Cover

The "educational continuum." The Naval War College is a part of a seamless process in the education of naval officers, and others, for leadership in the twenty-first-century security environment. The inter-relationships between its sources (policy and fleet influences), partners (notably the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland), and of course its products, its graduates, are represented here by their arrangement in a toroid-like pattern—denoting continuity and suggestive of infinity.

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Over the last nine months or so, the Navy has invested significant resources in developing a new maritime strategy suited to the realities of the contemporary security environment. Many elements of the Navy and Navy-affiliated organizations have contributed to this effort, but the Naval War College has played a central role in laying the groundwork for the new maritime strategy through an intensive series of workshops, war games, and analytical exercises. It has also helped to organize an ambitious series of public meetings around the United States (the “Conversation with the Country,” as it has come to be known) designed to engage the attention of the broader American public in issues of concern to the Navy and in the future of American naval and maritime power. It is appropriate, therefore, to start off this issue with two articles that provide some sense of the current state of thinking on maritime strategy issues within the Navy educational establishment. George Baer, a distinguished historian of the U.S. Navy and longtime chair of the Strategy and Policy Department at the Naval War College, offers some broad reflections on how one should approach maritime strategy today. (The article is based on remarks presented by Professor Baer at the first “Conversation with the Country” gathering, held in Newport in February 2007.) Next, Wayne Hughes of the Naval Postgraduate School offers an analytical framework for thinking about the requirements of naval force structure at a time when the Navy is seemingly caught between the conflicting demands of immediate low-intensity global threats—principally but not only the war on terror—and the longer-term yet increasingly formidable high-end threat posed by the People’s Republic of China and possibly other emerging major maritime powers.

On the subject of China, we continue our focus on “Asia Rising” with articles by Peter Dutton, a former Navy JAG officer and now a Naval War College faculty member, on the long-standing and potentially dangerous territorial disputes between China and Japan in the East China Sea, and by Colonel Philippe Rogers, USMC, on the little-known story of China’s participation in recent UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. We are pleased to welcome this outstanding student contribution to these pages.
Milan Vego is well known to a generation of Naval War College students as perhaps the leading historian and theorist of “operational art,” the arena of military action falling between strategy and tactics. The concept of operational art, deriving ultimately from German and Soviet military thought, has for some decades had a central place in U.S. Army doctrine, but its role in naval thinking and practice remains problematic, to say the least. Professor Vego here explores the notion of “major naval operations” as a key component of naval operational art, with particular reference to the Navy’s (as he argues) still-relevant World War II experience. This is a subject we intend to pursue in future issues.

In our final feature article, Gary Solis provides a careful analysis of “Targeted Killing and the Law of Armed Conflict.” This is a controversial subject but one that cannot be ignored by military professionals; particularly in today’s atmosphere of media sensationalism and emotionally driven political commentary, we have to be mindful of the increasing interdependence of military operations and issues of the law of armed conflict and with strategic communications requirements.

**ASIA EYES AMERICA**

*Asia Eyes America: Regional Perspectives on U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy in the Twenty-first Century,* edited by Jonathan D. Pollack, is in preparation for release in late summer 2007. This third book in our Policy Studies Series extends the East Asia focus of the first two volumes, *Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century* and *Korea: The East Asian Pivot,* also edited by Dr. Pollack. The highly distinguished international scholars and analysts represented presented these papers at the Naval War College’s Asia-Pacific Forum of 4–5 May 2006. They examine a contemporary Asia marked by increased competence, confidence, and resilience, and in which the U.S. role is a major variable. This book is a groundbreaking contribution to the study of the contemporary Asia-Pacific and to the wider debate on fundamental issues of national strategy and policy. The book will be sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office, through its online bookstore, at bookstore.gpo.gov/.

**EDWARD S. MILLER RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP IN NAVAL HISTORY**

The Naval War College Foundation intends to award one grant of $1,000 to the researcher who has the greatest need and can make the optimum use of research materials for naval history located in the Naval War College’s Archives, Naval Historical Collection, Naval War College Museum, and Henry E. Eccles Library. A guide to the College’s manuscript, archival, and oral history collections may be found on the Naval War College’s website, at www.nwc.navy.mil/museum (under Naval History Resources, then Naval Historical Collection Publications).
Further information on the manuscript and archival collections and copies of the registers for specific collections is available online and from the Head, Naval Historical Collection, by e-mail at evelyn.cherpak@nwc.navy.mil.

The recipient will be a research fellow in the Naval War College’s Maritime History Department, which will provide administrative support during the research visit. Submit detailed research proposal (with statement of need and plan for optimal use of materials, curriculum vitae, at least two letters of recommendation, and relevant background information) to Miller Naval History Fellowship Committee, Naval War College Foundation, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, R.I. 02841-1207, by 1 August 2007. For further information, contact the chair of the selection committee, at john.hattendorf@nwc.navy.mil. Employees of the U.S. Naval War College or any agency of the U.S. Department of Defense are not eligible for consideration; EEO/AA regulations apply.

FORTHCOMING: NEWPORT PAPER 29

_U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s and 1980s: Selected Documents_, Newport Paper 29, is the third of a series of volumes in which Dr. John B. Hattendorf, the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College, documents the history of U.S. naval strategic thinking in recent decades. Newport Paper 29 will provide the key capstone documents for U.S. naval strategy in the 1970s and 1980s. This is a selection of documents that are described in Professor Hattendorf’s Newport Paper 19, _The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986_, and were the predecessors of the documents that he published in Newport Paper 27, _U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents_.
Rear Admiral Jacob L. Shuford was commissioned in 1974 from the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps program at the University of South Carolina. His initial assignment was to USS Blakely (FF 1072). In 1979, following a tour as Operations and Plans Officer for Commander, Naval Forces Korea, he was selected as an Olmsted Scholar and studied two years in France at the Paris Institute of Political Science. He also holds master’s degrees in public administration (finance) from Harvard and in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College, where he graduated with highest distinction.

After completing department head tours in USS Deyo (DD 989) and in USS Mahan (DDG 42), he commanded USS Aries (PHM 5). His first tour in Washington included assignments to the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, as speechwriter, special assistant, and personal aide to the Secretary.

Rear Admiral Shuford returned to sea in 1992 to command USS Rodney M. Davis (FFG 60). He assumed command of USS Gettysburg (CG 64) in January 1998, deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet operating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the Battle Efficiency “E” for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.

Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he directed the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Following this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy Division as chief of staff of the Navy’s Roles and Missions Organization. He finished his most recent Pentagon tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure, Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint Staff—primarily in the theater air and missile defense mission area. His most recent Washington assignment was to the Office of Legislative Affairs as Director of Senate Liaison.

In October 2001 he assumed duties as Assistant Commander, Navy Personnel Command for Distribution. Rear Admiral Shuford assumed command of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in August 2003. He became the fifty-first President of the Naval War College on 12 August 2004.
PRESIDENT’S FORUM

An International Forum for Operational and Strategic Leadership

AS THE NATION CONFRONTS a dramatically altered strategic and political environment, the Naval War College has been thrust into a position of increased prominence on the Navy’s agenda. Four initiatives in particular reflect what can be described as a catalytic role being played by the College, leveraging its enduring strengths as an academic and research institution to meet the challenges of today’s global security environment:

• Building and sustaining global maritime partnerships
• Bolstering the ability of the Navy and its maritime partners to lead and support at the operational and strategic levels of war and diplomacy
• Evolving both the theory and practice of decision making and command and control in globally networked, self-organizing environments
• Developing strategic and operational leaders.

These initiatives are all in execution even as we continue to develop and refine our concepts of their constituent elements.

Also on the Navy’s agenda is a proposal to establish a venue for the collaborative intersection of the genius and energy behind these efforts—a setting appropriate to the international stature of the Naval War College and the special, global responsibilities that fall to the U.S. Navy, and indeed, to all its partners in the maritime domain. The Navy’s Commander Naval Installations Command is currently crafting a master plan for Naval Station Newport to realize post-BRAC* efficiencies and respond to associated expanded mission sets. The major element of this plan is a building to house academic and operational activities relating directly to the four initiatives just listed. This new “International

* BRAC: the Base Realignment and Closure Commission whose work was completed in August 2005.
Forum for Operational and Strategic Leadership” would—as outlined below—architecturally reorient the campus and create urgently needed space for additional mission functions, student loading, and faculty and staff associated with dramatically expanded student throughput and tasking (see my Spring 2006 and Winter 2006 “President’s Forums”).

Building and Sustaining Global Partnerships

Establishing an international forum for strategic and operational leadership would provide a permanent, world-class facility where leaders and scholars of maritime nations could work to develop an increased understanding of the international security environment, an enhanced appreciation of each others’ interests and issues, a deeper awareness of the critical role that culture plays in international relations, and effective leadership methods for implementing solutions in both policy and operational arenas. Increased and more robust engagement and dialogue between the military and civilian leaders of these maritime nations is the linchpin of global maritime partnership and of what is often referred to as the “thousand-ship navy” (cf. the “President’s Forum” of the Summer 2006 Review). The International Forum for Operational and Strategic Leadership would be the global center of excellence for considering the most sensitive and pressing issues affecting maritime nations.

Activities and functions centered in the Forum would, for example, expand the very successful concepts associated with the Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO’s) biennial International Seapower Symposium (ISS) into an ongoing research and problem-solving process. Several elements to support this process come immediately to mind:

- A state-of-the-art conference facility capable of accommodating events from small workshops to CNO’s Navy flag officer meetings to conferences for up to two thousand people, with simultaneous translation of up to eight languages.

- Language labs to allow students to maintain language currency.

- Working-group facilities, enabling military officers and civilian practitioners and academics to explore collaboratively issues of interest to the international maritime community and provide working-group reports and recommendations at the ISS. Overarching themes for working group efforts could be determined, as an example, through discussion at each ISS.

- A Fellows-in-Residence program would be established to allow the Naval War College to offer one-year fellowships in Newport. These Fellows, working with NWC faculty and students, would research pressing regional issues determined by the CNO and regional maritime component
commanders, such as democratization, defense cooperation, piracy, and cultural obstacles to regional and international cooperation. In addition to their research activities, Forum Fellows would support demands for expertise in the College’s recently implemented, AQD-producing* regional electives program (and provide regional expertise to courses at other Newport school commands), as well as be available to brief senior naval commanders en route to commands in various regions of the world.

- An International Scholars program to allow a select group of recent Naval Command College and Naval Staff College graduates to remain in Newport to study regional issues of importance to the officers’ home governments and the maritime component commanders operating in their respective regions of the world. These Scholars would also serve on appropriate working groups in support of the ongoing ISS process and support the advanced regional awareness training.

The Forum would also house the office and staff of the Associate Dean for International Programs. As a direct contribution to building partner capacity, the Naval War College would bring into collaboration and focus the combined intellectual power of its faculty, the operational leadership mentoring resource of our new Operational Leadership Department, the vast joint and international experience and research of its student body, and the war gaming and applied research resident in its research faculty.

**Bolstering the Ability of the Navy and Its Maritime Partners to Lead and Support Leaders at the Operational and Strategic Levels of War and Diplomacy**

Recognizing that warfighting today is weighted at the operational and strategic level, Navy operational commanders have begun to insist that their staff officers be strategically focused, critical thinkers and skilled practitioners of operational art. At the start of World War II, all but one Navy flag officer in the Pacific had graduated from the Naval War College in Newport. Then, as today, the curriculum stressed operational- and strategic-level perspectives, processes, risk assessment, decision making, and leadership in peace, policy, and war. Competence at the operational level of war today is more than thinking jointly; it is long-range thinking and sophisticated analysis of the combined effects of a host of diverse actors and factors so as to integrate both military and nonmilitary elements of national power in order to achieve objectives.

Moreover, commanders at this level must develop skills and instincts appropriate to an operational environment populated by an array of nontraditional organizations, all able to access and influence mission factors horizontally (vice

* An AQD—additional qualification designator—corresponds to a billet or assignment demand for a specific set of competencies.
through the more deliberate, formal, “vertical” structures that have traditionally organized decision processes). Mission success must be assured with international and national agency and nongovernmental partners—often without clean, clear, or formal lines of communication and with diverse interests, charters, and doctrines in play.

Key to this level of command are the know-how, processes, and systems that enable commanders and their staffs to sort through the blizzard of operational detail as well as the complex array of diplomatic, political, cultural, and religious issues to correctly frame and appreciate the mission and its context. Winston Churchill wrote, “The success of a commander does not arise from following rules or models. It consists in an absolutely new comprehension of the dominant facts of the situation at the time, and all the forces at work.” To create an inventory of leaders who can do this, the Navy has established a “continuum” of professional military education (see the “President’s Forum” in the Spring 2006 issue), objectives, and requirements—the content of which is the responsibility of this College.

At the top end of this continuum are the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) and Combined Force Maritime Component Commanders (CFMCC) courses for flag officers. At the junior end of the continuum is a Maritime Operations Center course for people who will report to maritime headquarters staffs. Supporting all elements of the continuum is the Senior Mentor program, created to leverage the wealth of expertise that resides in the retired flag and general officer community to help build command expertise at the operational level. The Forum would house the staff for these initiatives and draw upon the collective intellect and research of others colocated in the facility to reinforce and strengthen their efforts.

**Evolving Theory and Practice of Decision Making and Command and Control in Chaotic, Networked Environments**

Because of the importance of information and knowledge as operational tools in war and diplomacy, the International Forum would arm students, researchers, and operators with the skills and competencies they need to achieve success in the new operational environment. In order to harness the power of this new force multiplier, we must develop new theories of knowledge-based warfare. Practitioners and scholars must work together to create a set of unifying principles and constructs of the sort that establish new domains of learning—new academic disciplines.

What has to happen today in the information domain remains a subject of intense scrutiny vital to evolving the ability of commanders to operate effectively in an effects-oriented environment. Strategists from Sun Tzu to
Clausewitz to Colonel John Boyd of the U.S. Air Force have recognized the value of information and, more importantly, use of that information to gain a relative advantage over an enemy. At issue are the largely intangible conceptual skills, cognitive abilities, sentient and sensory information, socialization and acculturation, organizational structures, and interpersonal skills—not just information management—required to be harnessed in increasingly sophisticated ways to frame and appreciate a mission and to marshal diverse actors and effects to execute it. The Forum would be the focal point for testing, analyzing, and understanding the complex interdependencies required to produce decisions at the operational and strategic levels. Activity and investigation in the Forum would be channeled to identify creative ways to share knowledge, to use that knowledge better, and to generate new knowledge and ultimately create greater wisdom about complex situations and the innovative methods necessary to cope with them. The Forum would provide the new and expanded “game floor” that has been the centerpiece of the College since 1884.

The Forum would itself instantiate and exploit knowledge theory and technology through its design and would be the focus for evolving knowledge-based warfighting as an academic discipline. Coupling the theoretical effort directly into the “feedback loop” with the warfighters, policy makers, and diplomats routinely involved with the College and its Forum would create huge value for the Navy and its global maritime partners.

**Developing Strategic and Operational Leaders**

Going forward, none of these initiatives can bear fruit without a group of leaders of character who can function effectively and efficiently in a dynamic, self-organizing environment. The College’s Operational and Strategic Leadership Department, established under the leadership of a recently retired two-star flag officer, would also center its administrative functions in the Forum.

To support all these efforts, this facility would host a new Naval War College Library, expanded especially in the area of regional studies, cultural awareness, and knowledge systems. It would employ cutting-edge technological research and information capabilities to support the Forum and the broader range of student, faculty, Navy, national, and international needs. Reachback into this resource would be available to all graduates of both our national and international programs.

Since the International Forum is intended to be a place where the future is the focus, the building would incorporate environmentally friendly engineering. Making this building a model for future Navy building design that emphasizes energy efficiency and environmental awareness—opening outward toward the
world across the ocean approaches to historic Narragansett Bay—would also make the building speak to the Navy’s approach to global environmental concerns.

The International Forum would be more than just another academic building. It would leverage the College’s international reputation for intellectual objectivity and institutional integrity, and it would signal an irrevocable commitment to effective international, joint, and interagency collaboration. It would become the venue and resource of choice for U.S. and international operational and strategic leaders searching for a way to bring diverse genius and expertise to bear on the most pressing issues of mutual interest in the maritime domain. Its activities would serve to bring partner nations together to discuss, study, experiment, game, and socialize actionable approaches to operational and policy issues of importance to national, regional, and global security. It would build regional expertise and cultural awareness among those nations, and it would establish objectives and operate together with joint, governmental, and nongovernmental agencies and organizations. It would help all these to learn how, in other words, to think outside bureaucratic and political boundaries while expertly working within those boundaries. It would be a fountainhead of creative thinking and mission impact. The capability, capacity, and mission focus of the Forum would tie together, with mutually reinforcing effect, those four vital initiatives the College is pursuing with such great energy and focus for the Navy, and it would serve the current and future needs of the service, the nation, and our partners around the world for decades to come. It is a proposition worth pursuing.

J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

\[signature\]

J. L. SHUFORD
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
Dr. Baer is professor of strategy and policy in the Naval War College’s program at Monterey, California. Educated at Stanford University, Oxford (where he was a Rhodes Scholar), and Harvard (where he earned his PhD), Professor Baer has been a member of the Naval War College faculty since 1981. He is emeritus Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor of Maritime Strategy and was for ten years the chairman of the Department of Strategy and Policy. He was previously a professor of history, and twice chairman of the Department of History, at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and before that taught at Dartmouth College. His five books include the award-winning One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The United States Navy 1890–1900 (1994).

Naval War College Review, Spring 2007, Vol. 60, No. 2
NOTES TOWARD A NEW MARITIME STRATEGY

George W. Baer

Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chief of Naval Operations, has charged us with thinking about how to redefine sea power in this era of hyperglobalization. He asked us to think of a new vocabulary, a new frame of reference, to consider what will take our maritime strategy beyond sea combat and enable a sound public understanding of the Navy’s value. Or, as Vice Admiral John G. Morgan, Jr., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information, Plans and Strategy, has said, the core question for us to answer at the end of this discussion is: “How will sea power influence history in our time?” Put another way: What is the role of the ocean, of American maritime armed forces, in securing American safety and prosperity?

A NEW MARITIME STRATEGY?

This is not new a question. One hundred fifteen years ago, faced with similar challenges of new technologies, globalization, and new naval threats, the founders of the Naval War College, admirals Stephen B. Luce and Alfred Thayer Mahan, answered the question with a new maritime strategy for the nation and the Navy. They called it “sea power,” and it endured for a hundred years, a strategy of sea combat, of sea control, and of power projection. We are following in this tradition when we ask again today: What is the Navy for?

One goal of the new maritime strategy, then, is to establish and sustain public understanding of the role we expect sea power to play in our time, to demonstrate the link between American naval forces and the preservation of our way of life.

Of course, we have some general expectations of our naval policy. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has listed them: to adapt the service to the country’s requirements in an era of hyperglobalization; to meet the threat of terrorism; to
stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction; to deter or control a future peer competitor on the sea; to support friends and allies; and to address maritime issues in an era that is both transnational and state-centric in nature. These are jobs the Navy must do to support our national policies.

Beyond these basic and essential naval requirements, is there anything more that the Navy, and a maritime strategy, may do to help the nation in this era of hyperglobalization? Establishing our national maritime agenda is a shared responsibility, shared between the public and the military, between officers and civilians. This is so because we want to give a national answer to the question of what the Navy is for.¹

That was Mahan’s question, and it again is ours. Like his, our concerns mix old and new, traditional maritime services and future needs. Like his, our new maritime strategy has to have public as well as professional support. Sea power then and today must be socially construed.

We all agree that the Navy is a combat force and that its missions generally are to preserve free use of the sea, enhance global commerce, and secure our shores. The first requirement for our fleet, then, as the basic condition of our new maritime strategy, must be broad preparedness for sea combat. But more may be asked of it than sea combat.

The Navy must serve homeland defense, and it also must be ready to give humanitarian assistance around the globe. It must support armed interventions and also position itself for ballistic missile defense. It must deliver “fires” ashore and also conduct constabulary duties. It must protect fisheries and also be ready to fight an interstate war. It must enforce sanctions and also assist in sea-use management. It may be called upon for offshore command and control in case of a terrorist pandemic and also to monitor the cybersphere. I mention these many and varied functions—some traditional uses of navies, some new, hard- and soft-engagement missions—because all these are what the Navy must prepare for. For all that, for our maritime environment, do we need a new strategy? The answer is yes.

For starters, I think we should want to establish the widest possible national understanding of the values we assign to the ocean. A national maritime strategy will take into account more than just combat. The sea sustains our ecosphere. It is essential to life on earth. The ocean is a vital venue of our commerce and global culture, a source of essential protein, a domain of salutary recreation. Some forty thousand merchantmen of over three hundred gross tons ply the sea today. The U.S. Maritime Administration estimates that global maritime trade, travel, and commerce will double in the next twenty years. Entire societies are
dependent upon maritime commerce and upon food from the sea. More than a
hundred marine reserves have been established worldwide as habitats, reflecting
the need of a productive and resilient ocean. It is an ocean under stress. The
phytoplankton mass is diminishing, acidification is increasing. The number of
dead zones has increased by a third in just the last two years. The number of
these anoxic zones is now two hundred. Public and official discussions must
keep these facts in mind, for commerce and culture, ecology and food sources, as
much as politics and naval power, shape the values we—and others—place upon
the sea.

The ocean has value because it is an essential part of our common space. The
opening words of the recent 2004 report of the U.S. Commission on Ocean Pol-
icy express our position in the world: we are “a nation surrounded by and reliant
on the oceans.” We are on a water planet. Seen from space, the earth is largely
blue. The ocean is a single whole. The water of Narragansett Bay connects to the
Sea of Japan. Our life and well-being are affected by this global connection. For
that reason, our maritime policy must be holistic. A maritime strategy is Amer-
ica’s face to the sea.

We must now consider the ocean’s value from different perspectives. One is
seeing the ocean as what Mahan called the “wide common,” a space for the
movement of commerce, a place of food, of environmental health, and of recre-
ation, for use by all. Another perspective is to see that same ocean as military wa-
ter, either as a moat, a protective defensive barrier, or, alternatively, as a water
highway for offensive use. The point is that ocean water can be crossed in all di-
rections, so it can be a medium of trade, of military aggression, or of defense in
depth. It can be a common, a moat, or a highway. Our maritime strategy will de-
depend on what we want it to be.

**IS THE OCEAN STILL A COMMON?**

Yes. But it is an increasingly restricted and contested common.

It is a place of potential contest because sea space is not just geographical
space. It is also political space. Many states today are developing their own mari-
time strategies, either for protection or for armed reach. Nations make local eco-
nomic and security claims. Asian states seek stability near the Straits of Malacca.
Sweden protects the environment of the Baltic. India advances its influence in
the Indian Ocean. China wants to influence East Asian and perhaps western
Pacific seas. Recently President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China
called for the building of a powerful navy prepared “at any time” for military
struggle, a navy fit for what he called China’s “military’s historical mission in this
new century and at this new stage.” North Korea threatens ocean movement in
the Sea of Japan. Australia and Spain worry about illegal immigration from the
sea. Chile and Iceland think about fisheries. New Zealand’s exclusive economic zone is fifteen times the land area of that country. Norway and Nigeria, to say nothing of Iran and the Arab states, think about pumping and transporting oil. As part of its nation, the United States claims almost 11.5 million square kilometers of territorial waters.

Our claims are political as well as commercial: we project naval power across the sea, throughout the globe, and that power may be contested. Last October a Chinese submarine surfaced, undetected, within five miles of the carrier USS *Kitty Hawk* in waters near Okinawa. It is possible that some states might create formidable sea-denial capabilities and, perhaps, limited sea-control capabilities as well. If that is the case, America may need to continue to command the commons, as only strong maritime power can prevent such denial, and once in command, influence how certain ocean-directed states may develop: encouraging them to cooperate or deterring their expansion. In the present world of many powers, and should our land and air forces be restricted in access or effect, such influence at sea as command of the common presents may be our best means of foreign policy leverage, and hence the key to a future maritime strategy. The sea is and will remain a political sphere.

But if the sea can be contested, it can also be a space for cooperation. Many laws and agreements already apply at sea, and all shape, or suggest, a common concern for the “wide common.” There are environmental protocols, the International Seabed Authority, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, the UN’s Law of the Sea Convention. The United States is not a party to the Law of the Sea Convention, but we recognize the usefulness of cooperation and operate in ways consistent with its provisions of navigation and overflight. Admiral Mullen stated his policy on cooperation recently in Venice. It was, he said, “the maritime forces of many nations working together for global maritime security, while keeping the sovereignty of territorial waters secure as a core principle.”

“Good order at sea,” then, refers to a framework of agreements for living with the unitary world ocean. A secure global maritime environment is in America’s interest. Good order at sea will be an international construction, an iterative process, a network shaped as much by agreement as by naval power. A cooperative attitude is there to develop. For instance, today twenty-two countries participate in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, a group that is itself a direct outcome of a suggestion for regional associations made by the American CNO at an International Seapower Symposium held at the Naval War College twenty years ago. In the words of Admiral Mullen, “As we build upon ideas like Theater
Security Cooperation, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Regional Maritime Security Initiative, we find that every nation has a stake in security, and a distinct, unique capability—as well as a great desire—to contribute.” If they have a stake in security, they should have a stake in broader ocean management as well.

IS THE OCEAN A MOAT OR A HIGHWAY?
Of course it is both. The ocean as a moat, a military space, gives security space. It offers defense in depth. But by the same token, as a body of water it permits offensive use, permits maritime power projection. One can move both ways across a moat. A moat can become a highway. Naval strategy is what determines how the Navy will use the ocean, both for defense in depth and for access to foreign ships and foreign shores.

For two hundred years America was favored by ocean space. We thought of the sea as our protection, as our safety zone, our natural strategic depth. A French ambassador many years ago observed, “America is blessed with fish on one side, and fish on the other.” But fish space is not enough: ocean space is again open to those who master the technology of sea control and have the will to use it.

We are not invulnerable. Attacks against us have happened before. The United States was founded in the face of the longest seaborne supply route before World War II, the greatest overseas expeditionary force yet seen by history, launched against us in the War of Independence. We won that one, thanks to our continental resolution and outside help, but our vulnerability to British sea power remained as long as we lacked sea control. Depth in itself was not enough. A few years after independence, in 1814, the British burned down Washington, D.C.—destroying the Capitol Building, the White House, the National Archives, and the departments of War, State, and Treasury—all, that is, destroyed by an amphibious invasion force from across the sea. The United States could not defend its own shoreline.

That is why, in 1890, searching for a new maritime strategy in a new technological age, Mahan said that the Navy had to reshape its force and its doctrine if it was to be the true shield of the republic. Passive coastal protection was not enough. We needed oceangoing battleships. The Navy had to become an offensive battle fleet prepared and able to defeat an approaching enemy fleet in blue water, away from American shores. Mahan’s strategy of sea combat and power projection dominated American naval policy for the next hundred years. Sea power meant we could fight our wars “over there” and beat anyone who challenged our use of the sea. The best defense of our coastline, Mahan said, was a good offense, out to sea.

That strategy of maritime power projection held through World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. The North Atlantic Treaty was named for an ocean,
befitting its maritime sponsor. The Cold War was for the United States based on a global maritime strategy meant to contain a continental opponent. The United States became the protector of the ocean’s rimlands, a barrier against Soviet expansion to the sea. At the end of the Cold War we had total sea control. The rimlands of the world were open to trade and to liberal values—our national policy called for “enlargement and engagement.”

Then on 9/11 violent politics hit our shore with a stunning shock. The ocean’s vastness and our prodigious military and intelligence forces had not safeguarded American soil. The meaning of security had changed. Now the national strategy proclaimed that protective actions abroad and at home were indistinguishable and might have to occur simultaneously. The strategic distinctions were blurred between offense and defense, between means and ends. Strategic depth had to be established, not just enjoyed. The moat that secured the United States from direct attack and the highway that secured our strategic access abroad came to be seen as one and the same, as indeed they have always been.

That is to say, the expanse of the ocean does not in itself guarantee either security or access. Its strategic dimensions must be created. Strategic value is something that must be imposed upon the sea. This is why our new maritime strategy must emphasize full maritime domain awareness. That is why the Navy will have a role in ballistic missile defense. That is why the Navy must operate in cyberspace. That is why the Navy will rely on the Global Information Grid, on new command-and-control capabilities, to confer strategic benefits, to use the sea’s great capacity for maneuver to hit the foe before he hits us, to give us offshore control. Mahan would have approved of forward deployment, forward presence to maintain strategic depth, to stop a threat before it materialized.

THAT BRINGS US TO: THE NAVY AND A NEW MARITIME STRATEGY

We can start by remembering the geostrategic values that are conferred upon a maritime state such as the United States, which is in a position that gives the great strategic advantage of global exterior maritime lines of communication.4

A recent workshop at the Naval War College gave us a useful sea power syllogism, emphasizing the value of a naval peripheral approach and what is strategically required.5 It was described as “the Periphery Syllogism”:

• Who commands the seas can exploit global maritime exterior lines.

• Who exploits global exterior maritime lines can attain the global exterior maritime position.

• Who exploits the exterior position can prevent anyone else from commanding the world.
To elucidate these issues, Robert Rubel, dean of the Naval War College’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies, asked the College faculty members three questions. *Is the nation shifting from strategic defense to strategic offense?* That is, which serves the nation better now: The ocean as moat or the ocean as highway? Strategic depth or power projection? Concentration or dispersion of force? The answers to these questions bring into play the main strategic features of ocean use: mobility, depth, influence, access. In one form or another the Navy will use these attributes to defend the homeland, secure its economic well-being, and promote a favorable world order.

There are, however, very substantial economic costs to global influence. Forces “poised” in continuous forward deployment are immensely expensive. An effective strategy must be sustained by an appropriate budget—hence our need for public support and for cooperative allies. As Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt knew, the public had to want to buy those battleships. Preparedness was a shared responsibility.

The Navy cannot write a sustainable national maritime strategy alone. Admiral Mullen has noted that the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps are direct participants in forming the new maritime strategy. He has called the Coast Guard’s Evergreen Project the equivalent of the Navy’s maritime strategy. The recent publication of *The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship* stresses the Coast Guard contribution to developing regimes supporting American ocean policy, developing maritime domain awareness, and close integration with the Department of Defense. The subtitle of *Sea Power 21* is *Projecting Decisive Joint Capabilities*.

The nature of war at sea may also change. What kind of force, what kind of strategy, what kind of friends, and what cost will be required remain open questions. The most recent report of the CNO’s Strategic Study Group 24, located in Newport, gave a look thirty years ahead and concluded, “Future operations will more resemble a pick-up game with neighborhood partners, or a street fight that spontaneously erupts, than a well-planned operation conducted under conditions of the U.S.’s choosing.”

*What is the value of navies in preserving economic order?* That is, how can the Navy best protect the benefits we gain from use of the sea in the age of hyperglobalization? This again suggests the value of creating good order at sea—a strategy that includes naval force but also the creation of a cooperative framework of like-minded maritime states. Our purpose here is to permit access to materials and markets, to encourage prosperity and the favoring of political values through trade and social interchange, and to protect the position in the global economy of our friends and allies. We can use our influence in two ways. We can help friends—and we can hurt opponents. We can open commerce, and
we can cut it off. We can seal off another’s moat by blockade, to take away the value of his seaward protection. We seek to preserve economic order; we may also be called to disrupt it. Sanctions are under way this very moment against several states. These sanctions could get stronger. Blockade and interdiction are traditional naval missions, and they are very serious: blockage is a belligerent act under international law and may be considered an act of war.

A new maritime strategy must be ready for whatever the government commands: sea control, sea denial, assurance, deterrence, or disruption. Or more: recently the CNO instructed the newly convened Strategic Studies Group 26 to take as its theme for the year “Fighting in Cyberspace in 2030.” He told the SSG to “seek an appreciation of the relationship between cyberspace and the traditional maritime domains, including warfare and naval competition.”

This is the new world: naval presence in cyberspace, in the new “wide common” of our time. U.S. policy seeks an unimpeded flow of information commodities, of the goods and services of cyberspace. That recollects traditional Navy functions. There must be free navigation through the sea of ether as well as on the sea of water. In financial markets, for instance, over 95 percent of all wealth is digitally represented. Information warriors, terrorists, and pirate hackers threaten this, and thus also the security of military communications. A great deal of information power, over 90 percent, flows under the ocean, through fiber-optic cables. Protection is required to ensure reliable movement of electrons along the seafloor as well as of bulk cargo on the surface. Information moves as commerce; movement adds value. The Navy is movement, and commercial movement is something navies have always protected, or attacked.

So the Navy of a trading nation might well position itself to protect and monitor bandwidths as well as merchant ships. A mobile, present Navy could grasp a new form of sea control, guaranteeing free navigation of—if necessary, escorting—the transmission mechanisms of the modern world.

Also, for all-important national defense, the need to track an enemy in cyberspace, to deprive him of this medium of action, is a top national priority that the globally deployed and electronically endowed Navy is well equipped to support. This again is a function of full maritime domain awareness, the basis of effective sea power.

How can we encourage naval investment by friends and allies? Here the Department of State could well become an active partner. The proposed Global Maritime Cooperation Initiative, an international network of navies that cooperate in flexible ways on the missions suggested above, will be as much a diplomatic
project as one just among navies. In short, and for greatest value, all our maritime considerations must be fit together. Our national maritime strategy expresses the whole, not just the parts. We must see maritime strategy whole.

A strategy, then, will show the maritime services what they are to protect, what they are to pursue, and for what they are to prepare. It will give a common purpose that will serve to overcome the community-based differences within the Navy. A new maritime strategy will be an integrated naval combined-arms concept, envisioning a force ready to fight in integrated space. A new maritime strategy will express the way we see ourselves in respect to the world ocean and declare what the fleet can do about it.

These purposes must be clear, and they must be realistic. In the last analysis, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard cannot decline to act, but they must be able to do what they are asked to do. A strategy is worthless if it cannot deliver on its promise, if it sets goals without effects. That is why setting policy and strategy is iterative, an interaction of ends and means, between the goal setters and the men and women at sea. Officers must state the requirements of the maritime services to officials who must set the nation’s expectations. Political officials must listen to the military officers, who must act. Both in turn depend on the support of the American public. Naval effectiveness means getting the right mix of resources and need. Naval readiness is about a national obligation to pay for and support the force. Again: the new maritime strategy is, and must be, a shared responsibility.

