provision of support of a coalition in a variety of scenarios. On the other hand, there will always be an ad hoc nature to ML. An approach that encourages flexibility, adaptability and robust “plug and play” communication can mitigate many challenges.

d. Some functional areas are more challenging because of national sensitivities. Advanced planning and bilateral/multilateral arrangements/training may overcome some of these sensitivities. Examples include blood supply, sustaining ammunition, and mortuary affairs.

e. It is difficult to achieve consensus during the planning phase regarding common funding for financing/reimbursement arrangements, yet up-front common funding can significantly reduce critical support costs associated with strategic lift, common infrastructure and Ports of Debarkation (POD) improvements.3

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3 Common Funding is defined as expenses for forces required as either deployment or ongoing support enablers to establish/maintain an in-theatre presence through the provision of such services as Strategic lift, CJTF and Component HQs, Communications backbone infrastructure, Ports and Line of Communications improvements, real estate & infrastructure improvement and select common user supplies/services.
f. There are many gaps in standardization, particularly between MIC and non-MIC military forces that impede ML. Workaround procedures implemented by participating nations are often required to lessen the adverse impact of this lack of standardization.

g. The current lack of commonality and capabilities in national database systems does not lend itself to the sharing and passage of logistics information that is crucial to the establishment and maintenance of ML. Coordination among the MIC nations prior to the onset of a crisis can produce a greater level of interoperability.

h. At the outset of a crisis there is often not enough time for mission analysis to include all coalition partners. Issues concerning releasability and the requirement for the national decision making processes only add to the “time shortage” dilemma. Advance planning and the establishment of support arrangements are required to resolve common issues and to make ML contingency plans.

i. There is a lack of common understanding, training and exercises focused on ML planning and execution. Both operations require substantial staff time and effort. Familiarity with ML concepts and procedures gained through education, training and exercises can substantially reduce the conflicts of ML and maximize its benefits.

Part II – Key Planning Issues

B9 Logistics Standardization. Standardization is a continuum that extends from compatibility through interoperability and interchange ability to commonality. The focus of nations intent on future coalition building is interoperability, while simultaneously balancing national interests with a larger common mission. This is best achieved through cooperatively developed doctrine and procedures. Where possible, the adoption of NATO standardized agreements (STANAGs) and ABCA quadrennial agreements (QSTAGs) will facilitate the standardization of procedures within the coalition. Early exchange of logistics planning information will contribute to interoperability. Though more difficult to achieve at the tactical level, ML standardization can increase the freedom and flexibility of action of tactical forces.

Logistics Support Agreements and Arrangements

B10 Mutual Logistics Support (MLS). MLS is assistance between two or more nations in the transfer, exchange, loan or lease of logistics support, including contractor support. It is an important enabler in order to reduce support redundancies within the theatre and to fill national capability gaps. By working together and sharing resources, especially service delivery

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4 Interoperability is defined as the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.
capabilities, nations, individually and collectively, can achieve economies in their logistics operations. The requirement for MLS should be considered early in the planning process so that nations can initiate negotiations for the establishment of MLS arrangements with other coalition members and factor in such dependencies into national planning.

B11. **Mutual Logistic Support Arrangements (MLSA).** MLSAs provide a framework for the exchange of logistics support between nations. MLSAs can be either generic documents covering any transfer of logistic support, supplies and services for a period of years, or an emergent document designed for a specific operation or exercise where no generic document exists. Many nations have developed mutual support agreements or arrangements, either bi- or multi-laterally, to ensure provision of logistic support to their forces to cover a range of military operation support. Full coalition visibility of Logistics support arrangements and other Agreements or Arrangements that are in place is essential to ensure support arrangements fit into the overall coalition concept of support. Once MLSAs are in place, mission specific arrangements at the operational and tactical level can be quickly negotiated and initiated in the emergent context. Where pre-existing arrangements are not in place, significant time may be required to reconcile differences in national law and policy. In order to minimize the potential for differences in national law/policy and regarding the content/language within MLSAs, it should be the intent within the MIC to establish MLSAs between all coalition members before the development of a situation requiring the deployment of a coalition force.

B12. When authorized by nations, the agreements and arrangements may be negotiated and/or established by a CFC on their behalf. Nations may differ in their national interpretation of what constitutes an agreement’s legal authority. However, authority may be provided by a nation to a CFC in order to negotiate operational-level IAs or TAs.

B13. **MLSA Development and Documentation.** Normally a MLSA is developed with subordinate documents elaborating the mission-specific procedural aspects and the detailed support requirements to implement the MLSA. Documents within a generic MLSA may include Memorandums of Understanding (MOU), Technical Arrangements (TA), Implementing Arrangements (IA) and/or Request/Invoice Forms. Planners should ensure that these subordinate documents are put in place as early as possible and be aware that variations in interpretation and in format and content between nations are likely.

B14. **Financial Considerations.** While there may be circumstances where logistic support, supplies and services could be provided free of charge to some nations, the normal expectation is that MLS will be subject to reimbursement by the requesting/receiving nation to the supplying nation through cash, equal value exchange or replacement-in-kind transactions. Planners should ensure that financial procedures are understood and promulgated. For example, MLSAs will normally

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5 In the case of the US, a MLSA is referred to an Acquisition Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA).
provide not only procedures, but also process timelines, order formats for supplies and services, dispute resolution procedures, credits and payment currency. Similarly, contractor logistics support to multiple countries will normally be arranged through bilateral contracts. Terms, conditions, services rendered and payment will be clearly articulated in such contracts.

B15. **Common Funding.** As the coalition forms, an early decision will need to be made concerning whether there will be common funding or not. If common funding is agreed, both national and coalition financial and logistics planners must understand the cost sharing arrangements, financial procedures and eligible categories of common funded expenses. These expenses may include, but are not limited to:

a. Predeployment expenses for forces required as either deployment enablers or to establish in-theatre presence;

b. Strategic lift;

c. CJTF and Component HQs;

d. Communications infrastructure;

e. Ports and lines of communication improvements;

f. Real estate/infrastructure improvement; and

g. Select common user supplies/services.

B16. **Authorities and Responsibilities.** In multinational operations, coalition nations typically retain operational command (OPCOM) but assign operational control (OPCON) of combat forces to the CFC. OPCON in and of itself does not include authority over administrative and logistics functions, and nations may adopt command and control arrangements for logistics units that are different from other forces. Consequently, command, control and support relationships for ML need to be clearly delineated in planning and reflected in relevant plans and orders. Planners should consider:

a. Routinely granting the CFC coordinating authority for logistics.

b. Obtaining agreement from the nations to place some logistics elements under OPCON of the CFC for tasking in support of the coalition. OPCON of logistics elements may be limited to specific phases, time, roles, sorties/operations and/or units reflecting the capabilities and limitations of coalition nations.
c. Obtaining agreement from nations to grant the CFC the authority to redistribute specified logistics resources to meet urgent and/or critical requirements during an operation. The circumstances that might meet this criterion should be identified during planning.

d. Obtaining agreement from nations to grant the CFC directive authority for common support capabilities in other areas consistent with the OPCON of assigned and attached forces.

e. Routinely granting the CFC authority to exercise Tactical Control (TACON) of ground units transiting through the area normally designated as the Joint Rear Area (JRA). The authority and responsibility for TACON of units in the JRA or other designated rear area is normally subordinated to the commander assigned responsibility for these areas in order to coordinate security requirements and control main supply routes.

B17. **Logistics Liaison Officers (LNOs).** As discussed in the main body of the Coalition Building Guide, there is a requirement for nations to provide liaison teams early in the crisis planning process. Included in these teams must be liaison officers who can facilitate effective logistics command and control planning. From the outset, to facilitate planning and execution, the maximum use should be made of standing liaison officers in relevant national headquarters. The requirement for logistics liaison officers increases commensurate with the complexity of command, control and support arrangements. While it may be obvious, it is essential to send qualified LNOs with tactical and operational experience in the type of operations in which they are intended to plan. The LN will request the early dispatch of national logistics LNOs from nations that are considering participation in the coalition— and an LNO matrix should be developed. Within the LN planning structure, logistics LNOs will assist the logistics planning teams at the strategic level and will facilitate the exchange of information between the nations represented and the LN. It is expected that the logistics LNOs will be capable of advising the LN logistics planning staff of any national logistics constraints that may be faced by their respective nations and its potential impact on the coalition. The LNOs will also be capable of providing the logistics capability that potentially may be available from their respective nations should they decide to participate in the mission, however, the sharing of this information in no way represents a commitment on behalf of the nation.

B18. **Logistics Command and Control (C2) Organization in Coalition Operations.** The logistic C2 organization of a coalition operation encompasses both the internal logistic staff elements of the CJTF HQ and the overall logistic organization, as integrated into the coalition C2 structure.

a. **Small Scale Operations.** If the operation is relatively small or involves only a few multinational partners, the CFC may rely on the Combined-Joint Logistics Officer (CJ-4) and staff, augmented (if necessary) with functional experts, to plan and coordinate coalition logistic activities.
b. **Larger Operations.** In the case of larger, more complex operations requiring more coordination and common support, the CFC may establish a separate organization to assist the CJ-4 in developing and executing the operation’s logistic support plan. NATO designates such an organization for coordinating and managing logistics cooperation a Multinational Joint Logistics Center (MJLC). NATO has developed detailed doctrine regarding the flexible structures for MJLC including the functions and staffing of various coordinating centers.

B19. **MJLC Structure and Staffing.** The MJLC is a logistics staff developed to execute the theatre level logistics plans and policies of the CJ-4. Its size, structure and composition strongly depend on the mission, environment and the organisations it is designed to support. Guidelines for the structure, roles and staffing of the MJLC are found in Ref G and if used should be defined early in planning and the obligations of nations for personnel, equipment and funding agreed. To be effective an MJLC should be constituted in sufficient time to allow for relevant induction, training and preparation. It is expected that the LN will provide the core of the MJLC; some nations may have standing deployable joint logistics C2 capabilities that they may choose to contribute to a MJLC.

B20. **MJLC Structure Options.** The MJLC, when formed, has a flexible and modular structure and may be established as one of the following:

a. An augmentation to the CJ-4’s staff, especially during initial planning or for smaller operations of limited duration.

b. A separate staff section within the CJ-4 organization.

c. A separate organization integrated in or co-located with the CJTF HQ or other supporting HQ.

d. A module placed within a component command under the CJTF;

B21. **MJLC Functional Coordination.** Within the MJLC, functional coordination centers (or other equivalent cells) may be established, based on the operational need to provide centralized coordination of common support services, such as engineering, movement control, medical activities, contracting, HNS, and the provision of common supplies, such as bulk fuel and rations. Possible structures are listed in Reference G.

B22. **Coalition Logistics Boards and Committees.** Boards and committees should be constituted to address cross-functional issues and to develop solutions to logistics challenges faced in strategic

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\(^6\) Allied Joint Publication 4.6 MJLC Doctrine, Reference G.
planning and by the CJTF when constituted. When established, boards and committees will seek 
consensus through representation by coalition participants. They will be convened on an as-
required basis to meet specific operational requirements. Early in the planning phase, planners 
should consider requesting the assistance of standing multinational logistics organisations. 
Access to industry and key national/multinational logistics organisations can be facilitated 
through appropriate consultation and/or representation on relevant boards and committees.

B23. **Modes of National and ML Support.** The following modes may be employed for the delivery 
of logistics support to the coalition:

a. **National Logistics.** National logistics support flows from national sources usually based 
in the home nation through a strategic line of communications to their most forward-
deployed national units in the JOA. Each nation will require national support for national 
unique materiel and services. Planners must differentiate between what support will be 
provided nationally and what will be provided by other modes (described below) in order 
to optimize support and deconflict Lines of Communications (LoCs). Planners should 
still be alert to opportunities for sharing LoCs and associated resources thereby avoiding 
transportation/distribution node congestion, reducing logistics footprints and enhancing 
efficiency.

b. **National Support Elements (NSE).** Regardless of the level of multinational or national 
logistics a nation employs, it is likely to employ a NSE to provide integral national 
support to the forces it contributes to an operation. The planner will consider:

(1) The NSE types and level of support;

(2) Employment of other modes of support (described below);

(3) Physical location;

(4) LoCs;

(5) T-transit, access and basing rights;

(6) Contribution to the CJTF concept of operations;

(7) Coordination with the MJLC (or similar organization); and 

(8) Critical information exchange and reporting to the CJTF.
c. **Host Nation Support (HNS).** In the logistics context, HNS involves the provision of goods and services by national/local governments, often reducing costs, increasing efficiencies and avoiding sustainment over long distances. This is initially planned through logistics intelligence, then refined through reconnoitre and best carried out in theatre in a coordinated fashion by the LN to avoid erosion of host nation goodwill and overstressing host nation infrastructure/resources.

d. **Lead Nation for Logistics.** LN support involves one or more nations assuming responsibility for co-ordinating and/or providing specified support and other functions.\(^7\) If the LN concept is employed, planners must coordinate agreed LN functions with all countries involved and ensure a means of reimbursement (if required) is in place. A LN mission is similar to a Role Specialist Nation (RSN) mission with the main difference being that the LN mission is wider in scope for logistics support for all or part of the CJTF. The LN will assume responsibility for the co-ordination of a portion of logistics support to other nations within a defined geographical area.

e. **Role Specialist Nation (RSN).** A RSN assumes the responsibility for the provision of a single commodity, class of supply or service. It allows each troop contributing nation to exploit its unique logistic strengths and capabilities that, when combined with the capabilities of the other members of the coalition, can serve to make the whole of the logistic capability stronger than its individual parts. The RSN would not assume responsibility for coordination across the coalition; the LN for logistics would provide that function.

f. **Multinational Integrated Logistic Units (MILUs) and Multinational Integrated Medical Units (MIMUs).** A MILU/MIMU is formed when two or more nations agree to provide logistic and/or medical support to a multinational force typically under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the CFC. Due to the complexity and degree of coordination required to form MILU/MIMUs, planners should initiate assessments and coordination early in the planning process even if the requirement for the MILUs/MIMUs is planned for a subsequent operational phase or force rotation.

g. **Third Party Logistic Support Services (TPLSS).** TPLSS is the provision of selected logistic support services by a contractor. TPLSS can release scarce military resources for higher priority tasks elsewhere, overcome known logistic shortfalls and provide long-term endurance and sustainability. Planners should consider the cost-effectiveness and cost sharing of TPLSS, pre-established, short-notice national TPLSS contractor capabilities, and their willingness to provide contracted support bilaterally or

\[^7\] A lead nation for support is separate from the LN concept for the C2 of the overall coalition operation. An individual nation, who is not the LN for the operation, may agree to be the lead nation for a specific range of materiel or services.
multilaterally within the coalition. TPLSS can be sourced from within the host country, from the international market or from coalition national arrangements; different political and financial challenges may apply to each.

B24. **Coordination of Logistics Support with International Organizations (IOs)/Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).** Activities of IOs and NGOs within the area of responsibility are to be taken into account at all levels of logistics planning. Close contact is to be established and maintained from the outset of the planning process. IOs/NGOs most often operate independently from the CJTF, however coordination of their activities is necessary in order to assure appropriate security and to harmonize competing demands for local resources. Establishment of effective working relations with IOs/NGOs provides for the exchange of relevant logistics information and cooperation on issues of common interest. IO/NGOs often represent both challenges and opportunities. For example, their labor pool for humanitarian aid distribution may relieve coalition forces from similar tasks. The coalition may provide trucks and transport, while IO/NGOs provide food, water and the people to serve the local distressed civilian population. However, when rebels or insurgents prey on the innocent, IO/NGOs may require protection that creates an unplanned protection requirement on limited coalition resources.

