TERRY SUTHERLAND (DIA Public Affairs): Okay, good afternoon everybody. I’m Terry Sutherland. I’m from DIA public affairs. I appreciate you all coming. I just wanted to set some quick ground rules. This will be on the record. We’re trying to keep this about 45 minutes, no more than an hour at most. Mr. Pick is going to start off with some opening remarks, introduce some people, and then we’ll go right to questions. Thank you.

MIKE PICK: That was quick. Okay, hi, I’m Mike Pick. I’m from DIA. Naturally, I really look forward to discussing the establishment of the Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center today that became effective on 3 August. Let me – a few introductions, starting with myself, I’ve recently been appointed as the chief of the CI HUMINT enterprise management office. And I’m very excited about it. Didn’t have to be appointed; I would have volunteered for it in any case, because I really believe in where we’re going as an enterprise.

And representing the undersecretary of defense for intelligence is Mr. Toby Sullivan to my right. He is the director of counterintelligence for USD(I). Also here today with us are two former CIFA employees that are actually now senior leaders within the center. To my right over here is going to be my deputy in the Enterprise Management office, Ms. Roxanne Hammond. Brings a lot to the experience, to the table. And Mr. Chris Prosser is going to be the staff director for the center. So all the daily headaches and the running of the center are going to be Chris’. But he’s more than up to the task, a real strong CIN background.

Again, this integration really does reflect the importance that DOD is placing on HUMINT and CI, as well as interrelated and complementary disciplines. But we’ve made a special focus to preserve the unique missions of both. And they’re both
indispensable to countering foreign intelligence threats and indispensable to the fight against terrorism as well. What we’ve created is a fully collaborative DOD-CIN HUMINT capability that is organized in a parallel structure to that of which already is in existence at the combatant commands, the services, and in other national organizations. And moreover, it reflects the continued evolution of DIA’s role as a defense enterprise manager for intelligence operations and follows on the 1 October ‘07 stand-up of the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center, or DIOCC, to manage intelligence operations across defense intelligence.

The Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Center, or DCHC, will actually centrally manage the DOD-wide CI and human intelligence enterprises. And it will develop programs that support DOD component CI and HUMINT functions, and will execute assigned CI and HUMINT activities worldwide.

What I’d do now by reading scripted comments here – I’d like to kind of put some of this into context as to what the stand-up of the center really means. And the real story is not the disestablishment of CIFA. The real story here today is the establishment of DCHC. What we’ve done for the first time is we’ve integrated counterintelligence and human intelligence at the national level. And I want to give you a little bit of background so you can better understand what that really means in the context of standing up this center.

Very quickly in terms of what is CI, what is HUMINT, and why are these two complementary disciplines together now inside of this center? Well, this is nothing new. It’s not a recent revelation that CI and HUMINT work well together. And I’ll walk you through that here in just a second.

But just in terms of definitions, again, counterintelligence is focused on countering or neutralizing adversary intelligence collection activities against U.S. forces. And they do that via several functions: the collection function, investigations, operations, analysis and production, and also other functional services. On the other hand, HUMINT, again working very closely with HUMINT, but HUMINT is focused on collecting information regarding enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, dispositions, plans, and intentions. A lot in common, very complementary – they both deal with the HUMINT domain.

Some of the overlapping areas that you could highlight would be sources and methods are common. Interview techniques, tactics, techniques, and procedures – a lot of the same training requirements, report writing. CI actually provides significant support to HUMINT in terms of source credibility assessment.

So I guess the question would be, well, if you know all this, why didn’t you integrate it sooner? Well, we did. Actually, if you go back to the early ’90s is when we actually integrated CI and HUMINT. And it goes back to what many of you are familiar with in terms of the J2X. And we are fighting the insurgency-type environments of Bosnia, Haiti, and Somalia. We found that we really did need to integrate these two
elements. We had CI and HUMINT collectors out there in the battlefield, in some cases, exploiting the same sources for different reasons. And it was creating problems for us.

So by the mid-90s we’d actually established a CI and HUMINT doctrine that established a J2X. And what a J2X is in simple terms is just a staff element that brings CI and HUMINT together, responsible for synchronizing, deconflicting, coordinating all of the CI and HUMINT activities in a given theater of operations. And again, we’ve been employing that in every engagement we’ve found ourselves in since Desert Storm.

Subsequently to standing that up, at least in a contingency environment, that’s really what the doctrine reflects at this point in time. All of the COCOMs and actually the services as well decided to stand up a similar capability at that level, not only to manage operations, de-conflict, coordinate, because as you know we have operations going on across the world on a daily basis, so they needed that capability, but they also wanted just a – since those two disciplines were so similar – just kind of bring together the oversight for training and policy and IT architecture, career management, planning. You name it, it just kind of made sense to have all of those activities together located in one staff element with one individual responsible for the oversight of that organization, responsible to the appropriate service chief or combatant commander, and/or J-2.