A FINAL WORD ON EDUCATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING

They say the Naval War College is about “Clausewitz and salt water.” To me, that equals maritime security and, more broadly, maritime strategy. Let me conclude with a brief word on the College’s historical role in shaping our understanding of the sea and the sea services, the importance of ideas and of education in establishing the terms of maritime and national security, the importance of the education of professional naval officers and of creating a broader public awareness of maritime values.

I mentioned Mahan’s contribution. Eighty years after Mahan, in 1972, Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner restated the College’s academic purpose in his convocation address to its officer-students. “We must be able to produce military men who are a match for the best of the civilian strategists, or we will abdicate control of our profession. Our profession can only retain its vitality so long as we ourselves are pushing the frontiers of knowledge in our field.” That is the mission of the schoolhouse.

I end with a story about the power of ideas. In 1893 Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert decided to close the Naval War College. His assistant said the College
was “really only a dancing school” for Newport debutants. The head of the Bureau of Personnel said about Mahan, “It is not the business of a naval officer to write books,” and ordered him to sea. As Secretary Herbert boarded a dispatch boat to go to Newport and personally close the school, his aide handed him a copy of Mahan’s second sea power book, The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Napoleon, 1793–1812. Herbert did not close the institution, and on his return to Washington, he said, “This book alone is worth all the money that has been spent on the Naval War College. When I embarked on this cruise, I had fully intended to abolish the college; I now intend to do all in my power to sustain it.” Such is the power of strategic analysis. If you look at Mahan’s book, you will see in the preface: “Whatever success the book has is wholly and exclusively due to the Naval War College, which was instituted to promote such studies.” That is why—to advance such studies—we are in conversation today.

NOTES

This article is adapted from remarks given on 6 February 2007 at the Naval War College during the first “Conversation with the Country,” public sessions subsequently held in major cities throughout the nation on behalf of the Chief of Naval Operations to elicit inputs to the formulation of a new maritime strategy.


6. The Royal Navy defined “poise” as: “An attribute of a maritime force which permits it to remain in international waters for long periods while retaining the ability to become engaged in events ashore or withdraw without risk of embroilment.” The British also have defined forward deployment as “naval loitering with variable menace.”

7. For ideas on a naval role in information protection I thank Dr. Joseph Rosen. Whether, or how, the United States would permit its military to stand between a civilian information society and a (potential) information enemy, at least in peacetime, is an open question. It is a matter of constitutionality, function, and capability. The uses of force for this purpose, however, can be indirect, the support of cooperative politically and commercially critical regions—which is what naval forces can do.

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A BIMODAL FORCE FOR THE NATIONAL MARITIME STRATEGY

Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)

While still serving in my first ship, I read a twelve-page article in the Naval Institute Proceedings entitled “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy.” Written by Samuel P. Huntington, this durable and popular essay has stuck with me ever since. As a source of wisdom for confronting both international communism and the Soviet Union, “Transoceanic Navy” is not as incisive as public servant George Kennan’s Long Telegram or as sweeping as theologian Reinhold Niebuhr’s book The Ironies of American History. Nevertheless I believe Huntington’s article, written in 1954, rivaled them as a guide for the Cold War.

1950: The Navy in the National Strategy of Forward Defense

What were the strengths of Huntington’s description of a “transoceanic navy” for the American nation? They were three. First, he did not speculate on a new direction for the American navy. On the contrary, he described with a clarity all might grasp the changes actually under way both in purpose and composition, and why the changes of strategy and supporting forces should be stable, enduring across changes of administration and military leadership.

Second, Huntington went beyond describing the new maritime strategy then being embraced by the U.S. Navy. He described the national strategy of forward engagement that was being fulfilled by the Marshall Plan for Europe, the restoration of Japan, the fight against communist expansion in Greece, and the establishment of the NATO alliance. He pointed to the creation of the Sixth Fleet in 1948 as the most important arrow of seapower’s transoceanic influence, an arrow sunk deeply into the eastern Mediterranean. He emphasized what was increasingly being taken for granted, namely, the exploitation of naval supremacy
as the cornerstone of a policy of containment and forward defense. He expressed a *national* maritime strategy.

Finally, Huntington was explicit that an armed force must be seen by the American people as relevant and worth supporting financially. He hinted at, though he did not explore, how the investment in military capability must be weighed against present and future national and international economic circumstances.

By the 1960s the roles of the Navy in the forward strategy had become multifaceted. The Soviet Union had achieved its own nuclear weapon capability, and the bipolar U.S.-Soviet Cold War competition had reached a wary stalemate of mutual nuclear deterrence. The Soviet Union had also established a significant air and submarine threat at sea sufficient to challenge an uninhibited “transoceanic” American naval influence. The Soviet navy would no longer tolerate unmitigated American forward operations across secure oceanic sea lines of communications, and the U.S. Navy could no longer take maritime superiority for granted. Expression of the expanded navy—and national—maritime strategy had to be updated.

**1970: A More Complicated Set of Navy Responsibilities**

Starting in 1970, actions by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) reflected the multiple roles in the design of the fleet. In 1974 Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, President of the Naval War College, expressed the changes in “Missions of the U.S. Navy,” published in these pages. In his article Turner described a “redefinition of traditional navy roles that had been in effect since 1970.” He wished “to force the Navy to think [about itself in these new roles] in terms of output rather than input.” Like Huntington, he said that a nation of free citizens and skeptical taxpayers was “more interested in what is harvested than in what is sown.” Implicitly he assumed that the United States was a maritime nation exercising a national maritime strategy tied to operations well away from its shores to confront the Soviet Union—and that the Navy was the enabler of that worldwide confrontation and containment. In considerable detail he explained the logic of four supporting missions for the U.S. Navy: *strategic deterrence* of nuclear war, *sea control* to safeguard the sea lines of communication, *projection of power* as the reward and output of the Navy, and naval *presence* forward to affirm American commitment to the defense of the free world. He said other states might have other missions but that these were the four that served our national interests. With varying degrees of emphasis these four missions served the nation

*Will we have a unifying structure as clear and long lasting as those enunciated by Samuel Huntington and Stansfield Turner?*
well, became accepted, and ensured popular support for the Navy until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

What led to that collapse and the next great transition? An important nuance to the national strategy of patient containment is well described in a recent book, *The Reagan Imprint*, by Professor John Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate School. In the 1980s President Ronald Reagan went beyond containment and set out to push back against international communism, while establishing in personal meetings with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that he wanted peaceful competition between the two superpowers and genuine nuclear arms reduction. The U.S. Navy’s contribution had never been greater, its presence around the world more important, or its support of overseas activities more crucial than they became during its effort to serve those ends. The Navy was indispensable in fostering the sequence of economic and political consequences inside the Soviet Union that, after a decade or more of unsustainable defense expenditures, resulted in collapse.

**1990: After the Fall—A Return to Projection of Power**

By 1991 the consequences as they affected the Navy were nearly identical to what Huntington described as the result of the fall of Germany and Japan. The Navy returned to transoceanic operations to demonstrate its continuing viability and marshal popular support. The role emphasizing projection of naval power was described in a series of CNO white papers, beginning with *The Way Ahead* and the more aptly titled... *From the Sea.* These expressed the projection mission explicitly and, directly or indirectly, forward presence for peacekeeping. With a de facto sea sanctuary temporarily assured, the missions were implemented with large ships for efficient delivery of naval combat potential overseas. The Navy bought new, more powerful, and more expensive weapons afloat, and the Marine Corps bought the capability to avoid direct, opposed assault with “ship-to-objective maneuver,” as a safer but more expensive way to conduct what had been its bread-and-butter mission ever since World War II, operational maneuver from the sea.

But forward presence and crisis response became ever more difficult in the 1990s as the nation claimed its “peace dividend” and dramatically reduced the proportion of the federal budget devoted to defense. Navy fleet numbers took a nosedive, from almost six hundred ships to five hundred and then to less than four hundred. Just “being there” was getting harder, and “there” had to be more and more selective as pressure mounted throughout the 1990s to be in the Adriatic, the Arabian Gulf, and the western Pacific for extended periods.

It is deeply ironic that while the size of the fleet diminished by approximately 40 percent the demand on the Navy for crisis response actually rose. What was
worse, the duration of the average response increased greatly. This was true worldwide, but I will cite numbers in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility, because I have studied them the most closely. Before the fall of the Soviet Union, from 1970 to 1989, the number of crises in the European theater requiring response was 2.1 per year, with a median duration of less than a month. From 1990 to 1996 there were 2.6 crises per year, with an average duration of 375 days. At the time of my study (1998) no one knew for sure whether this rash of trouble spots would continue, but it was obvious that neither the peaceable “end of history” of Francis Fukuyama’s famous prediction nor the world harmony anticipated in 1991 was nigh. More and more Sixth Fleet ships and aircraft were being siphoned off to the Middle East. Nor was there any evidence that the demand for American military presence in Gulf waters was going to be eliminated after our swift victory in DESERT STORM. The Navy was using ships that were inefficiently large for the blockade and interdiction roles they were playing. We needed more but smaller ships and aircraft for what have come to be called constabulary roles—a multiplicity of activities that are neither quite projection of power, peacekeeping presence, nor sea control.6

Meanwhile our forces in the Pacific were similarly strained with demands in many places, but most notably with respect to the growing influence of China in East Asia.

What was worse, the coastal sea sanctuary we had enjoyed was in jeopardy. The inshore environment is replete with islands, shoals, bays, and inlets. It is cluttered with coastal shipping, fishing boats, commercial aircraft, and oil rigs. Littoral waters have become dangerous, from mines, coastal submarines, and sudden land-, sea-, or air-launched missile strikes.7 Crippling attacks on USS Stark (1987), USS Samuel B. Roberts (1988), USS Tripoli (1990), and most recently USS Cole (2000) illustrated the variety of potential means, surprise being the one common denominator of every successful attack.

2001: A New Transition
Evidence of the transition under way lies in the almost unassimilable whirlwind of guidance, visions, operational concepts, appraisals, program guidance, and decisions flowing from an unparalleled number of statements of strategy—for starters, a National Security Strategy, a National Defense Strategy, a National Military Strategy, a National Strategy for Maritime Security, a National Fleet Policy, and directives associated with the Quadrennial Defense Review. In addition, we published “Naval Power 21,” “Sea Power 21,” the “Naval Operational Concept,” and the “Navy Strategic Planning Guidance.”8 The other armed services issued analogous documents.
Where is the staying power of these documents? What convergence, consistency, and cohesiveness? Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the Chief of Naval Operations, is working on a new maritime strategy for the Navy that he hopes can serve as a steady hand on the tiller to last well beyond his personal tenure as CNO and even that of the next presidential administration. If it is to be durable it must be consistent with what de facto has been the long-standing national maritime strategy of forward engagement, empowered by the U.S. Navy, to allow the nation to sustain its political and military influence overseas.

Will we have a unifying structure as clear and long lasting as those enunciated by Samuel Huntington and Stansfield Turner? Let us look beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, not to conjecture future changes in force composition but instead simply to state what is actually occurring and how, almost implicitly, the defense establishment is responding for the long pull into the twenty-first century.

We cannot put equal weight on all circumstances and crises and be, as the slogan goes, always ready for anything, anytime, anywhere. We should describe an affordable American armed force that is no more costly in percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) than now. The present defense budget already costs as much as those of the next five or seven defense establishments, including China’s. As Huntington and Turner insisted, the American people will want to know not only what we, the defense establishment, expect to do to serve their interests but also that it will cost them no more than at present.

Let us define a two-pronged national military strategy with two, and only two, objectives: first, the capabilities to deal with a peer competitor, and second, the means to conduct several small operations concurrently. Next we will construct in sweeping terms the capabilities of the force components to meet those two objectives. We must satisfy ourselves that the capabilities of all the services will probably cost no more and might cost less than our present capabilities. The final step is one I do not take here but merely discuss—to assess whether this “bimodal force” is capable of dealing with other situations, if with less efficiency.

The Bimodal Defense Establishment

Even the CNO cannot suggest a national maritime strategy. But I can do so, asserting that such a strategy reflects what is happening, is economically viable, will be popular with the American people, and probes more deeply than a transitory response to present circumstances in Iraq and tensions with China over Taiwan. The strategy will reflect not only what is transpiring as it may be inferred from external events but also changes in operations and training that in due course will affect force composition.
The first mode aims at future peer competitors. But for the indefinite future there is only one peer of concern, so let us be explicit: the high end of U.S. defense planning should take aim at the People’s Republic of China.

**Engaging the Emerging Peer Competitor**

Evidently we do not wish to fight China, any more than we wanted to fight the Soviet Union in the Cold War. We want to influence China. The exact nature of that influence—whether it be collaboration, containment, or confrontation—is very important, but it will probably change from decade to decade. The question is: How can we best design American military capability as one component of a bimodal force that will be robust across a spectrum of changing relationships with China?

For example, here are two factors to be weighed:

- Foci of current relations with China are the Republic of China on Taiwan and the unhealthy situation in North Korea. A durable American military capability ought to reflect the consequences on force design if an accommodation is reached between “the two Chinas” or if a reunification occurs between North and South Korea. I will outline an American force structure that accommodates either the status quo or peaceful, voluntary transformations. Korea north and south is a situation best viewed not as a potential regional conflict but almost entirely as it relates to China.

- China is in the process of creating an increasingly robust sea-denial capability that reaches farther and farther off its coast. We must anticipate that in due course China will attempt to shift its navy from sea denial to a sea-control capability. This is because it is now beholden to the U.S. Navy to protect its trade and imports of energy by sea. We ought to anticipate that China may decide that this vulnerability is unacceptable for a peer of the United States, or that the U.S. fleet is merely a paper tiger that can no longer protect the trade of China or of anyone else.

The consequences of these two factors are major but need not affect the force design criteria. Here is an outline of the high-end force mode, designed against the only visible future peer:

- **We must maintain strong and influential military capabilities in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters**, such that China and its neighbor states know we do not want Chinese soft or hard power to inhibit the freedom and independence of those neighbors.

- **The first element of U.S. forces is a robust offensive and defensive nuclear deterrent.** China has a nuclear weapon capability. It will grow, as much because of the probable proliferation of these weapons among other Asian
states as because it would serve as an instrument of U.S.-Chinese diplomacy or military confrontation. The offensive and defensive capability also serves importantly against Russia’s nuclear arsenal, an old role in strategic deterrence.

- Under no foreseeable circumstances would we invade China. Therefore, as the second element, we must influence China with American sea and air power, accompanied by close relationships with friendly states that do not wish to see Chinese hegemony in Asia. Maintaining the viability of our air and naval forces into the indefinite future will require adjustment of future designs in ways not clearly discernable. The designs, however, must anticipate Chinese aspirations for a sea-control navy.

- As the third element, the American surveillance and reconnaissance advantage must be maintained. Future designs will probably be a continuation and evolution of the expensive satellite and other high-tech means at which we are expert, accompanied by clandestine penetrations with Asia-centered human and signals intelligence.

- Fourth, we will also need a command and control (C2) advantage using networking technology. We in the Department of Defense (DoD) have been self-critical of our own efforts, yet a reasonable appraisal of our information technology is that the services and American industry have invested great amounts of money and have achieved an advantage over the competition that will serve well if edge-of-war tension arises between China and the United States. But China as a potential peer competitor has the industrial and intellectual skills to catch up, a situation to be avoided through constant vigilance.

- Fifth and last is the logistics component that maintains the fighting elements in the western Pacific. This is an expensive component that takes a substantial fraction of the defense budget. For example, without its air wing an aircraft carrier is only a highly efficient and mobile airfield. As a “logistics” component, the carrier costs roughly the same amount of money as its aircraft. Long-haul logistical support is the responsibility of the Navy and the Air Force; thus, with respect to China these services will be sustaining their own operations. Keying on China makes it easy to see where to base forward support—in Hawaii, South Korea, Guam, Japan, Okinawa, and Singapore, for example—and the desirability of warm friendship with the Philippines.
The Other End of the Spectrum: Small Wars and Peacemaking

By “small wars” I refer to the global war on terror and to constabulary and humanitarian operations. “Stability operations,” “irregular warfare,” and “counter-insurgency” are frequently used terms. A good shorthand word is peacemaking. The upper limit of “small wars” is arbitrary, but the American forces that have fought them have constituted no small fraction of military capability, if we call to mind the Indian wars on the western frontier (1865–90), Army operations during the Philippine Insurrection (1899–1902), and Marine Corps peacekeeping operations in Central America in the 1920s and 1930s.11 A superb book covering the long history of U.S. Army and Marine performance at the small-wars end of the spectrum is Max Boot’s The Savage Wars of Peace.12

In small wars, a severe complication is that armed forces are often not in control. Though the DoD must design in advance a capability for a wide range of peacemaking operations, the forces will neither constitute the entire capability nor be governed exclusively by a military command. In contingency and humanitarian operations, DoD influence will be shared with the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, sometimes the departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and even nongovernment organizations. No one below the National Security Council can establish, in the several instances going on all over the world, how U.S. operations are intended to proceed and goals to be accomplished. Further, these will be coalition operations, with host states and other participating nations.

There is another important distinction. The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine says American armed forces should not be committed without sure knowledge of how the operation will conclude. It also mandates the use of sufficient—implying preponderant—force. Neither criterion can apply to small wars or constabulary operations, which tend to be open-ended. The war against stateless terrorists is much more like the never-finished “wars” on crime and drugs than what Weinberger envisioned—a war between states that ends in capitulation or a negotiated peace after American aims are achieved.13

A complementary doctrine for “small” operations is badly needed. The lack of one does not mean there has been no effort to distinguish between the two ends of the spectrum of conflict. Three diverse examples will suffice, taken from thinking now under way at the Naval Postgraduate School. Jan Breemer offers different principles for insurgencies in his prizewinning essay “Statistics, Real Estate, and the Principles of War.”14 Raymond E. Franck and Terry C. Pierce describe the

Evidence of the transition under way lies in the almost unassimilable whirlwind of guidance, an unparalleled number of statements of strategy.

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United States as a near-perfect enemy for terrorists and suggest things we could do to be a tougher opponent, in “Disruptive Military Innovation and the War on Terror: Some Thought for Perfect Opponents.” Commander (now Rear Admiral) Bill McRaven, a Navy SEAL, recognizes that classical theory of war and its principles need modification for special warfare. His master’s thesis on the subject was published as SpecOps in 1995.

Despite these complications it is possible to describe the force elements for small wars and operations. The elements will contrast sharply with—be virtually disjoint from—the forces for use against the peer competitor, at the other end of the spectrum of warfare.

- Nuclear deterrence that applies against self-governing states—in fact, the concept of deterrence itself—is irrelevant. A separate, expensive, warlike campaign is now under way to forestall terrorist attacks of grave consequences. The aspiration of this small-wars force element is to prevent even one nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon attack.

- The second element comprises the forces to engage in small wars and operations, namely ground forces, with tactical support from the air. The primary role of the Navy and Air Force here is to deliver the ground forces to the scene of action rapidly and sustain them, often for months or even years.

- The third element, intelligence and surveillance, is primarily based on human intelligence. “HUMINT” takes time to establish, is difficult to maintain, and is costly—so much so that it must be placed selectively, for a blanket capability around the world would be unthinkably expensive. High-tech intelligence gathering is also part of the formula. High tech can be more quickly deployed as we learn how to insert effective “hastily formed networks” employed by signals intelligence experts, but effective small-wars intelligence and surveillance are different in most respects from the intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance network against China.

- The fourth element is a command-and-control system to link coalition forces and agencies outside the American military establishment. Those who tilled this weed-strewn soil in the heyday of NATO know that even for operations between semipermanent, treaty-governing forces under international command, the problems of reliable, secure, swift communications are endless. One way to appreciate the future difficulties in small-wars C2 is to imagine the challenges as the U.S. Navy develops a highly desirable, multinational “thousand-ship navy.”

- Fifth is the logistics element that delivers, supports, and sustains the forces operating on land. Sea and air components do the long-haul delivery. Army,
Marine Corps, and special forces conduct mostly their own in-theater support. Since in small wars there will be hot spots in many places around the world, agility and adaptability become bywords for these operations, much more so than for confronting China. Logistics is again a very large and costly component. The advantage of smallness in scale is offset by the vast panorama of possible contingencies, the many places they occur, and their history of ugly longevity.

Observe again the striking contrast with the force composition for the peer competitor. Operations carried out by a peacemaking force are quite dissimilar. This is why a force designed for the middle—crudely, the composition that served well for “two major contingencies” in the 1990s and until the watershed attacks in 2001 against the Twin Towers and the Pentagon—is badly configured to handle either the China or small-wars end of the spectrum of conflict.

**Affordability**

The aim in American competition with China should be to keep that competition economic and political. Each side has advantages and disadvantages. We watch the Chinese economy warily, on one hand, because strong, sustained growth will sharpen the competition and, on the other hand, because a collapse or serious downturn might create internal political chaos there that would without doubt affect the world’s economy as well as our own. At the same time there are plenty of concerns for the American economy. The short-term causes are much in the news, but the vital aspect is our long-term economic health. Health implies not the absence of bubbles and downturns but resilience through exploiting the virtues—some would say the mean-spiritedness—of capitalist competition. Defense’s contribution, one that assuredly will be demanded by the American people, is to avoid excessive expenditure.

Economic considerations at the small-wars peacemaking ends of the spectrum must be based on confrontations that cannot be peaceful. Here we will not infrequently resort to force of arms and must expect to fund a stream of “small” operations. Inescapably the long war against terrorism will be episodic and marked by many campaigns, some of them long lasting. What is the expected economic impact on defense expenditures? I don’t know. Despite much inflammatory rhetoric, the cost of operations in Iraq has been modest compared with wars like Korea, Vietnam, and upward. Evidence from American history is a mixed bag. The American economy did not seem to suffer when substantial fractions of the Army and Marine Corps were engaged in many constabulary operations overseas from 1898 until World War II. On the other hand, when the “Two Ocean Navy” buildup commenced in the mid-1930s during the Great Depression, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration seemed eager to disengage,
replacing peacekeeping in Latin America with a Good Neighbor Policy. But if we are to focus effort on peacemaking around the world, it would be useful to know the economic history, along with the military history, of small wars of the nineteenth-century British Empire and of the early-twentieth-century United States.

The often unnoticed expense of the transoceanic strategy is logistical. I know of no data, but at a guess half the U.S. defense budget is expended just to operate our forces transoceanically. It is an unavoidable cost at both ends of the bimodal spectrum. It is a burden borne by no other nation.

A suitable benchmark is a defense budget that does not grow as a fraction of the gross domestic product. The federal government took its “peace dividend” and reduced defense expenditures substantially in the 1990s. Expenditures bottomed out at 3 percent of the GDP, their lowest point since the late 1940s. Since the DoD budget is still by far the largest defense budget in the world, we should aim to work within the current level, which is now between 3.5 and 4 percent of GDP. The Congress and the nation should be cautious about increasing it, because economic strength is as important as military capability and international political influence.

The war on terrorism extends well beyond Defense Department operations. There are many players, not least the Department of Homeland Security. A strong homeland defense alone can never be sufficient: first, because with the advantage of initiative terrorists will sooner or later penetrate any defense; second, because a disastrous attack would be economically crippling; and third, because as we have already seen from expenditures for airline, port, and many other forms of domestic security, homeland defense is extremely expensive and plays into the enemy’s hands economically. Our successful strategy must continue to be a combined “homeland defense and overseas offense.” The overseas operations, borne mostly by DoD, are expensive because we must go and often stay somewhere—and that “somewhere” is many places. Yet conducting overseas operations will be far less costly in the long run than keeping our guard up only at home.

In terms of affordability, the watchword for influencing China is blend—the right mix of economic, military, and political astuteness. The watchword for small wars is caution—awareness that employing forces can become as expensive as procuring them. Wars, big and small, are notorious as a way in which great powers have destroyed their economies and brought themselves to ruin.

**Wars in Between?**

After conjecturing a suitable, affordable bimodal force, the final step is to test how much risk is entailed should there be a theater war for which it is not configured. There should be no concern that the shift is risky. For better or worse, the forces the Navy, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force operate now
will be the foundation of their capabilities for at least a decade. During the last fifteen years the armed forces were configured to fight two major contingencies. Except for the Coast Guard, all were designed for “wars in between.”

In the forty years when U.S. policy was to contain the Soviet Union, the armed forces were designed against a single foe. With patience, military readiness, and diplomatic wisdom we and our allies avoided war with the Soviet Union. When we employed the same forces in many other fights (often to resist Soviet-sponsored communist expansion around the world), they were ill designed and sometimes badly trained for such operations, from major theater wars fought in Korea and Vietnam down to such successful crisis responses as the first Lebanon (1958), Grenada, and Haiti and unsuccessful ones like the Iranian rescue mission, the second Lebanon (1983), and Somalia. A future combination of high-and low-end bimodal forces to deal with major contingencies cannot be perfectly suited either. The combination might be imperfect but sufficient. Or it might entail so much risk that we would not wish to undertake the operation. I cannot imagine who the high-risk “in between” enemy can be, so readers must specify their own foes to conquer—or achieve a negotiated peace with, per the Weinberger Doctrine. They should pick their foes for the 2020–30 time frame, because it will be that long before a new bimodal force replaces the present two-contingencies force. The more the reader surveys the world and picks several different foes, the better the test will be.

The Navy in the Bimodal Force

The American navy is transitioning from a fleet that responded to the 1990s program guidance to handle two major contingencies, nominally centered on North Korea and Southwest Asia. In that guidance maritime superiority was taken for granted, there was no peer to influence, and small wars were ignored. Today the Department of Defense, with the Navy following in its wake, has transitioned away from two-contingencies force planning.

Half the transition concerns relations with China. I have mentioned the steady shift of Navy forces from the Atlantic and Mediterranean to the western Pacific. Although the American people still take sea control largely for granted, the nations of Asia do not. They welcome the American navy because they depend on it to protect their sea lanes. The Pacific Fleet concerns itself today mostly with Taiwan and Korea, while supporting friends of the United States and warily watching the extension of China’s sea-denial capabilities. Just beyond the horizon is a predictable aspiration in China to achieve sea control in the western Pacific and Indian oceans, with the prospect that the U.S. Navy must think seriously again about command of the seas and the share of the fleet designed specifically to retain maritime superiority in the twenty-first century.
The other half of the transition is a force designed for the large number of “small” operations, expeditionary in nature, in which the Navy will continue to participate. Partly these operations are to respond to state crises, instabilities, and insurrections; partly to resist stateless terrorists, pirates, drug runners, and illegal immigrants; partly to guarantee energy supplies for the free world; and partly to answer natural or man-made disasters with humanitarian operations, in which the Navy has been leader and major contributor. The Navy no longer regards these many activities as “lesser included cases” of theater war. It now says they entail forces with unique capabilities and has started to develop fleet components that can be distributed in more and smaller packages and to partner frequently with our international friends.

Huntington and Turner both emphasized the need for popular acceptance and tied it to affordability. The transition under way will appeal to the American public but not be so popular that the U.S. Navy’s budget will grow. A rash of recent studies expresses concern about the shrinking size of the fleet. These studies point out that at the same time the number of ships in the Navy has gone down, its total combat capability has gone up in terms of missiles carried to sea, aircraft sorties flown, accuracy of weapons delivered, and rate of targets attacked. But they conclude that within the current shipbuilding budget—and by implication the aircraft procurement budget—the current force of only about three hundred ships must shrink further, barring a change in average unit cost or a reconfiguration to smaller ships in a more distributed force. The essential point is that all of these generally Navy-friendly and well-intended studies assume that the shipbuilding budget cannot increase.

We don’t know in detail what the Navy force should look like. We know it will come from the loom that wove the fabric of the projection-oriented Navy of the 1990s, which in turn was partly composed of the residuals of the four-mission Navy of the 1970s and 1980s. The existing Navy comprises large, efficient ships to project power to the land, principally in the form of air strikes, missiles, and Marine elements. Against China, the need to threaten air and missile strikes will not change, but China is developing the means to attack large ships at sea. It is time to explore a more distributed fleet that is offensively disposed yet can suffer losses and fight on, for no defense at sea can be perfect against a skilled opponent. Marine elements have a muted role, if any, in the naval configuration to influence China. The Marine Corps will continue to win the support of Congress and the American people as staunch, adaptive fighters, but they will retain that support by being proficient in small wars and peacemaking operations.

Nor do I mean to say large aircraft carriers and ships for amphibious assault will soon be useless and should be scrapped. On the contrary, the carriers are efficient and of proven versatility in almost any small-war contingency. Carriers
are so valuable in fact that one might wish to have aircraft flying from as many as
twenty-five or thirty “airfields” afloat. The nation cannot, however, afford the
cost of building and operating thirty large carriers, the CVNs. The practical ap-
proach is to sustain an affordable number of CVNs and supplement them with
smaller, more distributable airfields at sea that carry unmanned aerial vehicles,
helicopters, and (one may hope) STOVL* aircraft—the performance of which
may not match CTOL aircraft but are suitable for small wars. Nor should exist-
ing amphibious ships be discarded just because the need for opposed, forcible
entry is rare. Their aircraft, small craft, bunk space, and medical facilities give
them proven value in constabulary and humanitarian operations.

The submarine force is a major player in any attempt to influence China. One
can easily envision a “no-man’s-land” in the East and South China seas where
neither warships nor commercial traffic dare to venture on the surface, creating
the “empty ocean” once predicted by John Keegan, who foresaw a time when
nothing could survive on the sur-
face. American submarines de-
stroying commercial ships will
represent a paradoxical return to
times past but a logical expansion
of their present missions. As with
aircraft carriers, the issue will not
be having too many submarines but too few of them, because nuclear propul-
sion is expensive. If this new mission transpires, the construction of nonnuclear
submarines will make sense to complement the present all-nuclear-powered un-
dersea fleet.

Submarines will continue to play a central role in nuclear deterrence. But for
active defense when deterrence fails, missile-launching cruisers on the surface
will, when properly positioned in the right numbers, be able to shoot down
many or most of any enemy’s regional and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The U.S. Navy has great capacity to adapt its aircraft and missiles afloat. Our
missile cruisers and destroyers update their offense by updating their missiles.
Modernization of the defense is harder, a future problem not yet solved. The so-
lutions will probably be different for a confrontation with China than for small
wars. The Navy is experimenting with mission modularity while simultaneously
taking a cautious step toward a more distributed force with two new Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS) designs and experimentation with other small, high-speed
ships. As the Navy shifts focus to “green-water” (inshore) and “brown-water”
(riverine) operations, a continuation is predictable of the trend toward more
and smaller air and surface combatants inshore.

* STOVL: short takeoff, vertical landing; CTOL: conventional takeoff and landing.
A very recent Navy role is defense against terrorist attacks in ports and in the littorals. Still evolving, the role is shared with the Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, port-city governments, and other agencies domestically. It is also being worked out with foreign governments internationally. There is no more clear-cut evidence of a de facto bimodal approach by the Navy than the sharp distinction between its contribution to nuclear deterrence against responsible states and its commitment to help protect against nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks by irresponsible stateless entities.

I have emphasized scouting and networking as critical components. Navy surveillance, reconnaissance, and C2 networks are not hard to put in perspective, for legacy systems—most of them unheralded, invisible, even intangible—become obsolete much faster than ships and aircraft in the fast-moving world of information technology. Weighing the cost-effectiveness of updates is a continuing process, quietly going on, because the investment cost is substantial. Against China, Navy high-tech systems are robust and more or less the right ones; “Steady as you go” is a reasonable rudder order. At the small-wars end of the spectrum, there is (in gross terms) simply a vacuum to be filled. A benefit of concentrating on the need will be to accelerate stronger human intelligence, network security and intrusion against diffuse foes, operational connections with friendly states, and a structure to work with other American agencies.

Navy personnel are a different, special aspect. The important descriptor of the people factor is turnover. The downside of personnel turnover is constant, inescapable turbulence, because of the perpetual need for recruiting, training, and assignment, which has a much greater effect on military organizations than on businesses. Associated is the seemingly never-solved problem of balance in career-long experiential and educational maturation to achieve sufficient numbers of qualified people working in new technologies, foreign relations, strategy, and the economics of defense. But my purpose here is to point out the rarely noticed upside: that personnel turnover is the way to step out of the past and accelerate a transition. This opportunity to transform people is especially important for the Navy, whose major pieces of large, expensive equipment sometimes must last forty or fifty years. The Army and Marine Corps, it seems, are transitioning faster, because lives now depend on grasping the demands for the tactics and training of peacemaking. The Navy, because of its sea sanctuary, has not been shot at much and has had less motivation to change. That is why a rich understanding of the bimodal force’s implications is the path out of the hardware straitjacket.

Do you doubt that a transition can occur without new sensors and weapons because new tactics and operations are impossible without new hardware? A little reflection should convince anyone otherwise. Between the attack on Pearl
Harbor in December 1941 and the start of the great sweep westward to Japan that began at Tarawa in November 1943, every class of U.S. Navy warship changed its role, from battleships to aircraft carriers, to heavy and light cruisers, to destroyers, and even to submarines. They were the same warships, but with a great sense of urgency the crews were taught new combat roles, and the new roles were supplemented with almost invisible new capabilities to complete the fighting fleet that would soon carry the war to the Japanese home islands.  

Personnel turnover is the opportunity to change, and the training and education to effect the change are explicitly the CNO’s responsibility. From my perspective on the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School, he will know the transition is complete when we in the Navy schools are teaching to the demands of the bimodal force, from language skills to inshore combat.  

Transitions and Transformations

The swift changes in the fleet during World War II can be called transformational. They were sudden and radical, only dimly foreseen, and urgent, because national survival was in question. Military organizations—successful ones, at least—respond quickly when the national jugular is threatened. In normal times, the steady state offers a great power the opportunity for incremental refinements of its fighting machine’s tactics and equipment that everyone understands and is comfortable with. I have used the term “transitional” to describe changes that are neither transformational nor incremental. A transition is impelled by external events and is observably occurring. It need not be wrought in an atmosphere of crisis and desperation, but if the new circumstances are not recognized or if the flywheel of continuity resists the need for orderly transition, the eventual result will be a radical, abrupt, financially irresponsible transformation. The Army and Marine Corps have been criticized pitilessly for their less than perfect peacemaking in Afghanistan and Iraq. I think they deserve more sympathy than they have received as long as they are in transition, evolving and adapting into what I’ve called bimodal forces. The American armed forces have never before fought to the standard of perfection of today’s critics. “The Greatest Generation” that won World War II would by today’s standards be judged incompetent. The Navy has been transitioning perhaps too slowly, but it also deserves some slack. First, the need for a bimodal navy is less evident, because the fleet has scarcely been attacked or suffered loss at sea. Second, the current Chief of Naval Operations has already established the foundation for a new, durable maritime strategy.  