B25. **Coalition Logistics Information Management.** Appropriate management and timely distribution of logistics information is critical to the success of logistics planning. Exchange of logistics information between MN and National Command Elements must be established from the beginning. Logistic information requirements typically required in support of a CJTF will be specified at Appendix 1 to Annex B (to be published at a later date). Policies and procedures must assure the timely release of logistics information to enable coalition nations to plan collaboratively and to enable the CJTF to operate effectively. Essential subjects to be addressed early during planning are:

a. LN responsibilities for setting up a robust coalition network, architecture and digital rules of engagement.

b. Access to both classified and unclassified logistics networks for hosting logistics application with sufficient bandwidth for logistics communications;

c. Collaborative logistics planning and support tools including shared logistics databases and Logistics Common Operating Picture (LOGCOP);

d. Logistics data management and exchange protocols; and

e. Development and management of Logistics Intelligence products, such as Aerial and Sea Ports of Debarkation metrics and capabilities, road/rail networks, and HNS capabilities.
f. Review of lessons learned from prior similar contingencies.

g. Establishment of logistics reporting, data elements, formats and frequency.

B26. **Force Protection.** Force Protection (FP) is an important consideration as logistics forces are particularly vulnerable. The multinational dimension can present further challenges, including a greater risk of fratricide. The following factors should be considered:

a. Coalition partners do not necessarily share the same views on standards of FP. The complexities of differing national ROE, FP profiles and national agreements with the HN will need to be factored into the planning.

b. Strategic and operational LoCs are particularly prone to interdiction. The assignment of supported and supporting component relationships for FP is key.

c. When setting the Combined Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR) the LN should articulate the levels of FP capability required to ensure uninterrupted logistic operations. Close coordination with the operational commander will be essential in order to tailor FP capabilities with the threat. Access to coalition intelligence assessments will be a key information requirement to enable this activity.

d. The CJTF FP guidelines and Security Plan should incorporate the needs and capabilities all logistic formations and organisations, other governmental agencies, HN, TPLSS, IO and NGO. Cooperation and liaison is key to success.

B27. **Redeployment.** Redeployment planning in ML operations is as complex if not more so than deployment due to a number of factors: environmental restoration, ownership of common funded items, disposal of property and the orderly redeployment of forces. Planners must factor these complex issues into initial planning and are likely to have to include them in MLSAs.

**Part III - Coalition Logistics Planning Process**

B28. **Introduction.** Logistics planners are an integral part of the overall planning team but will benefit from the detailed work of supporting functional and cross-functional logistics subject matter experts and planning team. Normal planning processes dictate that planning takes place in an iterative, parallel and concurrent fashion. The nature of coalition operations becomes more complex due to differences in national planning processes and cycles. This is a particular challenge to the coalition logistics planner whose focus is to create early effects.

B29. **Advanced Planning.** In order to reduce response times, MIC nations may wish to conduct advanced planning for future coalition operations. These efforts would include logistics planning
that will provide the foundation on which to build a support structure. The following activities are the minimum requirements for advanced logistics planning:

a. The overarching MLSAs between MIC nations, must be negotiated and put in place. Templates for MLSAs should be developed to facilitate negotiations with non-MIC nations when a coalition is formed.

b. Nations, willing to accept the lead nation role, need to identify the level of logistics support and logistics coordination that they will be able to provide. In particular, their ability to provide logistics and movement planning cells and the level of augmentation from other nations must be identified to ensure an early formation of these elements during crisis planning.

c. Nations willing to act as RSNs for specific categories of support should be identified.

d. The capability to form MILUs for specific functions should be identified and templates for MLSAs for the forming of a MILU should be developed.

e. Draft support plans for various geographic areas or mission types may be developed.

Crisis Planning

B30. **Initiation Stage.** As the crisis is identified it is important that the logistics planners use their recognized and informal links to build situational awareness and to start national planning processes as a precursor to the formal establishment of coalition logistics planning. The planners should begin consideration of the logistics information environment including the logistics intelligence assessment needed to support collaborative logistics planning between the LN and potential contributing nations. Due to the lengthy lead times to establish logistics enablers, there will be an early requirement to gain an appreciation of key time constraints and resource requirements to guide the coalition logistics planners.

B31. **Orientation Stage.** The key to success in the planning processes at both the strategic and operational levels is the establishment of planning teams at the earliest opportunity. Both the TCNs and planners need to understand that these teams must remain in place for the duration of the crisis, as planning is an ongoing process and does not end with the issuing of the initial plan.

B32. **Logistics Mission Analysis.** The aim of the logistics mission analysis is to focus on the single operational end state, the logistics main effort and the elements of the plan that are likely to become decisive points in the deployment and sustainment of the force. It will inform the overall mission analysis process and Course of Action (COA) development. The initial emphasis is on strategic deployment and logistics constraints. Key products resulting from the mission analysis
effort are the Commander’s Guidance and an agreed list of logistics Commanders Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). The logistics planning team must be prepared to identify the Logistics CCIRs required and where possible identify the sources for satisfying these requirements.

B33. **Coalition Logistics Intelligence Assessment.** One of the early functions of the multinational Logistics planning team will be to request the development of a consolidated logistics intelligence assessment from all sources concerning the theatre of operation. This assessment will be made available as part of the logistics input to the strategic mission analysis.

B34. **Logistics Input to the Coalition Strategic Commander’s (CSC) Guidance to the CFC.** The logistics planning team will provide logistics guidance for the CSC to in turn pass on to the CFC.

B35. **Concept Development Stage.** Logistics planners will be intimately involved in development of the COA. Logisticians in parallel with operational planners, will develop and recommend concepts of support based on variables of suitability, acceptability and feasibility to support mission accomplishment. The logisticians will advise the CFC on the logistics implications, impacts and risks associated with each COA. The results of the Coalition Logistics Risk Assessment must be included as part of the COA Decision Brief. The following will form the important selection criteria for the COA Decision Brief.

a. **Logistics Cost Estimate Input.** Coalition logistics planners will be expected to provide planning data to assist the financial planners with determining the various cost options for common funding or agreed MLSAs.

b. **Logistics Input to the Force Protection Assessment.** Through this process, the logistics planning team will identify the vulnerable areas requiring force protection to ensure uninterrupted logistics support to the CJTF.

c. **Coalition Logistics Risk Assessment.** The coalition logistics risk assessment consists of inputs from each of the nations to determine feasibility of providing the required level of support to the CJTF. A logistics risk assessment will have to be carried out for each COA being examined.

B36. **Plan Development**

a. **Logistics Concept.** Following Mission Analysis, the LN assisted by the coalition logistics planning cell, will develop the Strategic Logistics Concept of Operations.

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8 CCIRs are defined as the crucial elements of information identified and required by the Commander that directly affect decision-making and successful execution of operations.
LOGCONOPS). The Strategic LOGCONOPS is informed by the Logistics Course of Action (LCOA) selection, taking into account Commanders Guidance and will reflect the Logistics Risk Assessment and related mitigation. Drafts of the Strategic LOGCONOPS will be presented and reviewed at all major planning conferences and finalized at the Final Planning Conference. Timely dialogue between the Strategic and Operational levels is required to enable the Operational level Logistics Planning Team to support the development of the Strategic LOGCONOPS and reflect the logistics needs of the CFC. Factors to be addressed include the command and control structure for the coordination of coalition logistics, force preparation standards, strategic deployment, force reception, CJTF bed-down arrangements, in-theatre logistics hubs, in-theatre sustainment arrangements for the employment phase of the operation, mission closure and redeployment arrangements.

b. The LOGCONOPS forms the basis of the Logistics aspects of the OPLAN including the Logistics and other relevant Annexes.9

c. Logistics Command and Control. The planning team will consider Logistics C2 when developing input to the LOGCONOPS and the Logistics input to Coalition Joint Statement of Requirement (CJSOR). When developing options for Logistic C2, planners should take into account the scope and complexity of the support task. The size, composition and authority of the CJTF HQ, CJ-4 staff and MJLC should be determined. The supported and supporting relationship between formations and nations and OPCON/TACON assignments will be relevant. The Boards and Committees required for Logistics C2 should be identified and the terms of reference agreed. Logistics Reporting will be assessed. Once approved, the Logistics C2 arrangements will be documented and promulgated in the Logistics Annex to the OPLAN. Agreed national contributions of staff to logistics headquarter organizations and relevant rotation plans should be documented in a Coalition Headquarters Staffing Plan. Details should include position task descriptions, rank and skill requirements and intended rotation schedule. Redeployment and exit plans should be outlined.

d. **Logistics Input to the Coalition Statement of Requirement (SOR)**. The logistics input to coalition SOR development will occur concurrently with development of the CONOPS.10 This input to the coalition SOR identifies the force logistics capabilities

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9 The OPLAN should contain the following supporting plans included in the Logistics or other Annexes [Deployment Plan, Sustainment Plan, Contract Support Plan, Finance Plan, Logistics Information Plan, Medical Plan, Engineering Plan, Supply Plan, Mortuary Affairs Plan, Logistics Reporting Plan, Administration and Personnel Plan, Logistics Command and Control Plan, M&T Plan].

10 Although much of the development of the CONOPS and coalition SOR will occur concurrently the CONOPS should be approved before the coalition SOR is finalized.
necessary to support the force. Factors to be taken into account will include initial self-sufficiency stocks, theatre supply stocking policy, force disposition and sustainment requirements (frequency, range, volume and location of supply requirements).\textsuperscript{11} The coalition SOR should identify key logistics capabilities\textsuperscript{12} required by the force, logistics vulnerabilities and preferred modes including recognition of HN and TPLSS. Logistics review of the overall coalition SOR should consider FP and communications support for logistic elements and LoCs. A draft of the coalition SOR should be considered by the Initial Movement Conference in order to identify preferred options for deployment and any potential capability shortfalls to support the deployment.

e. \textbf{Contractor Support Plan.} The Contractor Support Plan will form part of the Logistics Annex to the OPLAN and should address contract requirements and potential sourcing, funding and timing. The Contractor Support Plan should identify all contract support arrangements (including TPLSS) intended to be used in the JOA regardless of source. Requirements for contractor support should be identified before national military contributions are finalized as they may influence deployment planning. Responsibilities and protocols for contractor tasking, deployment, access under SOFA arrangements, security, support, funding, contractor personnel tracking and contract management should be clearly identified.

f. \textbf{Medical.} It is primarily a national responsibility to provide for an efficient medical support system. This includes: maintenance of health and the prevention of disease; holding, treatment and evacuation of patients; re-supply of blood and medical materiel in order to minimise man-days lost due to injury and illness; and return of casualties to duty. An effective medical support system is thus considered a potential “force multiplier”. Medical support must meet standards acceptable to all participating nations and provide a standard of medical care as close as possible to prevailing peacetime standards, taking into account the operational environment. General medical support precepts and guidance for NATO are provided in Reference K.

g. \textbf{Personnel Management.} Personnel management is the formulation of policies and plans and the execution of those functions leading to the most efficient employment of personnel. While personnel management is a national responsibility, its execution must be ensured so that the CFC’s ability to accomplish his mission is not impaired. Manning the force ensures that military personnel of the right type and in the right numbers are in the battle space.

\textsuperscript{11} These factors are reflected in the Sustainment Statement.
\textsuperscript{12} Addressing all administration and logistics functions (including Movement, Medical and Engineering).
h. **Infrastructure.** Engineering functions are generally a national responsibility. Due to the cost, the differences in training and equipment and the complexity of managing large construction projects, it is difficult to create a multinational engineering element to support a coalition. It is recommended that the CFC coordinate the national engineering efforts by establishing priorities, facilitating agreements and contracts between nations.

B37. **Coalition Disposition List (CDL).** Drafts of the CJSOR are considered by the Force Generation Conference, which will identify and addresses potential shortfalls, overlaps, gaps and redundancies in capabilities and ultimately confirm the national logistics contributions to the coalition concept of support. Opportunities to implement potential ML modes that can improve the effectiveness or efficiency of coalition logistics support must be identified before the CDL is finalized. Final agreement is usually achieved following the Force Balancing Conference. Once national contributions are agreed upon, the CDL will be issued by the Coalition Planning Cell to allow nations to finalize their Detailed Deployment Plans (DDPs).

B38. **MN Detailed Deployment Plan.** The MN DDP results from combining and deconflicting national DDPs. This is normally done in a series of separate Movement Planning Conferences. Sequential simulation and evaluation of national Movement and Transportation (M&T) planning leads to determination of:

a. Initial gross feasibility;

b. Constraints to the operational plan;

c. Inputs to Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) planning; and

d. Shortfalls of national and HN capabilities, during deployment operations.

B39. In parallel, RSOM planning is carried out in combination with the HN, resulting in POD assignment, identification of reception, marshalling, staging and assembly areas, routes to final destination etc. Shortfalls of national M&T assets and of HN RSOM capabilities may require enhanced MLS such as pooling of strategic lift assets and funding for transportation. Common M&T planning tools must allow for the iterative sequencing of data between the coalition planners. The final MNDDP represents an agreed, resourced and feasible movement concept, considering:

a. Force packaging (including enabling forces and advance parties),

b. Desired order of arrival,

c. Time phasing,
d. LoCs and PODs,

e. Modes of Transport, and

f. Assignment of Transportation Assets.

g. The Movement Planning Conferences will agree the movement concept as defined in the OPLAN, to include movement architecture, C2 and the definition of agreed responsibilities. The MN DDP is continuously updated during execution phases.

B40. Logistics Information Management. Logistics Information Management (IM), addressed during Mission Analysis and LOGCONOPS development is a critical enabler for ML. Logistics IM arrangements should be documented within the Logistics Annex to the OPLAN with appropriate cross references to force communications arrangements. The Logistics IM plan should address the coalition logistics information architecture (including system design and interoperability, staffing, equipment, funding, data exchange protocols, logistics applications, communications support and bandwidth, releaseability policies/approvals, security, training and support).

B41. Funding/Finance Plan. Common funding obligations (if any) and related procedures should be identified in the Finance Plan. The plan will also identify processes and procedures for invoice presentation and payment.

B42. Sustainment Plan and Sustainability Statement. The Sustainment Plan is generated at the strategic level in consultation with the CFC. The Sustainment Plan includes a Sustainability Statement, articulating the CFC’s direction to logistics planners on logistics requirements, the resources available/limitations, and the authority to commit resources. The Sustainment Plan is iteratively developed and reflects the capabilities and constraints of coalition participants. It is refined as the logistics tasks are more closely aligned and harmonized with operational planning as operational planning evolves. By virtue of the logistics planner’s participation in all prior operational and logistics products described above, the Sustainment Plan tells the planner what logistics support must be delivered within constraints.

B43. Multinational Logistics Dependency Matrix. The Logistics Dependency Matrix informs all levels of command of the agreed support arrangements between nations for effective and efficient support of the force. Resulting from LN negotiations, first at the ministerial level, then at the staff planner level, the MN Log Dependency Matrix enables participating nations to determine, by support category, what contract, HNS, or LN/role specialist nation will provide a class of supply, commodity or service to others. The ML Dependency Matrix is the key product
from negotiated logistics contributions to the MNF. It allows each nation to reduce their logistics force and national support element by virtue of contributions by other nations.

B44. **Mutual Logistics Support Arrangements/Implementing Arrangements/Technical Arrangements (MLSA/IA/TA)**. MLSA/IA/TAs are enablers and take months or years to negotiate and finalize, thus at the outset of crisis planning, planners should have in hand or soon create a matrix that depicts bilateral MLSAs between each coalition nation and all other coalition nations in order to initiate coalition logistics planning. Nations may differ in their national interpretation of what constitutes an agreement’s legal authority. However, authority may be provided by a nation to a CFC in order to negotiate operational-level IAs or TAs.