So really, again, we’ve had consolidation at all levels except national. And what we’ve now done is we’ve brought that together at the national level. And let me tell you some of the reasons as to why that just makes sense.

MR. PICK: The two recent studies – and I think they were referenced in the press release that went out a couple of days ago that were conducted – concurrent studies from July of ’07 to about December of ’07 – one that was established by the OSD and another one that USD(I) conducted looking at HUMINT as a collection discipline and how it could be best optimized and employed. They both came to similar conclusions in terms of it’s a natural evolution to bring CI and HUMINT together at the national level. So both studies made that recommendation.

They recommended establishing a single management center that could best optimize the – I don’t want to say limited – but the finite amount of CI and HUMINT expertise that’s available. Bring it all together into one center. It would provide for greater organizational alignment with NCS, with the combatant commands, with the services. Again, we’d already been doing that at those levels for the last 10 to 15 years. It would now allow for programmatic coordination between the two disciplines.

We’d have an organization that could now represent all of defense CI and HUMINT capabilities and requirements to Congress and to other members of the intelligence community. We could provide a unified strategic direction, requirements management, prioritization. It’s on the executive level. We’re not getting inside each individual service and/or executor and dictating who does what. The executive level, I’m talking combatant command service level, OSI, NCIS. At that level, just kind of
establishing what are the requirements? What is our collection strategy and how do we use the finite resources that we have to collect against those most efficiently?

Systems integration, career management, professional development, policy implementation, again TTP, all of those things, we just wanted to put them into one organization so we could interface best with all the other IC partners – with the services, with the combatant commands. They would know where to go for support. And it just really centralized the management of all the activities.

Why DIA, you might ask? We did we select DIA? It just kind of made sense again. DIA, the director already had the mission for Defense HUMINT in terms of being the Defense HUMINT manager. He’s been chairing for the last two to three years now – quarterly board – called the board of governors, where all the HUMINT executors come to the table. HUMINT executors again being the combatant commands and the service intel chiefs. So all those HUMINT enterprise folks, since we’re already resident inside of DIA, and some CI enterprise functions as well.

Some of the CI enterprise functions that DIA was performing even with the establishment of CIFA included strategic analysis and production, CI requirements management, and CI support to the Joint staff, support and oversight of the counterintelligence support officers that are in place at all of the combatant commands. Those were roles that DIA was already playing, again enterprise CI-type functions with the remainder really being with CIFA for the past six years. And those enterprise functions that CIFA was performing included operations and investigations oversight, training and development, IT support, and a lot of program management-type functions in terms of strategic planning, performance management, resource management, and policy implementation.

So really, what we’ve done now is we’ve taken all of those CI enterprise functions and put them into one location. And none of them itself is an accomplishment; but by further integrating them with the HUMINT at the national level, that’s where we’re really creating the operational synergies that we can talk more about as we go through this discussion.

The director of DIA now serves as the defense counterintelligence manager and also as the defense HUMINT manager responsible for the centralized management of the DOD-wide CI, HUMINT enterprises. That’s kind of why we’ve integrated and why we’ve integrated at DIA.

What I’d like to do now is just quickly kind of walk you through the organization, the major components inside of the organization. The center level, we do have a two-star, O-8 that runs that center. Works directly for General Maples, conducts those activities on his behalf, because General Maples is the defense CI and HUMINT manager. We have four major components inside the center. Chris heads up – this is one of the major elements – Chris heads up all the special staff elements that kind of provides
for the unit administrative, personnel, logistics, security, those types of functions, runs the center on a day-to-day basis.

But inside of the center, we have – again, four major components. A counterintelligence directorate that will be performing all-source analytic support to the DOD CI community. It will be overseeing DOD counterintelligence and counterterrorism operational investigations. It will be providing CI support to HUMINT operations. And it will be conducting a relatively new capability at the national level, strategic offensive counterintelligence operations. And we can talk more about that in a few minutes if you like as well.

The HUMINT directorate was already resident inside of DIA. It’s DIA’s directorate for HUMINT or DH. And they basically plan and conduct Defense HUMINT operations and centrally direct and manage the DIA HUMINT worldwide workforce to include the defense attaché system.

Another new organization that we’ve stood up inside the center is the one that I’m responsible for and that is the CI HUMINT enterprise management office. We’ll be managing and overseeing long-range Defense CI and HUMINT, long-range planning, policy, doctrine, training and professional development, resource management, performance management, technology development. And we’ve also established a D2X – new term – again to correspond with those J2Xs that are already out there. That’s just the Defense equivalent to a J2X, really established to synchronize DOD CI and HUMINT activities to include situation awareness, requirements taskings, technical support, source registration and de-confliction, and intelligence planning.

So the two enterprise-focused elements really within the center are the enterprise management office that pretty much does everything the D2X isn’t doing – D2X is really focused on the operational management, again the source de-confliction, the operations coordinations, a real operational focus similar to what a J2X would do in a contingency environment in providing that interface. What we’ll be doing is all the other CI and HUMINT-related activities that are required to run the enterprise that I ran you through. And then, we did maintain, as I stated in my opening comments, a CI directorate and a HUMINT directorate that are focused on those two disciplines and retaining those unique missions and capabilities within those two directorates.