If Admiral Mullen and the Navy’s leadership succeed, the strategy will lead to the right education and training, soon followed by an affordable system of ships, aircraft, sensors, command-and-control systems, and logistical support for a
bimodal force structure to sustain the Navy’s part of a durable national maritime strategy for well into the twenty-first century.

NOTES

This article was prepared for a Center for Naval Analyses–sponsored conference, “The Future of Maritime Strategy,” held on 26 October 2006.

1. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Ironies of American History* (New York: Scribner’s, 1952). Niebuhr wrote on the values of Western civilization, the need to preserve them, the innocent attempts to improve on them, and the malevolent attempts to replace them with fascism and communism. He said it was absurd to say the sins of the West were in any way comparable to the crimes of Soviet despotism. He counseled resistance by patience, temperate resolution, and economic warfare but never by the use of nuclear weapons. George F. Kennan sent what became famous as the “Long Telegram” from the American embassy in Moscow in 22 February 1946. The widely read version was that published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947 as “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.”


3. “The people” is the great American tyrant, the more so because constitutional interpretations grant both the majority and several minorities enormous and inconsistent influence. It is, however, probably a correct generality that our taxpayers expect their armed forces to stay ahead in the latest technology but suspect that building new technology into every piece of equipment (tanks, ships, aircraft, etc.) is unaffordable.


6. One way to update Turner’s missions for the Cold War, and one in which constabulary roles fit more comfortably, appeals to the four functions of a navy described in Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., *Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1999), p. 9: at sea, a navy (1) ensures that our own goods and services are safe and (2) that the enemy’s are not; from the sea, it (3) guarantees safe delivery of goods and services ashore and (4) prevents delivery ashore by an enemy.

7. Worldwide, by far the largest share of damage to merchantmen, tankers, and warships since 1967 has been inflicted by missile attacks.

8. For the “Naval Operational Concept” and the “Navy Strategic Planning Guidance” see Hattendorf, ed., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s*.

9. One wonders whether the closed society of the People’s Republic of China is as clever in concealing its actual defense expenditures as was the Soviet Union. Even if that were true, U.S. defense expenditures would still dwarf all others.

10. The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the Navy. He does not make strategy, not even naval strategy, but he cannot fulfill his responsibility without knowing how the navy he leads will be employed by the combatant commanders who will fight it. Therefore CNOs have expressed their design intentions as “maritime strategies” and the like. These statements have been welcome and clarifying.

11. Some say Army stability operations in the Philippines lasted much longer.

13. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger developed the doctrine for the 1980s with the assistance of his military aide, Colin Powell. It much influenced Powell’s actions as secretary of state and is frequently called the “Powell Doctrine” now. The doctrine says that all the following six tests are to be met before committing forces to fighting overseas: vital U.S. or allied interests must be at stake; “combat troops” should be “committed wholeheartedly . . . to win”; political and military objectives should be clearly defined; objectives and forces “must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary”; there must be reasonable assurance of support by Congress and the American people; and commitment of forces to combat should be the last resort. There are subtleties in all the tests. For example, they recognize that a great power never dabbles by going in, getting bloodied, and backing out; it stays until the “clearly defined objectives” are met. Combat troops are seemingly specifically at issue here, so that the doctrine does not extend to bombing or missile attacks from afar.

14. Published in Military Review (September–October 2006).
17. Reflection on the history of peacekeeping and peacemaking operations will convince the reader that these four short lines are too cryptic. Seeing that is the beginning of small-wars wisdom, for “small” operations are in fact extraordinarily intricate and hard to describe, and require small-war professionals. Consider merely the past and present inshore and riverine roles of the Navy. Nevertheless, clinging to the belief that small wars are first and foremost operations by the Army, Marine Corps, and special forces on the ground.
18. “Hastily formed networks” is a term used by a consortium of Naval Postgraduate School faculty with practical experience in rapid deployment to several Asian states and in humanitarian support of the 2004–2005 tsunami and Hurricane Katrina relief operations.
19. “Thousand-ship navy” is a term introduced by the CNO to foster coalition operations at sea. The purpose of the slogan is not to create a bigger navy on the cheap but to ensure that the U.S. Navy is not thought of as the policeman of all the world’s coastal waters.
20. It does no harm to point out again the frequent intricacy of small-wars logistics. “Mostly” admits of in-theater air and river traffic, too.
22. STOVL aircraft can fly from an aircraft carrier much smaller than a CVN. CTOL aircraft fly from large carriers. Before World War II the Army Air Corps demonstrated that carrier aircraft could not match land-based aircraft performance (in operational ceiling, range, payload, etc.). But the flexibility of a moving airfield was recognized and valued, carriers prospered and multiplied, and by midwar our carrier aircraft performance matched or exceeded that of Japanese army and navy aircraft.
23. John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare (New York: Viking, 1988). Keegan’s conclusion (pp. 266–75) is entitled “An Empty Ocean.” However he does not do justice to the fact that blue water “no-man’s-lands” have existed since aircraft became ship killers and that, sooner rather than later, control of the oceans’ surface must be established so commerce can move on it.
24. These tactically influential equipment changes included radar, the Combat Information Center, a proliferation of short-range antiaircraft guns, second- and third-generation aircraft, and torpedoes that worked. Old battleships were used for shore bombardment, because they were designed before World War I and
lacked speed to stay up with the fleet. The new fast battleships, the first six of which were commissioned in 1941–42, went with the fleet but relinquished their capital-ship role to aircraft carriers. Most of our mine force, amphibious ships, landing craft, and PT boats were built from scratch to fill a void.

25. “Bimodal force” is, by the way, an inelegant if eye-catching term. I will be happy if “bimodal” does not long survive this article, although I believe in the need for the kind of force structure it connotes.

26. Among other things, Admiral Mullen’s tasking for 2006 directs: “Develop adaptive force packages and flexible deployment concepts to include NSW, U.S. Coast Guard, and coalition partners in support of operations in blue, green, and brown water environments that are aligned with the National Fleet Policy and the National Strategy for Maritime Security.”
CARVING UP THE EAST CHINA SEA

Peter Dutton

As the primitive society pushed ahead and the population of clan groups increased, the balance between the material requirements of the clan groups and the total quantity of the natural materials for living in their localities was upset ... resulting in the earliest form of war of human society.

THE SCIENCE OF MILITARY STRATEGY

The dispute over the continental shelf in the East China Sea ... is a battle of energy and a battle of geography. It is a fight for the benefit of the ocean, and it is a contest for development of a country and the destiny of its people.

JIANCHUAN ZHISHI

It is a timeless and fundamental question: Must competition for scarce resources inevitably lead to conflict? Today, that age-old question is often asked in reference to the many sites in the world’s oceans in which neighboring coastal states are shouldering each other for the authority to claim the potentially vast sources of hydrocarbons embedded in the continental shelf and the fishing rights to the waters above it.¹

With more than a billion people to feed and a surging economy that demands ever more energy, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become one of the world’s fiercest competitors for the ocean’s resources.² China’s oil consumption, already the second largest in the world after the United States, is forecast by some to grow to 590 million metric tons in 2020 (up from 220 million tons in 2000), nearly three-quarters of which will be imported by that time.³ By some estimates, gas and oil deposits in the central area of the East China Sea could go a long way to alleviating the energy
deficit the country faces: the Chunxiao Natural Gas Development Project, an area of hydrocarbon exploitation by the Chinese, is publicly estimated to contain a reserve of 65.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 12.7 million tons of oil. This development project, which involves American and European oil companies as minority stakeholders, lies in the heart of the disputed zone in the East China Sea. China has accommodated and cooperated to develop disputed areas with several other of its maritime neighbors and even to resolve some of those disputes amicably—most notably those with Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, with whom it shares overlapping claims in the South China Sea; nonetheless, the competition between China and Japan over the resources in the East China Sea remains confrontational, causing some concern that the competition for regional predominance between these two powerful nations could spark armed conflict if not carefully managed.

In the recent statements of Chinese leaders—such as the conciliatory meeting in early August 2006 with the Chinese ambassador to Japan, Wang Yi—and in the recent decrease in Chinese research in the disputed zone, there are glimmers of hope that China will pursue policies of cooperation with Japan. Additionally, China reopened talks with Japan in July 2006 to attempt to resolve competing claims to the gas reserves in the East China Sea. In the South China Sea, by contrast, China completed cooperative development agreements with Vietnam and the Philippines in March 2005; it did so again recently with Malaysia, in a manner that implicitly accepts Malaysian, rather than Chinese, sovereignty over the disputed portion of the South China Sea. These latter decisions reflect Beijing’s active wooing of support from Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members as part of its “peaceful rise” strategy. However, the strategic situation between China and Japan is significantly different. Even with China’s accelerated economic development, Japan still possesses the second-largest economy in the world and consumes a proportional share of global petroleum resources—resources China may also need to continue its economic rise and the rejuvenated international status it desires. More important, however, is the fact that Beijing sees Tokyo as a potential rival for predominance in Southeast Asia, a perception that despite a recent thaw in relations makes the possibility of long-term cooperation and compromise in the East China Sea less likely.

The focus of the dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea is an expanse of nearly seventy thousand square nautical miles of water space that constitutes the overlap between China’s claim—which reaches from the mainland eastward to the Okinawa Trough just west of the Ryukyu Islands chain—and Japan’s claim along a line equidistant from the shores of each state (see chart 1). China asserts its claim to the full continental shelf—and the waters above
it—on the basis of the continental shelf provisions in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and Japan correspondingly points to the provisions related to the exclusive economic zone as the legitimate starting point to determine a maritime boundary.

In part the dispute arises from the fact that UNCLOS essentially imported existing international law related to the continental shelf without also incorporating the pre-UNCLOS maritime delimitation standard based on equidistance. Alongside it, UNCLOS set new law governing the creation of exclusive economic zones—that is, the waters above the continental shelf extending to two hundred nautical miles from the shoreline—stating only that “an equitable solution” should be achieved in delimiting maritime boundaries for both the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. UNCLOS provides no guidance as to just what factors constitute an equitable means of dividing between two claimants the seabed with its resources and the water column with its resources. Many international courts and tribunals have reverted to the equidistance standard with corrections for factors such as offshore islands, disparate lengths of opposing coastlines, and economic considerations. Still, because signatories to UNCLOS are bound only to its provisions and not to the decisions of international tribunals, no unified standard exists to bring stability and predictability to this volatile area of international law.

THE CHINESE POSITION ON THE EAST CHINA SEA

Since the period of negotiations that led to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China has advocated that the “middle line” principle should be considered merely one delimitation method out of several, rather than the mandated means to achieve a fair and reasonable result, especially in cases that involve both continental shelf boundaries and exclusive economic zone boundaries. China has consistently adhered to this position, and today, with virtually a unanimous voice, Chinese scholars and political actors alike argue that the “principle of fairness” and the “principle of natural extension”—referring to the coastal state’s automatic authority over the continental shelf as the natural extension of its continental territory—are the most equitable means of resolving their maritime delimitation disputes in the East China Sea.

Out of this legal perspective arises a theme that recurs with remarkable consistency in the statements of Chinese scholars (and government authorities): the sense that the continental shelf off the coast of China is actually historical Chinese territory, not simply an area to be claimed under the international regime of oceans law. One discussion of the topic by Chinese oceans scholars refers to the regression of water during the Ice Age, extending the Yellow and Yangtze and other rivers out onto the continental shelf, where they deposited silt from the
Chinese mainland. On this basis, the scholars claim that "the East Sea continental shelf is a natural extension of Chinese territory." This emphasis helps to put in context the strength of feeling by many Chinese, who seem to view competing claims on the continental shelf as actual encroachments on their rightful reposition of the continental shelf and its resources. Accordingly, the Chinese position on delimitation is that the entire continental shelf under the East China Sea—from the mainland coast to the Okinawa Trough just west of the Ryukyu Islands chain—should be Chinese and that delimitation of the maritime boundary should therefore occur in that area (see chart 1).

These same scholars view compromise on the economic resources in the water column above the continental shelf through a different lens. Their position that China should also rightfully claim the majority of the waters in the East China Sea is based on concern for the Chinese fishermen who "would lose their traditional fishing grounds ... [causing] unacceptable losses to the Chinese fishing industry."

Just as nationalism is reflected in the Chinese view of the continental shelf, there is also a nationalist aspect to China's view of its exclusive economic zone claim over the East China Sea. The language of UNCLOS recognizes coastal state sovereignty over the territorial sea and implicitly conveys the full jurisdicational authority of the state in that area. However, it affords coastal states only specified sovereign rights in the exclusive economic zone and no more jurisdiction than is necessary to enforce those rights. UNCLOS specifically provides all states the right to high seas freedoms in the exclusive economic zone of a coastal state, subject only to the "due regard" standard that is also applied on the high seas. Chinese commentators, however, treat the concepts of sovereignty and sovereign rights as if the distinction were insignificant and argue that coastal states have, for instance, "sovereignty . . . over the natural resources," as opposed to the sovereign right to harvest them.

Using this approach, the Chinese assert that "it is perfectly justifiable, reasonable and legal for the coastal State to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within [the exclusive economic zone, and] although other states enjoy freedoms of navigation, overflight, and the laying of undersea cables and pipelines within this zone, such freedoms are conditional and restricted." The view that a coastal nation has authority in the exclusive economic zone that approaches full sovereignty—at least over the resources—may be contrary to the purposes of the drafters of UNCLOS and a novel approach to maritime law, but it is a view that is widely held among influential Chinese and one that informs their positions on boundary disputes. They view maritime boundary negotiations as essentially "winner takes all" endeavors, which actually result in enhanced or depleted sovereignty for the coastal state.
THE JAPANESE POSITION ON THE EAST CHINA SEA

Japan too, as a major importer of energy resources and one of the world’s strongest economies, has interests in the resources of the continental shelf. Nonetheless, Japan bases its claim to water space and the continental shelf resources under it on provisions in UNCLOS related to the exclusive economic zone, which have significant differences from the continental shelf provisions and allow Japan to make a legitimate claim on more of the East China Sea than do the provisions on which China relies. Specifically, while China relies on the

The shaded area marks the disputed zone in the central East China Sea. Japan claims delimitation should be based on the median line; China views the Okinawa Trough as the appropriate boundary.
“principle of natural prolongation” (found in Article 76) on the continental shelf and refers to the Okinawa Trough just off the Ryukyu Islands as a natural, geomorphological dividing point, Japan relies on the “equidistance principle,” as articulated in many of the maritime delimitation decisions of international courts. Japan is critical of China’s claim, with some support from the International Court of Justice, which has ruled out geomorphology as a relevant basis under international law for most maritime delimitations. Thus, Japan asserts that neither in law nor in fact should the Okinawa Trough form the basis for a maritime delimitation, since geomorphologically it is just an “incidental impression in an otherwise continuous continental shelf” and therefore not a true boundary. Accordingly, Japan concludes, an equitable division of the East China Sea should be devised through an equal division of the waters created by drawing a line equidistant to the baselines of the Chinese coast and the baselines of the Ryukyu Islands chain (see chart 1). The legal basis for the dispute between the two states is therefore one of interpretation of the text of UNCLOS and of the relevant factors, as developed through the application of international maritime law by other states and international bodies, that should sway in favor of one interpretation or the other in the particular case of the East China Sea.

THREE OPTIONS FOR PEACEFUL DELIMITATION

Despite the legal difficulties, there are reasons to hope that the political will for a peaceful and lasting compromise may be developing. For instance, both sides have agreed to cooperation; both sides have agreed to seek an equitable solution through negotiation; both sides agree that shared fishing rights are mutually beneficial and have agreed to a joint fishing regime; both sides express an interest in joint development of the hydrocarbon resources of the East China Sea; and perhaps most importantly, both sides recognize the potential for undesirable conflict and agree to exercise self-restraint and apply international law as expressed in and through UNCLOS in formulating a solution. These areas of agreement provide a substantial basis upon which to forge cooperation and compromise, reached in accordance with international law of the sea, which will serve to decrease tensions in the region and increase the efficient use of the East China Sea's resources.

A Single Integrated Boundary: The Gulf of Maine Case

Perhaps the single best guide to the international law that governs resolution of maritime boundary disputes like the one in which the Chinese and Japanese find themselves engaged in the East China Sea is the 1984 Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (the Gulf of Maine Case), decided by the International Court of Justice. In that case, as do the Chinese and
the Japanese today, Canada and the United States found themselves in a dispute involving overlapping continental shelf claims, overlapping exclusive economic zones, and the proper means of drawing a maritime boundary in resource-rich waters with historical use by the people of both countries. The international law of boundary delimitation was at the time (and remains, as we have seen) fraught with ambiguity that encouraged parties to stake out and stand by irrec-

oncilable approaches to drawing a common and accepted maritime border. Canada and the United States were unable to resolve their differences through negotiation because there was no commonly accepted set of principles from which to start realistic negotiations. However, the factors considered and the approach taken by the International Court in the Gulf of Maine Case can shed light on a fruitful path forward in the East China Sea.

Canada and the United States disputed the appropriate basis on which to de-

mark the international maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine (see chart 2). Canada's position was based on a straightforward rendering of the principles of the equidistance line (for laterally adjacent coasts) or the median line (for opposite coasts), which hold that unless there are special circumstances, an equal division of the areas of overlap is the most equitable result.

The American position was that holding strictly to the equidistance principle would lead to an inequitable division of the waters; accordingly, the United States urged the Court to apply a more nuanced balancing of relevant factors to achieve an equitable result. Specifically, the American side argued that the Court should blend considerations of continental shelf delimitation and economic zone delimitation. In such blended situations, the United States argued, international law requires the Court to apply equitable principles, such as consideration of the geographic features of the relevant coastlines; ecological features, including the nature and location of commercial fish stocks; and special circumstances, such as the historical dominance over the area by American fishermen and government authorities for more than two hundred years.

The Court began its analysis of relevant international law and the parties' po-

sitions with an important observation—that it was not determining a true boundary between sovereign states but merely delimiting zones of jurisdiction or sovereign rights outside each state’s sovereign waters. The Court recognized that the international community had relevant rights in these areas that would not be affected by whatever the Court decided, since, presumably, the international rights in these waters were predominant and would therefore remain unchanged regardless of which coastal state ultimately possessed the rights to the resources in the disputed area.

The key to the Court’s ultimate decision was an essential acceptance of the U.S. position that geographic circumstances are relevant to maritime delimitation
decisions. In an unexpected move, however, the Court decided to define what the parties had not: it took an expansive view of what constitutes the Gulf of Maine, to include the protrusions caused by Cape Cod Bay and Massachusetts Bay on the American side and the Bay of Fundy on the Canadian side (see chart 2), a position that neither party had apparently anticipated.\(^{45}\)

Fundamentally, the Court rejected delimiting a maritime boundary based solely on either the basis of the continental shelf or the exclusive economic zone. In doing so, it determined that international law requires that delimitation in such complex, overlapping zones be based on equitable criteria in relation to the geographical features of the region.\(^{46}\) Having rejected either geomorphological or resource-related attributes as a basis for delimitation, the Court drew a boundary based on the geography of the adjacent and opposing coastlines, adjusting it for relevant special circumstances in order to achieve an equitable result. The first special circumstance of which the Court took note was the

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**CHART 2**

**GULF OF MAINE: FISHERY ZONE AND CONTINENTAL SHELF CLAIMS**

![Map of the Gulf of Maine showing fishery zone and continental shelf claims.](image)
presence of the adjacent Bay of Fundy, which it used to increase the overall allocation of space to Canada. The Court also took note of a few very small Canadian islands in the Gulf of Maine and adjusted the line slightly to give them only half effect, in order to avoid cutting into the U.S. allocation of space by an amount disproportionate to the islands’ diminutive size. Finally, the Court chose to divide the Georges Bank between the parties, because “a decision which would have assigned the whole of Georges Bank to one of the Parties might possibly have entailed serious economic repercussions for the other,” given the historical dependence of the inhabitants of both countries on the fishing resources in that area.

Applying to the East China Sea the same rules that the International Court of Justice applied to the Gulf of Maine, China and Japan can negotiate agreement of a single maritime boundary. An equitable division of the space can be achieved using geographical features as a starting point and taking into account the special circumstances. One special circumstance is the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; another is historical patterns of use by each country. In order to achieve an equitable result that does not harm the long-term interests of either party, accommodation of these issues must be considered.

One omission in the Chinese literature—and a fairly curious one, in light of the Gulf of Maine Case—is any assertion that the Yellow Sea should be taken into account as a special circumstance in addressing an appropriate ratio to guide allocation of water space between the two countries. The International Court having held that the adjacent presence of the Bay of Fundy as a dependent body of water of the Gulf of Maine should weigh in Canada’s favor when delimiting the maritime boundary, one would think that the Chinese might make the same claim for the effect of the Yellow Sea on China’s rightful allotment of the waters of the East China Sea. But recently the description by a pair of Chinese oceans scholars of the northern border of the East China Sea as “the Yangtze River’s entrance at Qidong to the southwest corner of the Korean peninsula” specifically excluded the Yellow Sea, thus excluding that sea as a consideration in this context.

Delimiting a single boundary to mark both the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between China and Japan has the benefits of clarity and certainty, and it therefore minimizes the potential for future conflict over resource rights and sovereign jurisdiction. However, given the suspicion that hangs over the relationship between the two countries because of the history of Japanese use of force against China to pursue territory and resources, the likelihood that this kind of comprehensive solution to the boundary dispute can be successfully negotiated is remote. The positions of these states are too divergent; agreement on relevant factors and the weight to be given them is unlikely; and,
because of the confused state of the law, each side has at least some legal support for its position as to the proper location of a unified boundary. Therefore, other approaches to boundary delimitation should be considered.

**Multiple Functional Boundaries: The Australia–Papua New Guinea Treaty**

Chinese scholars have been considering another potential model for peaceful and equitable resolution of the boundary dispute: delimitation of nonidentical boundaries for the continental shelf and for the economic zones in the waters above it. An example of this type of dispute resolution can be found in the Australia–Papua New Guinea Border Treaty, which set a precedent for creativity in international dispute resolution and founded the practice of cooperative jurisdiction between interdependent states. The two states, which share only a maritime boundary, agreed to four distinct types of boundaries between them: sovereign boundaries between territorial waters in the narrow Torres Strait, in which overlapping territorial water claims existed; a seabed boundary; a fisheries boundary in the water column; and a special reservation area for aboriginal peoples living on the islands in the Torres Strait. This agreement broke new ground, so to speak, in that the two states agreed to exclusive jurisdiction in separate forms over the same space. Additionally, the two states recognized the special status of islands with cultural and historical significance and accommodated those values by carving out a special zone for them.

The preamble to the treaty addresses the fundamental values that the two states applied in coming to the creative solution and that they sought to protect and preserve by accepting multiple boundaries. It especially emphasizes freedom of navigation and overflight, conservation and sharing of fishing resources, regulation of seabed mineral resources, the importance of preserving the marine environment, and the desire to protect the historical way of life of Torres Strait Islanders and indigenous coastal peoples.

The multiple boundary approach helps resolve the tension left within UNCLOS between delimitation of exclusive economic zones and delimitation of the continental shelf. Although the Australia–Papua New Guinea Treaty was negotiated before the convention, it presaged at least one answer to the thorny dilemma presented by the two approaches to maritime delimitation. As one Chinese scholar has noted:

Although the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea adopted a compromise position between the “natural extension principle” [of continental shelf delimitation] and the “centerline principle” [of exclusive economic zone delimitation] . . . it only provided guidance in the most general terms saying that states should proceed in accordance with international law . . . in order to attain an equitable solution. Although this stipulation sets down the principle of peaceful and equitable dispute resolution . . . it is
nonetheless overly general and simplistic and lacking in rigorous standards, and as a result the two sides engaged in a border negotiation often wind up offering widely divergent or even contradictory interpretations of this principle in actual practice. . . . And with regard to whether the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf should share the same boundary or have two different boundaries, the Convention on the Law of the Sea was completely silent.\(^{51}\)

Although this scholar probably overstates the “silence” of UNCLOS concerning boundary delimitation methods where both exclusive economic zone and continental shelf boundaries are under consideration, if the Chinese and Japanese governments were to apply this multiple boundary method to the dispute in the East China Sea, each principle could be applied to its own zone.\(^{52}\) The delimitation of the seabed boundary may be based on the continental shelf approach of “natural extension,” taking into account primarily geomorphological factors of the seabed to delimit this boundary and adjusting for “special circumstances” such as the presence of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which will be discussed below. With regard to the exclusive economic zone, a separate boundary could be established using the median line principle, achieving an equitable result by again adjusting for such special circumstances as the ratio of the length of each state’s coastline, the presence of the Yellow Sea adjacent to and arguably a part of the East China Sea, and the historical use of the waters by each state’s coastal population for fishing and harvesting of other resources.\(^{53}\) Boundaries thus established would have the benefit of resolving a long-standing source of friction between China and Japan, and they would allow for the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in the wide expanse in the middle of the East China Sea that each side has agreed not to develop.\(^{54}\)

In the negotiated compromise reached by the Australians and the Papua New Guineans each side was confident of future stable relations between them, but future stability across the East China Sea is less assured. The most significant aspect of the treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea is clearly the implementation of a delimitation system of overlapping jurisdictions, which will require substantial and perpetual cooperation between the two states to implement effectively. In other words, Australia’s ability to exploit its seabed rights will be forever dependent on Papua New Guinea’s acquiescence to Australia’s presence in the waters over which Papua New Guinea has economic jurisdiction, and vice versa.

In the Gulf of Maine, another location in which international stability between the negotiating states was reasonably assured, the parties chose to implement a single boundary in order to guarantee future peaceful relations concerning the maritime space and the resources contained within it. Jurisdictional authority in the Torres Strait region was also successfully separated, but
between Australia and Papua New Guinea the possibility for friction continues unless each state habitually accommodates the other. Habitual accommodation has worked reasonably well between Australia and Papua New Guinea, which have no long history of antagonism and neither of which is presently vying for regional predominance. It might have worked well between the United States and Canada, but each side wisely chose to avoid even the possibility of friction.

However, in the case of China and Japan, hope for such accommodation over time is rather far-fetched, given the long history and recent geopolitics. Chinese scholar Li Yi of the College of Political Science and International Relations at Beijing University, in commenting on this multiboundary approach, has suggested a compromise that may help to reduce tension in the East China Sea—that the area of overlap formed by the two different boundaries (continental shelf and exclusive economic zone) be designated a joint development zone. Although such an agreement would move relations a step closer to the harmony each side professes to desire, it still relies on political compromise to diffuse tension, and history suggests that such compromise, if ever achieved, would be fleeting, since the fundamental bases for mistrust have not been addressed. That said, a third approach to maritime delimitation—creation of a zone of shared jurisdiction—is worth examining to determine whether any agreement in existence could offer a stability-building compromise.

**Agreement and Cooperation: Joint Jurisdictional Zones**

The idea of creating a zone of mutual jurisdiction was to some degree taken up in the Australia–Papua New Guinea Treaty, in relation to “reservation zones” set aside for free use by the indigenous population. In that case, neither state party to the treaty is authorized to exercise jurisdiction—except its seabed or fishery rights—without the concurrence of the other state party. This is an approach to boundary and resource disputes well known to the Chinese. In May 1979, for instance, Deng Xiaoping, then vice premier, proposed to Japan that the dispute over the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands be resolved “through bilateral negotiations and joint development, without touching upon the issue of territorial sovereignty.”

**Joint Use and Development: The China-Vietnam Model.** On Christmas Day in 2000, Vietnam and China signed a comprehensive—and creative—maritime delimitation agreement for the waters of the Tonkin Gulf (Beibu Gulf, to the Chinese). The Tonkin Gulf is a stretch of water bounded by Vietnam on the west, mainland China on the north, and China’s Hainan Island on the east. The agreement created the first finalized maritime border between China and a neighboring coastal state. It divided the waters roughly equally, delineating territorial waters and exclusive economic zones and allocating continental shelf...
In this case, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf boundary are conterminous. The creative aspect of the agreement is the establishment of a joint fisheries zone in waters with historical significance to both countries in the middle of the gulf (see chart 3). Fishing vessels of both states have the right to fish for a period of twelve years—with three years of automatic extensions—after which the waters will revert to full sovereign control on either side of the agreed-upon line. Since the agreement came into effect on 30 June 2004, China and Vietnam have begun joint maritime research and joint patrols in the fisheries zone.

This agreement demonstrates that the two states, which have engaged in open conflict over border and resource disputes in recent decades, can move beyond the past to peaceful resolution of their differences, to mutual benefit. As one Chinese commentator noted,

The delimitation and fishing agreements between the two countries are mutually beneficial. It shows that the two sides are fully capable of resolving historical problems through friendly consultation. It will also boost the development of bilateral ties and promote lasting stability, neighborliness, amity and overall cooperation between the two countries. At the same time, it will further strengthen mutual political trust.

CHART 3
TONKIN/BEIBU GULF CO-FISHING AREA
and their cooperation in other fields, which are favorable to the peace and stability of the [Tonkin] Gulf area.62

Indeed, China and Japan had a similar burst of bilateral sentiment in 1997, when they signed an agreement for cooperative fisheries management in the East China Sea. However, unlike the growing cooperation between China and Vietnam in the Tonkin Gulf, the intervening years since the China-Japan East Sea Fisheries Agreement have been unproductive in reaching a larger settlement and are better characterized by reported tense, armed standoffs between the two powers.63 Even if the political circumstances do not currently permit the 1997 agreement to serve as the starting point for cooperative compromise across the East China Sea, the possibility of a broader, long-term solution could be improved if China and Japan took smaller confidence-building steps toward that goal.

Joint Business Development: The PRC/Vietnam/Philippines Model. One such confidence-building step was taken in the form of a business arrangement by China, the Philippines, and Vietnam to develop jointly the hydrocarbon resources under the South China Sea. Although each state maintained its rival claim of sovereignty over all or portions of the Spratly Islands, the three countries agreed in March 2005 to perform a joint survey of potential hydrocarbon deposits in the disputed areas of the South China Sea.64 Each country claims sovereignty over some or all of the Spratly Islands, which pepper the South China Sea, and accordingly each claims rights to the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone that would pertain to the islands under the UNCLOS framework. The tripartite agreement authorizes the state-owned oil companies of each country (China National Offshore Oil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation) to engage in joint seismic exploration, sharing costs equally, as a commercial transaction specified to last three years and to have no effect on political claims.65

Cooperation among state-owned oil companies is certainly not new, but an agreement among rival claimants—whose rivalries led to armed skirmishes in the 1970s, ’80s, and ’90s—to cooperate in the development of maritime resources while postponing final agreement over sovereignty is a potential model for cooperation between China and Japan in the East China Sea. One of the stumbling blocks to a final agreement between China and Japan is a lack of shared information about the nature of likely resources under the East China Sea’s continental shelf. Suspicion by each of the exploratory activities of the other is in part responsible for the heightened tensions and increased potential for military conflict.66 Joint exploration in the East China Sea using the Spratlys cooperative business plan as a model could lead to joint development with mutual benefits and will at least afford a more complete picture of the resources
available for negotiation. Even though it may be a small step in a much longer process, an agreement on joint exploration would form the basis for increased trust and confidence and demonstrate a real desire by each side to move forward cooperatively. Additionally, China and Japan have each stressed the importance of the resources in and under the East China Sea to their respective economies, and joint exploitation may result in more efficient use of the oil and natural gas resources available to lessen each country’s dependence on external energy supplies.

Establishing a joint development zone in the East China Sea, either through a business-based agreement or a mechanism that allows for joint resource exploitation for a period of time, has the benefit of building upon the factors upon which China and Japan both already agree. It helps alleviate each country’s need for resources without touching the “third rail” of sovereignty, the issue on which neither side seems ready to compromise. Perhaps most importantly, joint development could serve as the foundation of trust and confidence necessary to move forward on a comprehensive delimitation agreement. That said, the potential for conflict remains as settlement of the key issue of sovereignty is once again put off for another day. Perhaps that is the most that can be hoped for, given the complicated political factors that make negotiations in the East China Sea so difficult.

TAIWAN AND THE SENKAKU/DIAOYUTAI DISPUTE AS COMPLICATING FACTORS

Significantly complicating factors in the delimitation of the maritime boundary in the East China Sea are the dispute over the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai, to the Chinese) and the unique status of Taiwan. The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are a group of five small uninhabited rocky islets, the largest of which is 3.6 square kilometers in area. Historically, they were known to the Chinese and mentioned in official documents as early as the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), but there is no evidence they were ever taken under effective administration or control by the Chinese, the necessary element under international law for a state to assert legitimate sovereignty over territory. They have been administered and controlled by Japan since 1895—with the exception of the post–World War II occupation by the United States between 1945 and 1972—based on Japanese claims of discovery in about 1894. China’s view is that they were stolen from Chinese control as a result of the 1895 Sino-Japanese War and should have been returned to China after World War II. Military posturing between Chinese and Japanese naval forces in the waters around these islands has been intense in recent years, including aggressive Japanese tracking of a Han-class Chinese nuclear submarine in the area in

Resolution of the issue of sovereignty and the naval tensions that attend it, however, are only the first complicating factors concerning these islets. An equally strident argument is ongoing over the extent of water and continental shelf space to which this small but crucial group of outcroppings is entitled—regardless of which side receives final sovereignty over them. The crux of the problem is, again, ambiguity in the language of UNCLOS, which states that if these outcroppings can be considered islands—that is, if they can support human habitation or commercial activity—they should normally receive a full two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. However, if they are merely rocks—that is, if they cannot sustain human habitation or commercial activity—they receive no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Although the islands have never been inhabited and have not sustained commercial activity of any kind in approximately eighty years (they were used briefly around the turn of the last century to harvest guano and perhaps at various times as a refuge for fishermen) the dispute remains whether they could support human habitation or commercial activity, and thus whether the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf boundaries in the East China Sea should be adjusted for them. The difference is not insignificant: perhaps as much as eight thousand square miles of ocean space—and the rich resources in and below the water that go with it—are at stake.