B45. **Plan Review**. Plan review is a continuous and concurrent process of review against progress, military and political developments, new information and new guidance. In a multinational context these reviews are complex in nature; the effect on logistic support can be far reaching due to the numerous possible ML interdependencies in support of a potentially changing MN force structures and dispositions. There are two main methods of review:

a. **Plan Evaluation**. Ideally, the plan will be evaluated through exercises and war gaming. Logistic planning staffs must put in place the right logistic planning tools to be able to represent the logistic impact on variations, branches and sequels to the plan.

b. **Progress Review**. Once the plan is executed the logistic planner must be alert to the opportunities and challenges presented by success or setbacks. A system of metrics will have to be developed to gauge the effectiveness of the plan. During the deployment phase changes to the Desired Order of Arrival (DOA) can have significant impact to the MN DDP and will require close liaison with the CFC’s required date. During sustainment phases, the logistic planner will need to be alert to the opportunities to tailor the MN logistic footprint as goals are reached.
Glossary of Terms

- AAP-6 NATO Glossary

Acronyms and Abbreviations

References

**NATO and Other Multinational References:**

A. MIC Coalition Building Guide (MIC)
B. AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions
C. AAP-15 NATO Glossary of Abbreviations
D. AJP 4(a) Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine
E. AJP 4.4 Allied Movement and Transportation Doctrine
F. AJP 4.5 Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine and Procedures
G. AJP 4.6 MJLC Doctrine
H. AJP 4.9 Modes of Multinational Logistics
I. AJP 4.10 Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine
J. ABCA Coalition Logistics Handbook 1 Jun 2003-11-25 (ABCA)
K. MC 326 Medical Support Precepts and Guidance For NATO

**National References:**

L. JP4-08 Joint Doctrine for Logistics Support of Multinational Operations 25 Sep 2002 (USA)
M. JDP 1/01 Multinational Logistics Planning (UK)
N. Multinational Force SOPs Chap C-4 Logistics (USPACOM)

**Standardization References**

O. NATO STANAGs (Listing and website to be completed)
P. ABCA QSTAGs (Listing and website to be completed)

**Logistics Information Website Addresses Useful to Coalition Logistics Planners**

(To be completed)
ANNEX C - COALITION COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (CIS) PLANNING GUIDE

Purpose

C1. The purpose of the Coalition Communications and Information Systems Planning Guide (CCISPG) is to provide guidance to coalition CIS planners at the strategic (politico-military) and operational (Theatre) levels on what may need to be considered in order to provide effective, efficient and robust CIS in support of coalition operations and activities. The definition of CIS is expanded to fully cover all aspects of spectrum management and usage of spectrum.

Introduction

C2. The Coalition Building Guide (CBG) adheres to the four-tiered political, strategic, operational and tactical paradigm for the direction of operations. Broadly, these include:

a. Political – the recognised ‘civil authority’ whose mandate underpins the coalition operation and the political control of the operation shared by coalition members.

b. Strategic – the broad politico-military national and alliance or coalition interests, plans, policies, security objectives and guidance, and the use of national and multinational resources to accomplish objectives.

c. Operational – the planning, conduct and sustainment of major joint campaigns and operations to attain Theatre and area of operations objectives. This level also provides the link between the strategic and tactical levels.

d. Tactical – the battles, engagements and other military actions planned to accomplish military objectives.

C3. Key assumptions made in the CBG considered relevant to CIS planning staff at all levels are:

a. A coalition operation may be carried out within an established alliance framework.

b. In most cases, coalition operations will be facilitated by the selection of a Lead or Frame-work nation.

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1 Refer to CBG Levels of Activity for more specific detail.
2 (a) Lead Nation – The Lead Nation, or group of Lead Nations, is that nation with the will and capability, competence and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be
Each MIC member recognises that it may be called upon to perform the role of a Lead or Framework nation in future coalition operations.

The primary mission of coalition CIS is to facilitate command, control and support functions in conjunction with national affiliations at all levels. The identification and establishment of CIS links between the ‘recognised civil authority (eg UN), political and strategic CIS links in the early stages of planning is paramount. Existing links such as diplomatic channels (eg to Ambassadors) and military channels (eg to Military Attaches/Advisers) should be utilised in the first instance and expanded where necessary to meet additional political and strategic requirements.

Coalition CIS planners need to recognise the requirement to plan for and provide total CIS integration at all levels between participating nations in order to allow the rapid passage and exchange of information. It is also recognised that spectrum management has become a key element of CIS that must be addressed in planning both prior to deployment and during operations. It is therefore important that CIS planning representatives from participating nations and particularly those from any identified supporting force are included early in the planning process. This will ensure that any significant differences in methods of operation and the allocation of resources can be resolved at an early stage. It is assumed that the framework nation will provide the staff and tools to perform the spectrum management function.

Responsibilities

Primary responsibilities that need to be recognised in any coalition CIS planning process are:

a. **Lead or Framework Nation**

1. Coordinates the planning and execution of the overall coalition CIS framework and providing the strategic level J6 leadership.

2. Coordinates the design, architecture, governance and specifications of coalition secure and non-secure network requirements that will support the operation or activity including collaborative planning tool requirements.

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designated as Functional Lead Agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical subfunctions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.”

(b) The “Lead Nation” referred to would be recognizable within NATO as the “framework nation,” whereas “functional lead agent” would correspond to a nation within NATO which is designated as a “Lead Nation” for functional specialty support.

3 Refer ACP190(B) – A guide to Spectrum management in Operations.

(3) Ensures adequate CIS strategic to operational command links are in place.

(4) Identifies and organises the provision of critical and specific CIS assets.

(5) Plans, organises, and provides effective information sharing among all coalition participants.

(6) Prepares the CIS, security and information releasability policy, guidance and requirements to enable the designated Coalition Force Commander (CFC) to effectively operate within the Coalition Force (CF) CIS structure.

(7) Coordinates CF CIS releasability issues.

(8) Coordinates the CIS activities of the CF with relevant national organisations, contributing nations forces and other entities as appropriate eg. recognised civil authority, CIA, Gendarmes.

(9) Coordinates host nation lead-time CIS requirements (eg frequency clearance and permission to operate CIS equipment) through the relevant strategic commands as required.

(10) Ensures that measures are taken to minimise system degradation caused by IS network attack, action damage, system overload and/or Electronic Warfare (EW).

(11) Provides guidance to the CFC on Emission Control (EMCON) and Communications Security (COMSEC) requirements.

(12) In co-ordination with national administration/spectrum management agencies determines the spectrum access requirements of the proposed coalition forces and develops a spectrum management plan.

(13) Provides the spectrum management function in the CFC headquarters with links to national and subordinate spectrum management elements.\(^5\)

b. **National Contingent Commanders (NCC).\(^6\)**

(1) Establishes CIS liaison with the Lead or Framework nation and CFC.

(2) Ensures own national CIS linkages within the CFC Headquarters and CF as appropriate.

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\(^5\) Note that items 8, 9 and 10 above contain significant spectrum management elements.

\(^6\) Refer CBG paragraph 0136
(3) Supports the CIS activities of the CFC and CF with relevant national organisations, contributing nations forces and other entities as agreed eg recognised civil authority, CIA, Gendarmes

(4) Prepares and promulgates own national CIS policy and guidance to enable subordinate forces to effectively operate within the coalition CIS structure.

(5) Provides national input into CF security policy, standards and guidance.

c. **Coalition Force Commander (CFC).**

(1) Ensures adequate CIS operational to tactical level command links are in place.

(2) Requests adequate and effective CIS assets to support the CF.

(3) Plans and publishes CIS plans, annexes and operating instructions, including EMCON, COMSEC, and Spectrum Management plans that support the CFC and CF assigned missions.

(4) Nominates a CF J6.

**Organisation**

C7. The organisation of coalition CIS staff is critical to the overall accomplishment of the CF mission. It is imperative that the organisation capitalises on the capabilities of all participating forces and that the organisation has a cross section of all participants assigned to the various CFC and CF CIS staff positions. Formal and informal agreements may need to be prepared designating who furnishes, installs, operates and maintains key network systems and hubs as well as determining CIS staffing.

C8. Figure C-1 depicts notional CIS organisational relationships between coalition participants from the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

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7 Refer CBG paragraph 0135.
C9. There are several factors critical to understanding the relationship among strategic and operational organisations namely; understanding the command and control, the coordinating and support relationships that govern ‘technical control’ of CIS networks, equipment and personnel. Normally, the CFC (through the CF J6) has authority to exert operational direction and management over every aspect of the entire CIS supporting a CF.

C10. The operational arm of the CF (J6) can be achieved by the establishment of a CIS Control and Coordination Centre (CISCCC). A CISCCC provides an effective and efficient CIS planning, monitoring, and spectrum management capability that ties the strategic and operational command control networks together. Such an organisational structure ensures CIS planners are able to quickly react to future strategic decisions that may flow down to the operational level. An example CISCCC structure is at Figure C-2.
CIS Planning Considerations

C11. Planning CIS support in the dynamic environment of a coalition operation is a challenge. The situation may require several iterations of the planning process. Maintaining an awareness of the strategic and operational environments should be the first consideration for CIS planning. Some items to consider as potential situations develop are:

a. The political and diplomatic environment.

b. Strategic guidance given by the Lead or Framework nation (including guidance given on ‘recognised civil authority’ CIS connectivity, assistance and requirements).

c. The geographic location of the Area of Operation (AO).

d. The Commander’s mandate in respect of rights of Administrations as defined in the ITU Convention and Radio Regulations

e. Known interoperability issues.

f. Existing coalition CIS assets within the AO.
g. The operational status and availability of CIS assets.

h. The type of operation anticipated.

i. Maintaining situational awareness through close liaison with planning and operational staffs at the strategic and operational levels.

j. Ability to use extant or ‘in country’ telecommunications infrastructure.

k. Coalition information exchange requirements.

C12. Planning needs to consider provision of the following secure and non-secure CIS services available to the political, strategic, operational and higher tactical levels as listed in priority order:

a. Voice.

b. Facsimile.

c. Formal text messaging.

d. Electronic Information Exchange (EIE) including collaborative planning tool requirements.

e. Video teleconferencing (VTC).

f. CHAT.

g. Common (Relevant) Operating Picture (C(R )OP).

h. Imagery transfer.

i. Web.

C13. The CIS planning guidelines provided below describe the constraints, assumptions and critical vulnerabilities that need to be considered during the planning process:

a. **Constraints.**

   (1) Nature of the Information Operations (IO) threat.

   (2) Existing networks and systems available to provide information exchange requirements.
(3) Bandwidth availability and projected requirements.

(4) Availability of CIS personnel, assets and spares.

(5) Spectrum management coordination, clearance and permissions to operate specified transmission and processing equipment within the area of operations.

(6) Ability to obtain reinforcements or rotate personnel for sustained operations or activities.

(7) State of CIS training.

(8) Compatibility and interoperability of CIS between Joint, Coalition and other integrated forces eg CIA, Gendarmes.

(9) Existing host or ‘in country’ telecommunications infrastructure.

(10) Siting requirements for CIS equipment and location of existing commercial infrastructure and cable routes.

(11) Priority accorded to CIS requirements.

(12) Environmental conditions.

(13) Transport and movement availability.

(14) Information, physical, communications and personnel security policies and guidelines that may impact on the location or deployment of CIS equipment.

(15) Coalition information exchange releasability and system accreditation requirements.

(16) Identification and prioritisation of CIS links.

(17) Requirement to provide CIS support for the ‘recognised civil authority’ and Other/non-Government organisations (OGO/NGOs) eg. UNHCR

(18) The availability/implementation of a coalition wide capability required to more effectively support the coalition CIS information exchange requirements.

(19) Key CIS nodes must be capable of stand-alone operation to militate against planned or unforecast isolation.

(20) Existing CIS agreements, memorandums of understanding (MOU) and standards.
b. **Assumptions.**

(1) Provision of forces is not limited to each nation’s strategic response options or operational preparedness directives.

(2) Damage could isolate key C2 CIS nodes, bearers, and means of transmission.

c. **Typical Critical Vulnerabilities.**

(1) Availability of fixed, mobile, and deployable CIS assets.

(2) Availability of strategic and lift assets.

(3) Availability of military, commercial terrestrial, satellite, and High Frequency assets, nodes, and interfaces.

(4) Concurrency with each participating nation’s own Defence activities and extant operations.

(5) Concurrency with activation of other contingencies.

(6) Critical fixed infrastructure.

(7) Trained human resources.

(8) Ability to rotate personnel and equipment for sustained operations or activities.

(9) Ability to operate CIS equipment in extreme weather and environmental conditions.

(10) Hostile action.

(11) Congestion of traditional military frequency bands.

**Other CIS Planning Considerations**

C14. The following should also be considered in the CIS planning process:

a. Determination of CIS requirements by phase.

b. Allocation of responsibility against capability (based on probable assigned force elements).
c. Provision of capability domains eg national, allied and coalition.

d. Use of commercial telecommunications carriers for sustained operations or activities and their legal considerations.

e. Compilation and promulgation of EMCON, COMSEC and Spectrum Management (SM) policy based on direction and guidance from the Lead Nation.

f. Sovereign rights over bandwidth.

g. Diplomatic clearance requirements.

h. Use or provision of necessary agreements (Service Letters of Agreements, Letters of Assist or Memorandum of Agreement or Status of Forces Agreements). This should include agreements made to meet interoperability engineering standards through such means as NATO Standard Agreements (STANAGS) and Quadripartite Agreements (QSTAGS).

i. Establishment of a CIS Management Group (strategic and operational) to provide oversight of the operation.8

j. Bandwidth requirements for transmission of imagery and video teleconferencing.

k. Lessons learned or identified from previous coalition operations eg MIC, NATO and contributing nations databases.

l. Security Policy and accreditation.

Allocation of Resources

C15. Once CIS requirements have been established, tasks should be allocated to individual participating nations. Where appropriate, each Nation, by Service, should tentatively allocate its own resources to ensure that overall commitment can be met with some reserve capacity. If at any stage of planning it becomes apparent that CIS resources are insufficient to support the mission or activity, the lead nation should be notified.

16. Planning should be based on available military CIS and equipments. The Lead Nation will use CIS planning tools (if available) to analyse and assure the necessary level of

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8 A strategic/operational CIS Management Group need only be established where the level of CIS activity and complexity is considered to require a group that is able to specifically coordinate, manage, oversee and provide higher level guidance to the CFC J6 and CISCCC. The group should normally be headed by the Lead or Framework nation J6 and consist of nominated participating nation CIS liaison officers.
interoperability of provided CIS systems. It is unlikely that significant civil communications assets will be available for military use, although when available, integration with military networks should take place. When security conditions permit, lines or terminal facilities may be requisitioned from a civil telecommunications authority. This action should be initiated early in the planning process if required.

Other CIS Planning Guidance

C17. Besides reference to relevant Allied Communications Publication (ACPs), the outcomes from the following forums, committees and working groups may be able to offer further guidance to coalition CIS planners, particularly in regards to CIS interoperability issues:

a. **Multinational/Coalition.**

   (1) NATO CIS Planning Guide
   (2) Networking Multinational Interoperability Working Group (Network MIWG).
   (3) Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT).
   (5) Coalition Communications Interoperability Guide (CCIG).

b. **Combined.**

   (1) Combined Communications Electronic Board (CCEB).
   (2) The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP).

c. **National** - relevant Combatant Command/Theatre planning guides.

d. **Single Service.**

   (1) Australia/Canada/New Zealand/United Kingdom/United States Naval C4 Organisation (AUSCANNZUKUS).
   (2) American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies (ABCA) Program.
   (3) Air and Space Interoperability Council (ASIC).