That’s what I wanted to start off with and we can now open it up to any questions you all might have.

MR. SUTHERLAND: If you could state your name and organization.

Q: I’m Pam Hess with AP. Could you tell us about the strategic offensive counterintelligence operations? What are they and how do they differ from other counterintelligence operations?
TOBY SULLIVAN: Offensive CI operations are – CI folks call OFCO – are clandestine CI activities run in support of DOD military national security objectives and programs against individuals known or suspected to be foreign intelligence officers with connections to foreign intelligence or international terrorist activities. And they’re run to counter the foreign intelligence operations, espionage, against DOD national activities and, of course, terrorist operations against DOD or national.

These are very tightly controlled departmental activities run by a small group of specially selected people within DOD. There are only four organizations in the department that can run these operations – Army Counterintelligence, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and now DIA with the center.

Q: And how is it different from the way that you’ve caught these people in the past?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, again, these are clandestine operations where we’re targeting –

Q: Is that new? I mean, did you not –

MR. SULLIVAN: No, we have – this is not a new capability. It is new for DIA. Until about two years ago, DIA did not have the authority to run these ops. The Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, at the request or in response to a request from DIA, granted them a two-year trial basis to run these things. So my shop has been working with DIA, as did CIFA, to help them build this capability. And they performed admirably.

Q: Can you tell us some of their successes?

MR. SULLIVAN: No, I cannot. We’re talking about classified operations.

Q: But nothing that’s made its way to court.

MR. SULLIVAN: No, these type of operations rarely go to court. They’re not – an investigation of someone conducting espionage may wind up in court. Look at the press recently. There was a GS-15 associated with the Pentagon who just plead guilty and got close to five years. There was an investigation on him, not an operation. Operations are in support of various national and DOD objectives.

Q: And the operations are meant to accomplish what if not to investigate and prosecute someone?

MR. SULLIVAN: To gather information, to make something happen, to learn more about events, to yeah – gather –
Q: These are a precursor to an investigation?

MR. SULLIVAN: There have been investigations come from these offensive CI operations. There have been spies caught because of someone else making a mistake and us catching up on it. But by and large, these are not run to identify spies. They are run to thwart what the opposition is trying to do to us and to learn more about what they’re trying to get from us.

Q: I’m still a little bit fuzzy on what that looks like in real life, because in my limited imagination, I can only think of you guys are trying to catch spies. So what is this operation that you’re trying to – what are these kinds of operations that you’re trying to bust up that don’t have to do with busting up a spy network.

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, just perhaps trying to help a combatant commander in a wartime situation get information that he needs, that she needs as the case may be to prosecute the war. To identify people who might be trying to – again from a terrorism situation – trying to do harm, collect information against us, and keep them from doing that. An investigation is more focused on identifying people who are engaged in a state for espionage, and from a law enforcement perspective taking them to trial, at least the U.S. part of it rarely do you see a foreign intelligence officer, a Russian or a Chinese diplomat go to trial – maybe PNG – or something like that.

Q: So is that – I’m sorry go on.

MR. SULLIVAN: Our focus in the investigation in working with the FBI is the DOD person. If we’re involved in an espionage investigation, it will be looking at the person in the department of Defense who is allegedly spying for somebody else. In the operation, we’re going after the somebody else.

Q: So these operations that you’re talking about, they’re basically foreign-based, is that right? Or do they take place in the United States?

MR. SULLIVAN: They are targeted against foreign intelligence officers and people associated with foreign intelligence.

Q: But you talk about combatant commanders in wartime situations.

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, and there are combatant commanders not in wartime situations. So we work closely with the FBI and the United States on any operation conducted in the United States. We work closely with the CIA overseas. But the focus is not so much the venue; it’s the target. And if the target is in the United States, then clearly we have the authority to work with the proper authorities to run an operation here. But it’s against a foreign intelligence person, not a U.S. citizen.

Q: Can you guys address some of the concerns that have come about over the past few years in Congress and among civil liberties advocates about an expansion of
domestic spying through CIFA and how it is that this new center does or doesn’t address some of these concerns?

MR. SULLIVAN: Sure, as one of the people who got to talk to Congress frequently on the subject on Talon, I’d be happy to. And in fact, the paperwork starting Talon came out of our office. The paperwork ending Talon came out of our office. Talon really was a good idea. And CIFA got an awful lot of bad press, no pun intended, about their role in this.

And let me tell you quickly how it started in ’03, because really we are here today to focus on the center. But you have and perhaps the American public has concerns about CIFA and Talon and how that is now in the center. A lot of concern among the senior officials in the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff after Khobar Towers and the other terrorist acts against the Department of Defense, that there were bits and pieces of information out there that someone knew but didn’t report. It was not worthy of an intelligence report or it’s not worthy of an investigation. It was just a dot.