Taiwan’s status is another complicating factor to boundary delimitation, given the visceral way in which Beijing reacts to any suggestion that Taiwan has a legitimate status apart from the rest of China. Nonetheless, Taiwan maintains an independent claim over the Senkaku Islands (called the Tiaoyutai by the Taiwanese), and Taiwanese fishing boats have historically plied the waters around the islets and continue to do so regularly with nationalistic support from portions of the Taiwanese population and their representatives in government. Japan’s geostrategic support for Taiwan will remain an obvious irritant to the prospects of a lasting peaceful compromise in the East China Sea, but on a practical level, Taiwan’s nonacceptance of any agreement between Tokyo and Beijing could prevent meaningful application of confidence-building measures that would form the necessary first step of any lasting agreement.

The Chinese reaction to these two concerns—the Senkakus and Taiwan—demonstrates that unresolved territorial claims remaining from the period of Japanese aggression during World War II still evoke strong Chinese memories of suffering as a nation at the hands of outside colonial powers. This in turn may limit the freedom of the Chinese government to compromise with the Japanese and at the same time maintain legitimacy in the eyes of its populace.
ANOTHER COMPLICATION: CHINA MAY NOT WANT TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE

It is entirely possible that regardless of the overtures of friendliness recently extended to the Japanese by Chinese leaders, the Chinese may not actually see it as in their best interest to settle these disputes. The tension between China and Japan over resources, boundaries, and sovereignty in the East China Sea—and especially the confrontation over Japanese administration of, and claim of sovereignty to, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—provides to the PRC government a lever of nationalism with which to divert the attention of the Chinese people from domestic difficulties and shore up support for the central government during times of domestic political competition. In this context, Chinese leaders have historically used economic advantage and territorial nationalism as two sources of legitimacy—emphasizing economic progress during periods of prosperity and blaming outside powers during times of instability.

One reason why China has successfully negotiated a path forward in its disputes with Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines in the South China Sea but has refused to do so with similar disputes with Japan in the East China Sea is that China has never been dominated by the former states: accommodation with them allows China to portray itself as internationalist and cooperative with its neighbors. Put simply, Japanese aggression within the living memory of many Chinese makes Japan an easy object for nationalist fervor. Whenever Chinese leaders desire to enhance Chinese nationalist sentiment, they need only remind their people of the territorial disputes in the East China Sea to call to mind Japan’s occupation of large portions of Chinese territory only decades ago. This, combined with an unbending stand against Japanese encroachment on China’s maritime claims, demonstrates to the Chinese people that the PRC government will never again allow outside powers to humiliate them. Thus, by negotiating cooperatively with its other neighbors but remaining in controlled conflict with Japan, China balances its domestic and regional political messages in a way that contributes both to domestic stability and regional rise.

It is likely that there exists a spectrum of contending causal forces that move international relations between China and Japan along a sliding scale between cooperation and competition. Domestic political concerns, international power dynamics, resource requirements, economic fluctuations, and even major events like the 2008 Summer Olympics can move their relationship from a static competitive dynamic toward cooperation. Perhaps Hu Jintao’s recent signals of rapprochement with Japan after the election of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reflect confidence by Beijing in China’s economic future and a desire for international goodwill before the Olympics and that the time may indeed be right to move forward on the East China Sea dispute. Perhaps. But China’s long-term
strategic interests are still captive to its geographic position, bounded as the
mainland is by the island chain that runs along China’s coastline from the
Kuriles to the archipelagoes of the South China Sea. As James R. Holmes and
Toshi Yoshihara have observed,

China’s naval and air modernization efforts point to a build-up toward a strategy of
sea denial against U.S. forces seeking to intervene in Asian waters. . . . [In time of
conflict], the closer U.S. military forces get to [Chinese] territory, the more competi-
tive the [Chinese] will be. This arises from a combination of political, physical, and
 technological facts. These facts combine to create a contested zone—arenas of con-
ventional combat where weak adversaries have a good chance of doing real damage
to U.S. forces.79

In other words, because it provides the Chinese with a larger operational
 space within which to contest legitimately the presence of non-Chinese war-
ships, it may be to China’s military advantage to maintain its claim over the full
breadth of the waters of the East China Sea, from the mainland to the Okinawa
Trough and the doorstep of American bases on Japanese territory, rather than to
reach a compromise with the Japanese that might restrict China’s legitimate
freedom of action during any future conflict.80 Still, China has no short-term in-
terest in allowing the dispute over maritime boundaries in the East China Sea to
get out of hand and spill over into actual conflict. Only if its assertion of sover-
eignty over Taiwan were severely threatened would China be likely to take mili-
tary control over the full extent of its East China Sea claim.

**CHARTING THE COURSE**

Before agreement can be reached, China must conclude that it is genuinely in its
interest to compromise with Japan. This is no small hurdle. Beijing may perceive
managed conflict as an essential tool in maintaining political legitimacy as
China develops the “harmonious society” that Hu Jintao intends to build.81 Ac-
cordingly, until China’s domestic growing pains are eased and Taiwan’s status is
settled, there may never be a policy toward Japan that is fully cooperative. Still,
effective interim steps can be taken that will ensure that the current competition
does not unintentionally escalate into open conflict.

First, agreement should be reached that the Senkaku/Diaoyutai dispute is to
be removed from the equation through agreement that no matter how the sover-
eignty question is ultimately settled, the islets will receive no territorial effect be-
yond the twelve-nautical-mile territorial sea. The waters around the islands
could be designated a joint fisheries zone on behalf of China, Taiwan, and Japan,
with a cooperative approach to policing—perhaps on a rotating basis. Stake-
holders with hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation concessions in the area
could be given financial compensation for affected rights.\textsuperscript{82} Deng was right: the way forward requires both sides to “shelve the dispute over sovereignty and proceed with mutual development.”\textsuperscript{83}

Additionally, first steps toward building trust and confidence for mutual development could be undertaken by an agreement to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the 1997 Fishing Agreement and to build a joint enforcement team composed of both Chinese and Japanese officials to police the East China Sea fisheries zone. This should be followed by a new agreement, similar to the existing agreement between China, Vietnam, and the Philippines, to develop jointly the hydrocarbon resources in the disputed area of the East China Sea. Furthermore, both sides should agree that during the period of joint development, final boundary delimitation will be negotiated in good faith.\textsuperscript{84} Negotiators should consider the advantages and disadvantages of delimitation of a single boundary as opposed to multiple boundaries, paying special attention to solutions that promote permanent avoidance of friction.

If a negotiated settlement cannot be reached during that period, both sides could demonstrate their commitment to the rule of international law, as Canada and the United States did in the Gulf of Maine, by agreeing to submit specified questions to an international tribunal as called for in UNCLOS. The stated commitment of both states to resort to the rule of law rather than to confrontation and intimidation would offer hope that the region can move beyond the geopolitical rhetoric that has informed public discourse to date and would serve as a model of accommodation and cooperation between former competitors.

So far, China and Japan seem to be talking past each other rather than to each other in their public discourse surrounding their dispute over the East China Sea. However, the stakes are high, given the possibility that supposedly “managed” conflict can always result in unintended war.\textsuperscript{85} Substantial economic and political benefits could be derived from a cross-sea détente, but this would require both sides to choose to set aside old grudges and move forward cooperatively rather than competitively. The examples provided by the agreements between the United States and Canada and between Australia and Papua New Guinea demonstrate that international law charts several productive paths for this way forward. Tokyo and Beijing should begin this journey by developing a trusting and cooperative spirit through step-by-step implementation of precursor agreements similar to the tripartite agreement for hydrocarbon exploration in the Spratlys and to the joint fisheries agreement between China and Vietnam. Only then will East Asia be able to demonstrate that competition for scarce resources need not inevitably lead to conflict.
NOTES


3. Ibid.


5. Ibid.


8. "PRC Naval Vessel Activities in East China Sea 'Drop Sharply' in 2006," Sankei Shimbun, 4 November 2006. For Wang Yi’s meeting, Jiang Wenren, “China and Japan: Reconciliation or Confrontation,” China Brief, 16 August 2006, p. 5. The focus of the meeting was reportedly on the most promising things the two countries could do to advance reconciliation.


20. Zhang and Liu, "A Study of East Sea Oil and the China-Japan East Sea Continental Shelf Demarcation Dispute," p. 11, para. 3.1. See also Zou Keyuan, "Historic Rights in International Law and in China’s Practice," Ocean Development and International Law 32, no. 2 (April 2001), p. 163, where the author states, “In China’s view, a claim derived from historic rights may seem more forceful and valid in law than claims simply based upon the EEZ concept.”


23. Compare UNCLOS Article 2, “The sovereignty of a coastal state extends . . . to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea,” with Article 56, “In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources” and “jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention” [italics added].

24. UNCLOS Article 58 specifically states that “in the exclusive economic zone, all States . . . enjoy . . . the freedoms referred to in Article 87,” concerning freedom of the high seas.


26. Ibid., pp. 54–55.

27. See, generally, ibid., p. 54.

28. Japan imports 80 percent of its oil, 88 percent of which comes from the politically unstable Middle East. For a good discussion of the varying interests between China and Japan in development of hydrocarbon resources under the East China Sea, see Zhang and Liu, "A Study of East Sea Oil and the China-Japan East Sea Continental Shelf Demarcation Dispute.”


30. Since UNCLOS allows states to claim continental shelf rights out to two hundred nautical miles regardless of the features of the seabed, the International Court of Justice concluded that where opposing coasts are less than two hundred nautical miles apart, the geological and geomorphological characteristics of the seabed are entirely irrelevant to delimitation. Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya and Malta), International Court of Justice, Judgment of 3 June 1985, paras. 39–41.


38. Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area [hereafter Gulf of Maine Case], 1984 Yearbook of the International Court of Justice, p. 246.

39. To be precise, the parties requested the court to assist in the delimitation of a “200-mile exclusive fishery zone,” but in the intervening years, with the growing acceptance of the term “exclusive economic zone” established in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, both parties have accepted the newer concept and changed their terminology accordingly.

40. Gulf of Maine Case, p. 300.

41. Ibid., pp. 258–60.

42. Ibid., p. 284.

43. Ibid., p. 265.

44. Ibid. Whether the Court was correct in its assessment is debatable. For instance, different states have different treaty obligations vis-à-vis third states for such rights as fishing and hydrocarbon exploitation that could well be affected by the Court’s choice of boundary. Additionally, coastal states differ with regard to their understanding of passage rights available to the international community in the waters and airspace over them. China in particular maintains that it has the right to regulate many activities in the airspace above its exclusive economic zone despite the fact that UNCLOS specifies that they are international in character. Thus, as maritime boundaries change, so do the zones of interpretation and obligation change.

45. Gulf of Maine Case, p. 270.

46. Ibid., p. 278.

47. Ibid., p. 343.


50. The treaty, which consists of thirty-two articles and nine appendixes, was concluded in 1978 and came into effect in February 1985. It is available online from the Australian Government Publishing Service at www.austlii.edu.au.

51. Li, "A Discussion of the Distinguishing Features."

52. The equidistance line method is mentioned in neither UNCLOS Article 74 nor Article 83, which relate to delimitation of exclusive economic zone and continental shelf boundaries. Both articles require, however, that delimitation be “effected by agreement on the basis of international law” and “in order to achieve an equitable solution.” This is a significant departure from Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, which required the equidistance line method unless historical title or special circumstances existed. Donaldson and Williams, “Understanding Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes,” pp. 135–56.

53. For a thorough treatment of this approach, see, generally, Li, “A Discussion of the Distinguishing Features.”

55. Li, “A Discussion of the Distinguishing Features.”
57. Li, “A Discussion of the Distinguishing Features.”
68. Austin, China’s Ocean Frontier, p. 162.
69. Ibid., pp. 163–164.
72. UNCLOS, Article 121.
73. Austin, China’s Ocean Frontier, p. 168.
74. Jianchuan Zhishi, “Behind the Disputes in the East China Sea between China and Japan.”
77. For a view to the contrary, see M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation,” International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 46–83. Professor Fravel argues that PRC regime insecurity actually increases the likelihood of compromise. His examples of past compromise, however, all involve land borders in the western portion of China where territorial compromise was seen as the best means of gaining and maintaining control over groups of non-Han Chinese citizens. He acknowledges that where historical Han territorial interests have been at stake, such as in Hong Kong or Macau (and, I argue, the maritime claims in the East China Sea), China has been much less willing to compromise and indeed sees recovery of these territories as central to the legitimacy of the Communist Party regime.
78. For a good discussion of power dynamics in the relations between the United States and China, see Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future


80. As one Chinese commentator put it, “If China can control the East China Sea, it can establish a protective screen as a strategy at sea and to enhance its strategic defense from the east.” Jianchuan, “Behind the Disputes in the East China Sea between China and Japan.” See also Ho Szu-shen, “China Interested in Japan’s Waters,” *Taipei Times*, 9 September 2004, quoting Liu Huaqing, former first vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, as saying that China’s blue-water naval strategy is to allow it to move its defense from the coastline to the first chain of outlying islands—Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia—and perhaps beyond.


82. This is also discussed by Valencia, in “Ways Forward.”

83. Jianchuan, “Behind the Disputes in the East China Sea between China and Japan.”

84. Indeed, UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 require states to “make every effort to enter provisional agreements of a practical nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement.”

China comes to Africa in the 21st century with not only a need for natural resources but also with the financial resources and political influence to pursue its objectives vigorously. China has altered the strategic context in Africa.

ANTHONY LAKE, MORE THAN HUMANITARIANISM

In February 2007, President Hu Jintao of the People’s Republic of China completed a much-publicized visit to Africa. The trip fulfilled a promise made at an Africa-China summit in Beijing in November 2006, where forty-eight African heads of state heard him pledge to double aid to Africa by 2009 and create an investment fund of five billion dollars over the next three years. This 2007 tour—which included Cameroon, Liberia, Sudan, Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, and the Seychelles—was the third such high-visibility visit to Africa President Hu has made since 2000, and it reflects China’s growing interest and influence in that continent.1

Indeed, China has developed for Africa a comprehensive strategy reflecting its own wide-ranging economic, diplomatic, political, and military engagement there. Beijing’s burgeoning presence in Africa has been fueled by a combination of its own economic growth, its need for resources, more sophisticated leadership, better scholarship on Africa, and a domestic public more confident in China as a global actor.2 Additionally, China has notably enhanced its international standing with a dramatic increase in participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions from Haiti to East Timor, and as part of this larger engagement it has become a significant contributor to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. This peacekeeping presence represents just one, but nevertheless

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important, facet of growing Chinese influence in Africa, which needs to be understood and appreciated by American policy makers.

CHINA’S RISING INFLUENCE IN AFRICA

China’s pervasive influence in Africa is manifest not only in its burgeoning economic trade with the continent, forecast to surpass $100 billion by 2010, but in its energy strategy, its diplomatic presence, its cultural exchanges, and its growing military presence and security cooperation. Over seven hundred Chinese companies operate in forty-nine African countries, in markets ranging from textiles to fishing to extractive industries. It has established seven regional trade and investment centers throughout Africa to seek new economic and infrastructure-development opportunities. China, currently the world’s second-largest net importer of oil, imports from Africa 25 percent of its oil (forecast to increase to 40 percent within the next decade). Not only President Hu but other top Chinese leaders have visited Africa extensively since 2000, and Chinese diplomatic representation to African regional organizations is growing exponentially. China has sharply increased its foreign aid and floated multibillion-dollar loans, at low or no interest, to a variety of countries. It has aggressively promoted cultural and educational exchanges involving Chinese universities and tens of thousands of African students. It has also increased its military presence in Africa, selling small arms and fighter aircraft to several nations, increasing its number of military advisers, and building small-arms factories in Sudan and other countries.

At the November 2006 China-Africa Economic Forum, hosted by Beijing and attended by forty-eight African nations, President Hu promised that China would double economic aid to the continent by 2009, increase trade and infrastructure development, train fifteen thousand African professionals, provide scholarships to four thousand African students, and develop increasingly closer ties over the succeeding decade. This forum and China’s actions with respect to Africa send a loud and clear message—that China has seized the initiative in Africa, altering the continent’s strategic landscape.

China has used what it calls an “independent foreign policy” (a term by which Beijing connotes independence from American power) to achieve its considerable influence in Africa, seeking diplomatic, military, and economic influence in exchange for unconditional foreign aid, whatever the human rights record or political practices of countries that benefit. However advantageous it is for Beijing, this foreign policy undermines U.S. and international promotion of good governance, market reform, and regional security and stability while concomitantly diminishing the influence of the United States and other countries in Africa. China’s relationships with Angola and Zimbabwe, for instance, have
enabled these countries to ignore international pressure and have frustrated ef-
forts to isolate, coerce, or reform them.

China's strong influence in Africa and what it might portend for the inter-
national community is underscored by its relationship with Sudan. Sudan's in-
ternal conflict has been roiling for decades. A seemingly intractable domestic
conflict with age-old roots has become a full-scale “ethnic cleansing.” The in-
ternational community, collectively sworn not to allow another Rwanda-type mas-
sacre, is finding a solution elusive. Worsening the situation is China's refusal to
yield to international pressure and condemn Sudanese actions, insisting on Sudan's
right to govern its own internal affairs irrespective of the ongoing genocide. The
disturbing reality is that China is heavily invested in Sudan, whence 20 percent
of its African oil comes and where Chinese oil firms are deeply entrenched. Over
ten thousand Chinese workers live and work in the Sudan. Instead of using its
considerable influence in Sudan to work for a solution, Beijing has cast a blind eye
on Sudanese inaction and complicity—all but endorsing its actions. Chinese re-

duction. The inter-

sion to address the situation appropriately is the primary reason for the watered-
down character of UN resolutions with respect to Sudan.

Against this contextual background of China’s influence in Africa, let us now
explore Chinese involvement in UN peacekeeping missions in the continent. Af-
ter a short history of China’s contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in gen-

eral, this article examines its perspectives on peacekeeping and its involvement
in peacekeeping missions in Africa (with particular focus, based on first-person
accounts, on the peacekeeping mission in the Western Sahara). It closes with an
examination of the significance of Chinese contributions to peacekeeping in
Africa.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) officially joined the UN and became a
permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 1971. Peacekeeping
missions have been authorized by the UN since 1948, but China initially chose
not to participate in them. China’s reluctance to contribute to UN peacekeeping
missions was primarily driven by its belief that the sovereignty of nations gave
them an inherent right to control their own internal affairs without third-party
interference—an issue that had been vital to the early survival of the PRC itself.

In 1989, however, China began its first exploratory foray into UN peacekeeping
missions, sending nonmilitary observers to join the UN Namibia Transitional Pe-
riod Aid Group overseeing a general election. In 1990, China dispatched mili-
tary observers to the Middle East in support of the UN Truce Supervision
Organization (UNTSO). It was this act that marked the beginning of its official
participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Over the ensuing decade and a
half, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) became increasingly involved with peacekeeping, sending more than 6,500 peacekeepers to thirteen UN missions in Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, East Timor, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.\textsuperscript{14}

Today, China sends more peacekeepers to more UN missions than any other permanent member of the UNSC besides France—in fact, China was only recently surpassed by France’s commitment of forces to Lebanon in August 2006. As of January 2007, over 1,861 Chinese military and civilian personnel were deployed to twelve UN missions; this number is expected to climb in the near future as China sends additional peacekeepers into Lebanon and Sudan. In comparison, France has 2,049 personnel in ten missions, the United Kingdom 360 in eight missions, the United States 316 in eight missions, and Russia 298 in thirteen. Of the 114 nations now contributing 81,992 personnel to sixteen peacekeeping missions worldwide, China ranks twelfth overall (France tenth, the United Kingdom fortieth, the United States forty-third, and Russia forty-fourth).\textsuperscript{15} In fairness to other UNSC permanent members, China’s dues represent only 3 percent of the UN budget (the American share is 22 percent); nonetheless, Beijing’s willingness to support UN peacekeeping missions with personnel—a low-density/high-demand commodity—paints China as a “responsible stakeholder” on the international stage.\textsuperscript{16} China’s readiness as a permanent Security Council member to contribute large numbers of people also lends important credibility to the very missions the council approves, funds, and supports.

China, then, has certainly made up for a slow start in peacekeeping involvement. It has contributed not only United Nations military observers (UNMOs) but engineer battalions, police units, medical teams, and transportation companies as well. In fact, it has committed itself to providing permanently “one UN standard engineering battalion, one UN standard medical team, and two UN standard transportation companies to ongoing missions”—essentially establishing its own designated expeditionary niche.\textsuperscript{17}

Chinese UNMOs are usually officers, selected or volunteering from a variety of specialties and backgrounds.\textsuperscript{18} Staffs in the Beijing area are often drawn upon for intelligence, logistics, infantry, and personnel officers to fill these positions.\textsuperscript{19} Tours normally last eight months to one year before units or personnel are relieved and replaced by follow-on units or personnel.

The Chinese engineer battalions dedicated to UN missions normally deploy as units, sometimes with reinforcement or augmentation. They frequently come from the engineer brigade stationed at Nankou, Northwest Beijing, in the Beijing Military Region. Other regions augment the engineer battalions as necessary.\textsuperscript{20} The Nankou brigade, being in a constant state of training and
preparedness for peacekeeping, with units either deployed or preparing to deploy, and because of its familiarity with and repeated experience of such operations, has issued a UNMO handbook, *Logistics Support for Peacekeeping Forces.*

Chinese civilian policemen are sent to the Chinese Peacekeeping Civil Police Training Center, in Langfang, Hebei Province, fifty kilometers southeast of Beijing, the largest such center in Asia. The training center is run by the People’s Armed Police (PAP); however, there have been no PAP deployments as such in support of peacekeeping operations. Prospective civilian police normally receive advanced peacekeeping training in thirty-one courses in the months before deploying. Training includes anti-riot procedures, searching techniques, protection of very important persons, combat techniques, psychology skills, physical agility, driving, and vehicle maintenance. Training is also conducted at a base in Nanjing in Jiangsu Province. Chinese police units, medical teams, and transportation companies deploying to UN peacekeeping missions are drawn from various military regions. Units of these types have deployed to missions alone and in combination.

Since 2000, China has supported numerous missions on many different continents, sending UNMOs, police units, and troops to every clime and place. Of note, in 2004 China sent a 125-man police company to Haiti—the first time a complete Chinese police unit had been sent to a Western Hemisphere mission. China has seven staff officers serving in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN Headquarters in New York City. Nine Chinese peacekeepers have died during UN missions to date. Chinese participation in UN peacekeeping missions as of January 2007 is represented in the table.

**CHINESE PERSPECTIVES ON UN PEACEKEEPING**

China has clearly established itself as a credible UN peacekeeping contributor, reversing an earlier policy of nonparticipation. What brought this sea change about?

One of the main roots of the dramatic upswing in Chinese peacekeeping can be traced to the PLA actions in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. The events of Tiananmen damaged ties that had developed between the PLA and the people of China since the revolution in 1949. The People’s Liberation Army determined that it needed to restore a congenial relationship with the broader society and the world. The actions it chose included disaster relief, domestic security, and other measures, but also, very importantly, participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

China’s attitudinal change with respect to UN peacekeeping was eventually captured in a white paper, *China’s National Defense in 2004.* Chapter 9, “International Security Cooperation,” in a section entitled “Participation in UN
CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS
(as of January 2007)

MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara)
  14 military observers
MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti)
  129 civilian police
MONUC (UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo [DROC])
  218 troops and 12 military observers (total 230)
UNIFIL (UN International Force in Lebanon)
  392 troops
UNIOSIL (United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone)
  1 military observer
UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea)
  7 military observers
UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo)
  18 military observers
UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia)
  565 troops, 18 civilian police, 5 military observers (total 588)
UNMIS (UN Mission in Sudan)
  446 troops, 9 civilian police, 14 military observers (total 469)
UNMIT (UN Mission in Timor Leste [East Timor])
  2 military observers
UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire)
  7 military observers
UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)
  4 military observers

Total 1,861


Peacekeeping Operations,” specifically lays out the new position on peacekeeping missions:

China has consistently supported and actively participated in the peacekeeping operations that are consistent with the spirit of the UN Charter. It maintains that the UN peacekeeping operations should abide by the purposes and principles of the UN charter and other universally recognized principles governing peacekeeping operations. China will continue to support the reform of the UN peacekeeping missions, hoping to strengthen further the UN capability in preserving peace.27

This section is unique among other permanent members’ national defense strategies. No others specifically list involvement in UN peacekeeping missions and or classify them under “theater security cooperation,” an important distinction.28

The importance that China now gives peacekeeping is emphasized as well in China’s Foreign Affairs, an annual foreign-affairs compendium compiled by the Policy Planning section of the Foreign Ministry to promulgate and explain the
government’s foreign policy and affairs. The document asserts that “UN peacekeeping operations are an important means developed over many years of UN practice for the maintenance of international peace and security” and that “always valuing and supporting PKO [peacekeeping operations] consistent with the UN Charter, China has gradually expanded its involvement in these endeavors and thus projected an image of a peace-loving and responsible major country.”

In support of this fundamental foreign policy change, the Chinese media has portrayed PLA and civilian police participation in UN peacekeeping missions positively. Further, the media devotes a great deal of attention to peacekeeping troops, since they are the only forces deployed externally. These missions are an opportunity to place China in a favorable light domestically and internationally, which is important to the PLA and its role in society.

Likewise, the populace follows the exploits of its peacekeepers closely. The cremated ashes of a Chinese peacekeeper, Lieutenant Colonel Du Zhaoyu, who died during an Israeli air raid on Lebanon in 2006, were interred at the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery in Beijing. President Hu Jintao; the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Guo Boxiong; the CMC’s vice chairman, Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan; Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing; and Liang Guanglie, chief of the General Staff of the PLA, all presented wreaths and paid personal respects. Du’s body was covered with the flag of the Communist Party of China and surrounded by white roses and cypress leaves. Hundreds of people, including Du’s colleagues, schoolmates, teachers, and neighbors, attended the service. This story, like many other touching ones like it, seems to have strengthened the bond between the people and the PLA.

CHINA AND UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN AFRICA
China’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa (1,316 personnel) outweighs its total contributions elsewhere (545), a reflection of its keen interest in peacekeeping efforts in Africa. Beijing has also stated to the UN that enhancing regional peacekeeping capacity in Africa in order to meet ongoing challenges to security and stability is a Chinese priority.

Furthermore, China’s African Policy, as defined by China’s African Policy: A White Paper, specifically addresses a desire for “enhancing solidarity and cooperation with African countries” as part of “an important component of China’s independent foreign policy of peace,” promising that China will “continue to appeal to the international community to give more attention to questions concerning peace and development in Africa.” China’s African Policy specifically mentions UN peacekeeping as one of its security cooperation tools, as does the defense white paper: China, it declares, “will urge the UN Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa” and “will continue
its support to and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa” as part of “Enhancing All-Round Cooperation between China and Africa.”

China is currently involved in all seven UN missions in Africa: in the Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), Liberia (UNMIL), Sudan (UNMIS), Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), and the Western Sahara (MINURSO, discussed at length below). The Chinese have also been involved in past missions in Namibia in 1989–90 (UNTAG), Mozambique in 1993–94 (ONUMOZ), Liberia in 1993–97 (UNOMIL), Burundi in 2004 (ONUB), and both past Sierra Leone missions, in 1998–99 (UNOMSIL) and 1999–2005 (UNAMSIL).

The seven Chinese UN military observers in the UNOCI mission (Côte d’Ivoire) form part of a larger force comprising over 8,990 uniformed personnel. UNOCI is charged with monitoring the cessation of hostilities and movements of armed groups and with the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation, and resettlement of military personnel and militias.

In MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo [DROC]), 230 Chinese troops and UNMOs serve among 18,410 uniformed personnel deploying and maintaining a presence in the key areas of potential volatility in order “to promote the reestablishment of confidence; discourage violence, by deterring the use of force to threaten the political process; and allow United Nations personnel to operate freely, particularly in the Eastern part of DROC.” The Chinese
have several times rotated (for eight-month tours) troops and UNMOs to this mission, including engineer companies of 175 personnel and medical Platoons of forty personnel.  

In UNMEE (Eritrea and Ethiopia), seven Chinese UNMOs serve with 2,280 military personnel monitoring the cessation of hostilities and helping ensure observance of the security commitments agreed between the two countries.  

In UNMIL (Liberia), the Chinese contingent of 593 troops is part of a mission of 15,200 military personnel observing the implementation of a cease-fire agreement, investigating violations and maintaining liaison among all Liberian military forces. Past Chinese deployments to Liberia have been very successful. For instance, the 1st PLA Construction Engineer Company from Shenyang Military Region, a medical team from the Nanjing Military Region, and a transportation team from the General Logistics Department deployed in 2003–2004. The construction company, actually a reserve water-supply unit, underwent a three-month buildup and training period in preparation. These units built a 1,200-kilometer road, four camps, two parking aprons, and twenty-one bridges, and leveled off over seventy thousand square meters of ground. The medical team treated over 2,300 outpatients, hospitalized over 250 people, and operated on fifty. The transportation team moved over thirty thousand tons of material and over seventy thousand people. Chinese peacekeepers are now in their fourth tour to Liberia; in all, China has sent over 2,243 to that country.  

In UNMIS (Sudan), 469 Chinese serve as part of a mission of 9,980 supporting implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by warring parties. Laiyang, in Shandong Province, sent a 275-man engineer detachment, a hundred-person transportation detachment, and a sixty-man medical detachment in 2005. Their principal missions were to construct roads, bridges, and airports; provide water and power supplies; and transport personnel and water. There is a large Chinese presence in Sudan, and it is not uncommon to see signs in Chinese along with Arabic and English.  

In UNIOSIL (Sierra Leone), one Chinese UN military observer serves in a 278-person mission mandated to help the government of Sierra Leone consolidate peace, strengthen democracy, and sustain development.  

CHINESE PEACEKEEPERS IN THE WESTERN SAHARA (MINURSO)  
The following commentary is based on the experiences of three American UN military observers (including the author) who have served with Chinese peacekeepers in the Western Sahara. The three were attached to MINURSO for six-month deployments between 1998 and 2001.
The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara

MINURSO was established by Security Council Resolution 690 of 29 April 1991, in accordance with “the settlement proposals for la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro.” As agreed by the belligerents—Morocco and the Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro (POLISARIO)—the implementation plan provided for a transitional period during which a special representative of the United Nations secretary-general would have sole and exclusive responsibility over all matters relating to a referendum in which the people of the Western Sahara would choose between independence and integration with Morocco. The Special Representative would be assisted in his tasks by an integrated group of UN civilian, military, and police personnel, to be known as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara. 46

The current military force is headed by a two-star general officer; as of January 2007 over twenty-five nations were represented. Fourteen Chinese UNMOs serve in a contingent of 215 military personnel (twenty-eight troops, four police, 183 unarmed military observers), along with 101 international civilian personnel, 138 local civilian staff, and twenty-three United Nations volunteers to the mission. The UNMOs are distributed among nine sites east and west of the dividing line between the belligerents, a liaison office in Tindouf (Algeria), a staging area in Dakhla, and the UN headquarters in Laayoune. The team sites’ areas of responsibility range in size from twelve thousand to forty-seven thousand square kilometers. A team site’s UNMOs carry out an average of eighteen patrols each week (some of them at night), each team site covering a minimum of two thousand square kilometers. Approximately thirty-five UN helicopter reconnaissance flights are conducted each month in the areas of responsibility. 47

Since 1991, MINURSO has been effectively monitoring the cease-fire. UNMOs patrol both sides of the dividing line and the demilitarized zone that cuts across the Western Sahara, verifying compliance with military agreements signed by both parties to the conflict. They monitor entry into the zone and such activities as tactical reinforcement, redeployment of troops, infrastructure improvement, or other matters requiring prior approval. Military observers have the right to visit the belligerents’ units and conduct patrols at any time. 48

The Military South Sector Commander: The Chinese Colonel

The military mission in 2000 was co-led by the French and Chinese, who contributed the largest numbers of UNMOs (twenty-one each). The operation is split into North and South sectors for span-of-control purposes. The North Sector was led by a French colonel, who had approximately ninety-four UNMOs at five team sites. The South Sector was led by a Chinese colonel in charge of the same number of UNMOs and sites. These sector commanders had challenging
jobs: they were personally responsible for all their UNMOs and operational considerations in their sectors. Their responsibilities included all logistics, medical care, aviation, and UN team sites and equipment, as well as the complaints and infractions of the treaty parties. Threats to their forces included the possibility of hostile acts by treaty parties, extreme weather (sandstorms, 150-degree heat, etc.), and millions of mines laid during the Western Sahara conflict.