Coalition Networks

C18. Coalition operations involve different communities of interest (domains). These are:
a. **National Domains.** The internal sharing of information is assumed to be seamless where proven technology allows full information exchange.

b. **Allied Domains.** These do not need a specific coalition operation to be formed rather, they require a permanent and protected environment for the sharing of classified or sensitive information. Bilateral domains offer the richest exchange of information between nations based on firm trust and mutual understanding, facilitated by common standards and proven technology shared between two nations.

c. **Coalition Domains.** Wider coalitions require robust but flexible C2. The CBG calls for a Lead-Nation to provide a mechanism for the exchange of information between the coalition partners. A separate domain may be created for each operation so that a multinational coalition can work together, ideally, at all levels of command and at the necessary security level. Coalition domains are established for a specific operation or purpose and include non-traditional partners.

C19. Ad hoc networks will usually be required because of the constraints in exchanging information across national boundaries. These networks, usually provided by the Lead Nation in an operation, provide the user with applications and reach into the operational and tactical environment that cannot be connected to National systems. Additionally, Network Centric Warfare (NCW)\(^9\) supports highly reactive Coalition Joint Task Forces through smaller and more agile mission groups. Commanders will have differing information requirements across the various levels of command and will require near-real time information. Domains between coalition partners must enable the sharing of information in a seamless, coherent and timely manner.

**Tiered Coalition Networking**

C20. The end-state for allied and coalition information exchange and collaborative planning is between national C2 systems, with the integrity of national information being maintained by Boundary Protection Services (BPS). Currently, BPS are not available for all coalition information exchange capabilities. Until a novel approach to the protection of national information appears, new capabilities will continue to be introduced which need BPS. Work should be undertaken to develop a standard BPS architecture for use in coalition operations recognizing that the selection of the key hardware, guard and cryptographic components is the responsibility of the lead nation. It is worth noting that this selection could be constrained by a list of approved hardware if such exists. Therefore, two types of capabilities will always exist: ones with BPS and ones without. Until now, no model has been available that describes this current two state Coalition Information Exchange Environment (CIEE).

C21. A Two-Tier approach provides a model to develop capabilities and evolve current and future networks. These are:

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\(^9\) NATO refers to NCW as NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC).
a. **Tier 1** - those capabilities (infrastructure and applications) with BPS solutions and can be connected to national classified C2 systems.

b. **Tier 2** - those capabilities that do not have BPS solutions and require additional coalition C2 infrastructure.

C22. Planners should note that both Tiers require the development of agreed multinational domain policy, procedures and standards that include security and Computer Network Defence. The end-state for coalition information sharing between traditional partners is the migration of all Tier 2 capabilities into Tier 1. However, until such time as BPS solutions are available, Tier 2 capabilities will remain. In coalitions where the connection of national systems is not desired, but unfettered access to information is required, the provision of Tier 2 capabilities must be implemented.

C23. The MIC has recognised and identified services considered necessary for future development of Tier 1 networks. These are as follows and should be considered by CIS planners for implementation in support of coalition networks:

a. **Initial Web Capability.** This is the ability to share simple web page based information between Nations.

b. **Directory Services.** As the Tier 1 user community expands, the Directory Service needs to be enhanced.

c. **Chat.** Chat provides operators with the ability to hold real time or near real time informal discussions with other operational planners through instant messaging.

d. **Basic Common (Relevant) Operating Picture (CROP).** A common situational awareness database or data structure and geographic format, used by commanders and staffs at all levels to present relevant tailored situational awareness views. These may or may not use the same rendering software.

e. **Military Messaging.** Military Messaging is essential for the transfer of accurate, timely and non-repudiated information.

f. **Reachback** is technically not a service, but provides a capability for nations to extend national connectivity to remote, deployed or liaison national elements embedded within another nation.

C24. **Future Services.** Other future services include but are not restricted to:

a. Desktop VTC (Video).
b. Desktop IP Telephony (Voice/Audio).

c. Whiteboarding.

d. Advanced Web services.

e. Shared applications.

f. Virtual Workspace Applications.

g. Scrolling Bulletins.

**Existing Coalition Networks**

C25. The AUSCANNZUKUS developed Maritime (Mobile) Wide Area Network (MWAN) provides tactical networking capabilities between mobile platforms, while the CCEB developed GRIFFIN is a multinationally developed initiative at the strategic-operational levels of command upon which to build, improve and evolve the coalition information exchange environment between national C2 capabilities. The MIC GRIFFIN Domain is being developed and will provide a capability, between nations, at the strategic operational level. GRIFFIN includes the infrastructure, applications, services, policy and procedures at the strategic and operational levels of command using national C2 systems. Directory Services and a basic Web Browsing capability are being incorporated.

C26. Lead/single nation controlled/provided networks offer some applications and collaborative planning tools that do not have BPS solutions at this time. Services provide a range of security domains at the operational and tactical levels, primarily between closed coalition systems. These networks will continue to be needed for information exchange and be maintained until such time as their capabilities are available at Tier-1.

C27. The CCEB, as the agreed body for coordinating C4 interoperability between the nations, will lead the development, consolidation and evolution of both Tier 1 and Tier 2 solutions. The development and evolution of solutions will address both technological and procedural aspects to allow the deployment of an effective capability.
ANNEX D
COALITION INFORMATION EXCHANGE

Purpose

D1. This annex identifies requirements for exchanging information between and among coalition members, and multinational (MN) partners in a coalition/MN environment. These guidelines are designed to facilitate the creation and assembly of a coalition force. They are confined to military-strategic level considerations and are intended to assist a designated Coalition Lead Nation (LN) in the process of coalition building.

Scope

D2. This annex supports the exchange of information in a coalition/MN environment across the entire range of military operations. These guidelines provide the potential LN of a coalition with the information needed to understand the capabilities that each Troop Contributing Nation (TCN) is committing to the coalition and provides the TCNs, in turn, an understanding of their responsibilities in the coalition and what the LN will provide to them.

Background

D3. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for a common purpose. Coalition actions are normally outside the bounds of formal alliances, usually established for a single event, or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. Some nations’ national laws require a formal mandate from the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or European Union (EU), before they can participate in coalition operations, and especially armed coalition operations. The formation and execution of a coalition is compounded and complicated by the political, military and cultural diversity of the participating nations as well as differences in military capabilities and resources. Consensus is necessary in a coalition and/or MN operation but difficult to achieve. Reaching consensus in coalition building begins at the strategic level. The development of a coalition is based on a clear understanding of mutual requirements, needs, national policies and intents of the LN and TCNs. Coalition building activities require a mechanism for the exchange of detailed information regarding the capabilities of each contributing partner and the willingness and/or ability of each partner to commit resources to the coalition.
Assumptions

D4. This annex is based on a set of assumptions being implemented.

a. In most cases, coalition and/or MN operations are facilitated by the selection of a LN.

b. There normally will be an international organization or entity (e.g., the UN) that provides sanction and oversight for the coalition and/or MN activity being considered.

c. Disclosure policies for exchanging classified information between and among coalition/MN participants are modified and approved as applicable to support the entire range of military operations.

d. Coalition/MN participants will address C4I systems’ and data interoperability.

e. TCNs and international organizations, when participating in coalition and/or MN operations, are willing to cooperate and exchange information with other TCNs participating in the operations in accordance with their national laws and policies.

D5. A single Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS) environment is established to support Coalition Information Exchange (CIE) between coalition and/or MN participants. Within this MNIS environment, information is protected at its source and access control is based upon the participants’ authorizations to receive the information. It is assumed that not all participants will be permitted access to all information available in this MNIS environment. In a coalition and/or MN operation, factors such as country and the classification level of information determine which participants have access to what information. This MNIS environment will support the processing, storing, and transmission of releasable information from pre-hostilities through post-combat operational planning and execution. Only participants in coalition and/or MN operations are allowed access to the specific domain within the MNIS environment as well as to selected information regarding the respective coalition and/or MN operations. This MNIS environment is constructed to support the exchange of information with other systems and to provide support for MN exercises and MN experiments. The MNIS environment also supports education and training of participants’ operational and tactical staff in collaborative planning and other planning factors utilizing distributed learning technologies. The MNIS environment supporting CIE is flexible, secure and robust. When fully implemented, the environment supports multilateral or bilateral information exchanges between coalition and/or MN staffs and forces deployed to operational areas as well as between military staffs and governmental locations in each participating nation to include staffs within their national/strategic headquarters.

D6. Coalition and/or MN staffs of the LN and TCNs will develop the enabling concepts and agreements that facilitate building a common MNIS environment that supports CIE in coalition and/or MN operation while ensuring each nation’s national operational and planning needs are satisfied. The MNIS environment supports the overall goal of the MIC.
to provide for the exchange of relevant information across national boundaries in support of the warfighter in coalition and/or MN operation.

**MNIS Environment**

D7. In facilitating the exchange of information, a MNIS environment is established that ensures the exchange of relevant, accurate, and timely information/data between commanders and their staffs participating in coalition and/or MN operations. A MNIS environment is essential in facilitating the transfer of Military Information (MI) (between the various nations participating in the operations to include contributing nations). It is a complex and challenging task and will be implemented using a phased approach.

**Requirements**

D8. MN operations lessons identified have demonstrated a need to share relevant information in a timely manner between coalition members involved in planning for and conducting the full range of activities required to support MN military operations. In order to establish coalitions and/or MN partnerships, information sharing requirements must be identified and vetted collectively by coalition participants. Limiting factors on coalition and/or MN operations are bilateral and multilateral agreements, foreign disclosure policies, agreed technical standards to ensure information sharing and information technology and communications capabilities of individual participants, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) agreements, budgetary constraints, and release of communications security devices. The following are IS requirements necessary in a MNIS environment to ensure successful operations.

a. A formal process prioritizing common warfighting information requirements to achieve economies in coalition MNIS systems and solutions. At the operational and tactical level of warfare, the command and control (C2) system must provide for situational awareness, planning, execution and assessment. The essential Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) must be identified that provide a MN force with a common understanding of these elements of operation planning, execution, and assessment.

b. A formal mechanism, established by each participating nation, in accordance with their national policies and procedures, for the release of MI to the other participating nations. Commanders decide what MI is shared in accordance with national policies. Appendix D4 of Annex D of the MIC CBG provides a Generic Operational IERs Matrix. The Generic Operational IERs Matrix provides an excellent starting point for identifying and assessing information requirements. The IER Matrix, however, is not an all-inclusive list of MN and/or coalition information needs.

c. Verification, prior to disclosure, that the intended nation/nations require access to the classified MI to perform their official duties within the coalition or MN operation. National custodians of classified information are responsible for this verification of need for access. Access to MI needed to conduct the full spectrum of operations is
controlled, as determined by each coalition participant’s overall level of participation and need to know.

d. **Support of the exchange of classified MI within established national disclosure policies for each participating nation employing diverse physical/virtual environments.** Functional requirements supported by a combined wide area network (CWAN) are included in the MIC MN CWAN CONOPS document. A CWAN is considered an enabling tool for exchanging classified MI between: LN and TCNs, coalition partners, and participants conducting MN operations in support of a common set of objectives.

e. **Protection of classified MI exchanged between nations and accreditation/certification of information domains/networks.** Nations participating in information domains must ensure that the information they receive is protected in accordance with applicable agreements, and all information, including MI, that is electronically shared within the MNIS environment is appropriately classified and labeled. Within deployed headquarters, MI must be exchanged among coalition and/or MN members to facilitate collaborative planning, allocation of forces, logistics planning, and C2 coordination. Not all national participants are authorized access to all MI held by all coalition nations. National disclosure policies may require the establishment of multiple information domains within the deployed coalition headquarters. Each information domain defines the access control rules/foreign disclosure policies impacting the exchange of information between nations/participants on that domain. The level of protection needed for each information domain is determined by the potential harm resulting from unauthorized disclosure of that information. These domains facilitate the exchange of released information essential in conducting crisis action planning and mission execution. However, these domains are structured and used in accordance with established classified information disclosure policies that safeguard a participating nation’s classified or sensitive MI as required. The level of access restriction needed is defined in the bilateral and/or multilateral agreements between nations participating in the various phases of coalition and/or MN operation. The establishment of an accreditation body is required to support the MNIS environment.

f. **A formal mechanism for sharing of intelligence information between nations in coalition/MN operations.** Intelligence data for pending and/or on-going operations may be shared between coalition and MN partner nations. Threats to coalition forces are pervasive and may come from a wide variety of sources as demonstrated in recent MN operations. Therefore, each participating nation must exchange information from many sources including law enforcement, economic, political, infrastructure, organizational, or military to enable coalition and/or MN operation to achieve rapid success using the appropriate level of resources. Analysis of all sources of information can be processed into fused intelligence to ensure national assets provided by each participating nation are best employed or deployed to disable the adversary. Development of operational plans based on a broad spectrum of intelligence information enables the right force levels to be employed in theater at the right time in the right location.
Sharing of post action assessments among appropriate nations needed to support ongoing operations in support of operations tempo and collaborative planning. Results of post action assessments must be available to all appropriate nations in the MNIS environment to facilitate operational tempo and collaborative planning that may include the rapid reprioritization of assets in support of current and future objectives in the ongoing operation. All authorized coalition and/or MN participating nations must have the capabilities to independently and collaboratively evaluate (at any given time) the progress of the operations to best manage and apply the assets they have committed.

Standing operational and tactical level national headquarters should support collaborative activities. Standing headquarters (HQs) must be properly staffed to ensure LN and TCNs are properly represented and that personnel are trained and proficient in the use of the collaborative planning tools available to support collaborative activities.

Potential MN participants and/or coalition partners must integrate C2 systems that are interoperable and accredited within the operational MNIS environment. The MNIS environment must support global operations. It should be capable and accredited of accepting and/or providing data from existing intelligence networks. The core components of a MNIS environment should be available on a 24-hour/7-days per week basis to all participating nations and national C2 systems. The core component must satisfy all coalition and/or MN accreditation requirements for plugging-in on the CWAN. The purchase and maintenance of equipment required to connect to and interoperate with the CWAN is the responsibility of each nation participating in the MNIS environment. The LN will coordinate with TCNs/participating nations in identifying capabilities required to connect to the MNIS environment in supporting the planning of and conduct of the operations.

The MNIS environment is implemented through a single, secure, multi-domain network, a set of common TTPs, and deployable, expandable, and adaptable for the type of information services required to establish and support a deployable headquarters.

The MNIS environment shall use internationally accepted encryption, standardized information formats, and categories of information for exchange with coalition members.

The MNIS environment shall support education and training for operational and tactical staff planning, and the principles of distributed learning.

The MNIS environment shall take advantage of commercially available systems to execute global operations and shall provide the capability to exchange information in a timely and accurate fashion.
Constraints and Limitations

D13. **Capabilities.** The informational, operational, and technical capabilities each participant brings to a coalition may be different. Participating nations must understand the constraints on information exchange and agree to a MN and/or coalition processes to make this concept of operations viable.

D14. **Security.** Each coalition member is responsible for establishing and maintaining a secure interface (Boundary Protection Service) between their national system and the MN C2 system that meets mutually agreed security accreditation requirements.

D15. **Foreign Disclosure.** Each coalition member will comply with their nation’s foreign disclosure policy to meet requirements for sharing MI with other participating nations.

D16. **Information Throughput.** Each coalition and/or MN member will allocate sufficient bandwidth to ensure IS requirements are established and maintained across the full spectrum of operations.

D17. **Interoperability of Information Systems.** Protocols and other technical interfaces of the various network systems will comply with applicable international and NATO standards in order to achieve interoperability. Coalition interoperability trials between information systems of participating nations will be used to verify and test interoperability based on established and approved protocols and standards. Interoperability issues identified during Multinational Experiments (MNEs) will be addressed collectively by the LN/TCNs or resolved between the participating nations. Note: Trials may be conducted within the MNE framework and other coalition trial venues such as the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (CWID) or by other activities conducted on the MN Combined Federated Battle Laboratories Network (CFBLNet). This includes feeder systems and Automated Identification Technology (AIT).