And the idea was let’s create a system whereabouts when the gate guard gets the information about this car that is showing up four times in two weeks and just turns around and leaves, let’s put it some place, so if that car shows up someplace else, that an analyst could connect the dots. If you will, Talon was really an adaptation of an Air Force program. And it is not an acronym as some people report. It is part of a bird, because I know the Air Force colonel that named it. It’s part of a bird.

But nonetheless, it was an attempt to get these bits and pieces of un-validated potential threat information – terrorist threat information – so that an analyst could sit back and see were there dots to connect? We put the paperwork out. We authorized the program. CIFA’s role was simply to maintain the database that these report flowed into. They did not control collections. They did not have people out collecting. And they did not have people out working for them. They were simply, if you will, the goaltender in front of the net. And their error at this point was they really didn’t review all the reports coming in to the database. They figured the people collecting the information writing the reports would in fact take care of that. Into the database it went and CIFA didn’t really look very closely at what was in there.

Before all the press happened – I think it was about November or so of a couple years ago – the issue in Florida – CIFA had to realize that there maybe were some things in the database that they needed to look at. So they had already started an examination of the data. Roughly 13,000 entries in that database, 200 or so were ones that shouldn’t have been submitted at all, and there were a few others that should’nt have been in there because they were okay to be in there for a period of time but then they should have been purged because there was no link to any type of foreign intelligence service.

So, as a result of all the excitement, once this hit the media, we – I should say CIFA – closed down the Talon database, removed those 260-some odd from the file. And ultimately, we took all the information in the file, downloaded it to a disk or two,
whatever CIFA downloaded it to – put it in the safe and locked it up. And as of about August, when the deputy secretary’s letter came out last August, killing Talon in September, there was no access and there hadn’t been since really this started in the prior six or seven months. But there was no more potential access by any analyst or counterintelligence person to any of this data. There was one person in CIFA who had the combination to the safe that was responsible. And of course it’s now in DIA.

We kept the data because we were getting frequent questions from Congress and other people. Did you do this? Did you do that? And if we told everybody we’d stored the data, that would have made it a lot worse than – damned if you do; damned if you don’t. So the data was there really to respond to questions that came in from a lot of different areas and they would be funneled to the individual that has the key to the safe. And they put it together and off it went.

So the Talon program died. For those who may have seen the deputy secretary’s letter last August, there was a charge to another element in the Pentagon to create – because again, the concept is still good: connecting the dots of these bits and pieces of possible information. It’s a good thing; it just shouldn’t be in a counterintelligence database.

So I believe the office of the undersecretary of defense for policy is in fact working on developing a system that for law enforcement organizations and counterintelligence organizations to collect the data but to submit it to a law enforcement entity to maintain the database. During the interim, the FBI has allowed the department to use its guardian database. So any such reports that used to flow into Talon would in fact be going into the guardian database, through primarily the joint terrorism taskforce around the country.

So CIFA was never really spying on civilians. It received reports that were sent in by well intentioned field personnel who thought it should have come in. It didn’t do a particularly great job in screening the information. But there was no active program out there to collect information on schools, colleges, many groups in Florida. And CIFA was in fact playing by the rules. It just didn’t check the database.

There is no – we have repeatedly – and Congress, I know we briefed almost all of the committees. Once it occurred, the changes that were put forth into the system and ultimately the killing of system and we were looked at for a lot of different tractions. There was no concern that we in fact were spying on civilians because we weren’t. so there is really nothing bad to transfer into the Center. The Talon database is no more. There is a new initiative being done outside the counterintelligence and intelligence arenas to try and collect this data, which is important to base commanders.

One of the things in the database – there’s been a lot of concern about spying on colleges in California. There were only three reports on colleges in California. One of them – two of them dealt with a tax on reservists, on recruiters – on the potential tax on
the recruiters who were showing up at those two colleges. And the third report dealt with the attack that actually occurred.

The recruiting service was very interested in this kind of information. So it was good that someone had it and gave it to them but it didn’t belong in the counterintelligence database.

Q: Can you explain why law enforcement is not part of the mission frameworks? That’s one thing from –

MR. SULLIVAN: Say again, now?

Q: Law enforcement.

MR. SULLIVAN: Sure. That too has an interesting story. When we created CIFA – and CIFA was created out of the office that I’m currently the head of – on the USD(I) staff, we recognized that what we wanted to do was evolved the counterintelligence program in the department from where we were back about six years ago to where we wanted to be. And that was to create more of a CI enterprise, more of a CI community.

There are roughly 20 organizations in the department of Defense that do counterintelligence. Now, this is excluding Army tactical and Marine tactical counterintelligence. But we have counterintelligence elements at a number of defense agencies. Army, Navy, and Air Force counterintelligence are the heavy lifters. They have the great majority of the responsibilities, the authorities, the people. There are counterintelligence people at combatant commands around the world.