The Southern Sector commander was based at Oum Dreyga (see map). The Chinese colonel in 2000 was an extremely intelligent and capable officer who spoke fluent English. He was very comfortable in his operational environment...
despite its challenges and handled all aspects of the mission smoothly. He was very safety conscious, insisting especially upon driving safety—car accidents were the number-one source of injuries and death for the mission.\(^{30}\)

**The Chinese UN Military Observers**

The twenty-one Chinese peacekeepers in 2001 were capable, proficient, dedicated, intelligent, and professional. Like any other country’s UNMOs, the individual Chinese officers’ capabilities varied with personal experiences, intelligence, personality, and communication skills.\(^{51}\)

Operationally, the Chinese observers were sound. Most spoke English (the official MINURSO language) well enough to accomplish the mission, though some did so with only limited ability. A few were fluent not only in English but in French, Russian, and other languages as well. Language facility was important when it came time to assign billets and leadership positions; also, those who spoke English well were assigned the rewarding jobs (e.g., team site commander, deputy team site commander, operations officer, information officer). Chinese UNMOs filled each of these positions at one team site or another. Of note, the Chinese were sometimes used by sector commanders to pass information in their own language over open radio nets so the belligerents would be unable to intercept it; Spanish, French, Arabic, and Russian were in common use by the Moroccans and the POLISARIO.\(^{52}\)

The Chinese officers were tactically proficient, displaying a solid grasp of expected skills: navigation, information gathering, communication, and basic military knowledge, among others. Again, these skills varied between individuals, but most officers were technically capable. For instance, as the Smara team site commander in the North Sector from July 2000 to January 2001, I appointed a Chinese officer as my operations officer due to his UNMO skills. He was a very sharp major from the logistics field who spoke English very well and had fine interpersonal skills. When I left the mission he assumed command of the Smara team site and by all accounts performed well.\(^{53}\)

No particular “niche” capabilities or skills made the Chinese collectively stand out from the rest of the MINURSO observers, but they did have one noticeable and universal weakness—poor driving skills. China’s vehicle population at that time was small; also, presumably, officers from the big cities would not have needed to drive in China, and if they did, trained military drivers would usually have been available. Whether for these or other reasons, however, the Chinese officers were not car owners, by and large, and they had a particularly difficult time (though they were not the only ones) handling the MINURSO four-by-four, standard-transmission vehicles in desert conditions. The Chinese officers had evidently been put through a quick course in driving and maintenance, but
this did not replace a lifetime of driving experience. The driving conditions in the Sahara were brutal, and the vehicles, although modified to meet the harsh terrain, were not indestructible.54

As a matter of pride, the Chinese would not admit to their poor driving skills but to a man resolutely tried to improve. Many took up the offer of additional driving instruction from American UNMOS, and the latter were impressed with their motivation. One U.S. officer successfully taught a Chinese UNMO the difficult mission of backing up the team’s pickup truck with the site trash trailer hitched behind; the Chinese officer insisted on being the “permanent trash driver” for the rest of the mission.55

**Chinese Military Observer Personalities**

As one would expect with any country, the personalities of the Chinese UNMOS varied greatly. One American UNMO’s experiences with two Chinese officers (a captain and a major) with whom he served in 1997 at a team site on the POLISARIO side captures this observation. Both of the Chinese officers spoke English well, and both were terrible drivers (though they thought the opposite). Here their similarities ended. The captain, an infantry officer, was very approachable and genuinely liked by all team-site members. He had an outgoing personality, a great sense of humor, a genuine interest in everyone at the site, and was without question a team player. He was reliable, worked hard, and never caused disputes.

The major was a bit different. He was not introverted or reserved, but neither was he as amiable a character as the Chinese captain, and he befriended no one, even the captain. He was very opinionated and did not mind prodding his fellow UNMOS. According to the American observer, he deliberately antagonized the Russians by insisting that communism was flourishing in China, that it had failed in Russia, and that now Russia was failing with its new system as well. True diplomats, the Russians wrote off the remarks, but they were convinced this officer was not a real major in the Chinese army. They were certain he was a political agent, like a Soviet-era KGB rezident. They were quick to point out that the Chinese captain not only never argued with the major but kept his distance from him.

In terms of reliability, punctuality, and work ethic, the major was everything he should have been, but his personality was perhaps not well suited for a UN mission. For instance, he once almost got the team site in serious trouble on patrol by his tendency to pontificate on the merits of communism. On this occasion he and two other UNMOS on patrol visited a POLISARIO logistical unit commander and his small staff, all Muslims. Over tea and small talk, the major started on communism and all its aspects; before long he was declaring that religion is just a manifestation of mankind’s collective imagination, manipulated by
the capitalists and adhered to by only the less intelligent. This quickly drew glares from the POLISARIO soldiers, who were astounded if not shocked. The major, realizing his faux pas, abruptly ceased, and the UNMOs hastily concluded the meeting.  

Specialty, Rank, Money, and Time Off

UNMOs, regardless of nationality, are led to believe that the UN military observers of other nations are intelligence officers expressly sent for intelligence (or in UN parlance, information) collection. Whether this perception is true or not is irrelevant; the belief is engrained in all UNMOs. In the end, everyone perceives everyone else as an intelligence collector or intelligence officer.

The Chinese were naturally inquisitive and curious about Americans, and in light of that perception it was difficult to tell if their questions were purely for curiosity’s sake and thus benign or were truly aimed at developing profiles on American (and other) officers. I believe the case was a little bit of both. The Chinese questions sometimes ventured into technical and military realms, but cultural and linguistic differences meant that it was never clear if they wanted us to divulge secrets. In any case, there was not much strategic value to be gained from U.S. military observers who categorically assumed the Chinese to be either political or intelligence officers. However, the Chinese may very well have been what they claimed to be—infantry, engineer, or logistics officers, or whatever specialties they professed.

Another pervasive belief is that other countries’ militaries send senior officers to UN missions but reduce them in rank for the mission, either to fill assigned rank quotas or to allow senior officers to take part (there are only so many colonel leadership billets in each mission). Although I met officers from other countries who admitted to voluntary demotions, it was not clear whether the Chinese used this practice. Most American UNMOs assumed the Chinese were of higher rank than advertised.

All UN member states are legally obligated to pay their shares of peacekeeping costs under an established formula. The top ten providers of assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping operations were (as of January 2006) the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, Spain, China, and the Netherlands.

Troops serving in UN peacekeeping operations are paid by their own governments, according to their own national ranks and salary scales. The UN offers payments, at standard rates approved by the General Assembly, to compensate for pay and allowances of all troops and as supplements for specialists (that is, within infantry and logistics contingents and formed police units). In addition, contributing countries are reimbursed for the wear to clothing, gear and
equipment, and personal weaponry. The current rates per peacekeeper per month are $1,028 for pay and allowances; $303 supplementary pay for specialists; $68 for personal clothing, gear, and equipment; and five dollars for personal weaponry. Countries volunteering military contingents and formed police units are reimbursed by the UN for transport to and from the mission and for wear and tear to (and replacement if necessary of) “organic” equipment. Countries are either reimbursed directly or arrangements are made to transport, equip, or sustain their troops on a case-by-case basis.  

The Chinese UNMOs would each have received, tax free, eighty dollars (U.S.) a day in cash, paid at the end of each month during the mission. This was the same rate paid to all UNMOs in the mission. For a Chinese officer this represented a significant additional income.

All UNMOs on UN missions work every day, with no time off. However, the UN uses a “compensatory time off” system to award days off for accumulated workdays—that is, for every five days worked, the UNMO earns one day of compensatory time off. Once an UNMO has accumulated approximately twelve days off, he can, through prearrangement, schedule some “liberty” somewhere in the MINURSO area of responsibility (Laayoune, Morocco, or the Canary Islands). It was common for nationalities to schedule compensatory time off together in one of these locations. The Chinese UNMOs had a favorite destination in Morocco, a town called Agadir. Evidently Agadir is home to a large Chinese fishing community; eight to ten Chinese officers would head north to Agadir to enjoy a week of Chinese food, fun, and fellowship.

A Final Word on MINURSO

Perhaps the most endearing part of the mission for any officer in the Western Sahara was the sharing with fellow UNMOs of national-day festivities, such as the Fourth of July. Invariably this led to each nation’s taking its turn trying to outshine others with elaborately prepared national feasts, songs, and toasts. The patriotic fervor of the Chinese was no less fierce than any American’s, and their national day was a great event followed by a wonderful feast.

One year, when the team was gathered at the UN headquarters in Laayoune to celebrate China’s national day, this patriotism was particularly evident. The Chinese national contingent gathered to sing its national anthem and to raise its flag in the headquarters square. As the national song played and all stood at attention, the flag was unfurled and duly hoisted—upside down. The nervous Chinese officer who had unwittingly committed the error fainted in formation. His fellow countrymen and others stifled smiles. One thing was made clear—all UN military observers are the same, no matter what uniform they wear.
CHINESE PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: WHY DOES IT MATTER?
China’s recent rapid increase in UN peacekeeping missions and its willingness to expand its participation in them speaks volumes to how it views their importance. The Chinese have performed well, and their strict discipline and high efficiency have earned accolades, but what does China gain from this experience at different levels?  

The Strategic Value to China of Peacekeeping in Africa
China’s recent UN peacekeeping track record reinforces its role as a responsible stakeholder in the international community and gives it more global influence. This influence is parlayed into prestige and clout, both of which are attractive in the eyes of African countries, especially those inclined to search for alternatives to partnerships of the kinds traditionally offered by Western nations. That point, coupled with an overarching Chinese strategic approach to Africa that features “an independent foreign policy,” $1.8 billion in African aid to date with no apparent strings attached, and diplomatic, economic, and military ties with 90 percent of Africa (unshadowed by any colonial history on that continent), make it unsurprising that it is quietly but steadily building a significant presence there.

The influence China gains from African nation support in international fora is important to its “One China” policy; to its energy future, commerce, and military-industrial complex; and to the advancement of its international agenda. This mutually beneficial relationship is reinforced, in turn, by China’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions—which it considers, as we have seen, a form of security cooperation. The more China advocates and participates in UN peacekeeping missions, the more influence it creates with regional organizations (e.g., the African Union) formulating Africa’s future.

China has or is developing strong ties with the African nations to which it deploys UN peacekeepers. This may be coincidental, but Beijing’s disproportionately large contribution to African missions suggests otherwise. As demonstrated, China has a vested interest in the strategic security and stability of the African continent, and long-term involvement in peacekeeping missions there should be expected.

The Operational Value to China of Peacekeeping in Africa
Having little power-projection capability and a policy not focused on overseas deployment at the present time, for China UN peacekeeping operations represent one of the most important ways it can gain distant operational experience. With these deployments, the Chinese gain exposure to the operational practices and methods of foreign military forces as well. There are also benefits gained in the areas of operational logistics, multinational operations, combat and civil
engineering, and through a working knowledge of the operational environments in the deployment areas.

Moving a battalion or large echelon of personnel overseas, with all of the predeployment training, support requirements, and logistics required, is not a simple feat. Operating in a hostile or austere environment is also challenging, and the preventive medicine and security measures necessary to safeguard the force once there are not intuitively obvious. The value of being “on the ground” in a foreign territory for an extended period cannot be easily duplicated, and such experiences are more useful and practical than any other foreign-area training imaginable. Unit cohesion is also an immediate benefit. The fact that Chinese units are redeploying multiple times to Africa means that a ready force of African operational experts is being built—something the United States does not have.

This last point is very important. PRC troop deployments in support of UN missions such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan are giving Beijing an advantage in operationally deploying to these vastly different and difficult countries. This advantage comprises invaluable knowledge about logistics, ports of debarkation, lines of communication, lines of operations, operational intelligence, local “atmospherics” and modus operandi, and means of sustaining forces in Africa over prolonged periods.

Chinese UN military observers who command at any level of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa (such as the MINURSO colonel we have described) are privy to a unique operational opportunity available to few other non-African officers in the world. This alone is an invaluable operational commodity derived from UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.

The Tactical Value to China of Peacekeeping in Africa

Chinese peacekeepers who serve in Africa on UN missions also enjoy a unique opportunity as well: nothing can replace “boots on the ground” knowledge learned in such missions. Any MINURSO UNMO who has navigated with GPS across thousands of kilometers of desert, talked to local Bedouin, and survived the harsh Sahara and the extremes of desert weather will have a decided advantage in such operational environments, whether in Africa or elsewhere, UN related or not.

Repeated deployments to UN missions in Africa by China will enable the PLA to build an extensive knowledge base. The Chinese major who succeeded me as the Smara team site commander returned to Africa in 2006 for another one-year deployment, this time to Sudan, as a colonel. As far as African expertise goes, he has likely already twice the knowledge base that I possess in all things pertaining to African operational missions.
Now multiply that advantage by the one thousand personnel whom China is rotating through missions every year in support of UN peacekeeping in Africa. This effort is outpacing Washington’s efforts dedicated to operations in Africa by a considerable margin. Conceivably, the United States will one day turn to the Chinese military for help and expertise in missions in Africa.

One unintended consequence of China’s substantial participation in UN missions relates to Beijing’s stance on sovereignty, as regards intervention in foreign states. It appears that China is slowly being conditioned by the humanitarian efforts in which it has been participating. Whereas China once might have seen UN intervention as a potential threat to its own internal affairs, it now sees the intrinsic value of UN efforts in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace building and perhaps appreciates more than it once did how interventions can promote regional stability and security.

If so, this means China will continue to support UN peacekeeping efforts globally for the foreseeable future, which would be important to all members of the international community. China’s willingness to send significant numbers of personnel eases the strain on others, and its position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council lends a valuable impetus to peacekeeping in general.

Thus China will continue to send UN peacekeepers worldwide, but it will do so specifically with a keen eye to regions that correspond to its strategic vision. Beijing will continue to view peacekeeping as a valuable security cooperation tool in Africa, and it will take every opportunity to contribute to missions on the continent due to the strategic, operational, and tactical benefit and influence it gains from them. The United States needs to comprehend Beijing’s multifaceted and increasingly significant presence in Africa, take account of its contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, and grasp the positive and negative ramifications of this Chinese engagement.

NOTES

This article draws extensively upon research carried out for course work at the Naval War College in 2006 and 2007.


5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.


8. Eisenman and Kurlantzick, “China’s Africa Strategy,” p. 219. China’s diplomatic policy is primarily referred to as an “independent foreign policy”—a term Beijing uses to connote independence from American power. It has also been euphemistically called the “strictly business policy” by the Chinese and other nations; other descriptive phrases echo the theme, such as the “business is business” policy or “hands off politics.” A less flattering term used to describe China’s foreign policy is “oil diplomacy”—which has been used in the past to describe U.S. policy as well.


11. Human Rights Watch, *The United Nations and Darfur*, available at hrw.org/eng/docs/2005/09/08/darfur3.htm. For example, according to Human Rights Watch, “In the case of Darfur, the main impediment to stronger action by the Security Council has been China, which owns a 40 percent share of Sudan’s main oil producing field.” At the council’s special November 2004 session in Nairobi, China (and possibly Russia, which is thought to be the main arms supplier to the Sudanese government) threatened a veto to pressure other members to water down Resolution 1574. However, as discussed above, it is doubtful that the council would in any case have passed a resolution seriously threatening sanctions against Khartoum.


18. The UN DPKO provides the following definition of UNMO. “United Nations Military Observer: (UNMO or MILOB) Main tasks: to supervise, monitor, verify and report on cease-fire agreements, separations and withdrawals of forces, cessation of outside assistance; to monitor checkpoints, ingress/egress point and sea/airports; to monitor regrouping, cantonment and disarmament or demobilization processes; to locate and confiscate caches of weapons; to liaise with factions, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], UN agencies and neighboring countries, assist humanitarian activities (POW exchanges, food distribution etc); in some cases UNMOs form part of a peace-keeping force.” UN DPKO, *Glossary*, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary/m.htm.

19. Dennis J. Blasko, interview by the author, 18 September 2006; and author’s personal experiences.

20. The engineers who deployed to Lebanon in 2006 were selected because of their mine-clearing expertise, acquired through demining the Sino-Vietnamese border over the years. Dennis J. Blasko, personal correspondence with the author.


22. Although no People’s Armed Police (PAP) have deployed on peacekeeping operations, other types of Chinese police have deployed in support of UN missions, acting as UN
Civilian Police. It is not specifically clear why PAP have not deployed on UN missions to date.


24. Nanjing information provided by Dennis J. Blasko, personal correspondence with the author.


26. Ibid., p. 176.


29. China’s Foreign Affairs, 2005 (Beijing: World Affairs, 2005), pp. 359, 422. Several Chinese articles recently have treated peacekeeping operations as one of several nontraditional security issues. For example, the PRC Military’s First Symposium on Unconventional Security Theory states that the role of China’s armed forces in coping with nontraditional security threats has three aspects: “1) To preserve social stability, to stop and smash subversive and destructive activities, keep the government stable, and protect the nation’s long-term political stability; 2) For emergency relief, using the armed forces’ advantages in organization and relevant skills to control situations and eliminate dangers, and protect the nation and people’s lives and property; and 3) To participate in international peace actions, including international peacekeeping, emergency assistance, fighting transnational crime, and related joint military exercises, so as to make China’s rightful contribution to international peace and development.”


32. Another compelling story that has caught the media’s and the public’s attention is that of two pairs of brothers assigned to the peacekeeping engineer group in Sudan PLA: “Lin Tao is a staff officer of the operation and training section of a group army, Zhang Zhidong is the commander of the 3rd Company of an engineer regiment, and Lin Hao and Zhang Zhiguo are both soldiers of a motor company of the same engineer regiment. When the Peacekeeping Engineer Group to Sudan was to be set up, the two pairs of brothers were quite zealous and immediately submitted their application to the upper levels. However when their parents learned that the living conditions in the peacekeeping areas there were very hard and the mission was very dangerous, they strongly opposed their children’s decision. In order to persuade their parents, these two pairs of brothers phoned their parents and wrote to them many times. In a letter to his parents, Zhang Zhiguo wrote: ‘You sent me and my brother to join the army because you expected we could be useful persons to our country. To join the peacekeeping mission is the best chance for us to requite our country with our practical action. To step forward bravely when the country needs us most is not only our unshirkable obligation, but also extremely honorable to you.’ Eventually, their parents were moved by their determination to requite the country. They not only agreed with their request to join in the peacemaking group to Sudan, but also called or wrote to them many times to encourage them not to be distracted by their families and make sure to complete the peacemaking mission with flying colors.” PLA Daily, 8 July 2006.


47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Author’s personal experiences.
51. Author’s personal experiences.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Moore interview.
56. Todd D. Ryder (student, Naval War College, MINURSO UNMO, 1997–98) interview by the author, 10 October 2006.
57. Author’s personal experiences.
58. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Author’s personal experiences.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
66. The noticeable exception to this is U.S. involvement in the Horn of Africa. The Chinese are developing considerable influence in the region, but American military operational experience outpaces their efforts at present.
ON MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS

Milan Vego

Major naval operations are the principal methods of combat force employment by which operational or strategic objectives are accomplished in a conventional high-intensity war at sea. The U.S. Navy and other major Western navies planned and executed a large number of major naval operations in World War II as part of maritime and, in several cases, land campaigns. However, such major operations have been conducted on few occasions since 1945. The main reason for that is that none of the numerous regional conflicts fought in the past sixty years have involved large navies on both sides. The U.S. Navy and other major navies are currently involved in operations short of war, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement, maritime interception operations (MIO), and protection of friendly shipping against various hostile acts on the high seas, such as piracy or transnational terrorism. Among other things, they are also employed in preventing illegal immigration and drug smuggling. In some cases, employment of one’s naval forces, such as support or counterinsurgency (COIN) or MIO, might be aimed at achieving operational objectives. However, such actions lack many attributes of conventional major naval or joint operations. The focus here is exclusively on those planned and conducted in a conventional high-intensity conflict.

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WHAT IS A MAJOR NAVAL OPERATION?

There is no common agreement in the United States or the West on a definition of what constitutes a major naval operation. The term “naval operation” so often used by the U.S. Navy and other Western navies is too broad and imprecise. For example, “naval operation” is explained in the U.S. military as pertaining to “a naval action or the performance of naval missions, which may be strategical, tactical, logistical, or training.” This definition apparently does not make any distinction between objectives to be accomplished at sea and corresponding methods of combat force employment. It confuses the issue by mixing the combat employment of naval forces with logistics and training. An alternative meaning of the same term is “the process of carrying out or training for naval combat to gain the objective of any battle or campaign.” The absence of the term “major naval operation” is a clear proof of the lack of a coherent theory of operational warfare at sea. The U.S. Navy also still does not have a servicewide doctrine focused on the operational level of war at sea. Yet operational art is the principal focus of all joint doctrinal documents in the U.S. military.

In comparison, the former Soviet navy devoted extraordinary efforts to developing a theory of what it called “naval operations” in the early 1930s and through the 1980s. Naval operations constituted the very heart of the Soviets’ naval operational art. Yet the Soviets were distinctly unsuccessful in applying their theories in practice during the war with Nazi Germany, 1941–45. From 1945 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Soviet navy was never involved in real combat. Hence, one can only speculate whether its actual performance would have been any better than it was during World War II.

In one of the many Soviet definitions of the term, a naval operation (morskaya operatsiya) was described as a series of naval battles, engagements, and strikes coordinated in terms of objective, place, and time and conducted in an assigned area (zone) of an oceanic or sea theater of military action (TVD in the Russian acronym, theater of operations in Western terms). It was carried out by specially established groups, independently or in cooperation with formations, forces, or troop units of other services, according to a common idea and plan for accomplishing a single and especially important operational or operational-tactical task. Naval operations are controlled by a fleet commander.

In generic terms, a major naval operation can be understood as a series of related major and minor naval tactical actions conducted by several naval combat arms and combat arms of other services, in terms of time and place, and aimed to accomplish an operational (and sometimes limited strategic) objective in a given maritime theater. Major naval operations are planned and conducted in accordance with an operational idea (scheme) and common plan. They are normally an integral
part of a maritime or land campaign, but they can sometimes be conducted outside of the framework of a campaign.

The best (and proven) way of avoiding attrition at the operational and strategic levels is by planning and executing major operations and campaigns, respectively. With a major naval operation, the stronger side at sea can defeat the weaker in a place and at a time of its own choosing. Major naval operations are normally planned and conducted when decisive results have to be accomplished as quickly as possible and at the least loss. Successful major naval/joint operations can contribute considerably to shortening a war at sea.

The Roots
In the era of sail and until the late nineteenth century, the principal method of combat employment of one’s fleet to attain an operational or strategic objective was the “decisive naval battle.” Some decisive battles—for example, the battle of Trafalgar on 21 October 1805—led to drastic changes in the strategic situation at sea. Combat employment of naval forces gradually changed with the technological advances of the middle and late nineteenth century. The steady improvement in the performance of ships’ steam propulsion plants and the internal combustion engine had made it possible to fit powerful engines in even small ships. The introduction of torpedoes and mines led to the design of new small platforms capable of posing a serious threat to the survivability of larger ships. This, in turn, led to a proliferation of small warships of all types and classes. The numerical strength of the major navies steadily increased. In addition to battleships and cruisers, they also included a large number of smaller surface combatants, such as destroyers, torpedo craft, gunboats, and auxiliaries.

By the end of the nineteenth century the importance of a decisive battle had been steadily reduced because of the increased size and changing composition of the major navies. Instead of single decisive battles to achieve an operational or even strategic objective, war at sea between two strong opponents was fought over a large area and almost continuously. Numerous tactical actions were conducted by both large and smaller surface combatants. Operational deployment of combat forces became an integral part of a major clash between opposing fleet forces instead of something separate. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 was the first conflict at sea in which diverse naval actions were conducted almost continuously. These actions occurred over large parts of the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, and parts of the Pacific Ocean. In retrospect, the battle of Tsushima in May 1905 was the last “decisive” naval battle in history. Yet this was not grasped by the theoreticians or practitioners of the day. Up to the beginning of World War I, all the world’s major navies planned to seek a decisive battle.
(also called “general fleet action”) and thereby obtain command of the sea in a single clash of battle fleets.

In the last decade before the outbreak of World War I, the major navies continued to build both large and small naval vessels in quantity. For example, by 1914, the Royal Navy had in service 542 warships, including sixty-eight battleships, 110 cruisers, and 218 destroyers. The Imperial German Navy then had 301 ships (thirty-seven battleships, forty-eight cruisers, 142 destroyers, forty-seven torpedo boats, and twenty-seven U-boats). The advent of submarine and aircraft added second and third dimensions to the maritime battlefield. The ability to control the movements and actions of fleet elements over large ocean areas was considerably enhanced by new signaling devices and wireless telegraph. Fleet commanders were able to communicate with subordinate tactical commanders many hundreds of miles out at sea. The cumulative effect of all these technological advances was to make major navies of the day capable of conducting actions almost continuously, over large sea or even ocean areas, and employing diverse platforms and weapons. The very size of the major navies of the day, with their widely dispersed bases and installations, made it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to achieve decisive results by a general fleet action.

During World War I several large-scale fleet-versus-fleet actions took place, in the North Sea, the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the Baltic, and the Black Sea. Of these, the battle of Jutland, fought on 31 May–1 June 1916, came closest to what can be considered a major naval operation. It comprised a series of small engagements and attacks aimed at operational objectives. Admiral Reinhard Scheer (1863–1928), the commander of the German High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte), planned to sail out from Wilhelmshaven at about midnight on 30 May and then proceed northward, staying well off the Danish coast, and arrive the next afternoon off the western entrance to the Skagerrak. Afterward, the main body of the High Seas Fleet and Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper (1863–1932), commander of the Scouting Group (battle cruisers), would jointly launch an attack on the British merchant ships and cruiser escorts that German intelligence believed to be in the area. Afterward, Hipper with his battle cruisers would head north and advertise his location by steaming very close to the Norwegian coast in broad daylight, while Scheer would sail some fifty miles to the rear but out of sight of shore. Scheer was confident that as soon as the British learned the whereabouts of Hipper’s battle cruisers they would send their battle cruisers on a high-speed dash across the North Sea to cut off Hipper’s retreat to his home base. Scheer’s plan was to attack the enemy battle cruisers jointly with Hipper’s force next morning. In short, the German plan was to bring the strength of the British Grand Fleet down to parity with that of the High Seas Fleet. By coincidence Jellicoe also planned a sortie with his Grand Fleet to the Skagerrak area on
1 June 1916. His main objective was to lure the German High Seas Fleet to the north and fight a general fleet action. As it turned out, Scheer sortied only one day earlier than Jellicoe planned.\(^9\)

In the ensuing clash of the opposing forces, the Germans won a tactical victory in terms of losses in materiel and personnel inflicted on the Grand Fleet. The British lost fourteen ships (three battle cruisers, three armored cruisers, eight destroyers/torpedo boats) and some 6,100 men (out of a total of sixty thousand), while the German losses amounted to eleven ships (one predreadnought battleship, one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, and five destroyers/torpedo boats) and about 2,550 men (out of thirty-six thousand).\(^{10}\) However, operational success was clearly achieved by the British. In the aftermath of the battle the situation in the North Sea and adjacent sea areas remained essentially what it had been before the battle. Both opponents continued to watch each other and acted essentially as active fleets-in-being. The Entente’s blockade of the Central Powers was not weakened. The Royal Navy continued to ferry troops and supplies across the English Channel to France. The Germans retained their naval control of the Baltic theater.

The first major naval operation against the enemy coast was conducted by the Austro-Hungarian fleet, shortly after Italy’s decision to enter the war on the side of the Entente Powers on 24 May 1915. This operation had been planned by the Austro-Hungarian navy’s commander in chief, Admiral Anton Haus (1851–1917), in 1910, even though Italy was formally his country’s ally at that time. The main objective of that raid was to cut off Italian rail communications along the eastern coast of the Adriatic leading to the front on the Isonzo River. Another objective was to create fear and possibly panic among the Italian populace living in the coastal area.\(^{11}\) The Austrian assumption was that the Italians would try at the very outset of the hostilities to achieve a decision by employing their entire fleet in the northern Adriatic. Hence, the Austrians also decided to employ a major part of their fleet in the operation.\(^{12}\) The action would be successful only if full surprise was achieved, and that meant it had to be carried out shortly after the beginning of hostilities.\(^{13}\)

The Austro-Hungarian fleet carried out the raid as planned and employed rather large forces: four battleships, one armored and five protected cruisers, six large destroyers, seven destroyers, and thirty torpedo boats. The Austrian ships and naval aircraft bombarded fourteen ports and the coastal railroad from Venice to Brindisi. Targets included ports Porto Corsini (near Ravenna), Senigallia, Rimini, Ancona, the Potenza estuary, and Venice.\(^{14}\) The Austrian aircraft conducted raids against Venice and airship hangars at Chiaravalle. The Austrian ships also sank three Italian destroyers. This was the largest action of the Austro-Hungarian fleet during the entire war. The Austrian bombardment of
the coastal settlements and rail lines caused little material damage; Italian morale, however, was significantly depressed. There was a widespread belief among the Italian populace that their navy could not prevent such raids in the future. Moreover, it was believed that the Italian fleet was incapable of conducting similar actions against the Austro-Hungarian coast.15

During World War I, the first major joint naval operations emerged: the Entente’s amphibious landing at Gallipoli in April 1915 and the German landing on the Latvian coast in October 1917 are the best known examples. The principal objectives of the Gallipoli landing operation were to take Turkey out of the war, open a direct link with the Entente’s embattled ally Russia, force the Germans to shift troops from the Russian front, and influence Greece to side openly with the Entente Powers.16 The allied attack on the Dardanelles was poorly planned and executed. The naval plan prepared by Admiral Sackville Carden was approved on 13 January 1915, and a formal decision for the attack was made on 28 January. Carden’s plan was to use twelve old battleships, three battle cruisers, three light cruisers, one flotilla leader, sixteen destroyers, six submarines, four seaplanes, twelve minesweepers, and some miscellaneous craft for the naval attack on the Dardanelles.17 In a major omission, Carden was never directed to integrate the naval attack with the landing of ground forces.18 Naval bombardment started on 19 February; and bombardment of the outer forts started on 25 February. The initial attacks were fairly successful. However, the Turkish resistance proved to be much greater than anticipated. The Turks also heavily mined the straits, and the allied minesweepers were unable to clear the mines. On 18 March, out of sixteen battleships that ultimately took part in the bombardment, three battleships—two British and one French—ran into mines and were sunk, and three others were heavily damaged.19 The British and French losses included seven hundred sailors killed in a single day.

After the failure of the naval attack, the allies finally made a decision to commit ground troops to capture control of the straits. The initial forces for ground assault consisted of about seventy-five thousand British troops under General Sir Ian Hamilton. Specifically, this force comprised the British 29th Division and the Royal Naval Division, and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), composed of the 1st Australian Division and the New Zealand and Australian Division. In addition, the French made available on 10 March some eighteen thousand colonial troops of the 1st Division.20 The Turkish defenses of the straits were greatly improved after 24 March when the German general Liman von Sanders took command of the Turkish Fifth Army at the Dardanelles. He had to defend a coastline of 150 miles with just eighty-four thousand men (of whom only sixty-two thousand were combat ready) organized in six divisions. Only about twenty thousand men were defending the Gallipoli Peninsula.
The main landing at Cape Helles was carried out by about thirty-five thousand men of the 29th Division and elements of the Royal Naval Division on 25 April. Smaller, diversionary landings took place the same day, involving some seventeen thousand largely untrained troops of the New Zealand and Australian Corps, farther north at Ari Burnu (later renamed Anzac Cove). The 6th Colonial Regiment of the French 1st Division conducted a temporary landing at Kum Kale at the neck of the peninsula.

The allied troops seized the initial lodgment ashore but were unable to enlarge it because of stiff resistance by the Turks. The fighting evolved into trench warfare. Neither side was able to gain much ground, and both suffered heavy losses. By August 1915, the allied forces amounted to twelve divisions. A new landing was conducted in early August at Suvla Bay aimed to link with the ANZAC forces at Anzac Cove. After some gains, the entire operation ultimately failed, and the Turks recaptured Suvla Bay.

Despite all these efforts, the Allied troops were unable to make much progress on land. In the end, there was no other option but to abandon the entire operation. The evacuation was carried out in two stages: on 18–19 December 1915 and 8–9 January 1916. Losses on both sides were heavy. The allies eventually committed a total of about 490,000 troops (including seventy-nine thousand French) to the operation and suffered 252,000 casualties (including about 44,100 killed). The Turks employed some 500,000 troops and suffered about 251,300 casualties (including some 86,700 killed).

A more successful amphibious landing operation was Operation ALBION, conducted by the German navy and army in October 1917. This was the first German joint operation of such size and complexity. The operational objective was to seize control of the island of Oesel and thereby open the Gulf of Riga and thus threaten the rear of the Russian Twelfth Army, defending the Baltic coast. The aim was to land one reinforced division on the island of Oesel. Tagga Bay was selected as the landing objective area. Based on the lessons learned from the Entente's failure in the landing at Gallipoli, the Germans committed about 24,600 men, supported by a large naval force. The Germans achieved complete surprise, and the entire operation was a resounding success. The Twelfth Army was eventually destroyed, and the threat to the flank of General Oskar von Hutier's German Eighth Army was eliminated.

World War I at sea proved that the fleets of the major opponents were too large and deployed too widely to be destroyed during a single general fleet action or even two. It signaled the final demise of the decisive battle. It also demonstrated that operational objectives in the theater could be accomplished primarily by a series of related major and minor naval tactical actions sequenced and synchronized in time and place—in modern terms, a major naval operation. Deployment,
clashes of opposing forces, pursuit, and withdrawal/redeployment were meshed to constitute a seamless whole. The entire naval operation was planned, prepared, and conducted by a single commander. It was based on a definite idea and a common plan.

In the interwar years, most major Western navies, and also the Japanese navy, focused almost exclusively on the practical application of operational warfare, through planning, war gaming, and exercises at sea. In 1927, the U.S. Naval War College adopted for the first time the study of “operational” problems in addition to “strategical” and “tactical” ones. This practice continued in the 1930s. In war games held at the Naval War College in the 1930s the U.S. Navy repeatedly tested its plan ORANGE for operational employment of fleet forces in a hypothetical war with Japan. In the early 1930s, the U.S. Marine Corps embarked on an intensive effort to create its first operational doctrine for large-scale amphibious landings. The result was the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, issued in 1934. This manual borrowed heavily from the proper lessons learned in the Entente’s unsuccessful Gallipoli landing in 1915 and the successful German ALBION operation. After 1935 this document was used as a guide for amphibious exercises and research and development.25

The German navy used planning games, war games, and exercises extensively in preparing for a future war at sea. By the early 1930s it had introduced “operational,” in addition to strategic and tactical, war games. In the late 1930s, as a result of these games, the German naval high command became convinced of the prospective need to seize parts of the southern Norwegian coast and the French Atlantic coast in order to escape the constraints imposed by the geography of the North Sea and to be able to employ its forces operationally in the Atlantic. The tactical concept of using U-boats at night and on the surface was first described in 1922 in a study by two German naval officers. Their ideas were refined during war games in the early 1930s and became part of the U-boat doctrine in 1935.26 This innovative concept was tested for the first time during the large-scale Wehrmacht exercises held in the fall of 1937. Doenitz used shortwave radio from his flagship in Kiel and directed the employment of submarine groups in the Baltic. Afterward, the concept was tested during another, larger exercise held in the North Sea. In May 1939 the U-boats operated in groups in the Atlantic off Cape Finisterre and in the Bay of Biscay for the first time.27

In contrast, the Soviets focused on developing a theory of naval operations as part of their emerging theory of operational art. Their theories were incorporated into the Red Navy’s doctrine. The Soviet Field Manual of 1930 (BU-30) was the first doctrinal document to spell out the rudiments of joint operational employment of naval forces and ground troops. Afterward, the Soviets developed the theory of what they called “naval operations”—specifically, reconnaissance,
amphibious landings and anti-amphibious operations, and operations on sea lines of communications. Five years later, the Soviet navy adopted the new Combat Manual of Naval Forces (BU-MS-37). Here for the first time was presented an elaboration of “naval operations” and “day-to-day (routine) activities” as the principal methods by which the combat employment of naval forces and aviation would accomplish operational objectives. The new manual envisaged a dozen types of naval operations, aimed at destroying the enemy forces at sea, against coastal “objects” (installations), on sea communications and blockade, in support of own sea communications and counterblockade, landing operations, antilanding operations, and operations in support of the army flank. The day-to-day activities of the fleet forces would accomplish operational objectives by establishing what the Soviets called a “favorable operational regime” in their coastal waters and deployment areas. Soviet views on the nature of modern warfare at sea and operational art were incorporated into the Provisional Manual on Conduct of Operations (NMO-40), issued in 1940. However, the Soviet theory of naval operations was very poorly applied during the country’s war with Nazi Germany.