D18. **Political Factors.** Political considerations are an important factor in all MN operations and especially in the early stages when courses of action and negotiations are conducted to stand-up a MN or coalition arrangement. Coordination at the strategic level between participating nations is essential to ensure national leaders have viability through all phases of pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis operations as required.

D19. **Policies and Procedures.** Coalition and MN arrangements are based on bilateral or multilateral agreements that include information/intelligence exchange policies and procedures. These policies and procedures should contribute to the MNIS environment and support MN and coalition operations.

D20. **Cultural and Language Differences.** Culture and language differences and sensitivities have an impact on coalition operations and must be taken into account when establishing a MN or coalition operations.
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX D
INFORMATION EXCHANGE OUTSIDE AND DURING OPERATIONS

Information Exchanged Outside Operations

D1.1. Purpose. Military Information (MI) exchange and sharing are necessary during peacetime to coordinate and plan coalition operations. MIC members share or exchange MI prior to planning for and conducting operations. These activities enhance collective military preparedness, readiness, and interoperability. MI is used in organizing and training MIC member nations’ forces and also supports Concept Development and Experimentation (CDE) activities between MIC member nations.

D1.2. MI to be exchanged. The exchange of MI between MIC member nations involves all aspects and phases of military operations including pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis activities. MI exchange facilitates understanding between MIC member nations related to their forces, capabilities, and doctrine. The MI to be exchanged includes:

a. Doctrine and tactics,

b. Standing operating procedures (SOPs),

c. Lessons learned data and processes,

d. General releasable weapon, information and mobility systems characteristics, that include performance, reliability, survivability and interoperability data,

e. Logistic information,

f. Intelligence products such as reports, summaries, indicators and warning.

D1.3. Principles. MI is normally exchanged based on the general understanding that other coalition and/or multinational partners will freely exchange information with one another in accordance with established national disclosure policies and procedures.

Information Exchanged During Operations

D1.4. Political-Military Process. In order to have a common understanding of the situation and to seek a consensus on the need for forming a coalition, potential participants exchange strategic intelligence assessments on the crisis or conflict. After an event triggers a response, participants initiate the coalition strategic planning process by sharing information on a number of factors to include intelligence assessment on the theater involved and the nations involved or potentially involved in the crisis (i.e. description of the entities involved in the crisis or posing a threat to the entities, other relevant factors regarding the crisis and various scenarios available to the coalition in responding to the crisis or threat), summaries on force capability in the theater, development of strategic options, and assessments of the
relevancy and feasibility of the options developed in order to determine the coalition end state, the coalition’s strategic objectives, and evaluating the strategic options in order to select the best option for the coalition.

D1.5. Operational Planning Process. Participants provide MI to support the operational planning process. MI is exchanged between the LN-provided combined or multinational staffs and at the military strategic, operational and tactical levels.

a. MI for Estimate Process. The following MI is exchanged between participating nations (is provided by nations to the Operational planning staff):

(1) Intelligence summaries and reports on: the battlespace, the adversary or belligerent’s systems, intentions, strategic and operational capabilities; and centers of gravity and other items which support such staff products as JIPB, Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Estimates, and intelligence supporting targeting;

(2) MI on participant’s forces’ capabilities, which support the development of the courses of action, and includes capabilities, orders of battle, doctrinal concerns, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

Generic Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) are listed in Appendix D4 to Annex D. At the beginning of the planning process, when LN staffs are not fully operational, participants may, on their own initiative, provide MI on generic information requirements based on their assessments of the selected military options available to the coalition.

b. MI for Activation and Deployment Process. Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) and the LN share MI during the pre-crisis phase of operations related to the type, size, organization, doctrinal issues, capabilities, policies and procedures of their respective forces. The LN provides guidance on the coalition mandate, guidelines on what is expected of TCNs, the Command and Control (C2) architecture that will be used, and intelligence information necessary for the TCN to activate and prepare its forces for deployment. Appendix D2 of Annex D provides guidance on the type of information required from TCNs for defining their involvement in the coalition.

c. MI for OPLAN. Each Participant provides MI that assists in the drafting of the coalition Operations Plan (OPLAN). The information required to write the OPLAN includes target analysis, basic intelligence summary, meteorological and geographic information, etc. As required, participants in the theater share, in order to coordinate the authorized activities, MI on a variety of topics such as national points of contact, weapons availability, characteristics of information and mobility systems, electromagnetic spectrum management used by C2 systems, etc.
D1.6. MI for Conduct of Operations. TCNs share MI on:

a. The TCN commitment based on their reinforcement capabilities, unit’s rotational schedule, and other updated information impacting new tasks and/or coordination measures within the coalition staffs, etc;

b. National intelligence summaries and reports that address current target and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) intelligence, which support the development and sharing of a Common Operational Picture (COP), and the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).

D1.7. Lessons Learned. Participants share lessons learned on the current coalition operations.

a. The LN and TCNs share real-time lessons learned in order to assess and upgrade their current capabilities.

b. The LN and TCNs share/exchange lessons learned at the conclusion of operations and may provide these lessons to other non-TCN Participants as agreed to by all coalition participants.


a. MI is shared within the coalition structure using the coalition C2 system provided and approved by the LN.

b. Only under specific approved circumstances, can the coalition staff integrate MI provided by LN and TCNs,

(1) As raw data, fused information or assessments to be used by the coalition staff, or

(2) As finished products directly supporting the coalition’s decision making process.

c. All coalition participants need access to MI on a “need to know” basis.

d. During an operation, MI exchanged during peacetime with non-participating MIC member nations will only be exchanged with the explicit consent of participating MIC member nations.

e. MIC member nations not participating in the coalition operation will have no access to the MI shared within the coalition or MN operations unless specifically agreed to by all participants to the operation.
### D.1.1 FIGURE: SUMMARY TABLE OF THE INFORMATION SHARING REQUIREMENTS

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<td>Pieces of applied intelligence as required by CSC, CFC and CC</td>
<td>- Type, size, ODB, doctrine and capabilities of committed forces,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Intelligence on the battlespace, the adversary or belligerent’s intents and capabilities (systemic description of the strategic entities)</td>
<td>Information on force deployment, employment and sustaining capabilities</td>
<td>- Preparation time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Crisis / conflict factors and scenarios</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Length of the commitment, rotation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Legal – inc. ROE</td>
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<td>- Deployment and logistics capabilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Media environment</td>
<td></td>
<td>- C2 doctrine and procedures and integration capability into the lead nation C2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Force capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Understanding of legal basis of the operation, contribution to the coalition ROE, and SOFA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Feasibility, risk and cost assessments of the strategic military options</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Language and other cultural barriers to integration into the coalition</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Co-ordination information</td>
<td>Information provided by the LN:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Liaisons, POC</td>
<td>- Guidelines for TCN planning comprising General Information, and elements necessary for the Preparation of Military Units, Personnel, Administrative Matter and Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- EM spectrum management,</td>
<td>- Intelligence necessary for the TCN force preparation and activation activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Significant information, weapon, and mobility systems characteristics</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX D
INFORMATION SOUGHT FROM TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS (TCNs)

The following are key information requirements for a LN in defining the parameters for TCN involvement in a coalition force.

TCN Force Contribution:

D2.1. What type of troops will be contributed by TCN? (Combat forces, combat support forces, logistic forces, observers, civilian police, and/or civilian monitors?)

D2.2. What size force is TCN planning to commit?

D2.3. For how long are forces committed?

D2.4. What national rotation policy for troops will be followed?

D2.5. Will TCN contribute to a transition force?

D2.6. What capstone doctrine does the TCN operate under?

D2.7. Are TCN forces provided high or low-tech forces?

D2.8. What specific training does TCN troops require to enhance their skills before they join the Coalition?

D2.9. What levels/types of technical assistance will the TCN require to be interoperable with the LN and other TCN?

D2.10. What specific expertise or capability does the TCN’s troops provide to the coalition? Does the TCN’s troops provide niche specialties?

D2.11. Does the TCN have a warfighting approach?

D2.12. What are the professional standards embraced and followed by junior and senior military officers/leaders?

D2.13. What levels of force preparation is required inside or outside of the theatre before TCN’s troops are committed and integrated into the coalition?

D2.14. What degree of acclimatization is required by troops before entering the theatre?

Logistics:

D2.15. When are the TCN’s forces available for deployment?
D2.16. Will the TCN require strategic lift support to get its forces into/out of theater?

D2.17. What level of logistic standardization and interoperability exists between the TCN and LN?

D2.18. What are the major logistic limitations/shortfalls of the TCN and what assistance will it be seeking from the LN or other TCNs?

D2.19. Does the TCN’s contingent have the capability to perform its own administrative support procedures during deployment into theatre?

D2.20. Can the TCN meet the designated operational viability period (OVP) for the participating in the operation upon arrival? (How long can the TC’s forces be self-sufficient after arriving in theatre?)

D2.21. Can the TCN provide its own unique organic support requirements?

D2.22. Can the TCN contribute logistics support to the LN or other TCNs as required?

D2.23. Has the TCN the capacity to and/or interest in being the functional LN for logistics?

D2.24. Will the TCN authorize the LN to negotiate for Host Nation Support on its behalf?

D2.25. Will Acquisition Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA) and Implementing Arrangements (IA) be necessary?

**C4ISR:**

D2.26. What C2 doctrine does the TCN normally use?

D2.27. Is the TCN willing to operate under the LN’s C2 doctrine?

D2.28. Does TCN understand and accept the command relationships established by the LN, which may place its contingent under the “operational control” of the Coalition Force Commander?

D2.29. At what point will the TCN be comfortable with the Transfer of Authority (TOA) of its contingent to the control of the designated coalition commander?

D2.30. Is it comfortable with the planned Coalition HQ structure?

D2.31. What staff contribution will the TCN make to the Coalition HQ?

D2.32. Does the TCN have the capability and/or national intent to designate their officers to fill senior coalition command positions within the coalition such as Deputy Command?
D2.33. Does the TCN’s forces speak the same language as the LN? Is the TCN able to provide sufficient Liaison Officers (LO) and linguists skilled in speaking the LN’s language?

D2.34. What is the TCN’s in-theatre National Command Headquarters intentions/arrangements?

D2.35. Does the TCN have the capacity to provide LOs at all levels within the LN framework?

D2.36. Can the TCN provide a Planning Liaison Cell immediately to the coalition planning process?

D2.37. Will it agree to the connection of its national network to the CWAN? Is it accredited to do so? Will the LN’s major allies permit and authorize the exchange of intelligence data with the TCN through the established coalition framework?

D2.38. What CIS capacity/technology does it have? Is it compatible with the LN? Will it require augmentation? Does it have the technological and skills capability/capacity to act as the coalition network manager?

D2.39. Do TCN forces have/require reach back to the TCN?

D2.40. Can the TCN provide qualified full-time network management and system administration support for its own network interface with the CWAN?

**Legal:**

D2.41. Does the TCN understand the legal basis for the operation, particularly with regard to what international and national laws are applicable?

D2.42. Does the TCN agree that it will, where applicable, contribute on a consensual basis to the development of an appropriate Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which is legally sound and sustainable under international law?

D2.43. Does it understand that its forces will have no overall immunity under the law?

D2.44. Does it agree that the LN will develop Coalition ROE and that the TCN will, in addition to its own national ROE, need to develop supporting Coalition Force ROE?

**Cultural Factors.**

D2.45. What language does the TCN speak?

D2.46. Will it need interpreters?

D2.47. What language will its LOs speak?

D2.48. What cultural barriers exist in establishing harmonious relationship with other coalition partners?

D2.49. Are there any specific nutritional standards/constraints?
APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX D
INFORMATION PROVIDED TO TCNs

The following outlines information/guidelines the LN should provide to all potential TCNs to facilitate their planning activities.

The guidelines should as a minimum consist of five parts as follows:

D3.1. General Information
D3.2. Preparation of Military Units
D3.3. Preparation of Personnel
D3.4. Administrative Matter
D3.5. Command and Control

General Information

D3.6. General Overview. This section contains a description of the mandate and resolution (if under the auspices of the UN) for the coalition, and the tasks the coalition is authorized to do.

D3.7. Physical Environment. This section provides a brief description of the operating environment to include information on the geography of the region, climatic factors, infrastructure, population distribution, ethnicity, cultural sensitivities/political environment (stability of government), and the status of the economy.

D3.8. Support Environment. This section describes the support/logistic apparatus for the operation to include the planned distribution of personnel, stores and equipment into and inside the area of operations. It also includes details on the location, capacity and functioning of the following (as applicable):

a. Intermediate Staging Base (ISB)
b. Forward Mounting Base (FMB)
c. Air Port of Debarkation (APOD)
d. Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD)
e. Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG)
f. National Support Elements (NSE)
g. Force Preparation Unit (FPU) if established

h. Combined Movement Coordination Center

D3.9. TCN Support Responsibilities. This section provides guidance on what is administratively and logistically expected of TCNs:

a. The level the TCN must be administratively self contained on arrival its at the FMB (e.g. on arrive, self sufficient for 28 days with 7 days stocks held in theatre and 21 days stocks pre-positioned at the FMB).

b. Preferred packing methods for stores/equipment during deployment into theatre. (e.g. ISO containers).

c. The expectation that TCN will provide their own organic and/or unique support requirements.

d. Details on how common support requirements will be provided by force elements. From where and how support is provided? (Host nation; contractors; LN).

e. The TCN is expected to contribute to the coalition’s National Support Elements (NSE) based on the size and structure of the TCN’s national contribution to the Coalition.

Preparation of Military Units

D3.10. General. This part provides guidance on what is expected of TCN military units and confirms the language to be used in conducting coalition operations.

D3.11. Personal Equipment. This section outlines what basic personal equipment is mandatory. TCNs are advised to identify equipment shortfalls so alternative arrangements can be made by the LN or Logistics LN.

D3.12. Weapons. Weapon and ammunition requirements will be listed. Ammunition shortfalls will be addressed by the LN and other TCNs from their in theater supplies if possible.

D3.13. Communications. This section broadly addresses communications arrangements and the expectations that the TCN will be responsible for providing national links for welfare communications for its personnel. This section also addresses issues such as spectrum management and frequency ranges for communication equipment as well as cryptographic requirements for operating the equipment.

D3.14. Logistics. This section outlines the logistic support concept to include logistic support constraints, expected levels of self-sufficiency for TCNs, and provides details on second and third line logistic support arrangements.
D3.15. Contingent Equipment Requirements. This section provides a list of additional stores and equipment that should accompany each TCN contingent. (e.g., electrical generators, refrigeration equipment, tentage, special equipment requirements, office furniture, etc)

D3.16. Medical. This section outlines the force health support arrangements and the levels of integral health support that each TCN is expected to organically provide. It also outlines the basic health countermeasure requirements (inoculations) and casualty evacuation arrangements to be accomplished by the TCN.

**Preparation of Personnel**

D3.17. Preparation of personnel before they depart their country is each TCN’s responsibility. The LN expects troops provided by TCNs to possess competent soldier skills so that only specialized training in additional skills and disciplines for operating in combined force activities in unfamiliar territory would be provided in theatre.

D3.18. Pre-deployment Training. If a Force Preparation Unit is established, this section contains the objectives and arrangements for training personnel and provides a briefing on the training areas to be conducted. The professionalism and capability of the TCN contingent determines the amount of in-theatre training required.


D3.20. Medical Preparation. Required Immunizations and medical standards for personnel will be outlined.

D3.21. Pay and Allowances. The TCN is responsible for pay and allowances for its personnel with the LN responsible for facilitating money exchanges.

D3.22. Clothing. Personnel require a minimum number of uniforms in theatre.

**Administrative Matters**

D3.23. Deployment. This section will outline strategic movement and deployment arrangements.

D3.24. Load Lists. The TCN provides load lists for all personnel and stores requiring strategic movement to the FMB.

D3.25. Rotation. The rotation of TCN forces is normally completed in accordance with national priorities based on the operational imperatives of the LN and/or other TCNs.