So we had these 20 different organizations going different directions, doing different things, different pots of money, different authorities, different masters. And we thought it would be a great idea if we had one organization in the department that could kind of play “traffic cop.” Handle the money, because all of the counterintelligence money used to be handled by my office. But we needed to get more involved in the functional – if you will – program management of DOD counterintelligence? What were people doing with their resources? How effective and efficiently were they being utilized? What were the best practices that someone was doing over here that nobody knew over there?

So CIFA really – 90 percent of CIFA’s role was to be this enterprise builder. They really weren’t a doer. They were as much a traffic cop as they were anything else and they held working groups for CI to support research and technology protection – or CI and OFCO and they would bring people together, fund things, be the oversight or be that – if a particular program involved a whole bunch of different organizations, it would be CIFA that would bring them together.
So this evolution of CIFA out of our office allowed us to have our joint CI training academy with advanced training under a CI organization, CIFA, it allowed us to focus CIFA directly with the CI community. And so we began to create this enterprise. When the – then the secretary, Secretary Gates, was, in the early days of the new USD(I), General Clapper, told him he wanted to study, to look at all things HUMINT used to collect information. That led to the study that Mike talked about in the ultimate decision, that it was now time with CI because, literally, we had come so far, I think, in this last part, on this second, if you will, evolution of CI that we were ready to move forward from an integrated perspective to work closer with HUMINT. So the evolution of CIFA was to do all of this.

Now, I said Army, Navy, and Air Force were the heavy lifters. To create an organization to manage this enterprise required that we brought people in with cultures from – who could be representative of the people here now. The Army counterintelligence folks – Army counterintelligence really is just – they do Army counter intelligence. OSI and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service have both law enforcement and counterintelligence responsibilities.

So, if we wanted to have some OSI and NCIS people in this new CIFA, we had to figure out a way that would allow their civilians – because we – one of the main ways we were able to get CIFA approved was an agreement with the services that we would not tax OSI or NCIS and bring their military people into degrading their capability. So we had to start – we had to use money for civilians.

So we wanted to have some OSI and NCIS civilians in the organization for several reasons. Again, they are the heavy lifters. They bring their culture in and for reach-back in investigations and operations oversight, they would obviously be familiar with what their parent organization was doing.

The only way that we could get the civilian agents who by civil-service grade or 1811s and are law enforcement people was to have CIFA identified as a law enforcement organization. Working – let me finish – working with a number of lawyers, we were able to have CIFA identified as a law enforcement organization primarily, if not exclusively, for those two reasons, to have the experience and, in fact, to have this reach-back capability for the oversight.

If one were to look at the DOD directive on the CIFA charter, you would see about, third or fourth page in, that CIFA was prescribed for running counterintelligence investigations; it was prescribed for running any kind of CI active, investigative, or other activities that conflicted with people who did run investigations. It had really no law enforcement authorities other than the fact that it was a law enforcement organization.

That which counterintelligence does, Army counterintelligence specialists do it at a different grade skill category than what OSI and NCIS did. So this law enforcement issue was really more a function to getting people with certain types of OSI and Air Force experience in. How is the center going to handle that? Very simply. OSI and NCIS are
going to detail those people to the center. They don’t have to be part of the center’s organic capability and thus the center would not have to be called a law enforcement organization.

There is nothing lost between what CIFA was doing – everything CIFA was doing, its roles and responsibilities transferred into the center. There was nothing lost in this law enforcement change other than having organic 1811 OSI and NCIS personnel in the organization.

MR. PICK: Just one point of clarification – I think when you asked your question, you said “law enforcement functions.” I mean, to my knowledge, Toby, we do have law enforcement functions in terms of oversight. What the center is providing; what CIFA was previously providing. What didn’t transfer was the designation as a law enforcement activity.

Q: Meaning you can’t put anybody in jail.

MR. PICK: Exactly. HUMINT did not have that authority either and we really did not need the law enforcement activity designation for DIA to continue to perform the same functions that CIFA was doing in terms of oversight, we’re going to continue to do at DIA without the LEA designation.

MR. SULLIVAN: The real difference was how we get the OSI and NCIS people in the organization. And when CIFA was created, the only way we could do it was that law enforcement. We could have gone forward without the law enforcement designation of CIFA, but it would have been all retired guys like myself and all Army folks. And we wanted more of a balance.

MR. PICK: Back to a previous question, just one real quick final clarification: Talon aside, I think you asked the question about domestic spying. The center does not do domestic spying. Absolutely it does not.

Q: Not even these strategic offensive operations? They’re not –

MR. SULLIVAN: An operation against a foreign intelligence officer – (inaudible).

(Cross talk.)

Q: Those are not against U.S. citizens, but they can take place on U.S. territory and U.S. soil?

MR. SULLIVAN: That’s correct.

Q: It could be, couldn’t it? I mean, a U.S. citizen could be a foreign intelligence
MR. SULLIVAN: Our offensive CI operations are against people, foreign intelligence officers, not agents.