In World War II, all the major navies conducted, independently or in cooperation with other services of the armed forces, a large number of major naval operations in all the maritime theaters of war. Among many major naval operations, a few stand out because of their importance to the course of the war. Major clashes of opposing surface forces in the Pacific (notably the battles of the Coral Sea in May 1942, Midway in June 1942, the Philippine Sea in June 1944, and Leyte in October 1944) were not “battles” as such but major naval operations. In the Atlantic Ocean, the Germans in May 1941 conducted a major naval operation (RHEINUEBUNG), with Combat Group Bismarck (the 42,600-ton battleship Bismarck and the fifteen-thousand-ton heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen), aimed at interrupting Allied maritime traffic in the North Atlantic. The escape in February 1942 of two German battle cruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, of 38,100 tons at full load) and one heavy cruiser (Prinz Eugen) from Brest to Kiel through the English Channel (Operation CERBERUS) was a major naval operation. The purpose was to redeploy these heavy ships away from where they had been threatening Allied maritime traffic in the southwest approaches to England, moving them to Norway to strengthen German defenses against possible Allied invasion. The British carrier attack on the Italian naval base at Taranto in November 1940 (JUDGMENT) and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 (HAWAII) were also major naval operations aimed at destroying major parts of enemy fleets at their bases. The Allies also conducted many major amphibious landing operations in all theaters during World War II, especially in the Pacific.
Since the end of World War II only a few major naval operations have been conducted. One reason is that most regional wars in that time have not involved major navies. Two exceptions, however, were the blockade of North Korea's coast during the Korean War (1950–53) and the American blockade of the South Vietnamese coast (MARKET TIME, March 1965–December 1972). The Israelis planned and conducted what can be considered a major naval operation to obtain local sea control off the Egyptian and Syrian coasts during the Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War of October 1973. The British recapture of the Falklands in 1982 (Operation CORPORATE) was a major naval/joint operation with a limited strategic objective. The operations of the coalition naval forces in the Gulf War of 1990–91 and also in the war against Iraq in 2003 (Operation IRAQI FREEDOM), to establish and maintain control of the northern part of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, constituted a major combined naval operation.

**Purpose**

In terms of its principal purpose, a major naval operation can be offensive or defensive. Offensive major naval operations are normally conducted by the stronger side at sea, but they also can be planned on the defensive. The stronger side would mount a single major naval operation or several in succession to obtain and then maintain sea control. Such operations can also greatly reduce or eliminate threats posed by numerically larger forces and thereby facilitate operations in other parts of a maritime theater, as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor illustrates. An offensive major naval operation can also be planned as part of a defensive campaign, as was the Japanese commitment of a major part of the Combined Fleet in defense of the Philippines in October 1944. Major naval operations against enemy maritime trade and amphibious landing operations are inherently offensive in their purpose.

A major naval operation with an offensive purpose is usually planned and conducted in the initial phase of the war to obtain sea control and afterward in exercising sea control. It can also be conducted when one side has only local and temporary control, as Allied amphibious landings in the Pacific in World War II illustrate. Major naval operations in enclosed and semienclosed seas (collectively called "narrow seas") can be conducted within either a strategically offensive or a strategically defensive framework. For either one, limited, temporary sea control should be obtained first. Major naval operations aimed at protecting maritime trade can be conducted even when command of the sea is in dispute. The main factor for success then is at least control of the sea, the subsurface, and the air in the proximity of a large convoy. For example, the Royal Navy mounted several major operations in 1942 to supply the besieged island of Malta, although Axis forces possessed overwhelming strength in the air. The Allies
suffered extremely high losses in these operations from Axis land-based aircraft and submarines. It is also possible to conduct a major naval operation when friendly forces control only the air and the subsurface, as the Germans did in capturing the key bases and ports in the initial phase of their invasion of Norway in April 1940.

A defensive major naval operation is usually planned and executed when one side is forced onto the defensive at sea by permanent or temporary weakness. Then, the weaker side may conduct major defensive naval operations to oppose attacks on its naval bases and anchorages, enemy amphibious landings and attacks on coastal installations or facilities, and to carry out major evacuations of friendly troops and civilians. Both sides in a war at sea will occasionally mount major naval or joint operations in defense and protection of maritime trade.

A major naval operation is conducted as an integral part of a maritime, and sometimes a land, campaign. It is aimed at bringing about a radical or drastic change in the operational situation in a maritime theater; if a major naval operation is only partially successful, the operational situation is likely to remain as it had been, as the battle of Jutland in June 1916 illustrates. A major naval operation can have a strategic effect as well. This usually occurs when a surprise attack on a major part of the enemy’s fleet is carried out at the very onset of hostilities, to accomplish a strategic objective in a principal theater of operations. For example, the operational objective of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was to destroy enough of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to prevent it from interfering with the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. However, the unintended and highly negative (for Japan) effect was to shift American public opinion from isolationism to unequivocal support for complete victory over Japan.

A war at sea predominantly consists of a large number of tactical actions conducted in coastal waters, on the high seas, and also on the open ocean. Such major and minor tactical actions can accomplish specific operational objectives, but only after a longer time. However, the key to ultimate success in war at sea is avoiding situations in which objectives must be accomplished predominantly—or even worse, exclusively—through force-to-force encounters or attrition. Attrition warfare not only results in much higher losses, even for the stronger side, in terms of lives and materiel but is inherently protracted. One’s forces are tied down, and until given operational objectives are accomplished they cannot be employed for other urgent tasks in other oceans or sea areas. This happened to the Allies in the struggle for Guadalcanal between August 1942 and February 1943. The initial major naval operation—the amphibious landing on Guadalcanal (Operation WATCHTOWER) on 7 August 1942—was highly successful. Afterward, however, the Allies became progressively involved in a series of small but costly tactical actions with Japanese forces on land, at sea, and in the air. This included seven major naval battles, most of them
fought in the night, and numerous smaller tactical actions at sea. The U.S. Navy lost most of these battles, because the Japanese were much more proficient in night gunnery and torpedo tactics. However, both sides lost approximately the same number of ships. This attrition phase lasted almost seven months before the Japanese decided to give up their attempts to regain control of Guadalcanal. By then, the Allied operational tempo had been considerably slowed; no further major landings up the Solomons chain had been possible with Guadalcanal not yet secure. A good argument can be made that had the Allies been able to conduct a consecutive major naval or air operation to consolidate initial operational success, the struggle for Guadalcanal would have ended much earlier and with far smaller losses in ships, aircraft, and personnel for the Allies.

Types

Based on the degree of participation of various services and arms, naval, joint (multiservice), and combined (multinational) major naval operations can be differentiated. A major naval operation, as such, is conducted predominantly by a navy, although air or even ground forces can take part as well. Examples of major operations conducted by naval forces are the battles of Cape Matapan (March 1941), the Coral Sea (May 1942), Midway (June 1942), and the Philippine Sea (June 1944).

A major naval/joint operation is planned and conducted by forces of the navy but with substantial participation by other services. In a maritime theater encompassing a large ocean or sea area, major naval operations would involve significant air forces, and maybe ground forces as well. In contrast, major naval operations in littoral waters are likely to require participation of all three services. All major amphibious landing operations are inherently joint, as are major operations against enemy maritime trade or in defense of maritime trade in the littorals.

A major naval/combined operation is conducted with two or more navies or services of the armed forces of two or more countries. Today, major combined operations constitute a frequent method of employing naval forces in low-intensity conflict. In fact, because of the downsizing of most navies, they might well become routine for major regional contingencies or even general war. A major amphibious landing operation is sometimes combined with it, as was the case in the invasion of Sicily (Operation HUSKY) in July 1943, the landing in Normandy (NEPTUNE) in June 1944, and the UN amphibious landing at Inchon (CHROMITE) in September 1950.

Sometimes several major naval/joint operations can take place in a single maritime theater of operations. Such a situation would occur in the initial phase of a new campaign when several operational objectives must be accomplished
sequentially or simultaneously. In that case, the one aimed at the most important operational objective will be the main or principal operation, and the others will be supporting (ancillary) operations. For example, the Allied amphibious landing at Leyte on 20 October 1944 was the main or principal major naval/combined operation. The actions of Task Force (TF) 38 as distant cover and support between 17 October and 27 November constituted a supporting major naval operation.

In terms of their timing, one can distinguish between initial, successive, and preliminary major naval operations. The initial major operation is planned and conducted to accomplish the first, and most operational, objective in a campaign. For example, the Japanese Operation MI (that is, the battle of Midway) was the initial major naval operation in a projected maritime campaign in the Central Pacific. The Allied invasion of the Gilberts in November 1943 (GALVANIC) was the initial major joint operation in a series of major operations within the Central Pacific campaign (November 1943–September 1944). A successive (or consecutive) major operation normally starts during or shortly after the initial major operation. Its purpose is to consolidate or expand the operational success of the preceding major operations. The U.S. invasions of the Marshalls (Operations FLINTLOCK and CATCHPOLE) and the Marianas (FORAGER) are examples. A preliminary major naval operation is usually planned to isolate a maritime area of operations in which a new campaign or major operation is to be conducted. The purpose is often to prevent the arrival of enemy reinforcements in troops, aircraft, or materiel. Another purpose might be to deceive the enemy as to the intended sector of main effort. For example, TF-38’s series of air strikes and other actions against the Ryukyus, Formosa, and Luzon between 10 and 17 October 1944 constituted a preliminary major naval operation—that is, with respect to the invasion of Leyte.

Major naval operations can be conducted on the open ocean or in the littorals (waters contiguous to the continental landmass, and peripheral, enclosed, and semiclosed seas, respectively). Most major naval operations have taken place fairly close to continents, large islands, or oceanic archipelagos. Many have taken place in enclosed or semiclosed seas (collectively called “narrow seas”). Today, because of enormous advances in the range and lethality of weapons, even coastal navies composed of small surface ships, submarines, and land-based aircraft can conduct major naval operations.

Major naval operations in the littorals are generally more complicated to prepare and execute than those on the open ocean, because they involve diverse forces and assets of all services of the country’s armed forces. They also differ from major naval operations on the open ocean because of the much smaller operational space involved and the smaller forces used.
The initial position used by one’s forces in the initial phase of a major naval or joint operation often considerably affects the course of the operation as a whole, sometimes even its outcome. In general, the force can operate from a central or exterior position. In the case of employment of multiservice or multinational forces in the same operation, some forces can operate from central positions, others from exterior positions. Each position has some advantages and some disadvantages in respect to the employment of naval forces and aviation. It would be a mistake to believe that a central position is inherently more advantageous than an exterior one. Experience shows that not only victories but also defeats have ensued for forces operating from a central position.

A major naval/joint operation can be conducted along interior or exterior lines of operations. Interior lines are completely or partially enveloped by the enemy; hence, they originate from a central position. The opposing force, then, operates along exterior lines. Admiral Alfred T. Mahan (1840–1914) observed that interior lines are in fact a central position prolonged in one or more directions. “Interior line” implies that from a central position one can assemble more quickly on either of two opposite fronts than the enemy can and therefore can utilize forces more effectively.

Moving along interior lines, one’s naval forces can be interposed between two or more parts of the enemy force, concentrating against one as quickly as possible in order to destroy the bulk of the enemy force, while holding the others in check with a force that is possibly inferior. Interior lines are inherently shorter than those the hostile force occupies on the periphery, a fact that can be used effectively in both offense and defense. The key prerequisites for the success of major naval operations on interior lines, then, are sufficient physical space and ability to move forces quickly. For example, in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 the Japanese fleet occupied a central position between the Russian major naval bases at Port Arthur and Vladivostok and checkmated both places. The Japanese armies could be transported across the Tsushima Strait and through the Yellow Sea because the Japanese fleet was interposed between the Russian Far Eastern Squadron in Vladivostok and the force in Port Arthur. Thus, the Japanese fleet commander, Admiral Heihachiro Togo (1846–1934), could prevent the junction of the Russian squadrons to interfere with Japanese communications. In another example, TF-58 and TF-38 operated along interior lines during the battle of the Philippine Sea (June 1944) and the battle for Leyte (October 1944), respectively.

A force is said to operate along exterior lines when its lines of movement are separated by those of the enemy. These lines are generally longer than the shortest line the enemy force can use. A major naval/joint operation conducted along exterior or converging lines comprises concentric advances from several sea or ocean areas toward common physical objectives. The most important prerequisite
for the proper use of exterior lines is sufficient combat strength in each part of one’s forces. 34

The advantages and disadvantages of exterior lines are the reverse of those of interior lines. Exterior lines allow simultaneous concentric actions from several directions against the enemy’s center. 35 A force moving along exterior lines can select the point of attack along the enemy’s periphery. Exterior lines generally facilitate the shifting of forces to meet an external threat while maintaining communications and covering distances to approach the enemy’s force. The inherent advantage of a force moving along exterior lines is that it can threaten the enemy with envelopment. However, such a force moves along longer lines of operations than its opponent does. The greater the distance between the base of operations and the attack objective, the longer the lines of supply. Also, unless each force element is stronger than the enemy force opposed to it, there is a constant danger of defeat in detail. An inherent feature of all amphibious landings is that the attack forces initially operate from an exterior position. Once the amphibious forces land ashore, they operate from a central position and along interior lines.

Not only must a force operating along exterior lines move faster than its opponent moving along interior lines, but also its adjacent elements have to keep within mutual supporting distance, if, again, the force is to avoid being defeated in detail. Sometimes forces can operate beyond mutually supporting distance, provided that each prong of the advance is stronger than possible opposition, as illustrated by the Japanese conquest of the Netherlands East Indies in December 1941–April 1942.

A major naval or joint operation from an exterior position also requires precise synchronization of movement and actions by one’s forces. This is difficult to achieve, especially when the distance between one’s base of operations and the physical objective is great. For example, in the Leyte operation, the Japanese First and Second Diverionary Attack forces and the Mobile Force (Main Body) started their movements toward the Philippines from exterior positions. Likewise, the TF-38 carrier force operated from the exterior in regard to its targets on Luzon, the central Philippines, and adjacent sea areas. The Allied amphibious force that landed at Leyte also operated from an exterior position during its transit and approach phases.

**MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WAR**

In generic terms, the main purposes of a major naval/joint operation today in the case of a high-intensity conflict at sea can be to

- Destroy the enemy fleet at sea or in its bases
- Conduct an amphibious landing on the opposed shore
- Destroy enemy coastal installations and facilities
• Attack enemy maritime trade
• Defend and protect one’s own maritime trade
• Destroy enemy sea-based strategic nuclear forces
• Protect one’s own sea-based strategic nuclear forces
• Support friendly ground forces on the coast.

A major operation aimed at destroying an enemy fleet at sea or in its base is the quickest and most effective—but most difficult—way to establish sea control in a given maritime area of operations. These operations can be conducted on the open ocean or in narrow seas. Historically, several major operations have been aimed at destroying an enemy fleet at sea or in its bases at or shortly before the outbreak of hostilities. Most fleet-on-fleet encounters in World War II took place when one fleet provided distant cover and support of a major amphibious landing, as happened at Leyte in October 1944, or when the stronger fleet used the landing to lure an inferior force into a “decisive” battle, as the Japanese Combined Fleet attempted in Operation MI, which led to the battle of Midway in June 1942.

A major naval or joint operation to destroy an enemy fleet might be necessary when the attacker provides support of the flank to his forces operating in the coastal area or when the enemy fleet is forced to operate in a certain sea or ocean area. If the stronger side at sea attempts to isolate certain sea/ocean areas, then the objective could be the destruction of major parts of the enemy fleet forces. Likewise, though a major operation to destroy the enemy fleet at sea is difficult for a numerically weaker side, that side might decide to plan one in order to weaken or lift a blockade. In a typical enclosed or semienclosed sea, such an operational objective could be accomplished by massive strikes by surface combatants, submarines, and land-based aircraft. Preparation time would have to be short because of rapid changes in the situation at sea and in the air. Such an operation would most likely encompass a single phase, with one or several synchronized strikes by naval forces, aircraft, and coastal missile or artillery batteries.

Major naval/joint operations in distant ocean areas are not likely to be conducted in the near future, because there are no longer two or more major potential opponents at sea. A more likely scenario is a conflict between the navies of riparian states in an enclosed or semienclosed sea, or between a blue-water navy and a coastal navy operating in the littorals. Hence, attacks on naval bases or anchorages, combined with attacks at sea, seem to be the most likely method open to a stronger navy to destroy or neutralize a smaller fleet.
A prerequisite for success in a major naval operation to destroy an enemy fleet in its bases is usually local, temporary sea control. However, this is not always necessary. In the past, the best results were achieved by striking from beyond the effective range of the enemy’s defenses. Today, nuclear-powered attack submarines, modern conventionally powered submarines, land- and carrier-based aircraft, and surface ships armed with long-range cruise missiles are the most effective platforms for destroying enemy ships in their bases. Attack submarines armed with antiship missiles or land-attack cruise missiles can strike enemy naval bases from several hundred nautical miles away. For example, in the first few days after the start of the air offensive against Iraq on 17 January 1991, American carrier-based aircraft and attack submarines deployed in the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea repeatedly struck Iraqi naval installations near Umm Qasr and Basra with “smart” bombs and Tomahawk missiles.37

Air strikes against enemy naval bases in an enclosed sea, such as the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, can be far more effective than those mounted from the open ocean, because of the much shorter distances and the larger number of land-based aircraft that can be used. These strikes can be conducted with high intensity and repeated at short intervals. In some instances, not only fixed-wing aircraft but also missile-armed helicopters can be effectively employed.

In the initial phase of a war in an enclosed sea theater, the principal objective of a major naval operation would be to obtain the desired degree of sea control, thereby creating favorable conditions for carrying out other operational tasks—specifically, supporting friendly ground forces on the coast. An absolute prerequisite would be air superiority in the maritime theater.38 The objective would be accomplished by destroying the enemy’s surface forces and submarines; destroying or suppressing tactical air forces at their airfields; destroying enemy antisubmarine forces at sea, in their bases, or at airfields; suppressing or destroying enemy air defenses; and suppressing or interfering with command posts and electronic surveillance. In the second phase of the operation, the fleet forces would carry out strikes against enemy forces at sea and their bases and airfields in the sea’s only exit and its approaches.39

Amphibious landing operations are the most effective ways of projecting power on an enemy shore. They are also extremely complex to plan and execute. They are inherently joint in character, regardless of their purpose or the size of the forces involved. Amphibious assault landings within enclosed or semi-enclosed seas would take place across much shorter distances and are normally smaller than those mounted against coasts on open oceans. Sometimes, however, an invasion mounted across a narrow sea can exert a strategic influence, in the case of the opening of a new front, as was true of the Allied Normandy
invasion of June 1944, or causing a radical change in a strategic situation, as in
the case of the UN landing at Inchon in September 1950.

Today, a large-scale amphibious landing in an enclosed or semienclosed sea
would be difficult to execute if the defender effectively used land-based aircraft,
submarines, and combat craft in combination. Amphibious landings are aimed
at seizing an area of enemy-controlled coast that gives access to a military opera-
tional objective inland; speeding the advance of one’s troops along the coast or
the end of the war itself; eliminating or taking control of a large naval base or
port; preventing the adversary from seizing a base or port; cutting off an enemy
army’s avenue of escape; and countering enemy evacuation efforts across the
sea. A credible amphibious capability may also help to tie a sizable enemy force
to the defense of a large stretch of its mainland coast or offshore islands.

In U.S. terms, the emerging doctrine of Operational Maneuver from the Sea
(OMFTS) developed by the Marine Corps represents the application of opera-
tional art in planning and conducting amphibious landings. The tactical com-
ponent of this concept, the ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM), envisions
moving Marine air-ground task forces directly to the assigned operational ob-
jective deep in the enemy’s rear. Such an action will be carried out without stop-
ing to seize, defend, and build up beachheads or landing zones. STOM is
predicated on the existence of a sea base deployed in international waters.

A major naval operation aimed to destroy enemy coastal installations and facil-
ties can be conducted as a preliminary to an amphibious landing or as an integral
part of a naval blockade. Such major operations can be conducted with naval or
air forces or with both jointly. The primary purpose of attacks can be destruction
or neutralization of the enemy naval or commercial ports, airfields and airports,
shipbuilding and ship-repair industries, rail and road traffic, shore/offshore oil
and gas production, and refining industries. For example, the main purpose of
TF-38’s attacks in mid-October 1944 was to destroy Japanese ports, shipyards, and
airfields in the Ryukyus and on Formosa and Luzon. Today, longer-range and more
capable carrier- and land-based aircraft, armed with cruise missiles and “smart”
bombs, make it possible to attack the enemy coastal installation and facilities
along a large part of the enemy coast and far into the depth of his defenses. Major
navies today have a much greater ability than in the past to attack a variety of tar-
gets far in the enemy’s operational and even strategic depths.

Major naval operations on the open ocean and in littoral waters are conducted to
interrupt or cut off enemy maritime trade or to defend and protect one’s own mari-
time trade. Maritime trade is conducted almost continuously for the duration of
a war at sea. Each convoy or independent sailing ship represents only a fraction
of the traffic volume in a maritime theater at a given time. Correspondingly,
most naval actions attacking the enemy’s or defending and protecting friendly
maritime trade will be tactical in character. Major operations will be conducted only occasionally and then only in a certain part of the sea or ocean. When a major effort must be mounted to attack or protect a large convoy, its objective is an operational one.

To be effective, actions against the enemy’s military-economic potential must be conducted systematically over a relatively large area and against all the elements of the enemy’s maritime trade. Specifically, this includes attacks on enemy convoys, independently sailing ships, ports, and cargo loading and off-loading facilities; rail and road junctions in the littoral area; shipyards and ship-repair facilities; and shipping-related industries. In enclosed seas, attacks on enemy maritime trade and protection of one’s own are usually made with the full participation of not only one’s naval forces but also land-based air and, in some cases, coastal defense forces and ground forces. Such a major operation would usually consist of a single phase, but it would be conducted with high intensity. Some such operations could be divided into phases, with short pauses between.

A major naval operation aimed to interrupt or cut off enemy traffic would normally be conducted when sea control is in dispute or the enemy has slight superiority. Such an operation would consist of a series of massive missile, torpedo, air, and artillery strikes, plus offensive use of mines. Some theoreticians claim that enemy maritime traffic can be considered interrupted when traffic in a certain area is reduced by 20 to 25 percent, while cutting off maritime traffic means dropping total volume by 40 to 50 percent.42

An attack on the enemy’s maritime traffic in the littorals would consist primarily of smaller naval tactical actions conducted over relatively large areas of the maritime theater and over time. Such actions would be aimed at interrupting enemy shipping traffic to such a degree as to have an effect on land-front combat. A major naval operation would usually be planned and executed when there was significant enemy traffic in a certain area. It could also be aimed against ships carrying raw materials. Such an operation would be unified by a common concept and carried out in several phases. The prerequisite for the success of such an operation is full knowledge of all elements of the enemy’s maritime trade. Aviation, submarines, special forces, and coastal defense forces would take part in such an operation.43

One of the most effective methods of preserving the maritime component of one’s military-economic potential is a major naval/joint operation to defend and protect maritime trade. Specifically, such an operation is aimed at preventing interruption or cutoff of shipping carrying troops, weapons, military equipment, or strategic raw materials. In some cases, such an operation can be aimed to protect friendly shipping lines in coastal waters.44 It is indicated when shipping
lanes must be made secure or when friendly convoys must be protected from attack. Normally such an operation can be executed in a single phase. Its duration depends on the length of the shipping routes, how long ships stay in ports and anchorages, and convoy-assembly time. Smaller convoys and individual ships can sail independently, without protection.  

Today, only large navies have the capability to mount major operations aimed at destroying the enemy’s sea-based strategic nuclear forces—that is, ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) and their supporting elements. Such major operations might be focused on destroying enemy SSBNs either in their basing areas, in their patrol zones, or in transit between them. Likewise, a major naval operation might be conducted to protect one’s sea-based strategic nuclear forces. Such major operations would most likely be carried out predominantly by naval forces, specifically nuclear-powered attack submarines in the open ocean and patrol aircraft overhead. However, in areas closer to one’s own or the enemy’s coast, such operations will probably be more joint, because air forces will be expected to take part.

Major naval operations in support of ground forces on the coast are conducted both in marginal seas of oceans and in semienclosed or enclosed seas. They may become most frequent in the seas bordering continents (e.g., the Black Sea, the Baltic, or the Arabian Gulf). Tactical actions are a dominant method by which fleet and air forces support troops on the coast. However, a major naval operation can be planned to destroy a hostile fleet threatening one’s troops operating along the coast; to seize, by an amphibious landing, a major island, strait, or part of the enemy-held coast; to defend one’s own coast against an amphibious landing; to attack the enemy’s or protect one’s maritime trade; to conduct a large-scale evacuation of troops or civilians; and so on.

One’s naval forces would play the principal role in major anti-amphibious operations. Such operations would be carried out against enemy landings regardless of the ratio of forces. Success would depend on timely detection of the enemy movement to land, activation of coastal defense systems, and deployment of forces. A major anti-amphibious operation would normally consist of four main phases: strikes against the assembly areas of the enemy invasion forces, actions to destroy enemy forces at sea, the battle for the bridgehead, and engagements in the depth of the landing objective area. For each phase, the defender should determine an objective to be accomplished.

Major Naval Operations vs. Naval Tactical Actions

Major naval operations differ considerably from naval tactical actions in terms of the level of command that plans, prepares, and executes them; the decision-making and planning processes; force composition; the size of the sea or ocean area in which combat takes place; its duration; and the scale of combat support.
Major naval operations should be planned, prepared, and conducted by the naval component or functional commanders (e.g., in U.S. terms, numbered fleet commanders and joint/combined force maritime component commanders, or JFMCC/CFMCC) subordinate to a theater commander (that is, commanders of theaters of war or of operations). Sometimes an operational-tactical commander (or joint task force commander) and staff can plan and conduct major naval/joint operations. Unlike a tactical commander, the operational commander also has overall responsibility for logistical support and sustainment.

The decision to fight a naval tactical action is based upon a short-term estimate of the situation, while determination upon a major naval operation requires what is known as a “long-range estimate.” In preparing that estimate, especially for a major naval/joint operation in the littorals, the operational commander must take into account all aspects of the situation in a given theater—military, political, economic, sociological, ethnic, and climatic—projecting them for several weeks or months. Because of the resulting much wider range of uncertainty and the larger scope of a major operation, in comparison to a tactical action, a long-range estimate of the situation will necessarily contain more assumptions. In turn, the more assumptions a plan contains, the more likely it is to require alteration, modification, or radical changes, or even have to be abandoned during the execution phase.

In contrast to a naval tactical action, major naval/joint operations are invariably planned ahead of time. They are normally prepared, except for the initial phase of a war at sea, only when forces have at least local superiority over their opponent, whereas tactical actions can be conducted regardless of the ratio of forces. Major operations and campaigns are planned using a “regressive” method, in which the ultimate operational objective is determined first and then, working backward, several major tactical and some minor tactical objectives are determined.

A major naval/joint operation normally requires larger and more diverse forces than a naval tactical action. For example, in the battle of Midway in June 1942, the Japanese Combined Fleet employed four separate elements totaling 165 warships. The U.S. forces that took part in the battle of Midway consisted of seventy-six warships and about 110 land-based Army, Navy, and Marine aircraft based on the island of Midway. However, some major naval operations in World War II involved fewer ships and aircraft. In the “Bismarck Chase” (RHEINUEBUNG, for the Germans) the Germans directly employed the Bismarck group, six escort tankers, and one supply ship; three destroyers, two patrol ships, two blockade breakers (Sperrbrecher), one minesweeper flotilla, thirteen U-boats, one Italian submarine, and three Luftwaffe air groups were also used, in support.
For its part, the Royal Navy employed directly or indirectly five battleships, three battle cruisers, two aircraft carriers, eleven cruisers, thirty-three destroyers, and eight submarines to defeat Combat Group Bismarck.\textsuperscript{50}

Enormous increases in mobility and in the range and lethality of weapons allow operational objectives today to be accomplished with smaller forces than would have been possible only a few decades ago. Today’s major blue-water navies possess far fewer ships than they did during World War II or the early 1950s. A major naval operation in littoral waters will include more small ships and land-based aircraft than would those on the open ocean.\textsuperscript{51} Such an operation requires the employment of a variety of naval combat arms and often of air forces; in the littoral waters, such operations would also require the participation of ground forces.

Forces taking part in a major operation on the open ocean are deployed over a large part of a theater of operations, even though the majority of its constituent tactical actions take place in a single maritime area. For example, the forces that took part, in some way, in the battle of Midway operated from the Japanese home islands to the American West Coast and from the Aleutians to the Central Pacific. The battle for Leyte, in the larger sense, covered an area of about 432,000 square miles (including the eighty-five thousand square miles of the Philippines) and encompassed a major part of the western Pacific and smaller sectors of the central, southern, and southwestern Pacific. The actual fighting, however, encompassed only about 110,000 square miles.\textsuperscript{52}

Major naval/joint operations in the future are most likely to take place in enclosed or semienclosed seas, such as the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, or in such peripheral waters as the South China Sea. Yet a blue-water force like the U.S. Navy would deploy its forces, other than those already deployed forward, from bases in the continental United States or other maritime theaters.

A major naval operation lasts considerably longer than a naval tactical action. While a naval battle or engagement is fought in several hours or less, a major naval operation can last a week or more. In general, a major naval operation in a high-intensity conflict lasts longer if the distance between the base of operations and the operating area is great or if the opposing force is difficult to destroy or neutralize because of its size or peculiarities of the physical environment. Such an operation also takes much longer to the extent that the objective is nonmilitary in nature, as would be the case in counterinsurgency or peace enforcement.

**Characteristics**

The main characteristics of a modern major naval/joint operation are the complexity of its planning, preparation, and execution; the involvement of diverse naval combat arms and often combat arms or branches of other services;
diversity of tactical actions in a relatively large part of the theater; high intensity of combat and proportionately high losses; extensive use of electronic warfare techniques; and the complexity of combat support required.

Because of the enormous increase in the combat potential of platforms, major naval operations of the future are likely to be highly intense indeed. This will be especially true in a littoral environment, because of the small area and correspondingly short distances. For that reason, in major naval operations today extremely high consumption rates of fuel and ammunition should be expected.

A major naval or joint operation in the littorals differs considerably from one on the open ocean because of the much more complex physical environment and, as noted, short distances between points. Among other things, geomorphological and hydrographic (or oceanographic) features in narrow seas greatly affect the employment of naval platforms, weapons, and sensors. The coast in a typical narrow sea is usually highly indented and fronted by a large number of islands and islets. This configuration greatly restricts the maneuverability of surface ships, especially major surface combatants and submarines. In shallow waters, large surface ships have to reduce their speeds sharply. Navigational conditions in narrow seas are often difficult because of shoals, reefs, strong tides, and currents.

A major naval operation in an enclosed or semienclosed sea will most likely encompass the entire body of water. The combat will take place on the surface, subsurface, on the coast, and in the air. Diverse combat arms of the navy and other services will be extensively employed. Covertness of action and opportunities for achieving surprise are considerably enhanced by the combination of modern long-range and highly lethal weapons, such as antiship missiles and torpedoes, and the nature of the physical environment. Here again, combat between modern naval forces is likely to be short and intense and to result in high losses.

One of the main features of modern naval combat in an enclosed or semienclosed sea will be quick and frequent changes in the operational or even strategic situation. Modern electronic warfare techniques will be extensively used by both sides. This will cause great difficulties in using sensors and guided weapons, even make it impossible. The high speed of modern ships and aircraft and their ability to combine maneuver with “fires” allow one’s side to achieve surprise as well as to gain superiority in place and time.

Combat actions in enclosed or semienclosed seas will of choice occur largely at night or in bad visibility. That necessarily means fighting at close range, making the deployment, redeployment, and maneuver of forces more difficult. In a typical enclosed or semienclosed sea, land-based aircraft will be one of the most effective means for striking enemy shipping and facilities. Their high degree of
readiness and maneuverability enables aircraft to concentrate strikes against transports, warships, or aircraft covering enemy ships at sea.

Elements
A major naval/joint operation in war, regardless of its purpose, comprises three main phases: deployment, combat employment, and postcombat. As for deployment, naval forces can conduct, depending on the initial bases, only operational deployment (i.e., within a given maritime theater of operations) or, in some cases, strategic deployment (movement from one maritime theater to another) (see figure). If one’s forces are forward deployed, as are U.S. Navy forces currently in the western Pacific and in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, in case of hostilities they would need to conduct an operational or even merely tactical deployment. In a typical enclosed or semienclosed sea, however, because of the generally much smaller area, naval forces would conduct tactical, rarely operational, deployments.

MAJOR NAVAL OPERATION AND ITS MAIN ELEMENTS

The combat phase of a major naval/joint operation would consist of one or more phases, differing in duration. Normally, combat would take place in a sector of main effort and one or more sectors of secondary effort. The major part of one’s forces, arbitrarily called “main forces,” would be employed in the former, while the rest, “supporting forces,” would operate in the latter. The actions of one’s main forces would be focused at destroying or neutralizing the enemy’s
operational center of gravity in a series of related major and minor tactical actions. Supporting forces would at the same time try to tie down enemy forces to facilitate the success of the main forces. Normally, deception would be conducted in a sector of secondary effort. The cumulative effect should be accomplishment of the assigned operational objective. In the case of an offensive major naval/joint operation this operational success must be consolidated by pursuing and destroying the remaining enemy forces. The shift from combat phase to pursuit should be seamless, but an operational pause after the end of pursuit might be required to regenerate one’s combat potential. Thereafter, forces might withdraw to their base or be redeployed for other tasks in the same or an adjacent theater.