D3.26. Finance. TCNs have a responsibility to capture cost information for their subsequent recovery of costs incurred by their forces in theatre. Reimbursement policies are described but the expectation is that the cost of deployment, rotation and recovery of national forces is the responsibility of each TCN.

D3.27. Discipline/Jurisdiction. Discipline of troops is normally the responsibility of the TCN National Contingent Commander.
D3.28. Customs and Quarantine. The TCN is provided specific restrictions on the importation of specific goods and items into the host or staging countries.

D3.29. Facilities. Each TCN is provided information on the availability of accommodation, storage and HQ facilities, associated engineering support at the FMB, FOB, FPU in the assigned in-theatre area.

D3.30. Canteens. Canteen arrangements will be described.

D3.31. Mail. Mail arrangements will be described.

Command and Control

D3.32. The proposed C2 arrangements, which would apply both strategically and within Theatre, are provided and include:

a. The proposed strategic C2 architecture for the operation.

b. The proposed theatre/operational C2 architecture. (Parallel, Integrated, or LN).

c. The expectation/preference that TCN contingents will be assigned under Operational Control of the Coalition Commander.

d. The proposed level of staff integration.

e. National Component headquarters expectations.

f. Coalition Commander and Deputy Commander nominations/appointees if known.

g. Potential Functional Leads (e.g. Functional Lead Nation for Logistics)

h. SOP standardization suggestions (e.g. use NATO or LN SOPs, or develop coalition SOP)

i. Liaison Team exchange expectations.

j. CWAN network management and systems administration technical control hierarchy including installation management and trouble reporting and resolution procedures.

D3.33. Also included are any special coordinating instructions.
The operational information categories listed in this Appendix were agreed to by the MIC Operations MIWG and are not meant to be an all-inclusive list of information requirements.

**GENERIC INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Information Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Terrain       | General terrain classification  
|               | Prevailing gradient  
|               | Vegetation type and density  
|               | Significant surface drainage  
|               | Coastal characteristic (reef, delta etc)  
|               | Beach composition  
|               | Beach hinterland |
| Climate       | Average temperature  
|               | Extremes of temperature  
|               | Precipitation levels  
|               | Humidity levels  
|               | Prevailing winds  
|               | Prevailing sea conditions  
|               | Daily cloud cover  
|               | Seasonal variations  
|               | Moonrise and moonset times  
|               | Sunrise and sunset times  
|               | Times of high and low tides  
|               | Phases of the Moon |
| Hydrology     | Watercourses and water bodies  
|               | Depth, speed and crossing points  
|               | Navigability  
|               | Key dams, barrages and other structures  
|               | Areas of marsh or swamp  
|               | Glaciers  
|               | Flood history  
|               | Tides  
|               | Tidal currents  
|               | Stability, composition, type, condition and slopes of banks  
|               | Composition and stability of bottom  
|               | Ice conditions  
|               | Seasonal variations  
<p>|               | Oceanographic conditions |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vegetation</th>
<th>Type of vegetation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
<td><strong>Information Requirement</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetation (continued)</td>
<td>Height of canopy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Density of vegetation</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Areas of cultivation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Harvesting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Susceptibility to fire</td>
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<td>Poisonous/Hazardous Vegetation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Airfields</td>
<td>Category and status</td>
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<td>Civil/joint user</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Elevation and Layout</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Runways - number, azimuth, length, width, grade, surface, overruns, approaches, LCN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taxiway location, length, width, azimuth, grade surface, clear areas, turn radii, condition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Parking area and hard stand locations, surface, area and capacity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Navigation aids</td>
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<td>Lighting aids</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Communications</td>
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<td></td>
<td>POL type, storage, quantity, pumps, trucks</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintenance facilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Aircraft handling equipment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Covered storage</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Number type and size of hangars</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Housing facilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Munitions storage</td>
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<td>Administrative facilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Electric power supply</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Auxiliary power units</td>
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<td>Air defense systems</td>
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<td>Surrounding terrain characteristics</td>
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<td>Approach procedures and communication frequencies</td>
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<td>New construction</td>
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<td>Vertical obstructions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Military Aircraft on Ground capability</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Historical weather patterns and availability of meteorological facilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Eating facilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Emergency response vehicle capabilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Special requirements/equipment</td>
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### Availability and type of surface transportation

#### Roads in/out of airfields

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<th>Helicopter Landing Zones</th>
<th>Altitude</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Prevailing winds</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dominant terrain</td>
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<td>Significant landmarks</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Distance and direction from designated objective</td>
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<thead>
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<td></td>
<td>Size and capacity of zone</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surface material</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slope</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Obstacles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NAVAIDS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>POL availability</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NAVAIDS maintenance</td>
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<td>Lighting</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Surface Expansion capabilities</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Helicopter Landing Zones (continued)</th>
<th>Eating/Sleeping facilities</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Hangers</td>
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<td>Storage Facilities</td>
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<td>Roads In/Road Out</td>
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<td>Communications</td>
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<tr>
<th>Ports &amp; Harbors</th>
<th>Type &amp; condition</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity in tons per day</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alongside berths (Depth, length and width)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Surface Transportation</td>
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<td>Graywater/other garbage disposal</td>
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<td>Approaches and entrances - depth and width</td>
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<td>Anchorage</td>
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<td>Free swinging berths</td>
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<td>Vertical clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What are the major operating problems</td>
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<td>Tides - times, ranges</td>
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<td>Unusual geophysical conditions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Protective works - alignment, dimensions, construction</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total area in acres</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Harbor fairways</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Turning basins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Types of berth - commercial, tanker, naval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cargo wharves - location, number, linear meters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bulk cargo wharves - location, number, linear meters
Supplementary wharves
Principle wharf - type & construction, berth length, depth, height of
deck, transit sheds, fuelling facilities, cranage, specialized equipment,
clearance, utilities.
Offshore pipeline berths - location, number, max draught
Hard and unimproved sites - size and composition
Miscellaneous cranes
Storage facilities
Ship building and repair facilities
Dry docks - size, location, construction, condition, cranage, utilities
Shipbuilding ways - size, location, construction, condition, cranage, utilities
Floating dry docks - location, dimension, cranage

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<tr>
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<th>Information Requirement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Marine railroads</td>
<td>location, length of track, gauge, hauling capacity, power system, handing system, condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine shops</td>
<td>location, capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundries</td>
<td>location, capacity, condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire protection</td>
<td>boats, shore equipment, water supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>equipment, dredging requirement, rehabilitation requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigation aids</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pilot data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstructions</td>
<td>above and below water</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water supply</td>
<td>potability, distribution, capacity, adequacy, storage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electricity supply</td>
<td>source</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medical facilities</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Communications</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Charts and maps</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Urban Areas

Population - trend, significant segments
Importance - religious, internationally, nationally, militarily, economically
Suburbs
Landmarks
Extent of built-up area
Functional areas - type, location, area
Damaged, neglected areas - size and location
Road networks - major highways, through routes, by-passes
Major waterways - characteristics, relationship to urban area, ports, significance, structures
Airfields - type, location, purpose, usage
Engineer facilities and equipment - plant and fleets,
location and type, stocks of
construction equipment, storage and associated
facilities
Billeting and accommodation
Water supply
Language
Cultural Barriers
Political Considerations (to include description of local
government and
politics)
Electricity supply
Natural gas facilities
Sewage treatment facilities
Waste tips
Public transport - organization, routes, schedules, equipment
Police organization
Civil Defense organization
Storage facilities
Industrial areas
Hospitals
Underground installations
Major defenses
Communications infrastructure (e.g., landlines, RF,
etc.)

International
Aid to opposing forces/terrorist groups - how, when, where, why,
capability
Indigenous support for opposing forces
Reaction of other interested countries to crisis and demands
Third party involvement

Category
Information Requirement
Attitude of neighboring countries to external action
Which nations will or will not provide support
Any third party threat
Which countries are sympathetically disposed to opposing forces

Country Information
Strengths and weaknesses of indigenous forces
Will indigenous forces assist
Indigenous force C2, weapons, communications, discipline, loyalty,
capability
Disposition of indigenous force
Indigenous force commitments
Potential for reinforcement
Response to intelligence collection
Response to active EW
Entry and exit provisions/constraints
Border crossing procedures
Country Information  Border policing
(continued)

Crisis management processes
Key governmental figures
Decision making process
Attitude of government and populace including EPs and forces
Resources system of the leadership (e.g. fiscal system, illicit trade)
Current attitude to crisis
Catalyst for change of attitude
Freedom of Press
Interpreters

Enemy Forces  Aims and Intentions
Dissident groups
Political objectives
Military objectives
Joint capability
Command structure
FOLLOWING SECTIONS APPLY TO EN FORCES AND COALITION FORCES

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Information Requirement</th>
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<td>Ground Order of Battle</td>
<td>Units in AOO</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Weapons and equipment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Potential for reinforcement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Logistics capabilities</td>
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<td>Communications</td>
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<td>architecture/frequencies/doctrine/integration/interoperability</td>
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<td>Doctrine, strategy and tactics</td>
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<td>Defensive measures, strategy and tactics</td>
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<td>Hardened sites</td>
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<td>Obstacles – natural or man made</td>
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<td>Mined areas</td>
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<td>Surveillance and illumination</td>
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<td>Dummy dispositions or equipment</td>
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<td>Camouflage and deception techniques</td>
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<td>Force morale and combat efficiency</td>
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<td>Intelligence collection and counter intelligence capability</td>
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<td>Paramilitary forces</td>
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<td>Civil defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Order of Battle</td>
<td>Units which could influence AOO – composition, location, commander, HQ, operational status</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time to AOO</td>
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<td>Operational strength</td>
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<td>Force disposition</td>
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<td>Potential for reinforcement</td>
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<td>Doctrine, strategy and tactics</td>
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<td>Air defense – ground and air elements</td>
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<td>Ground attack capabilities and disposition</td>
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<td>Reconnaissance capabilities and disposition</td>
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<td>Air Transport capabilities and disposition</td>
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<td>Maritime capabilities and disposition</td>
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<td>Communication frequencies</td>
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<td>WMD delivery capability</td>
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<td>Logistics capabilities</td>
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<td>Operational sustainability</td>
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<td>Aircrew proficiency</td>
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<td>Night, all weather capability</td>
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<td>Timely weather and space weather analyses</td>
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<td>Secondary or dispersal airfields and highway strips</td>
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<td>Category</td>
<td>Information Requirement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naval Order of Battle (continued)</td>
<td>Naval aircraft and platforms</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Operational readiness</td>
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<td>Morale and combat efficiency</td>
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<td>Submarines – type, capability and location</td>
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<td>Patrol boats</td>
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<td>Deception capabilities</td>
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<td>C3I and integration with other environments</td>
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<td>Reconnaissance capability</td>
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<td>Blue water capability</td>
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<td>In-shore and coastal capability</td>
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<td>Amphibious capability</td>
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<tr>
<th>Missile and AD Order of Battle</th>
<th>Units within AOO</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weapons systems and equipment</td>
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<td>Potential for reinforcement</td>
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<td>Doctrine, strategy and tactics</td>
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<td>C2</td>
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<td>Force operational proficiency</td>
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<td>Deception capability</td>
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<td>Logistics support capability</td>
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<td>Operational sustainability</td>
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<td>Release authority</td>
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<tr>
<th>Electronic Order of Battle</th>
<th>Communication assets</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Non-communication assets</td>
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<td></td>
<td>EW capabilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SIGINT capabilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Electronic deception capability</td>
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</table>

| Medical | |
|---------| |
| Environmental condition | Swamps  
| | Tropical  
| | Mediterranean  
| | Desert  
| | Arctic, snow blindness, frostbite  
| | Altitude  
| | Precipitation  
| Respiratory Diseases | Meningococcal Meningitis  
| Gastrointestinal Diseases | Cholera  
| | Typhoid  
| | Paratyphoid  
| | Viral Hepatitis A and E  
| | Viral Hepatitis B, C and D  
| | Diarrhea  
| | Helminths  
| Category | Information Requirement  
| Vector Borne Diseases | Yellow Fever  
| | Ebola-Marburg Virus Disease  
| | Leishman  
| | Malaria  
| | Schistosomiasis  
| | African Trypanosomiasis  
| | Arboviral Fevers  
| | Lassa Fever  
| | Ticks and fleas  
| | Plague  
| Sexually Transmitted Disease | Gonorrhea  
| | Syphilis  
| | AIDS  
| | HIV  
| Other Diseases | Zoonoses  
| | Brucellosis  
| | Rabies  
| | Anthrax  
| Host Nation Medical Capability | Hospitals  
| | Health Centers  

D4-9  
17 April 2006
Doctors  
Nursing Staff  
Special Medical Facilities including Diagnostics  
Military Injuries  
Burn Units  
Blood Transfusion Facilities  
Ambulances  
Rescue Helicopters  
Red Cross recognized?  
Drug and Pharmaceutical Supplies  
Medicine Black Market?

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<tr>
<th>Host Nation Medical Capability (continued)</th>
<th>Electricity and Fuel</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health of Population</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dental Facilities</td>
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<tr>
<th>Stress Related-Conditions</th>
<th>Excessive Heat/Humidity leading to Exhaustion, Dehydration, etc.</th>
</tr>
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</table>

| Sanitary Conditions | Water Potability  
|--------------------|-----------------|
| Water Availability, is it seasonal  
| Waste Disposal  
| Sewage Treatment and/or Disposal  
| Pollution  |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributing Nations Susceptibility/Resistance To Regional Problems</th>
<th>For Example, participants from malarial areas of the world may be more immune to malaria and not require further immunization or preventive medical treatment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Information Requirement</th>
</tr>
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</table>

| Hazardous Animals | Snakes  
|-------------------|---------|
|                   | Spiders  
|                   | Scorpions  
|                   | Centipedes  
|                   | Rats  |

| Contributing Nations Requirements | Minimum Medical Standards  
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|
|                                  | Immunizations Required  
|                                  | Dental Health  
|                                  | Blood Grouping  
|                                  | Medical History  |
**First Aid/Health Training**
Pre-Deployment Training
Water & Hygiene Training
Disease vector equipment, such as mosquito nets, long sleeves, etc.

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<tr>
<th>Local Diet</th>
<th>What to eat and what not to eat</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What to drink and what not to drink</td>
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</table>

Contributing Nations Animals
For example, the need to consider medical arrangements for drug/IED dogs

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<tr>
<th>Post-Deployment Measures</th>
<th>Medicine Requirements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Symptom Advice</td>
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ANNEX E - NATIONAL DECISION MAKING MIC MEMBER NATIONS

Scope

E1. This annex outlines the various political strategic decision making processes used by the MIC member nations. This annex is designed to allow the Operational Commander and his staff better understand the process that leads to decisions within individual nations that may participate in a coalition and how that process may impact operational planning and conduct of operations. This is meant as a general overview and discusses only the processes that are in place in each nation. There is no attempt to interpret how or why a decision is reached in a given situation. The goal is to educate commanders and their staffs to help them understand where possible delays and/or conflicts might occur.

AUSTRALIA

E2. In Australia, the pinnacle of the National Crisis Management Machinery (NCMM) is the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) which considers a broad range of advice in determining the national response to a crisis situation. The Prime Minister chairs the NSC. The Minister for Defence is a standing member\(^1\) and Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) may be invited to attend when defence and security matters are discussed. A lead Government Department is nominated to coordinate the advice considered by the NSC and the implementation of its decisions. Within the Department of Defence, the Strategic Command Group (SCG) provides advice to CDF on military response options for NSC consideration.