Q: Okay.

MR. SULLIVAN: A card-carrying member of a foreign intelligence – of a government, of a foreign intelligence service, not someone they have recruited within our ranks.

Q: Okay.

Q: That would be the job of the FBI, is that it?

MR. SULLIVAN: That would be more of an investigation and we would work with an investigation. And the FBI certainly has authority in the United States to run operations against U.S. persons and I would defer to them to deal with their rules. We run against foreign intelligence.

Q: Can I ask an obvious –

Q: Where are you guys going to be based, at Bolling or can you say?

MR. PICK: No, I can. I mean, for the next several years – I mean, as you know, there’s a BRAC initiative underway to move CIFA, what was CIFA, down to Quantico. There will remain a large element of CIFA will remain at Crystal City for the next couple of years. We’ll move some of those assets over to the DIAC at Bolling. But by September 15, 2011, there’s a requirement to – in accordance with the BRAC commission recommendation of November of ’05, there’s a requirement to move 745 personnel down to Quantico.

Q: But at that same time –

MR. PICK: That facility has yet to be constructed.

Q: That’s being built now.

MR. PICK: It’s being built. They haven’t broken ground yet. We’re still – (inaudible, cross talk).

Q: The OSIs, they’re all there.

MR. PICK: Sure. All of the investigative agencies co-locating down at BRAC in accordance with – down at Quantico in accordance with BRAC recommendation number 131.
Q: Okay, and –

MR. PICK: They will move. We will move. The CI functions that CIFA was performing when it was still in establishment will move to Quantico.

Q: Okay, so this may be in the weeds, but has – at the same time that you’re getting ready to move 700 and some-odd people down there, you’re now setting up a whole new headquarters, organization, what have you. That’s got to add to your workload I would think.

MR. PICK: Well, it does, absolutely.

Q: Do you mind if I ask just a really obvious question? You’re talking about these foreign intelligence officers. What do you do when you find them?

MR. PICK: Again, we’re working with – in the United States with the FBI. And as I mentioned, these operations are based on national or DOD security requirements. So we do what the requirement or what those who have established the requirement would like us to try and do and then, again, with the coordination with the FBI, we conduct the operation.

Q: Do you kill them?

MR. SULLIVAN: No, we don’t do that kind of thing. There have been situations where people have been PNG’ed. The embassy has been asked to remove the diplomat from the country in the past. And depending on the nature of the operation, the guy could finish his or her job in the U.S. and be allowed to go wherever they’re going to have to. Again, it depends on the operation and what – we are an arrow in somebody’s quiver and they want us to provide a service to do something. So, we identify the possible threat; we work with those who are feeling the focus of the threat; and they give us some ideas about objectives, at least in the operational area, what we’re trying to accomplish. And then we try and accomplish that.

Q: You’re talking about now the center has the ability to have OSI, NCIS detail civilians to the center because it’s a law? No, excuse me. Why wasn’t that a possibility under CIFA? Why couldn’t you have had a –

MR. SULLIVAN: I think it probably could have been, but in the time it was taking for us to stand up CIFA, the desire to have organic CI people in CIFA – I guess it just didn’t really come –

ROXANNE HAMMOND: A lot of it was different services were afraid, if you will, of encroachment and us trying to steal away their personnel. So we wanted to provide an opportunity for career growth for other 1811s because not all of them came from the services. They had had an FBI background, a State Department background, or something of that nature that qualified them with both the counterintelligence and L.E.
criteria that we were looking for and, again, that oversight capacity that CIFA’s role was, bringing that expertise in and allowing us to then formalize where we wanted to take the enterprise.

Q: So these personnel – are they now going to be TAD or TDY as opposed to PCS?

MS. HAMMOND: They will be detailed in from the parent service – Air Force OSI or NCIS positions got transferred off of CIFA’s book to those two services. And a link will be established between DIA and that parent service, again, with the authorities that service brings to the table as an 1811. Again, bringing the expertise of understanding what a – for both OSI and NCIS.

Q: But details move really quick to PCS?

MS. HAMMOND: Right.

Q: Secretary Gates, former director of central intelligence, has very strong views on those issues. Is there anything in your charter or your functions that he shaped or reshaped as you were writing the charter and sending up anything that has the mark of Secretary Gates on it? Don’t say “everything.” That’s not really a good answer.

MR. PICK: On the 22nd of July, as you know, as you’ve probably seen, 22 July, the director typed a memorandum that was actually signed by Gordon England because the assumption I can make is that that was approved by the secretary ([http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/DTM-08-032.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/DTM-08-032.pdf)). That’s – (inaudible) – the DEPSECDEF signature and everything in that, I would assume, again, that the secretary supports that.

Q: Could you talk about the threats that you guys are sort of arrayed against? I’m thinking China has got to be high on your list. They seem to be in the news a lot for particularly defense technology, espionage. And I’m wondering where you fit into the whole cyber initiative that seems to be – so could you just talk about those and other things that you’re particularly focused on?