Tactical actions in a major naval operation are not just a random collection of various combat actions but are all related to each other. They can be fought on the surface, subsurface, in the air, or, in some cases, on the coast. They are all connected by and conducted within a given operational framework; otherwise, they would not contribute to the accomplishment of the assigned operational objective and would therefore represent a waste of resources and sorely needed time.

Naval tactical actions can range from actions in which weapons are not used (such as patrolling and surveillance) to attacks, strikes, raids, engagements, and naval battles. As the term implies, they are aimed at accomplishing major or minor tactical objectives in a given part of a maritime theater. In some cases, a series of diverse tactical actions conducted over time can lead to the accomplishment of an operational objective.

The lowest and the most frequently conducted tactical action using weapons is a naval attack, a combination of tactical maneuver and weapons used to accomplish a minor tactical objective. It is usually an integral part of a strike. A naval attack can be conducted by a single or several types of platforms. It is usually aimed to destroy or neutralize a single enemy platform, tactical groups, or a target ashore. Attacks can be distinguished by the type of weapons used—missile, gun, torpedo, bomb, depth charge, or a combination thereof. A naval attack can be conducted independently or as part of a strike or raid. The success of a naval attack depends largely on the surprise achieved, the degree of skill in maneuvering a platform or several platforms to obtain positional advantage, and the range, lethality, and precision of the weapons used. An example of a naval attack was the action by the U.S. submarines *Darter* and *Dace* on 23 October 1944 during the opening phase of the battle for Leyte. This attack resulted in the sinking of two Japanese heavy cruisers (*Atago* and *Takao*). The actions of U.S. motor torpedo boats and destroyers in the battle of the Surigao Strait on the night of 24–25 October are examples of naval attacks conducted by single-type platforms. In the Battle of Samar on 25 October, U.S. destroyers conducted torpedo
counterattacks against Japanese heavy surface ships of the 1st Diversionary Attack Force.

With the advent of missiles and other long-range, highly precise, and lethal weapons, it became possible to destroy the enemy force at sea or on the coast at much longer range than with guns or torpedoes. The long-range missiles and smart bombs can be fired or dropped by a single or several ships, submarines, or aircraft and in quick succession. A new method of combat force employment, called "strike," gradually replaced the naval battle and engagement as the principal method of accomplishing not only a major tactical but sometimes even an operational objective in war at sea and in the air. A well prepared strike is difficult to repulse. By using longer-range, more lethal weapons, the attacking forces can achieve success without suffering significant losses.\(^\text{55}\)

Depending on the scale and importance of the target to be destroyed or neutralized, strikes can be differentiated as tactical, operational, or strategic. However, destroying or neutralizing these targets is not identical to accomplishing the corresponding military objective; a number of targets must be struck and destroyed before an objective is achieved. A naval strike is usually conducted by two or more platforms of a single type of force—for example, missile surface combatants, submarines, or attack aircraft (helicopters). On an island-studded, archipelago-type coast, missile- or torpedo-armed surface combatants can conduct strikes from ambush against much stronger hostile forces. A strike can be carried out using conventional weapons (missiles, torpedoes, guns, bombs, etc.) or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). During the Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War, the Israeli navy conducted several successful strikes against the Egyptian and Syrian ships at sea. For example, a force of five Israeli missile craft struck a group of Syrian ships off Latakia on the night of 6–7 October 1973, sinking three Syrian missile craft, one torpedo boat, and a minesweeper.\(^\text{56}\)

Usually, in a strike conducted with several weapons, longer-range weapons are used first, to weaken the enemy’s defenses; then short-range weapons finish off the target. Thus, in a strike by missile-armed and torpedo-armed surface combatants, antiship missiles would be fired first, followed after a certain interval by torpedoes to finish off the enemy’s ships damaged by the missiles. A broader form of strike is a naval raid—conducted by a single or several naval combat arms to accomplish a tactical objective as a part of a major offensive or defensive naval operation. The aim is usually to deny temporarily some position or to capture or destroy an enemy force, coastal installation, or facility.\(^\text{57}\) One’s temporary or local control of the sea is not a prerequisite for the success of a raid. The stronger fleet can also conduct raids to divert the enemy’s attention or force the enemy to react in a secondary sector of effort.
A naval raid is usually conducted against an objective that the enemy considers so valuable that its loss or serious degradation could not be ignored. A larger purpose of a naval raid is to accomplish some temporary advantage and also pose a threat of future repetition. Besides destroying installations, facilities, or forces on the coast, a naval raid can be aimed to enhance one’s own morale or diminish that of the enemy. The action can range in scale from very small to very large; a large-scale raid can have many features of a major naval operation.

In the Gulf War of 1990–91, a landing party from a U.S. frigate seized Jazirat Qurah Island in the northern part of the Arabian Gulf. A day later, a landing party and helicopter from another U.S. frigate captured the oil platforms in the Durah oil field. In contrast, the Allied Dieppe raid (Operation JUBILEE), conducted on 19 August 1942, can be considered a significant military effort; some 6,100 troops, mostly Canadians, and 252 ships were employed. The main purpose of the Dieppe raid was to test German coastal defenses. After heavy fighting in which the Allies, especially Canadian troops, suffered heavy casualties (about 1,180 killed and 2,190 taken prisoner), the operation ended in unmitigated disaster for the Allies; the entire effort was abandoned.

The effect of a raid, like that of surprise, is usually transitory. However, depending on the enemy’s reaction, the consequences of a well executed raid can be much greater than initially planned. For example, the raid on Tokyo on 18 April 1942, popularly known as the “Doolittle Raid,” carried out by sixteen B-25 medium bombers launched from the carrier Hornet (CV 8) of Task Force 16 (TF-16), was an example of a naval raid that resulted in strategic consequences. It was launched about 670 miles from Tokyo, had a tremendous psychological impact on the Japanese, and greatly lifted American morale. A more important consequence of the raid was that the Japanese navy thereafter won the internal Japanese debate on whether to expand its defense perimeter in the Pacific. This led to the Japanese decision to initiate a new campaign in the central Pacific, of which Operation MI was the initial major naval operation. In the end, the Japanese suffered a disastrous defeat in the battle of Midway in early June 1942, which, in retrospect, was a turning point in the war in the Pacific.

In the past, a naval engagement consisted of a series of related strikes/counterstrikes and attacks/counterattacks conducted by main forces and aimed to accomplish the most important tactical objective in a naval battle. The clashes of opposing carrier forces in the Coral Sea in 1942, the battle of Midway in June 1942, and the battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 were examples of naval engagements.

A naval battle was until relatively recently the main method of accomplishing a major tactical objective as a part of a major naval operation. It consisted of a series of related attacks, counterattacks, strikes, and counterstrikes coordinated
in time and place. It was characterized by relatively long duration—several hours or even longer. Several naval combat arms, and often the combat arms of other services (e.g., air force, or troops defending the coast), participated in a naval battle. In World War II, numerous naval battles took place in almost all ocean or sea areas. The battles of Savo Island on 9 August and of Tassafaronga on 30 November 1942, fought between the Japanese and the Allied surface ships, are examples of naval battles. Defeat of the enemy fleet in a naval battle can sometimes result in not only operational but also strategic victory. To complicate the matter, however, a naval battle can be tactically won but nonetheless represent an operational (or even strategic) failure. Also, it can be tactically won but operationally lost, as happened to the U.S. Navy in the battle of Santa Cruz Islands on 26–27 October 1942 in the lower Solomons, and to the Japanese in the battle of Guadalcanal between 12 and 15 November 1942. For the near future at least, large naval battles are unlikely to be fought because most of the actions would take place between blue-water and coastal navies and in relatively small sea areas close to the landmass.

Prerequisites
The success of a major naval/joint operation is highly dependent on synchronization of theaterwide or operational functions. Sound theater command organization, then, is perhaps one of the most important prerequisites for the success of a campaign as a whole and of its subordinate major operations. All elements of operational functions are integral parts of the theater command organization. Other prerequisites for the success of a major naval operation include operational intelligence, operational command and control warfare, operational “fires,” operational logistics, and operational protection.

A major naval operation is the principal method of accomplishing operational objectives in a maritime theater. It can be the most effective way to achieve decisive results within a given time frame, bringing about a drastic change in the situation in a theater. The only alternative is attrition warfare, which should be avoided even when an operational commander enjoys numerical superiority. Nonetheless, Western naval theoreticians and planners have generally neglected major naval operations as an area of study in operational art. Too much emphasis is given instead to the tactical employment of naval forces and to various noncombat missions in operations short of war. The real danger is of creating the impression that no major naval operations will be conducted in the future—an impression that could not be more wrong. The absence of any serious threat at sea today should not delude anyone into believing that naval forces will never be required to plan and conduct major operations in the future. In any case, a
regional conflict could require the U.S. Navy to plan for and execute a major naval operation. Threats to national interests at sea tend to come with little warning. Fleets are built and maintained primarily not to conduct low-intensity conflict but to wage war, whether regional or global.

Major naval operations are categorized by their main purposes, the sea or ocean areas in which they are predominantly conducted, their timing, and the degree of participation by other services. Certain types have arisen from advances in naval technology and the evolution of warfare in maritime theaters. While naval forces will always play the most critical role in accomplishing operational or strategic objectives, other services and their combat arms will increasingly participate. This will be especially true in littoral waters, where the proximity and influence of a landmass allows not only land-based aircraft but ground forces to take part. Therefore, not only amphibious landings but also major naval operations against enemy maritime trade and in defense of one’s own will increasingly become joint or even combined activities.

The focus of theory should be on major naval operations of the types most likely to be conducted. However, this does not mean that the other types of major naval operations should be neglected. For example, because of the absence at present of major naval opponents, major naval operations to destroy enemy fleets at sea are not likely in the near future; nevertheless, it would be very wrong for theoreticians to ignore them. Likewise, no blue-water navy, focusing on major naval operations in littoral waters, should in the meantime neglect the possibility of encounters on the open ocean.

The current highly unsatisfactory situation in maritime thought and doctrine can continue only as long as the U.S. Navy and other Western navies do not face a peer competitor. Adverse consequences may well result if the opponent strives for superiority not through number of platforms and advanced weapons but by thinking and acting operationally instead of tactically.

NOTES
1. The U.S. Army’s Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (2001), and Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (10 September 2001), defined a major operation as “a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, and strikes) conducted by various combat forces of a single or several services coordinated in time and place, to accomplish operational and sometimes strategic objectives in an operational area”; FM 3-0 (2001), pp. 2–3; JP 3-0 (2001), pp. GL-12 and GL-13. The latest, slightly different definition of a major operation is provided in the amended JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02 (12 April 2001, as amended through 1 March 2007); JP 3-0, Joint Operations (17 September 2006); and JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning (26 December 2006), which define a major operation as “a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to
achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander;" JP 1-02, pp. 321–22; JP 3-0 (2006), p. GL-21; and JP 5-0 (2006), p. GL-16.


4. In 1900, the Royal Navy consisted of 205 warships: forty-five battleships, 126 cruisers, and thirty-four torpedo gunboats; the French navy had in service thirty-three battleships, thirty-eight cruisers, and twenty-one torpedo gunboats; Ronald B. St. John, “European Naval Expansion and Mahan, 1889–1906,” Naval War College Review 23 (March 1971), p. 74.


13. Ibid., p. 195.


19. The battleships Irresistible and Ocean (British) and Bouvet (French) were sunk; the battle cruiser Inflexible (British) and battleships Suffren and Gaulois (French) were put out of action; Thomas G. Frothingham, The Naval History of the World War: Offensive Operations 1914–1915 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1925), p. 282; Julian S. Corbett, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents, vol. 2, Naval Operations (London: Longman, Green, 1921), p. 223.

20. Travers, Gallipoli 1915, p. 270.


22. Moorehead, Gallipoli, p. 361; Travers, Gallipoli 1915, p. 229.

23. Plus 8,500 horses, 2,500 vehicles, forty guns, 220 machine guns, and eighty mine throwers; Erich von Tschischwitz, Armee und Marine bei der Eroberung der Baltischen Inseln im Oktober 1917. Erfahrungen und Betrachtungen (Berlin: Verlag R. Eisenschmidt, 1931), p. 32; naval forces consisted of two battle squadrons with five battle squadrons each, one scouting group with eight small cruisers, one torpedo boat flotilla with one small cruiser and thirty-two torpedo boats, six U-boats, and one mine-sweeping flotilla with one small cruisers and sixty motorboats. In addition, a flotilla of seventy-two vessels, mostly fishing steamers, was employed. The transport fleet was composed of nineteen requisitioned steamers totaling about 154,000 tons. These forces were


29. The following naval battles were fought: Savo Island (9 August 1942), Eastern Solomons (24 August), Cape Esperance (11–12 October), Santa Cruz Islands (26–27 October), Guadalcanal (12–15 November), Tassafaronga (30 November), and Rennell Island (29–30 January 1943). The U.S. Navy suffered tactical defeats in the battles of Savo Island, but the Japanese were unable to reach Allied transports; it won a tactical victory in the battle of Eastern Solomons, although the Japanese managed to land 1,500 additional troops on Guadalcanal. The U.S. Navy won a tactical victory in the battle of Cape Esperance, but the Japanese succeeded in their main objective of bringing fresh troops on the island. In the battle of Santa Cruz, the U.S. Navy inflicted larger losses than did the enemy, but the Japanese accomplished their main objective. The U.S. Navy suffered greater losses in terms of the ships sunk in the three-day battle of Guadalcanal but achieved an operational success because the U.S. forces went from the defensive onto the offensive. In the battle of Tassafaronga, the U.S. Navy suffered a severe defeat at the hands of an inferior but excellently trained and skillfully led Japanese force; it also suffered a tactical defeat in the last surface in the struggle for Guadalcanal, off Rennell Island. Samuel E. Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, vol. 5, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942–February 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951), pp. 63–64, 107, 171, 286, 313–15, 363.


34. Stanger, *Grundzüge der Lehre von der Strategie*, vol. 1, p. 79.

35. Joseph Rodriguez, Jr., *How to Maximize the Advantages of Interior Lines at the Operational Level* (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: School of


41. The term “maritime trade” is used instead of the more widely used “sea lines of communications” (SLOC), and the associated anti-SLOC and pro-SLOC, because it accurately describes the real purpose of such major naval operations—destruction, neutralization, or protection of all elements of maritime trade, not only the merchant ships at sea. SLOC, in contrast, implies abstractions—imaginary lines along which the shipping moves.

42. Bolfe, “Rasprava o podeli i osnovnim karakteristikama operacija na JPV,” p. 991.


44. Ibid., p. 757.


46. Ibid., p. 986.

47. Including eleven battleships, four large and four light aircraft carriers, four seaplane tenders, eighteen heavy and eight light cruisers, fifty-five destroyers, twenty-three transports with 6,500 landing troops embarked, thirteen tankers, twenty submarines, several smaller vessels, and about 250 carrier-based aircraft.


57. JP 1-02 (2007), in contrast, defines a raid as “an operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability; it ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.” JP 1-02 (1 March 2007), p. 444.


TARGETED KILLING AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

Gary Solis

There is no consensus definition of “targeted killing” in the law of armed conflict or in case law. A reasonable definition is: the intentional killing of a specific civilian who cannot reasonably be apprehended, and who is taking a direct part in hostilities, the targeting done at the direction and authorization of the state in the context of an international or noninternational armed conflict.

In the second year of the Redland-Blueland war, an armed conflict between two states, a Redland sniper squeezed the trigger of his rifle, the crosshairs of the scope unmoving on his target: a uniformed Blueland soldier. The weapon fired, and five hundred meters away the enemy combatant fell to the ground, dead.

Was this a “targeted killing”?

The Redland-Blueland war continued. After months of planning and the training of a team of disaffected Redland nationals, Blueland was ready to implement an operation against the enemy. Days later, two clandestinely inserted Redland nationals, trained in Blueland and wearing Blueland army uniforms, planted an explosive charge under a bridge located inside Redland. Later, as the limousine of the president of Redland passed over the bridge, the charge was detonated and the target killed. The president, elected to office when he was a college professor, had been a thorn in the side of the Blueland government, with his...
anti-Blueland rhetoric and verbal attacks on Blueland policies. Now, Blueland’s most hated critic was dead, silenced by Blueland agents.

Was this a “targeted killing”?

During World War II, in April 1943, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, was on an inspection tour hundreds of miles behind the front lines. Having broken the Imperial Japanese Navy’s message code, U.S. forces knew his flight itinerary and sent sixteen Army Air Forces P-38 Lightning fighter aircraft to intercept him. Near Bougainville, in the northern Solomons, the American pilots shot down their target, a Betty bomber, killing all on board, including Admiral Yamamoto.

Was this a “targeted killing”?

First, consider the Redland sniper. On the battlefield the killing of combatants—uniformed members of the army of one of the parties to the conflict—by opposing combatants is lawful. The sniper, a lawful combatant, killed a lawful enemy combatant in the course of armed conflict between two high contracting parties to the Geneva Conventions. To kill the enemy in a lawful manner was the sniper’s mission; it was expected and required of him. A combatant taking aim at a human target and then killing him is not what is meant by the term “targeted killing.” “The [1907] Hague Regulations expressed it more clearly in attributing the ‘rights and duties of war.’ . . . [A]ll members of the armed forces . . . can participate directly in hostilities, i.e., attack and be attacked.”2 1977 Additional Protocol I, which supplements the 1949 Geneva Conventions, repeats that formulation.3 The status of “combatant” is crucial, because of the consequences attached to it. It is the mission of every state’s armed forces—its combatants—to close with and destroy the enemy. Soldiers who do so are subject to no penalty for their acts.4 This was not a targeted killing.

The killing of Redland’s president is another matter. He was a civilian and presumably a noncombatant, not subject to combatant targeting. The leaders of some states may be considered combatants, however—World War II’s Adolf Hitler, for example. Saddam Hussein of Iraq, another example, was a combatant and lawful target, since he customarily wore a military uniform and went armed, often in the vanguard of Iraqi military units. He decided the tactical and strategic movements of his nation’s military forces. These factors combined to make him a combatant and a lawful target in time of war.

How about the president of the United States? He is denominated by the Constitution as the “commander in chief” of the nation’s armed forces. He is the person whom the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advises. The president is the final authority for the strategic disposition of U.S. armed forces—“the decider.”5 In time of international armed conflict the president of the United States is a lawful target for an opposing state’s combatants.
The United Kingdom’s monarch? The monarch is the honorary colonel in chief or captain general of many Commonwealth regiments—seventy-one, in the case of Queen Elizabeth II—and is sometimes in military uniform for ceremonial occasions. But determining if a chief of state is a lawful target is not simply a question of whether he or she wears a uniform. In this instance, the king or queen exercises no command of armed forces and has no say in the tactical or strategic disposition of British forces; those decisions reside in the prime minister and Parliament. The United Kingdom’s monarch, in uniform or not, is probably not a lawful target.

What little we know of Redland’s president—a noncombatant with no apparent role in directing Redland’s armed forces—suggests that he was not a lawful target. His killing, even in time of war, even by opposing combatants, was assassination.

There are many definitions of “assassination,” none universally accepted. The term does not appear in the 1907 Hague Conventions, 1949 Geneva Conventions, United Nations Charter, or the Statutes of the International Criminal Courts for Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Confusingly, the term is used differently in peace and in armed conflict. Assassination in time of armed conflict is “the specific targeting of a particular individual by treacherous or perfidious means.” This wartime definition tracks with that in the law of armed conflict (LOAC): “It is especially forbidden . . . to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army.” In U.S. practice, that language is “construed as prohibiting assassination. . . . It does not, however, preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or elsewhere.” One simplistic but adequate definition of peacetime assassination is the “murder of a targeted individual for political purposes [or] for political reasons.” Former Department of State legal adviser Abraham D. Sofaer has described it similarly: “Any unlawful killing of particular individuals for political purposes.”

In the domestic law of most states, assassination is considered murder. Michael Walzer writes, “Political assassins are simply murderers, exactly like the killers of ordinary citizens. The case is not the same with soldiers, who are not judged politically at all and who are called murderers only when they kill noncombatants.” In any event, the armed forces of most states are not customarily involved in assassination, that being left to other government organizations. The killing of Redland’s president was assassination and murder, but it was not a targeted killing.

* An example similar to that described here was the May 1942 assassination of SS Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, the SS chief of security police, deputy chief of the Gestapo, and the person largely responsible for “the final solution.” He was killed in Prague by two British-trained Czech soldiers disguised as civilians. Although Heydrich was a lawful combatant target, his combatant killers engaged in perfidy by disguising themselves as civilians. His killing was an assassination.
Nor was Admiral Yamamoto’s death a targeted killing. Like the Blueland sniper’s victim, Yamamoto was a lawful combatant in an international armed conflict, killed by opposing lawful combatants. “There is nothing treacherous in singling out an individual enemy combatant (usually, a senior officer) as a target for a lethal attack conducted by combatants distinguishing themselves as such . . . even in an air strike.”\textsuperscript{13} The fact that Yamamoto was targeted away from the front lines is immaterial. Combatants may be targeted wherever found, armed or unarmed, awake or asleep, on a front line or a mile or a hundred miles behind the lines, “whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{14} Combatants can withdraw from hostilities only by retiring and becoming civilians, by becoming hors de combat, or by laying down their arms.\textsuperscript{15} The shooting down of Admiral Yamamoto was not a targeted killing.

These exclusionary examples indicate that targeted killing is not the battlefield killing of combatants by opposing combatants. Targeted killing is not the assassination of an individual, military or civilian, combatant or noncombatant, for political purposes. What is an example of targeted killing, then?

On 3 November 2002, over the desert near Sanaa, Yemen, a Central Intelligence Agency–controlled Predator drone aircraft tracked an SUV containing six men. One of the six, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, was known to be a senior al-Qa’ida lieutenant suspected of having played a major role in the 2000 bombing of the destroyer USS \textit{Cole}. He “was on a list of ‘high-value’ targets whose elimination, by capture or death, had been called for by President Bush.”\textsuperscript{16} The United States and Yemen had tracked al-Harethi’s movements for months. Now, away from any inhabited area, the Predator fired a Hellfire missile at the vehicle. The six occupants, including al-Harethi, were killed.\textsuperscript{17}

That was a targeted killing. In today’s new age of nonstate actors engaging in transnational terrorist violence, targeting parameters must change. Laws of armed conflict agreed upon in another era should be interpreted to recognize the new reality. While some will disagree, the killing of al-Harethi should be considered as being in accord with the law of armed conflict.

\textbf{SELF-DEFENSE}

The justification for targeted killing rests in the assertion of self-defense. Israel argues that “it is the prime duty of a democratic state to effectively defend its citizens against any danger posed to their lives and well-being by acts or activities of terror.”\textsuperscript{18} In the United States, the preamble of the Constitution includes the words, “in order to . . . provide for the common defense.” A prominent Israeli
A scholar argues, "It may be contended that the right of self-defence is inherent not in *jus naturale*, but in the sovereignty of States." In 2004, the United States initiated an aggressive military-based strategy against suspected terrorists, no longer taking a law enforcement approach to their capture and trial. An argument against a state's assertion of self-defense as legal justification is that "this type of practice [targeted killing] is incompatible with international law, which categorically prohibits extra-judicial executions." Indeed, 1907 Hague Regulation IV notes, "It is especially forbidden . . . to declare that no quarter will be given." Human rights organizations say that "suspected terrorists should be detained and put on trial before they can lawfully be punished for their actions. . . . To kill under these circumstances is simply execution—but carried out without any trial or proof of guilt." The International Committee of the Red Cross says, "Any order of liquidation is prohibited, whether it concerns commandos . . . irregular troops or so-called irregular troops . . . or other cases. It is not only the order to put them to death that is prohibited, but also the threat and the execution, with or without orders." The prohibition on targeting non-combatant civilians is considered customary law. Some of these objections presume the employment of a law enforcement model in combating terrorists. But that model is irrelevant to targeted killing, which employs military means to target enemy civilian combatants, albeit unlawful combatants, during an armed conflict. "The problem with the law-enforcement model in the context of transnational terror is that one of its fundamental premises is invalid: that the suspected perpetrator is within the jurisdiction of the law-enforcement authorities in the victim state, so that an arrest can be effected."

Even in the law enforcement model an individual—or in this case, a state—may defend itself from attack, a state's right to defend itself being embedded in the Charter of the United Nations. Nor are terrorists, particularly those in leadership roles, easily detained for trial.

**THE ISRAELI VIEW**

Israel has openly engaged in targeted killing since September 2000 and the second intifada. Even before then, Gerald V. Bull, a Canadian civilian artillery expert, was in the pay of Iraq and well along in building an artillery “supergun” capable of firing a 1,300-pound projectile six hundred miles. From the gun's location in Iraq, Israel would be an easy target. In March 1990, individuals

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* An unlawful combatant is one who takes an active and continuous part in armed conflict who therefore should be treated as a combatant in that he/she is a lawful target of attack, not enjoying the protections granted civilians. Because unlawful combatants do not differentiate themselves from civilians and do not obey the laws of armed conflict they are not entitled to the privileges of combatants, for example, prisoner-of-war status.
believed but never proven to be Israeli agents murdered Bull as he entered his Paris apartment.

In 1996, a notorious Hamas bomb maker known as “The Engineer,” Yehiya Ayash, was killed when he answered a cell phone booby-trapped by the Israelis. His targeted killing was celebrated throughout Israel, but it also initiated a series of retaliatory suicide bombings that killed more than sixty Israelis. In 2000, helicopter-fired missiles killed a Palestinian Fatah leader and deputy of Yasir Arafat; an Israeli general said, “He’s not shooting at us yet, but he’s on his way.” In 2001, Israeli helicopters fired missiles into the West Bank offices of Hamas, killing eight. Later, in 2002, in Gaza, Salah Shehade, the civilian founder and leader of Hamas’s military wing and an individual said by the Israelis to be responsible for hundreds of noncombatant deaths, was targeted. In predawn hours an Israeli F-16 fighter jet dropped a one-ton bomb on the three-story apartment building where Shehade was sleeping. He was killed, along with fourteen others asleep in the building, including nine children. One hundred and seventy were reportedly wounded.

Among the most notable of Israel’s targeted killings was that of the wheelchair-bound Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the cofounder of Hamas and its spiritual leader. He was reputedly involved in authorizing terrorist actions against Jews. In March 2004, he was killed by helicopter-fired Hellfire missiles, along with two bodyguards and eight bystanders. Another fifteen were wounded. “The Bush administration felt constrained . . . to say it was ‘deeply troubled’ by Israel’s action, though later it vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the action.”

These Israeli actions were not taken in a vacuum, of course. Israeli noncombatants have been victims of countless terrorist attacks; Israel has been involved in numerous international armed conflicts with states employing terrorism, as well as with individual civilians whom Israel later targeted.

The LOAC problem with the Israeli view is summed up in the general’s phrase, “He’s not shooting at us yet, but he’s on his way.” The civilian target is presumed to intend direct participation in hostilities. Professor Yoram Dinstein, an Israeli and a foremost LOAC scholar, writes, “attack[s] (which may cause death, injury and suffering) are banned only on condition that the persons concerned do not abuse their exempt status. When persons belonging to one of the categories selected for special protection—for instance, women and children—take an active part in hostilities, no immunity from an ordinary attack can be invoked.”

Early in the U.S. conflict against Iraq, Forward, a Jewish daily newspaper, mixing assassination and targeted killing, reported:

The Bush administration has been seeking Israel’s counsel on creating a legal justification for the assassination of terrorism suspects. . . . American representatives were
anxious to learn details of the legal work that Israeli government jurists have done . . . to tackle possible challenges—both domestic and international—to its policy of “targeted killings” of terrorist suspects . . . Unlike Israel, which went public in November 2000 with its assassination policy, the Bush administration . . . officially is opposed to such assassinations and does not acknowledge that it engages in such actions.34

With the widely reported November 2002 targeted killing of al-Harethi, American deniability of the tactic’s use faded, along with American criticism of Israel’s tactic. The question is whether the United States shares Israel’s broad view of when a terrorist is a lawful target.

THE AMERICAN VIEW

Although there were dissenters, the United States and much of the Western press was initially critical of the Israeli practice.35 As early as 1991, however, former president Richard Nixon said that were he still in the White House he would order the assassination of Saddam Hussein.36 In 2001, the American ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, scolded, “The United States government is very clearly on record as against targeted assassinations. . . . They are extra-judicial killings and we do not support that.” Yet, in 1989, Abraham Sofaer, State Department legal adviser, equivocated: “While the U.S. regards attacks on terrorists being protected in the sovereign territory of other States as potentially justifiable when undertaken in self-defense, a State’s ability to establish the legality of such an action depends on its willingness openly to accept responsibility for the attack, to explain the basis for its action, and to demonstrate that reasonable efforts were made prior to the attack to convince the State whose territorial sovereignty was violated to prevent the offender’s unlawful activities from occurring.”38 In August 1998, still viewing lethal attacks on individual targets as assassination, a U.S. presidential finding allowed the targeting of Osama Bin Laden, seen as the force behind the bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.39 The United States fired a volley of cruise missiles at an Afghan training compound linked to Bin Laden, saying, “That prerogative arises from a fundamental right of national self-defense.”40

The 2002 killing of al-Harethi in Yemen attracted dissenters, but by then the United States had found targeted killing a useful weapon in the “war on terrorism.”41 The killing of al-Harethi had “shift[ed] the war on terrorism into a new gear.”42 The U.S. change of stance was described as reflecting a broader definition of the battlefield upon which the war on terrorism was being fought. Later, the right of national self-defense was also proffered as justification for targeting individuals associated with terrorist groups, as well as self-defense under article 51 of the United Nations Charter.13 Under a series of classified presidential findings, President Bush broadened the number of specifically named terrorists who
may be killed if their capture is impractical. In June 2006, the targeted killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qa’ida in Iraq, was celebrated as a strategic and political victory.

In early 2006, it was reported that since 9/11 the United States had successfully carried out at least nineteen targeted killings via Predator-fired Hellfire missiles. “The Predator strikes have killed at least four senior al-Qa’ida leaders, but also many civilians, and it is not known how many times they missed their targets.”

The question of whether America shares Israel’s broad view of when a civilian terrorist is a lawful target has not yet been clearly answered. Further U.S. attacks will reveal America’s policy.

DOMESTIC LAW
A killing in the name of the state must be based upon, or at least not in contravention of, the state’s domestic law. Targeted killing is not contrary to U.S. law. The Constitution’s Fifth Amendment, which protects any person from deprivation of life without due process, is not in play. Recent federal case law holds that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit American agents from torturing foreign nationals abroad. The same reasoning would appear to apply to targeted killing, the court hypothesizes. More to the point, federal law authorizes the use of U.S. military force to “defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” Additionally, Congress has authorized the use of “all necessary and appropriate force” against those who carried out the September 11th attacks and all who aided them and “to prevent future acts of international terrorism against the United States.”

As long as the targeted killing is related to the continuing threat against U.S. forces in Iraq, or is focused on those involved in the 9/11 attack or on those who aided or harbored them, or is intended to prevent future acts of terrorism against the United States, it does not violate U.S. domestic law and is in accord with Congress’s authorizations of force.

CHARACTERISTICS OF TARGETED KILLING
The 1949 Geneva Conventions are silent on targeted killing and who might constitute a lawful target. There is no announced American policy directive regarding targeted killing. Assassination is addressed in Executive Order 12333, which does not prohibit killing absolutely but does require presidential approval, which the president may give in secret or otherwise. But assassination and targeted killing are different acts. Given that there is no official protocol, one looks to LOAC for guidelines for the execution of a targeted killing.

First, an international or noninternational conflict must be in progress. Without an ongoing armed conflict the targeted killing of a civilian, terrorist or
not, would be assassination—a homicide and a domestic crime. Moreover, “IHL [international humanitarian law, or LOAC] can only be applicable when the terrorists are involved in an existing international or internal armed conflict, or when the conflict between a state and a terrorist group within its territory rises to the level of an armed conflict.”

If one contests the view that an armed conflict is ongoing, the lawfulness of any targeted killing is necessarily contested as well. It is the predicate armed conflict that raises the right to kill an enemy.

Second, the victim must be a specific civilian. Obviously, civilian victims may not be random targets. They must be selected by reason of their activities in relation to the armed conflict in progress. Were the identified civilians lawful combatants, uniformed and openly armed, they would be opposing combatants’ lawful targets, with no further discussion merited. On the other hand, it is clear that noncombatants may not be lawfully targeted. But civilians who take up arms may be. A vital distinction, then, is that between a “civilian” and a “noncombatant.” The two terms are often conflated; such descriptive carelessness is usually irrelevant, but not in this case. The targeted civilian must be a civilian unlawful combatant.

A civilian is any person not belonging to one of the categories referred to in Geneva Convention III who is eligible for prisoner-of-war status upon capture. As Additional Protocol I points out, “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section [General Protection against Effects of Hostilities], unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” In other words, a civilian who injects himself directly into ongoing hostilities violates the basic concept of distinction and becomes something other than a noncombatant. He forfeits civilian immunity and becomes a lawful target. For instance, a driver delivering ammunition to combatants and a person who gathers military intelligence in enemy-controlled territory are commonly acknowledged to be actively taking part in hostilities. A person cannot (and is not allowed to) be both a combatant and a civilian at the same time, nor can he constantly shift from one status to the other.

Only a specific civilian may be singled out for targeted killing. If an unaffiliated gathering of civilians is targeted it is unlikely (although possible) that all will have violated the distinction above and thereby made lawful targets of themselves and the entire group, or that all will have shared equally in the unlawful participation in hostilities. Were it otherwise, the forfeiture of immunity by one member of a group’s taking a direct role in fighting would render all group members targets. A critical exception is groups—terrorists, for example—

Now, Blueland’s most hated critic was dead, silenced by Blueland agents. Was this a “targeted killing”?
whose membership as a whole is dedicated to active engagement in unlawful combatancy.