E3. There are a number of committees subordinate to the NSC where senior Defence personnel are standing representatives. The two primary subordinate committees are;

b. *Secretaries’ Committee on National Security* (SCNS). *This is the senior inter-departmental committee and provides coordinated advice to the NSC on national options and strategy. CDF is a standing member*\(^2\).

c. *Strategic Policy Coordination Group* (SPCG). *This group has no executive authority but plays a key role in overseeing the day-to-day coordination of responses to international crises. Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) is a standing member*\(^3\).

E4. An Inter-departmental Emergency Task Force (IDETF) comprised of senior representatives from the involved government departments will normally be formed to facilitate policy and advice coordination and development. Defence representation is normally drawn from International Policy Division (IP Div) and Strategic Operations Directorate (SOD). For time-critical crises the NSC may direct that an IDETF be established immediately, thereby bypassing the formal involvement of SCNS and SPCG

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\(^1\) NSC standing membership is Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Minister for Defence, the Attorney General, and the Treasurer. Other ministers are invited to attend as required.
in the initial consideration of the crisis. However, these committees would likely be involved in the consideration of on-going issues following the initial response.

E5. Within the Department of Defence the Strategic Command Group (SCG) provides CDF with situational awareness and advice on intelligence, policy and operational issues. SCG is chaired by CDF and membership comprises CJOPS, Chief of Navy (CN), Chief of Army (CA), Chief of Air Force (CAF), Deputy Secretary Strategy (DEPSEC S), Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security (DEPSEC I&S), Chief Information Officer (CIO), Commander Joint Logistics (CJLOG) and Director General Public Affairs (DGPA). The Strategic Planning Group (SPG) is responsible for the conduct of immediate strategic level planning for operations and the development of CDF planning guidance to the operational level. Director General Joint Operations and Plans (DGJOP), the Australian Principal on the Multinational Interoperability Council, chairs this group.

2 SCNS standing membership is Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (SEC PM&C), Secretary Department of Defence (SECDEF), Secretary Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (SECDfat), Secretary Department of the Attorney General’s Department (SECAGD), Secretary Department of the Treasury (SECTRES), Chief of Defence Force (CDF) and the Director-General of the Office of National Assessments (DGONA). Other departmental heads may be invited to attend as required.

3 SPCG standing membership is Deputy Secretaries from PM&C and DEFAT, Deputy Secretary Strategy (DEPSEC S) from Defence and Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS).
E6. Any decision to engage the French forces in operations is made by the President of the Republic, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, following a military and political decision-making process. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CEMA⁴) participates in this process and then becomes the Operational Commander of the forces in operations. The Strategic Operations Planning and Control Center (CPCO⁵) is the tool allowing to anticipate crisis and to plan, command and control all the operations conducted by the French forces around the world.

E7. Crisis management requires the co-ordination of the three levers -diplomatic, military and media - and excludes any delegation. Crisis management is a highly centralised process. The speed of communication and the omnipresence of the media may also force political authorities to make frequent re-assessments of the situation. To be effective, the crisis management process must be swift. These two factors, centralisation and speed, led France to adopt the process described further.

E8. Trigger event: The response begins with an event either in the physical domain or political realm that may have an impact on the safety of French nationals or the interests of France. The event could be reported by various channels (Media, Defence Attachés, allied partners, Military Intelligence Directorate). The event is immediately analyzed by different experts:

b. In the Elysée Palace, the President’s own military staff;

c. In Hotel Matignon, by the Prime Minister’s military advisors.

d. In the Ministry of Defence;

e. Other concerned Ministries (mainly the Foreign Affairs Ministry); In the various SOPCC’s and MID cells.

E9. This analysis may trigger a planning process which will not necessarily lead to an engagement of forces. However, in case of an emergency, planning can be very fast and rapidly lead to an order of engagement of our forces. Whatever the event, the process is the same and can take a few weeks or a few hours, depending on the situation.

E10. Military Situation: This analysis leads to the assessment of the military situation that is carried out in close co-operation with the Military Intelligence Directorate (DRM⁶). They assess the relative risks run by the local population and the forces and elaborate various military options.

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⁴ Chef d’état major des armées
⁵ CPCO centre de planification et de conduite des opérations
⁶ Direction du Renseignement Militaire
E11. The role of the Chief of the Defence Staff: These military options are proposed by the CDS to the Government. The CDS has a dual role, as the military adviser to the Government and the Operational Commander of the forces. The CDS participates in the decision making-process from the beginning of a crisis until the decision is made to commit the forces, if it turns out to be necessary. Once the engagement is decided, the CDS becomes the Operational Commander of the forces. In his dual role, the CDS is in the best position to advise the Government on operations and to assume the responsibility of their conduct.

E12. Interagency Crisis cell and restricted committee: Involving all the key players described before, the interagency crisis cell drafts an overall situation assessment, initial conclusions and proposals. In his capacity as military adviser to the Government, the CDS (or the DCOS Ops) is a member of the “Restricted Committee” chaired by the Prime Minister, and is responsible for submitting the various options liable to meet the objectives. The possible options are studied, analysed and, if required, amended by the Restricted Committee that finalizes the proposals to be made to the President.

E13. Restricted Committee: During the session of the Council, in which the CDS takes part, the President takes his final decision concerning the commitment of the forces. In addition, once the operation has been decided and as a direct subordinate to the President, the CDS assumes at strategic level the operational command of all the French forces committed.

E14. Action: The decision to commit the forces is then transmitted by the CDS to the SOPCC which prepares the Oorder and the deployment of the Task Force before assuming its conduct under the orders of the CDS. The OPORD includes the situation, the mission, the assets involved, and of course, the rules of engagement. After taking part in the decision-making process, the SOPCC becomes tool used by the CDS as the Operational Commander.

E15. Decision Making Process: It is interesting to notice that the Parliament is not involved in the French decisional process. To be also noted is the fact that there is no vote of a budget for operations.
Proposal

Restricted Council

Political Goal
Desired End State
Strategic Option

Political Lead

President

Prime minister

Secretary General for National Defense

Defence Minister + Military Staff

Min of Interior

Finance Minister

Prime Minister + Military Advisors

Minister of Interior + Crisis Cell

Government

CDS
Joint Defence Staff & OPS Centre

Restrict Committee

E- 5  17 April 2006
GERMANY

E16. There are in general four phases in the National Decision Making Cycle: P1 Crisis monitoring and early warning, P2 - Planning phase, P3 - Decision making, P4 - National Command and Control of the Operation. Within P1 lead of the common activities lies with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is responsible for the overall crisis assessment.

b. For the involvement of German Armed Forces in unarmed operations (e.g. humanitarian/disaster relief) outside our national territory a decision of the cabinet of the Federal Government is required.

c. The participation of German Armed Forces in all other Crisis Response Operations has to be approved by the Parliament. German law however allows for very fast decision making and deployment in special and/ or urgent cases (i.e. EvacOps; Site survey).

E17. Decision Making and Plan Development within the MOD is managed through the following elements and fora especially shaped for quick decision making and effective planning (see figure 1):

E18. Operations Council: It is chaired by the Chief of Staff Federal Armed Forces (the CHOD) and brings together the Chiefs of all services/ Directors of MOD directorates. The council discusses general and essential topics related to the preparation and employment of German Armed Forces in joint operations. ACOS Ops Armed Forces Staff (AFS) is the secretary of the Operations Council.

E19. A first discussion in the Operations Council to launch an operation can be initiated

b. either by the Minister who sees a need to start planning,

c. or by the declaration of a „National Concern“ by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

d. or by the analysis of the Crisis Monitoring Team which is a high ranking military body under the chair of the Director of Intelligence. Co-ordinating Staff on Bundeswehr Operational Tasks:

E20. It is chaired by ACOS Ops AFS. Members are representatives at ACOS level from the Armed Forces Staff (mirroring the J-functions) and all services staffs and MOD directorates. The following co-ordination tasks will be performed:

b. preparation of decisions for the Minister of Defence/CHOD

c. co-ordination of all relevant activities in the MOD
d. preparation of a MOD position for the co-ordination with other ministries and external agencies/nations

e. Information for the Minister of Defence/CHOD/Government/Parliament about the execution of pol-mil decisions

f. adjustments to given military guidance and direction

g. lessons learned

Within his own division - as the core of military planning at MOD level - ACOS Ops AFS may establish a temporary Planning Cell for support of the overall planning process.

E21. The Planning Process at the MOD is depicted in figure 2. It early involves the capacities at the BwOpsCmd as the later executive authority at operational level. Planning is coordinated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other departments as appropriate. The Federal Chancellery is also integrated by nature, as for the decision to launch an operation the government has to make a decision, followed by parliamentary discussion / approval.

E22. The complete architecture of the German National Command and Control structure is shown in figure 3. The necessary co-ordination with Army, Air Force and Navy staffs including the decision on provision of forces and assets is a task that rests within the MOD. The BwOpsCmd is responsible for further co-ordination with the respective service commands. The forces in theatre report directly to the BwOpsCmd. There is no operational chain of command to the service chiefs (the services have become force providers).
Germany: MOD joint staff elements and fora for Plan Development, Decisions & Execution

Minister

State Secretary

State Secretary

Operations Council
(chair: CHOD)

Army Chief, Air Force Chief, Navy Chief, JSS Chief, Surgeon General
mil. and civ. Directors of all MOD Directorates

Coordinating Staff on Bundeswehr Operational Tasks
(chair: ACOS Ops Armed Forces Staff (AFS))

ACOS AFS / ACOS Service Staffs / Division Chief Directorates

Armed Forces Staff, Division V (Operations Bundeswehr)

develops Concept / releases Ministerial Guidance
(Mission - Capabilities - Strength - Time frame - Budget - Law)

Bundeswehr Operations Command

plans, executes and evaluates all operations
(Force Generation - Deployment
Logistics / Medical Support - Sustainment -
Conduct of Operations)

Germany: The Planning Process

Minister of Defence

Initiative: Need to start planning

Discussion

Approval

Decision

Decision by the Government Decision by the Parliament

CHOD + OpsCouncil

Discussion

Approval

Authorise Detailed Planning

Authorise:

Development of COA

Review

Release Ministerial Guidance

Military Response Options & Capabilities**

Authorise: Development of COA

Cdr Bw OpsCmd

(coord, with Services Commands)

Development of COA

COA***

Detailed Planning

Force Activation & Preparation

Authorise:

Detailed Planning

Release Ministerial Guidance

Notification of National Force Contribution

*** incl:
• Ops type
• Cost Analysis
• Required Capabilities
• Initial Desired Endstate
• Force composition and size
• Multinationality, poss. Lead Nation / Framework Nation function
• Timetable
• Sustainability
• Legal Implications
• Bilateral/ multilateral Agreements (SOFA, Diplomatic Clearances)
• Budget

* Planning may also be initiated via CHOD as result of the analysis of the Crisis Monitoring Team (which is a high ranking military body under the chair of the Director of Intelligence) or triggered through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (identification of national concern).

** "If" (or if not), "How" (basic idea of possible MRO), "Why" (Desired End State)
ITALY

E23. Crisis management entails the key functions of consultation, coordination and cooperation. These are the buzzwords of the entire process for Italy. The Italian government acts a Council of Ministers in an international crisis. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Affairs minister and the Defense minister play keys roles but others, like the Transportation and Health ministers have taken on more importance in recent times. The Council of Ministers proposes military engagement to the Parliament as part of the national foreign and defense policy. As a result, each military engagement is approved by the parliament and is funded concurrently as part of the military budget allocated to defense.

E24. The strategic decision-making process starts at the political level with the Pol-Mil Group (PMG) informs the Defense General Staff (DGS) of potential military involvement in a crisis response. The DGS makes a thorough estimate to the MoD based on guidance from the PMG, intelligence and other sources. The Services provide feasibility information to the process. The DGS is the focal point for this joint process. During this process the Joint Operational Headquarters is kept abreast of the situation and responds to questions from the DGS.

E25. The DGS advises the Chief of Defense on possible courses of action. The CHOD will make a recommendation to the Minister who in turn will present the advice and the term of the potential commitments to the parliament for approval or information in the case of a commitment already signed by the parliament.

E26. Once the engagement has been approved the MOD authorizes the CHOD to deploy forces. The CHOD gives the DGS his guidelines, which then issue a planning directive to the JOHQ. The Services are kept informed throughout the ongoing process

E27. The JOHQ (or the JCOSF) prepare a strategic assessment and a strategic directive for the CHOD allowing him to approve and give orders to the Services. Services start to officially prepare the force packages. Warning orders may be issued to units before the preparation of the packages if authorized by the CHOD.

E28. The JOHQ and the JCOSF can contribute to the operational headquarters in a multinational coalition. The National military authorities, the CHOD and the JOHQ retain operational command of the contingent. Logistics remain a single Service responsibility.
Ministerial Directive

Office of the Minister of Defence

CHOD

Operational planning (OPP)

JHQ/JSFOPS HQ

DGS

Political requirement for a military intervention

Minister of Defence

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Or representative in govt. organisations

POLITICAL-MILITARY ASSESSMENT

Forces Provider

ARMY

NAVY

AIR FORCE

CC

POLITICAL

MILITARY

ASSESSMENT

Political Requirement

for a military intervention

Initial feasibility request

Initial feasibility

Recommendation for the military intervention

Parliament

Presentation of the military intervention plan for approval or information

Ministry of Defence

Office of the Ministry of Defence

CHOD

Ministry of Defence

JHQ/JSFOPS HQ

DGS

Initial feasibility

strategic planning (step 1)
Ministry of Defence

Office of the Ministry of Defence

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Or representative in Govt. organisations

CHOD

DGS

JHQ/SFOPS HQ

Services

Approval of the military intervention

Ministerial approval + CHOD's guideline

PLANNING DIRECTIVE

INFO EXCHANGE

strategic planning (step 2)

Ministry of Defence

Office of the Ministry of Defence

JTF HQ

CHOD

DGS

JHQ/SFOPS HQ

SERVICES

INFO EXCHANGE CONOPS

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT + STRATEGIC DIRECTIVE

APPROVAL OF THE STRATEGIC DIRECTIVE

strategic planning (step 3)
UNITED KINGDOM

E29. World events are observed and assessed at the highest political level, and by individual government departments. Departments of state particularly involved will be the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International Development (DFID) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD). The Defence Overseas & Policy Committee (DOPC), chaired by the Prime Minister, also includes the Chancellor of the Exchequer (for financial issues), Attorney General (for legal issues) and the President of the Board of Trade (for the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)). There may also be Home Office interest if there is a Counter-Terrorist or Police angle to be considered.

E30. Within the MOD, the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) monitors World events continuously, taking inputs from the regional departments and the Intelligence services which are looking for indicators and warnings of emerging crises. DCMO has a morning briefing chaired at 3* (or 2*) level by the senior officer available from the MOD Commitments Area, known as DOps, normally Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments) (DCDS(C)). Also present are the regional and capability staffs and representatives from Intelligence, the FCO and MOD Media staff. The Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), the single-Service headquarters (Fleet, Land and Strike Commands), Director Special Forces (DSF), and the UK Delegations to HQ NATO, SACEUR and EU join the meeting via VTC. If it becomes apparent that a crisis is emerging, it may be decided to form a Current Operations Group (COG) to study the situation in detail.

E31. A COG may be convened at 30 minutes’ notice. It is chaired by DOps and selected regional and capability staffs attend. The FCO, DFID and Cabinet Office (CO) (used to co-ordinate cross-government activities) are invited to attend so that a common appreciation of events is gained across government. The COG assesses the severity of the crisis and considers the options for intervention. The need for strategic political direction from the Cabinet is discussed together with the desired end-state and exit strategy. The COG will decide on the need to form a Strategic Planning Group (SPG), if one has not already formed, together with a Current Commitments Team (CCT) dedicated to handling operational problems.