MR. SULLIVAN: The cyber initiative – there are other parts of the department that are responsible for protecting the IT systems of the department. The counterintelligence role in that – and we do have a role – is to provide some analysis and then, quite frankly, from an offensive capability, it provides us another venue to perhaps engage the enemy. But we don’t have a role in protecting the systems, if you will. There are other folks in the department that do that. As far as the threats, we had the Cold War threats and we have the today threats. There hadn’t been a whole lot of change over the last 20 or 30 years.

Q: Is IRTC now higher on your list than it was?
MR. SULLIVAN:  I think Iran is high on everybody’s list, as far as their potential.

Q:  Could you talk about the offensive cyber – what does that look that?  You mentioned that it’s another chance of venue to engage the enemy in your – on the cyber front.  Can you give us an example of what –

MR. SULLIVAN:  I’ve really not once – I’m not – can’t talk about any kind of operational activity, but you have people using the Internet to meet and talk and speak to each other and you have people communicating.  So you can have that opportunity for folks who need it as much as you can have an opportunity for folks to meet in a restaurant.

Q:  How much is done with the Internet versus in the restaurant?

MR. SULLIVAN:  We’re – oh, I’m not going to get into that how much of whatever we’re doing.  We’re working with the people who authorize those kinds of operations to, where necessary, to conduct them.  It’s an arrow in our toolkit, if you will.

Q:  Defense HUMINT service – Can you give a sense of the size and scope of the operation, does it now fall under the new Center?

MR. PICK:  Defense HUMINT service is actually an old title, but it’s really the director for HUMINT.  I was actually the formal vice deputy director for that arm of the service.  And we are one of 15 HUMINT executives as part of the HUMINT enterprise.  And we are, as a charter member of DIA, we are the executive who resides inside of DIA.  But that piece hasn’t changed.  We’re continuing the same mission we’ve had – continues inside the center.  It’s kind of an executor inside the center that gives General Maples kind of the worldwide HUMINT collection capability organic to the center.

Q:  Can you give a feel for how many attaches you have in the Army reserves – the HUMINT center or service awareness, call home.  Are we talking hundreds or scores?  Like you say, they’re in every embassy or every – (inaudible)?

MR. PICK:  We have them at all embassies.  We have 137 defense attaché offices worldwide.  That’s obviously a representation in all of those, without getting into the numbers.

Q:  Is there anything in this organization that will allow you to do your job better or make it easier than it was under CIFA?  Now that you’ve established the Center, is there anything about it that improves what had been done under CIFA?

MR. PICK:  I think just the operational, again, synergies, that have got to be created by bringing these CIFA functions together with HUMINT.  There’s just so much – I don’t want to say “duplication of efforts” – because that’s not the case.  It’s just, we can better apply the resources that we now have available to the Center.  And now we’re
going to be co-located side-by-side, working lots of the same issues. I think we’re going to get more focused, more efficient operations and just make better use of the finite number of resources that we own.

Q: Can you say that again? I’m a little confused back to Pam’s question about cyber – another one of these directives that was signed – (inaudible) – that made the Air Force, a lead executive service for all cyber in the last couple of months. So they come up with ideas or emissions and they would say, well, we’re busy today; let’s ask this new office in DIA to do it? Or you all stumble across something in the cyber world and you go up to them and say, Mother, may I? I mean, again, it seems that there’s still a lot of duplication because they’re the lead agency, but you have this enterprise authority. So, forgive me, I don’t understand how it works.

MR. SULLIVAN: The operations that you’re speaking of in fact have to be approved and coordinated by a number of people in the department, external to the department. There is a process. So there’s not an issue of duplication or our counterintelligence people kind of running amok.

Q: So it goes to a higher authority?

MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, there are higher authorities; there are processes; there is guidance, and a lot of strict rules to follow before anybody does anything.

Q: Okay.

CHRIS PROSSER: If I could add, putting two of the questions together, you mentioned Mr. Gates and what his footprint on this was and also your question about how will you be more effective. Consistent with DNI, we’ve been asked to come together, coordinate, and consolidate more. We’re doing that with CIFA and DIA coming together. We’ve actually found efficiencies with simple places like support: information technology, security. We’ve actually gone in and found additional billets that we’ve been able to consolidate and take those billets and reinvest those back to doing more specific function errands.

So that’s consistent with the way DNI is wanting agencies to consolidate, working more closely together. We’ve already done that, already managed that, and effected that same synergistic approach with these two agencies coming together.

Q: Can I ask a really in-the-weeds question, just because that’s my specialty?

(Laughter.)

Q: Yes, God help me. You had said that, for the purpose of this – to put it in military terms, working for the center here with OSI or NCIS is the equivalent of the PCS. That makes it sound like these people are organic to the center because, unless I’m
missing something, the way you first described it, I thought when you said “detail,” it sounded like this would be temporary duty and then they would –

MS. HAMMOND: Two to three years.

Q: Two to three years? Okay.

MS. HAMMOND: That’s what – on military terms, okay, you know, in the weeds, when you’re detailed to an organization, normally you are there for two to three years, initially two years and then the option to extend for the third year. And then the option then is to replace with someone new.

Q: Got it.

MR. PICK: So career management for that individual is retained by the service. OSI puts some of you in the center for a two- to three-year tour. They would determine at the end of that whether the individual rotates to. More than likely, they would not stay in the center for an extended period of time.

Q: So it’s not a career path.

MR. PICK: They’d be back out to an operational tour.

Q: Right, okay, thanks.

MS. HAMMOND: And the opportunity, obviously, is seeing how things are done at a higher level of bringing the integration together and then taking that expertise back to their service a kind of, if you will, you know, from train-the-trainer kinds of activities and along that of what they can expose to, to help foster that kind of integration.

MR. PICK: Going back to the Secretary Gates question, just one more time. I don’t want anybody to think that we’re skirting that issue because we’re not. It’s just that a lot of this has gone on under the sec, the DEPSECDEF signature. Obviously Secretary Gates supports what we’re doing. He approved the stand-up of the center; the studies were briefed to him. He is fully cognizant of what we’re doing and fully supportive.

And I think if you get the opportunity, if you haven’t already, to take a look at the director-type memorandum that was published on 22 July http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/DTM-08-032.pdf. That will give you some insight.

MR. SUTHERLAND: Okay, we have a few more minutes. A couple of final questions maybe, if any?

Q: So is there anything new that the center will do that CIFA didn’t do and that DIA didn’t do in counterintelligence?
MR. PICK: Specific to counterintelligence, I guess it’s more the growth of that strategic – (inaudible) –

Q: Or in HUMINT?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, from a counterintelligence perspective, there are things that are going to be done that DIA used to do and CT used to do; they are now doing it as a center as part of the same theme. The OFCO, Offensive CI Operations, DIA had a small charter to do this. Now, they have a larger charter. CIFA did not do that. So most of – again, 90 percent of what CIFA did was this traffic cop, program management, enterprise management. They are now coupled with parts of the enterprise that they weren’t coupled with before.

So we’re going to have a closer capability, if you will, for creating a “borg,” in old Star Trek terminology, it’s together instead of being split. But there is really no new authorities in the counterintelligence world for this entity. It’s picked up what CIFA did and continued on with what DIA was doing.

Q: You created the borg?

(Laughter.)

Q: Could you talk about HUMINT in particular? That’s been a big focus for everybody who served in the intel world for the last few years. Where do you all stand and have you increased your numbers? Have you increased covert officers or increased the pace of clandestine ops?

MR. PICK: Well, the HUMINT side specific to the center, I mean, I think we do have some increased capabilities, as we do in CI associated again just with the synergy that we’re creating, especially with the establishment of the D2X. That element of the agenda itself is now going to be a focal point for coordinating worldwide CI HUMINT activities that previously just did not exist. I think there’s going to be a lot of focus on efficiency and much more effective gains from that establishment. But it’s really not a new authority.

DOD directive related to HUMINT is being rewritten at this point, 5200.37. We expect that to come out some time within the next couple of months. And that will highlight any new HUMINT authority specifically associated with the Center.

Q: What do you expect – (inaudible)? Why is it being rewritten?

MR. PICK: Just to bring it up to date. I mean, it will go – it’s a 1992, is it, I believe, document. That might be off. I’d have to check that and get back to you. But it’s just got to bring the date in alliance with the stand-up of USD(I) and DNI and just the rewrite of the 12333.
Q: And HUMINT in general for DOD – can you give us just a snapshot of where you were, say, pre-9/11 and where you stand now?

MR. PICK: I’d say in general we’ve been going through a HUMINT transformation, if you want to call it that, over about the last four to five years. We have increased our resources in HUMINT. I don’t think I can get into those numbers.

Q: By an order of magnitude, by hundreds, by thousands? Any way you can give us a ballpark figure?

MR. PICK: (Chuckles.) No, I really can’t get into that.

MS. JENNIFER LASLEY (DIRECTOR, DIA CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS): Well, I think it’s important, though, if I could – in your question, you asked whether we had increased our covert and our clan. You used both of those terms in the same sentence.

Q: Is there a difference?

MR. PICK: We do not do covert collection.

MS. LASLEY: We don’t have the authority to do that.

MR. SUTHERLAND: Okay, any final question?

Q: Can I get the correct spellings of everyone’s name?

MR. SUTHERLAND: Sure.

MR. PICK: I get the easiest one: Mike Pick, P-I-C-K.


Q: Common spelling?


MR. PROSSER: Chris Prosser, P-R-O-S-S-E-R.

Q: P-R-O-S-S-E-R?

MR. PROSSER: E-R.
Q: G-R-O-S-S-E-R.

MR. PROSSER: No, P-R, P as in Paul.

MR. SUTHERLAND: Okay, thank you all very much!

(END)

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