E32. The SPG takes a long-term view and assesses the crisis to evaluate strategic options. It provides military strategic advice for the political process and assists the DOps and PJHQ on strategic issues. The SPG’s remit extends to forward planning and consideration of end-states. The SPG may initiate a Grand Strategic Estimate (GSE). This seeks to define the UK’s national intent and political objectives, the international community’s probable options and intent, the desirable and acceptable end-states, the resource implications, constraints and the likely reaction of allies. The process produces assessments of the diplomatic, economic, political and military options open to the British Government. Effectively, the SPG fulfills the ‘J5’ role for the MOD.

E29. A CCT is the crisis team formed at MOD. This usually includes staff from regional, capability, intelligence, logistics and movements MOD directorates, and from other Government Departments. The team is usually only 8-10 people, but will be
authoritative: a 2* lead is possible but a 1* or OF5 lead would be more usual. Initially, the team forms in the offices of its members but as the crisis deepens it will move into the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC) underground in MOD and work around the clock. The CCT’s role is to handle current operational issues concerning the deployment, action and recovery of forces. The CCT thus fulfills the ‘J3’ role for the MOD.

E30. When the CCT forms in MOD, a Contingency Planning Team (CPT) forms at PJHQ. The CCT and CPT work as a single entity through the medium of video conferencing. Together with the SPG, they produce initial advice on the crisis for the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) who then briefs ministers and, when invited, the Cabinet. The SPG will draft the CDS Planning Directive to the DCMO, based on the political direction given by Government. The product of the planning process is the Military Strategic Estimate (MSE), which is written by PJHQ (based upon the analysis in the GSE). The MSE will detail the military options including the implications for UK and the likely costs.

E31. CDS presents the military options detailed in the MSE to the Cabinet. In a major crisis, the DOPC will form to take the key political decisions. If they decide that UK armed forces will become involved in the crisis, they will choose an option and authorise CDS to proceed. The CCT will then draft the CDS Directive that will, inter alia, nominate a Joint Commander - normally the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) (3* Commander at PJHQ). The CDS Directive will also detail the UK aim, the desired end-state and any constraints applied by the Cabinet.

E32. On receiving the CDS Directive, PJHQ expands the small CPT to become an Operations Team (OT) which then exercises Operational Command to deploy, sustain and recover the committed forces. The OT issues a Mission Directive to the Joint Task Force Commander who would carry out his own Estimate and then ensure a continual two way flow of advice upward to Government and clear direction passed down.

E33. On completion of the combat phase of operations, MOD becomes a supporting department to the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU). This is a cross Government organisation which will be closely involved in both the SPG and CCT, and which then takes the lead for UK contributions in the crisis country for the reconstruction and economic recovery effort.
UK Politico-Military Organisation

- Political
  - Foreign Office
  - Treasury
  - Ministry of Defence
  - International Development

- Political / Military
  - Policy and Commitments Area

- Military
  - Permanent Joint HQ
  - Deployed Operations

UK Authorisation Process

- Strategic Planning
  - Monitoring and Policy: Foreign Office and MOD Policy Staff
  - Conflict Phase: MOD Commitments Staff

- CDS Planning Directive
  - Strategic Direction
  - Front Line Commands

- CDS OP Directive
  - Deployed Operations

- MOD Authorisation Process:
  - Front Line Commands
  - Deployed Operations
UNITED STATES

E34. The decision to commit U.S. Armed Forces is made by the President of the United States. He is vested this power by the U.S. Constitution that designates him as Commander In Chief. The Secretary of Defense who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate is his principal assistant for all matters relating to the Department of Defense (DoD). The President and the Secretary together form the National Command Authorities (NCA) and they have the constitutional authority to direct military action.

E35. The National Security Council (NSC) also advises the President. The NSC is the principal forum to consider national security issues and it has four statutory members: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State (Sec State) and the Sec Def. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI) are statutory advisors. Additional members may be specified by a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) and have included the Secretary of Treasury, the Representative to the United Nations, the national Security Adviser, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Attorney General and others as designated by the President. The role of the National Security Advisor has grown since it was first established and now fills a more public role in security issues.

E36. The Combatant Commanders report directly to the Secretary of Defense. Commanders of combatant commands exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces, and are directly responsible to the NCA for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions. apply within the theater environment and its unity of effort.

E37. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) consist of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman and the Service Chiefs. The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President. However, JCS has no executive authority to command combatant forces. The chain of command goes directly from the NCS to the Combatant Commanders. CJCS directs the Joint Staff in his responsibility to provide unified strategic direction of combatant forces; unified operation for combatant commands and the integration of land, naval, and air forces.

E38. There are three military departments, Army Navy (includes the US Marine Corp) and Air Force. The military departments recruit, train, organize and equip the members of the Armed Forces. The Services supply forces to the Combatant Commands.

E39. As a matter of routine, organizations of the US Government monitor the world situation. When an event comes to the attention of a U.S. official through this monitoring it is reported through various channels but eventually is reported through the National Military Command Center in Washington DC. From the NMCC the situation is reported throughout the government including to the White House Situation Room.

E40. In Phase II the NCA and JCS analyze the situation to determine whether a military option should be prepared to deal with the evolving problem. During this phase the combatant command continues to monitor the situation and report. They will also review existing
OPLANS and CONPLANS for applicability to the situation. The President will follow the situation and work with the NSC on possible responses involving the full range of government options. This phase ends with a decision by the NCA to have the military develop courses of action (COA). This decision may include specific direction on COAs.

E41. The Phase III COA development process is a collaboration between the CJCS and the Combatant Command. The CJCS issues a Warning Order, which establishes command relationships, defines tasks, allocates forces and directs the Combatant Commander to develop COAs. The Combatant Command develops the COAS and returns them to the CJCS for review and presentation to the NCA.

E42. Phase IV begins with the NCA with the advise of the NSC evaluating the COAs. While the NCA reviews the actions additional COAs are developed as necessary. The NCA will make a decision on the COA and the CJCS will transmit an Alert Order which publishes the NCA decision.

E43. The final phase includes planning by the Combatant Command to include deployment plans. The CJCS will develop the Deployment Order and publish the order at the direction of NCA. This phase ends with an executable OPORD and an approval from the NCA to execute the operation.
ANNEX F - PROCEDURE TO ACCESS THE NATO STANDARDIZATION AGENCY (NSA) PROTECTED WEBSITE (HTTP://NSA.NATO.INT) FOR NON-NATO NATIONS AND BODIES

Step 1

The nation or body submits details of users that will be allowed access on their behalf. The details should be submitted in writing to the NSA Web Master prior to the actual request for access by the potential user of the NSA Protected Website.

Details to be submitted by the nation or body per user are:

- last name,
- first name,
- email address,
- country
- organization.

The initial number of users per nation or body is limited to ten, additional requirements are to be discussed bilaterally.

Step 2

The new user connects to the NSA Protected Website: http://nsa.nato.int
Click the link: request access here
Fills in: user registration
Submits the request by pressing: request access.

Step 3

The NSA Webmaster will compare the details provided by new users with the details as submitted by the applicable nation or body. Access will be granted if the details match.

Mr W.Duensing
NSA Webmaster
NSA NATO HQ
B-1110 BRUSSELS
Tel : 0032 2 707 5556
Fax : 0032 2 707 5718
Email : nsa@hq.nato.int
ANNEX G – REFERENCES; DEFINITIONS; ACRONYMS

NATO References *(See AAP-47)*
Allied Joint Publication (AJP) – 01(B), *Allied Joint Doctrine*
AJP-2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security*
AJP-3, *Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations*
AJP-4(A), *Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine*
AJP-4.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Movement and Transportation*
AJP-4.5 (A), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Host-Nation Support*
AJP-4.6(A), *Allied Joint Doctrine for Multinational Joint Logistic Centre*
AJP-4.10, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support*
AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning*
AJP-9, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Co-operation*
NATO Bilateral-Strategic Command Reporting Directive; MC 133/3 (Annex C & D), NATO’s Operational Planning System.
AAP – 6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), NATO.
NSA (DNSA) 1042-35/13, Release of NATO Unclassified Standardization Documents.

Other Combined References


National References


Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, US Joint Chiefs of Staff.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Centre of Gravity
Use AAP-6 definition

Coalition Force Commander
The Operational Commander of a Coalition force (CBG)

Coalition Force Readiness Training – Combined or multinational collective training conducted by the assigned units and formations from the TCN to a coalition under the direction of the Coalition Force Commander with a view to harmonize the Coalition and to foster common understanding, combat efficiency and trust throughout the force) (CBG)

Coalition Strategic Commander
The strategic level commander of a Coalition. (CBG)

Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
Use AAP-6 definition

Course of Action
Use AAP-6 definition

Culminating Point
An operation reaches its culminating point when the current operation can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. (CBG proposal)

Culmination
Culmination has both offensive and defensive applications. In the offence, the culminating point is that point in time and location when the attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. An operation reaches its culminating point when it can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. Every effort should be made to avoid a joint force reaching its culminating point, while influencing the adversarial force in such a way that it reaches its culmination first. (CBG) Propose refer to AJP-I(C)

Decisive Point
Use AAP-6 definition

End-state
Use AAP-6 definition
**Forward Mounting Base**
A base (also deployed operating base) established within the operational area, to support operations at forward operating bases. It will be resourced to a greater level than a forward operating base, including C2, logistics and administration support elements. (*UK proposal*)

**Framework Nation**
One nation provides the framework for the required command structure and forces. The key elements of the staff and the headquarters support come from the framework nation. The working language and procedures are based on NATO standards (unless specified otherwise by the framework nation) (based on AJP3)

**Joint Operations Area**
An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by higher authority, in which a designated Coalition Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission-specific. (*CBG proposal*)

**Host Nation Support**
*Use AAP-6 definition*

**Lead Nation.**
This model is based on one nation assuming responsibility for planning and execution of an operation. The commanding officer, staff, Command, Control, communications and Information’s (C3I) structure, doctrine and logistic¹ co-ordination of the force will normally be provided by one nation (the lead nation). Other nations can assign contributions to this force, and fulfil some staff positions in the lead nation’s staff. (AJP-3)

In amplification of the NATO definition this guide considers a Lead Nation to be one with the will and capability, competence and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as functional lead agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical subfunctions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.² (CBG)

¹ According to NATO’s AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine, Lead Nation logistic support might be separately carried out by a nation without being responsible for the total planning and execution of an operation.

² (a) To avoid possible confusion, it must be noted that this definition differs from but is roughly analogous to terms utilized in NATO. The ‘Lead Nation’ referred to here would be recognizable within NATO as the ‘framework nation,’ whereas ‘functional lead agent’ would correspond to a nation within NATO which is designated as a ‘Lead Nation’ for functional specialty support. NATO’s AJP-3, Allied Joint Operations defines ‘framework nation’ as follows. ‘Forces based on a Framework Nation are commanded by an officer of that nation. A significant proportion of the staff and the headquarters support will come from the framework nation; its working language is of that nation. Staff procedures,
**Lines of Operation**  
*Use AAP-6 definition*

**Manoeuvre**  
*Use AAP-6 definition*

**National Contingent Commander**  
The Commander deployed by each country contributing forces to a multinational operation, with the exception of the lead nation, who will exercise national command and represent national interests at the operational level. The role of the NCC is to support both the CFC and his national commanders, while informing his own national authority.  *(NEW – based on AAP-6 and CBG)*

**Operational Control (OPCON)**  
*Use AAP-6 definition*

**Operational Pause**  
A temporary cessation of operations after the attainment of major tactical or operational objectives, but prior to reaching one’s own culminating point, to regenerate combat power in preparation for delivery of a decisive blow.  Adversarial action can also necessitate an operational pause. *(CBG)*

**Sequencing**  
The arrangement of events within a campaign in an order that is most likely to achieve elimination of the opposition’s CoG. *(CBG)*

**Tactical Control (TACON)**  
*Use AAP-6 definition*

although based on Alliance standards, will also reflect those of the framework nation. In practice, however, once command and staff teams work together, procedures may incorporate the “best ideas” of the contributing nations.’

(b) **NATIONAL RESERVATION:** France believes there may be instances in which there will be created a ‘group of Lead Nations’ – this is certainly possible if one nation has the strategic lead, one has the operational lead, and one the tactical lead, for example. Another instance would be a ‘division of labour’ among nations at any or all of the levels to take advantage of some special efficiency or capability. This Guide does not explore that level of complexity. France believes that this definition should read as follows:

‘The Lead Nation, or group of Lead Nations, is that nation with the will and capability, competence and influence to provide the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership to coordinate the planning, mounting, and execution of a coalition military operation. Within the overarching organizational framework provided by the Lead Nation, other nations participating in the coalition may be designated as Functional Lead Agent(s) to provide and/or coordinate specific critical subfunctions of the operation and its execution, based on national capability. These constructs may apply at the strategic, operational, and/or tactical levels.’
Tempo
Tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the adversary, within tactical engagements and battles and between major operations. It incorporates the capacity of a joint force to make the transition from one operational posture to another. (CBG)

**ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS (REMOVE AND PUT IN MIC ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS GUIDE)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Standardization Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>Acquisition Cross Serving Agreements</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACRORD</td>
<td>Activation Order</td>
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<td>ACTREQ</td>
<td>Activation Request</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTWARN</td>
<td>Activation Warning</td>
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<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Air Defence</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOO</td>
<td>Area of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>APOD</td>
<td>Air Port of Debarkation</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Command, Control, and Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, and Computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAOC</td>
<td>Combined Air Operations Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCEB</td>
<td>Combined Communications-Electronics Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCIRs</td>
<td>Commander’s Critical Information Requirements</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFACC</td>
<td>Coalition Force Air Component Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Coalition Force Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFHQ</td>
<td>Coalition Force Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Common Item Support; Communications Interface Shelter</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Course of Action</td>
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<td>COE</td>
<td>Common Operating Environment</td>
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<td>CoG</td>
<td>Centre of Gravity</td>
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<td>COIs</td>
<td>Communities of Interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMSEC</td>
<td>Communications Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>CROP</td>
<td>Common Relevant Operating System</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Coalition Strategic Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>COTS</td>
<td>Commercial Off-The-Shelf</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWAN</td>
<td>Combined Wide Area Network</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Decisive Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Doctrine/Plans/Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECM</td>
<td>Electromagnetic Countermeasures</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIE</td>
<td>Electronic Information Exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMCON</td>
<td>Emission Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>Electromagnetic Purse</td>
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<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>Electronic Protection; Execution Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESM</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare Support Measures; Electronic Surveillance Measures</td>
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<td>EW</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
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<td>FE</td>
<td>Force Element</td>
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<td>FLSG</td>
<td>Force Logistic Support Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMB</td>
<td>Forward Mounting Base</td>
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<td>FORCEPREP</td>
<td>Force Preparation Message</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPU</td>
<td>Force Preparation Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOTS</td>
<td>Government Off-The-Shelf</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Implementing Arrangements</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Identification</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>IERs</td>
<td>Information Exchange Requirements</td>
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<td>IS</td>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>Intermediate Staging Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>Joint Operations Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTFs</td>
<td>Joint Task Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>Lead Nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Multinational Interoperability Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIWG</td>
<td>Multinational Interoperability Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNLC</td>
<td>Multinational Logistics Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSAB</td>
<td>Multinational Security Accreditation Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>NATO Standardization Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, Biological, Chemical</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Contingent Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NSE</td>
<td>National Support Elements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>OOB</td>
<td>Order of Battle</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>Operations Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>OVP</td>
<td>Operational Viability Period</td>
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<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants</td>
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<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private volunteer organization</td>
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<td>QSTAG</td>
<td>Quadripartite Standardization Agreement</td>
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<td>RFIs</td>
<td>Requests for Information</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>SPOD</td>
<td>Sea Port of Disembarkation</td>
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<td>STANAG</td>
<td>Standardization Agreement</td>
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<td>SUPLAN</td>
<td>Supporting Plan</td>
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<td>TACON</td>
<td>Tactical Control</td>
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<td>TCN</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Nation</td>
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<td>TOA</td>
<td>Transfer of Authority</td>
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<td>Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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