Third, the individual who has engaged directly in hostilities, the unlawful combatant, must be beyond possible arrest by the targeting state. Since the focus of U.S. targeted killing is on noncitizens abroad, where the United States has no arrest authority, the issue does not arise. Presumably, neither would an allied state be in a position to make an arrest. U.S. constitutional issues, such as probable cause, do not arise when noncitizens abroad are targeted. If capture is possible, however, that option must be exercised. The status of previously targeted civilians would be that of arrestees, subject to interrogation and trial for the precapture acts that rendered them unlawful combatants. They fit none of the various criteria for prisoner-of-war status contained in 1949 Geneva Convention III.

Fourth, only a senior military commander, as a representative of the targeting state, may authorize a targeted killing. Of course, the authorizing individual may also be the president or a senior government official to whom the president has delegated targeting authority, such as the secretary of defense or the director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

THE AUTHORIZING DECISION

Under current directives, the president’s personal approval for specific operations is reportedly not required for persons already designated by him as potential targets. “As commander in chief, the President has the constitutional authority to command the use of deadly force by troops in war, whether it has been declared by Congress or thrust upon us by enemy attack or invasion.” Once beyond targets authorized by the president, what level of military commander may authorize a targeted killing on behalf of the United States? Army commanders? Battalion commanders? Press reports indicate that in Israel such decisions must be approved by “senior cabinet members,” which apparently translates to the prime minister. For the United States, the decision to carry out a targeted killing, with its potential political repercussions, should be made, if not by the president, only by the most senior military officers. The four-star commanders of the five geographically defined unified U.S. commands (Northern Command, Southern Command, Central Command, Pacific Command, and European Command) seem the lowest-ranking military officers who should be delegated such authority.

The military commander’s initial consideration is military necessity: Is the planned action indispensable for securing the submission of the enemy? The death of no one person will end global terrorism, but would the killing of this
particular target constitute a substantial injury to its cause or seriously disrupt its plans?

High among the commander’s considerations is collateral damage.\textsuperscript{60} Collateral damage, like proportionality and unnecessary suffering, is a difficult issue allowing for lenient judgment and moral assessment. In 2002, the Israeli chief of military intelligence, haunted by civilian deaths in killings he had overseen, asked a mathematician to write a formula to determine the number of acceptable civilian casualties per dead terrorist. Unsurprisingly, the effort was unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{61} Each proposed targeted killing raises its own unique considerations and moral dilemmas. There are no preconceived solutions.

**DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES**

The lawfulness of targeted killing turns on interpretation of the term “direct participation in hostilities.” As 1977 Additional Protocol I specifies, civilians are not lawful targets “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”\textsuperscript{62} For Israel, such activities reportedly include “persons recruiting certain other persons to carry out acts or activities of terror” and “developing and operating funding channels that are crucial to acts or activities of terror,” among other definitions.\textsuperscript{63} These are broad definitions of direct participation in hostilities. Professor Raphael Cohen-Almagor, director of the Center for Democratic Studies at the University of Haifa, holds that “Israel has the right and duty to kill these terrorists. . . . Furthermore, it is justified to kill chiefs of terrorist operations who plan and orchestrate murderous attacks.”\textsuperscript{64} Professor Robert K. Goldman of American University’s Washington College of Law offers a U.S.-centric viewpoint, saying, “The basic premise is that the U.S. regards itself as at war with al-Qa’ida. That being the case, it regards members of al-Qa’ida as combatants engaged in war against the U.S.”\textsuperscript{65} Is mere membership in al-Qa’ida enough to make a member a target wherever and whenever he may be found, or is something more required?

The civilian driver delivering ammunition to combatants and the civilian gathering military intelligence in enemy-controlled territory are arguably actively participating in hostilities. But when does their participation end? May the driver be targeted after he has returned to his starting point and walked away from the truck? May he be targeted when he is being toasted in the mess, late that evening? The next day? What if he were driving an ammunition truck miles away from the scene of any combat activity? May the intelligence gatherer be killed before he actually embarks on his task? Is a civilian POW-camp guard directly participating in hostilities? A civil defense worker who directs military traffic through his town? A civilian clearing land mines placed by the enemy? Is a civilian seated in the Pentagon, controlling an armed Predator over Iraq, directly
participating in hostilities? The United States authorizes the arming of civilian
defense contract workers in combat zones, and they “may be authorized to pro-
vide security services.” Are they directly participating in hostilities?

But these conundrums, relating to civilians of no particular political import
or military significance, do not describe the probable targeted killing candidate
in a war on terrorism. More apropos, when is Pakistan’s al-Qa’ida coordinator a
civilian, and when is he an unlawful combatant “directly participating in hostili-
ties”? Only when he is actually engaged in a firefight with American or Pakistani
forces? Only when he is actively directing terrorist activities? Or, by virtue of his
leadership position, is he not always a legitimate target—when asleep, or when
playing with his children? In 2002, was the senior al-Qa’ida lieutenant,
al-Harethi, who planned the bombing of the USS Cole, a lawful target while he
was on the move in Yemen, fighting no one, formulating no terrorist plan? Israel
takes the view that enemy leaders, including strategists who plan and advise, and
technical experts are not foot soldiers in the army of unlawful combatants and
that they are always legitimate targets, wherever they may be, whatever activity
they are engaged in, and require no warning of attack.

Civilians are protected unless they take a direct part in hostilities, and only for such time as they do. Professor Antonio Cassese writes, “When civilians taking a
direct part in hostilities lay down their arms, they reacquire noncombatant im-
munity and may not be made objects of attack although they are amenable to
prosecution for unlawfully participating in hostilities (war crimes).” But, one
may argue, by virtue of their positions, civilians who lead terrorist groups sel-
dom literally pick up arms and so, metaphorically, never lay them down. As Brig-
adier General Kenneth Watkin, judge advocate general of Canada’s armed
forces, says, “It is not just the fighters with weapons in their hands that pose a
threat.”

Not all law of war scholars agree that terrorists may be targeted only when ac-
tually engaged in terrorist activities:

If we accept this narrow interpretation, terrorists enjoy the best of both worlds—they
can remain civilians most of the time and only endanger their protection as civilians
while actually in the process of carrying out a terrorist act. Is this theory, which has
been termed the revolving door theory, tenable? . . . Another argument is that a
“combatant-like” approach based on membership in the military wing of a group in-
volved in hostilities, rather than on individual actions, should be adopted in deciding
whether persons may be targeted. If we adopt the restricted theory, according to which
international terrorists are civilians who may only be targeted while taking a direct
part in hostilities, the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter . . . may
become meaningless.
Is the civilian cofounder of Hamas, Ahmed Yassin—half-blind, paralyzed, and wheelchair-bound, killed as he left morning prayers at a local mosque—immune from attack because he was engaged in innocent activity at the moment of his death? Is Yehiya Ayash, the civilian who constructed diabolically effective bombs but led no combatants, gave neither orders nor instructions, who acted only as a fabricator of tools of insurgency, a lawful target only when actually constructing a bomb? A combatant general—for example, Dwight Eisenhower during World War II—is by virtue of his position of command and authority a legitimate target whenever and wherever he can be found by enemy combatants. Eisenhower, whether in London or Kansas, in civilian clothes or uniform, was always on duty, always an Allied commander, and could have been lawfully killed by any Axis combatant. Should civilian terrorist leaders, and terrorists with critical war-making skills, be free from the same threat by consciously avoiding lawful combactancy? Should not they, like the uniformed lawful combatants they target, be considered legitimate targets whenever and wherever they are found? It is reasonable that “the effect of the ‘temporal’ wording found in Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I is significantly more limited than commonly believed.”

Columbia University School of Law professor George Fletcher points out:

This phrase “direct part” conjures up a picture of someone picking up a gun and aiming it at the enemy. But . . . ordinary principles of self-defence apply against people pointing guns, whether they are civilians or not. Targeted assassinations are usually aimed at the organizers of terrorist attacks—not those who are aiming weapons. . . . The targets are the key figures behind the scenes who organize the suicide bombings, the hijacking and other terrorist activities. Are they “taking direct part in hostilities”? I think the phrase lends itself to this construction.

Two hundred years ago, the great eighteenth-century legal scholar Emerich de Vattel wrote, “Assassins and incendiaries by profession, are not only guilty in respect to the particular victims of their violations, but likewise of the state to which they are declared enemies. All nations have a right to join in punishing, suppressing, and even exterminating these savages.”

One may ask: If civilian terrorist leaders and terrorists with critical skills may be targeted, why not all terrorists? If it is lawful for some to be killed, is it not lawful for all to be killed? Logic compels a positive response: yes, it is lawful for all terrorists potentially to be subject to targeted killing, regardless of their positions or “duties.” But logic and practicality similarly dictate that only senior leaders and particularly dangerous specialists in groups dedicated to unlawful combatancy be singled out for targeted killing. The availability of resources—Predator drones and laser-directed munitions, for example—will severely limit the number of terrorists who may be targeted. The availability of mission
planners and support personnel—intelligence officers and agents, communications analysts, and interpreters—is similarly limiting. Just as in past wars, in which only senior combatants—Isoroku Yamamoto, Dwight Eisenhower, Bernard Montgomery, and Erwin Rommel—could be singled out for the demanding effort required for their targeting, so it would inevitably be for today’s terrorists. Finally, the judgment and reason of the senior leaders permitted to authorize targeted killing would also act as a natural brake upon the tactic.

That is not to say that a terrorist is a target for life. A soldier is a lawful target only so long as he or she remains a soldier. Soldiers who have retired from armed service and, in the words of 1949 Geneva Convention common article 3, “members of armed forces who have laid down their arms” are no longer combatants or lawful targets. A civilian terrorist who lays down his arms or, more significantly, lays down his arms and departs the combat zone would no longer be a legitimate target. Again, the reason and judgment of those authorized to order targeted killing would act as a brake upon targeting simple terrorist apostates.

Determining an individual’s “direct participation” should not be confused with testing for lawfully targeting objects. The criteria for targeting “people” and “objects” differ. Direct participation remains the thorniest issue in targeted killing, something that states and their political leaders and military commanders must resolve in each case, recalling that their resolutions may eventually be under international review. The law of armed conflict boldly states the criteria for targeting but does not clearly apply its criteria to kaleidoscopic real-world situations.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Killing senior terrorists, expert bomb makers, and those who provide philosophical guidance for terrorists may spare countless noncombatant victims while, at the same time, forgoing risk to friendly combatant forces. A successful targeted killing removes a dangerous enemy from the battlefield and deprives the foe of his leadership, guidance, and experience. The targeted killing of terrorist leaders leaves subordinates confused and in disarray, however temporarily. Successors will feel trepidation, knowing they too may be in the enemy’s sights. Targeted killing unbalances terrorist organizations, making them concerned with protecting their own membership and diverting them from their goals.

But targeting mistakes are made, whether the intended victim is killed one on one or by missiles. In 1973, in Lillehammer, Norway, Israeli Mossad agents murdered a Moroccan waiter they mistook for a Palestinian involved in killing Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics the year before. On the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in February 2002, a U.S. Predator tracked and killed a tall individual in flowing robes believed to be Osama Bin Laden. He was not. Tactical
situations may change in the moments between the order to fire and impact—women and children enter the impact area, the target moves to cover. Stuff does happen.\textsuperscript{77}

Innocent bystanders are often killed in targeted killings. Crowded city streets, even isolated houses, inevitably yield “collateral damage.” Are the anticipated deaths proportional? What level of probable noncombatant lethality is acceptable? “An extremely strong case has to be made to justify an attack on suspected terrorists when it is likely, not to mention inevitable, that the attack will cause the death of civilians. After all[,] . . . the military advantages to be gained by targeting them are based largely on speculation.”\textsuperscript{78} Does a more significant targeted individual justify a greater potential number of innocent deaths? Does the possible death of Osama Bin Laden justify the probable deaths of five bystanders? Ten? Fifty? In January 2006, in the village of Damadola, Afghanistan, seventeen Afghans died in a futile U.S. missile strike on several houses. The attack was aimed at al-Qa’ida deputy Ayman Zawahiri.\textsuperscript{79} American commanders apparently thought the risk of multiple noncombatant deaths was outweighed by the possibility of killing Zawahiri.

Targeted killings may prove counterproductive, in that they can instigate greater violence in revenge or retaliation. “I hope it will reduce the violence and bring back reason to this area,” an Israeli major general said in 2000 after three missiles killed a Palestinian leader and two middle-aged female bystanders.\textsuperscript{80} Instead, the killings touched off a week of the most intense fighting seen in that round of the conflict.

In a world where the enemy has missiles too, a targeted killing by the United States “makes every American official both here and in the Middle East a target of opportunity.”\textsuperscript{81} If an expanded interpretation of who constitutes a legitimate civilian candidate for targeted killing is accepted, we must accept that our own nonuniformed leaders and weapons specialists will become legitimate targets. “The United States and countries that follow its [targeted killing] example must be prepared to accept the exploitation of the new policy by adversaries who will not abide by the standards of proof or evidential certainty adhered to by Western democracies.”\textsuperscript{82} Some believe the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on 21 December 1988, killing 270, was Muammar Qaddafi’s revenge for the 1986 U.S. bombing of his Libyan home that killed his fifteen-month-old daughter.\textsuperscript{83} “Many past and present military and intelligence officials have expressed alarm at the Pentagon policy about targeting Al Qaeda members. Their concerns have less to do with the legality of the program than with its wisdom, its ethics, and, ultimately, its efficacy.”\textsuperscript{84}

It is argued that civilian victims of targeted killing, not afforded an opportunity to surrender, are deprived of due process and denied the “inherent right to
life.” The victim is unable to contest that he is a terrorist, seek judicial review, or lodge an appeal; no legal assessment of the legality of the targeting is available. But these objections accompany the initial question of direct participation in hostilities; if an individual is directly involved in hostilities, he forfeits noncombatant immunity and becomes a lawful target. Soldiers engaged in armed conflict are not afforded due-process rights. Even away from the battlefield, “deprivation of life shall not be regarded as a violation of the right to life when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary in . . . defence of any person from unlawful violence.” If considered a case of proportional self-defense, targeted killing would not violate the right to life off the battlefield.

With the limitations discussed here, targeted killing is within the bounds of law of armed conflict. Terrorists should not be permitted the shield of Additional Protocol I, article 51.3. This conclusion requires a broader interpretation of article 51.3, granting civilians targeting immunity except when they are directly participating in hostilities, than is currently universally accepted. But expansive interpretations of treaty provisions are not novel. (Although the United States has not ratified Additional Protocol I, article 51.3 is widely considered an expression of customary law.) Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter, of Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and a former president of the American Society of International Law, argues that the United Nations should itself target individuals identified by the Security Council as murderous despots. (She adds, however, “Such a course would never be acceptable, if undertaken by a single nation.”) Still, LOAC is not contravened if a targeted killing is carried out by a nation acting within the parameters described here. In U.S. law, and in the law of armed conflict, the targeting killing of civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, while they are taking a direct part, is not forbidden. The issue is in deciding what constitutes “a direct part.” As always, the devil is in the details.

NOTES


be attacked anywhere. As Euripides says: “The laws permit to harm a foe where’er he may be found”; Hugo Grotius, *The Law of War and Peace* (Buffalo, N.Y.: Hein reprint of Kelsey translation, 1995), Book III, chaps. IV, VIII.

3. 1977 Additional Protocol I [hereafter AP I], art. 43.2. AP I is one of two treaties that update and supplement the familiar 1949 Geneva Conventions: “Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains . . . ) are combatants [and] have the right to participate directly in hostilities.”

4. UK Ministry of Defence, *The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), ¶ 4.1: “Combatants have the right to attack and to resist the enemy by all the methods not forbidden by the law of armed conflict.” See also ¶ 5.4.5, listing lawful military objectives (“a. combatant members of the armed forces and those who take a direct part in hostilities without being members of the armed forces [who are not hors de combat]”).


8. *Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of Regulations* [hereafter HR IV], 18 October 1907, Annex 1, 36 Stat. 2277, TS 539 (26 January 1910), art. 23(b).


10. Judge Advocate Memorandum of Law (27-1a), ¶ 3.a. Even were targeted killing considered assassination, EO 12333 presents no real impediment to targeting individuals in wartime. An EO is not law, and it may be revoked or excepted by the president as readily as it was applied.


15. 1949 Geneva Conventions, common art. 3(1). For hors de combat, Dinstein, *Conduct of Hostilities*, p. 28.


22. *HR IV*, art. 23(d).


31. In 2005, I asked an IDF judge advocate who was involved in planning the Shehade operation what he had been thinking to allow a one-ton bomb to be employed in such a manner. His response, inadequate but understandable to any military planner, was, “We f——d up.”


33. Dinstein, Conduct of Hostilities, p. 150.


35. For dissenters, Prof. Robert F. Turner, “In Self-Defense, U.S. Has Right to Kill Terrorist bin Laden,” USA Today, 26 October 1998, p. 17A. For the Western press, “Self-Licensed to Kill,” Economist, 4 August 2001, p. 12 (“Israel justifies these extra-judicial killings as self-defense . . . . But the usual context of such a discussion would be that the two sides involved were at war . . . . The barely remembered truth is that the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority are supposed to be partners in a peace process”) and, “Assassination Ill Befits Israel,” New York Times, 7 October 1997, p. A24 (“Trying to assassinate Palestinian leaders in revenge is not the answer”).


41. On dissenters, Proulx, “If the Hat Fits,” p. 884: “I contend that targeted killing amounts to a violation of customary international law . . . . effectively stripping the target of his right to claim POW status, which is in direct violation of Articles 4 and 5 of Convention III.”

42. “No Holds Barred,” Economist.


50. HR IV, art. 25, and 1977 AP I, art. 3 (1)(a) and (d). Also, “It is a generally recognized rule of international law that civilians must not be made the object of attack directed exclusively against them.” UK Ministry of Defence, The Law of War on Land: Part III of the Manual of Military Law (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1958), para. 13. All nations’ military manuals are in agreement.

51. AP I, art. 50.1.

52. Ibid., art. 51.3.


55. The targeted individual would not fall under Geneva Convention III, art. 4.A(2), as a member of a “volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements,” because in the war against terrorism a nonstate enemy cannot be a party to the Geneva Conventions.


60. AP I, art. 51.5(b).

61. Blumenfeld, “In Israel, a Divisive Struggle.”

62. AP I, art. 51.3.


71. George P. Fletcher, “The Indefinable Concept of Terrorism,” 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice (November 2006), p. 898. ICRC writings also support the position that an individual may take an active part in hostilities without touching a weapon. See Sandoz, Swinarski, and Zimmermann, eds., Commentary, pp. 618–19.


73. AP I, art. 52(2).


76. Meyer, “CIA Expands Use of Drones.”


83. See Michael Ashkouri, “Has United States Foreign Policy towards Libya, Iraq and Serbia Violated Executive Order 12333: Prohibition on Assassination?” *New England International and Comparative Law Annual* (2001), p. 168. On 15 April 1986, in response to an alleged Libyan bombing of a German discotheque frequented by U.S. military personnel, the United States conducted an air attack on Libya (Operation ELDORADO CANYON), striking five military targets, including Qaddafi’s headquarters at the Al-Azizya Barracks. An estimated 100–150 Libyans were killed, in addition to two U.S. fliers. The UN General Assembly subsequently condemned the U.S. action.

84. Hersh, “Manhunt.”

85. “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” art. 6(1). The right to life is the only right referred to in the covenant as inherent, lending it particular significance. Also see “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” art. 3; the “European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights”; the “African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,” art. 4; and the “American Convention on Human Rights,” art. 4(1).

86. See *McCann & Others v. the United Kingdom*, No. 18984/91, 31 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1995), paras. 205–14, in which the European court specifies three requirements for employing lethal force against terrorists: there must be a strict and compelling necessity test; the threat and the targeting state’s response must be proportional; and the targeting state must consider nonlethal alternatives.


Leonard Wood was one of the towering figures of U.S. political and military history. He had a profound impact on the history of three countries, played an important role in one of the most important medical advances of the twentieth century, and was very nearly president of the United States. He was, in every sense of the word, a man of destiny, a man of action, a man of his time. Yet like so many men of their time, he is all but forgotten, at best remembered as an answer to a Trivial Pursuit question about the Rough Riders or as the name of an Army post in Missouri. There are probably several reasons for his passage into obscurity. First, a similar fate befell many of Wood’s Victorian-era contemporaries. Their military accomplishments, which loomed large at the time, seem insignificant beside the massive battles and technological fury of the two world wars. Their politics, especially those who favored the building of empires, appear to belong to a different and less complicated age, and their virtues, formerly extolled in prose and poetry, gradually became identified as racist and chauvinist. The fact that McCallum’s book is only the third biography of Wood, and the first published since 1931, is indicative of how completely this remarkable man has been forgotten.

Wood was indeed remarkable. McCallum takes pains to prove this, as he traces Wood’s life and time.
Wood’s early years read like a Horatio Alger story. Born into a poor Massachusetts family, Wood tried and failed to enter West Point, and then worked his way through Harvard Medical School. Successful completion of his studies resulted in an internship at Boston City Hospital, where the young Wood, presumably on his way to a successful medical career, ran afoul of hospital authorities for performing operations without proper supervision. Hemorrhaging money and faced with a massive fiscal crisis, Wood sought relief in the U.S. Army. Failing to obtain a commission, he was hired as a contract surgeon and sent west, where the Army was trying to find, fix, and capture the great Apache medicine man and spiritual leader Geronimo.

The Apache campaigns were some of the most grueling the U.S. Army had undertaken, and to the surprise of many Wood thrived in this environment, setting a rare example of endurance and stamina. As the ranks of the officers thinned, Wood occasionally found himself in command of line troops, where he experienced his share of deprivation, disease, and hardship, and he was there when Geronimo surrendered. As a result of this campaign, Wood found himself the recipient of practical lessons in civilian-military relations, the patronage of Gen. Nelson Miles, and the Medal of Honor. A series of relatively quiet posts followed, until at the age of thirty-five, ignoring the advice of his seniors, he actively sought a posting to Washington, D.C., where he made political enemies. When the Republicans came to power in 1897, however, Wood was in the right spot at the right time, becoming the personal physician to Ada McKinley (the hypochondriac wife of the president) and a staunch friend of Theodore Roosevelt. One of the book’s shortcomings is that this real and deep friendship is not seriously explored.

With access to the White House, social connections to Roosevelt, a thirst for adventure, and promotion, what Wood needed now was an opportunity to prove himself. That opportunity came in 1898, with the Spanish-American War.

The story of the Spanish-American War is in many ways a tale of the suspension of the laws of probability. There was perhaps a no more outrageous example than the success of the 1st U.S. Volunteer Cavalry, the “Rough Riders.” Although Teddy Roosevelt was always the unit’s dominant personality, he refused command and made it clear he would not join unless Wood was placed in charge. So it was that Leonard Wood, army surgeon, became the commanding officer of perhaps the most flamboyant and media-friendly military unit the United States ever created. He and Roosevelt pulled every string and called in every favor when outfitting and training their unit. The story and success of the Rough Riders is well known, and much of that success is owed to Leonard Wood.

Following the war, Wood commanded occupation forces in Santiago and made the city a model of modern health and services. He allowed no obstacle to
stand in his way in improving the city and its occupants. By all accounts Wood was a model administrator, and he used this reputation to good advantage, consistently pressuring the White House to make him governor general of Cuba.

While not without controversy, Wood’s tenure in Havana was successful. Among his more significant accomplishments were active support and advancement of the effort that led to the discovery of the origin of yellow fever, and although Walter Reed would rightfully reap the lion’s share of the credit, Wood’s role was not an insignificant one—implementing health and sanitation protocols that for the first time prevented yellow fever epidemics.

In 1902, when the pacification of the Philippines was nearly complete, Wood was selected to be its governor. By now a brigadier general in the regular Army, Wood was also due for promotion. The result was a political firestorm in Washington that saw Theodore Roosevelt pitted against political strongman Mark Hannah. The fight would last four months and demand all of Wood’s connections and Roosevelt’s pull and clout, but it would ultimately result in victory for Wood.

The fight Wood faced in the Philippines would last six years. Unlike Cuba, where Wood did not condone or use violence, in the Philippines he waged war with ferocity—indiscriminate killing, scorched-earth tactics, assassinations, and torture were common tactics on both sides. His methods were brutal and his tools of choice almost exclusively military. To be sure, Wood was, by the measure of the day, effective. Revolts were put down, revenues were collected, and the islands were made quiet.

By 1910, Wood was the senior general in the Army. As chief of staff, Wood devoted himself to repairing a thoroughly antiquated, disorganized, and ineffective force. He had seen modern European armies and was intent on creating something similar in the United States when problems with Mexico diverted his efforts. Wood moved forces to the southern border and fumed when the president refused to do more. The experience convinced Wood more than ever that the Army needed an overhaul. Possessing perhaps more vision than many of his counterparts, he was convinced of the power of aviation and from the beginning was enthusiastic about advances in metallurgy. He sought higher pay and more respect for private soldiers. Above all, Wood wanted a larger army, in fewer bases. His biggest defeat was his failure to create a large, well-trained reserve or appreciably expand the Army. His most powerful enemy was Woodrow Wilson.

The president and the general clashed over U.S. preparedness for war, and if history bore Wood out, he paid a heavy price for being right. In part this was due to his penchant for name-calling and to his devotion to Theodore Roosevelt, who delighted in excoriating Wilson. That a serving general should not openly disagree with a sitting president apparently never occurred to Wood. It also never occurred to him that when the United States did enter the war, Woodrow
Wilson would find another general to command the American Expeditionary Force. Wood spent the war training troops in Kansas.

With the war over and Roosevelt dead, Wood briefly became the political hope of the Republican Party. While still on active duty he hammered the Wilson administration, but as the 1920 Republican convention opened Wood lacked the required votes for the party’s nomination. Warren G. Harding emerged the victor.

Wood returned to the Philippines as governor general. But he had become a bitter man, afflicted by a brain tumor and acute bouts of memory loss. By 1927, his health rapidly deteriorating, Wood left for the United States, where he died on the operating table.

McCallum’s book does a fine job of laying out the life story of Leonard Wood. It is well organized, credibly documented, and, in the best sense of the term, an easy read. Given that there is so little known about Wood, this book’s major contribution may simply be to acquaint American readers with this fascinating man.

However, there is more to a man than simply his history. Readers hoping to gain insight into Wood himself are likely to be disappointed. It may simply be that Wood, the man of action, was not a man of introspection. For example, as McCallum notes, on the day Roosevelt died, Wood penned only the briefest of entries in his diary. In a similar vein, the book contains little contextual or comparative analysis. Wood dealt with many of the issues that beset military leaders today, such as insurgencies, asymmetric opponents, military transformation, the need for interagency cooperation, and the nature of the civil-military relationship in a changing world. Deeper investigation of these issues and a search for meaningful lessons, however, is left to future writers.

McCallum suggests that part of the reason Wood has been forgotten is that his strengths and weaknesses remind us too much of ourselves. Perhaps, but if this is so, then the life and fate of Wood are more deserving of study than ever.
AN AMERICAN WAY FORWARD?


This is a finely composed and extremely timely exposition on American grand strategy. Michael Lind, former editor of *The National Interest* and now a fellow at the New America Foundation, lays out an interesting thesis about a distinctly American strategic foundation. Where the late Russell Weigley described the "American way of war" (*The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, Indiana Univ. Press, 1977) as direct, offensive, and absolute, Lind argues that its strategic counterpart always strives to retain a more delicate internal balance. Operationally, the U.S. military seeks annihilation; strategically, U.S. foreign policy avoids absolutism in order to preserve a distinctly American and limited conception of government.

The real purpose of American strategy, according to this thesis, is the preservation of the American way of life by ensuring that the rise of a foreign hegemon does not inadvertently corrupt or sacrifice our own liberties at home. Lind argues that this American way of life is founded upon a constitutional order of checks and balances, a free-market economy not unduly constrained by government’s reach or interference, and a sacrosanct focus on individual freedoms. The author’s worst nightmare is the rise of a foreign opponent that would trigger an internal reordering of American government that undercut essential liberties and its carefully constructed institutions.

Such an idea would not have been foreign to the founding fathers. Benjamin Franklin once noted that those who would sacrifice a bit of liberty for more security deserved neither. This antistatist perspective may also be seen in Princeton professor Aaron Friedberg’s well regarded book *In the Shadow of the Garrison State* (2000). Friedberg demonstrates that U.S. Cold War success was achieved by tapping into the creativity of the American people and the vitality of the American economy without creating a state that arrogated too much authority or control. This antistatist preference guided a series of U.S. administrations, even as the Soviet Union’s power continued to grow. Instead of becoming a garrison state, the United States ultimately outpaced its overly centralized and statist rival.
Lind contrasts his definition of the American creed—“republican liberalism”—against a set of alternative futures. These involve the rise of “Caesarism,” the establishment of a garrison state, subjugation to a tributary status, and the emergence of a “castle society.” A Caesarian tyranny would usurp individual freedoms, while the surrender of American sovereignty would result from either national defeat or intimidation. The garrison state would ultimately absorb the freedoms and economic energy of the population; a castle society, characterized as a country internally wrecked by anarchy and massive insecurity, would also extinguish personal freedom.

In applying this American creed to contemporary challenges, Lind castigates the neoconservative thrust of the past few years, especially its focus on amassing military power and the extension of U.S. hegemony. Rather than perpetual military dominance, the author advocates a more prudent grand strategy consistent with preserving the American way of life. Lind argues that the United States should employ a “concert of power” that would prevent any hostile state from dominating the three key regions of the globe, “without requiring the United States to seek to perpetually control these areas alone.” Additionally, instead of an “irrational” post–Cold War strategy of isolation, the United States should seek “a special relationship” with Russia. However, Lind never addresses how such concerts and relationships might appear to China and Russia, powers that have not fully accepted the existing international system; nor does his approach offer much in terms of transnational threats.

Overall, Lind finds much of value in classical realism and state-based power balances. This approach, eschewing as it does crusades for democracy, may lack a moral compass, but it has a growing appeal, given the imbroglio we know as the Middle East. Lind is aware that a classical balancing approach does not apply to every region of the world—for example, in the Gulf region—but he encourages the United States to keep a lower profile, as an offshore balancer of last resort—“the least bad of several bad options.” Lind forcefully argues against what he perceives as the goal of global primacy that dominates current U.S. strategy. Such an approach is at odds with what Lind believes to be time-tested American traditions: “When American leaders have followed the American way of strategy, they have led the American republic from success to success, and when they have deviated from it the results have been disastrous.”

It is impossible not to find this book relevant to the ongoing debates over America’s strategy against global terror and the domestic implications of that strategy. Many have cautioned that we now live in the shadow of a security state. The advent of the Patriot Act, extraordinary renditions, aggressive surveillance protocols unchecked by judicial review, extended detentions without recourse to representation or due process, and military tribunals all suggest that concerns about a security state are well founded.

While its policy prescriptions are less than satisfying, this is a relevant and thoughtful book to be read and discussed by almost anyone involved in international relations and the American national security establishment. It could serve as a useful primer on
American foreign policy, as well as a cautionary tale on the dangers of trying to achieve preeminence overseas at the cost of undermining security at home. The American Way of Strategy could also inform today’s emerging maritime strategy, for which its characterization of the benefits of various grand strategies has value.

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How has American military strategic thought evolved since the fall of Saigon? How did each service reinvent itself, shake off old ghosts, and restore morale and purpose? How did each decide upon a different doctrine to guide its training, procurement, and deployment? How much influence do civilian defense officials wield over strategy and doctrine? Is the country well served by the process that produces strategy and doctrine inside the services? Military historian Fred Kagan provides here a tremendous primer on these issues. He has written a clear, definitive, and opinionated history of the development of strategy and doctrine in the American military since 1975. His clarity of prose and the evenhandedness of his presentation enable the reader to separate the history from Kagan’s interpretation. That is the mark of a fine scholar.

Kagan is well known among military historians. A serious researcher and author of a major work on the Napoleonic wars, his greatest strength is his down-to-earth, friendly, inquisitive style. As the resident military scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, Kagan has the venue and cachet to draw ambassadors and four-star generals routinely to his conferences, where they join captains and majors fresh from the battlefield. Building upon his years as a professor at West Point, Kagan has developed a broad network of military contacts that makes this book a blend of scholarship and insider knowledge. Though he is plugged into the daily skirmishes of Washington’s political arena, as a historian Kagan’s chief interest lies not in the immediate issues but in focusing upon the underlying trends.

The author blends brief synopses of such past campaigns as Bosnia, DESERT STORM, and IRAQI FREEDOM with portraits of strategic iconoclasts like John Boyd, John Warden, Douglas MacGregor, and Arthur Cebrowski, emphasizing how doctrine changed and with what results related to budgets and force structure. Kagan does not believe that force structure evolves slowly over the decades. Instead, he illustrates how the few influence the many, and how strategic leadership affects the direction of each service for good or ill.

On the positive side, Kagan recounts how in 1978 the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas Hayward, came to believe that the downward spiral in the naval budget was the result of an intuitive strategy held by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and his senior staff. These civilian defense leaders were concerned that the Soviet Union was increasing its geopolitical pressure across Europe, gaining both economic and political advantage in the shadow of its presumed superiority in land forces. Accordingly, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense was focused on building up Army and Air Force strength in Western Europe, while naval forces languished because they were seen as of lesser utility. Hayward set out to challenge this strategic vision by commissioning and then championing a naval force-planning study called “Sea Plan 2000.” The essence of this plan was the assertion that any assault across the inner-German border would result in a global war. Naval forces provided strike capabilities that could be marshaled anywhere, while protecting the sea-lanes. The redoubtable head of the Soviet navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, had enunciated a strategy of protecting his ballistic missile submarines in their northern bastions. Sea Plan 2000 advocated naval-based offensive strikes against the Kola Peninsula and against Soviet attack and missile submarines worldwide.

When President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, John Lehman became secretary of the Navy and aggressively supported such an offensive maritime strategy. The U.S. Navy budget increased, and the Soviets worried. Their self-confidence was dented, as they later freely admitted. No one could predict what would occur in an actual war, but according to Kagan, “Hayward’s realization that the Navy’s greatest weakness was its strategic thinking made possible a transformation of the Navy’s capabilities with few new technologies. As a result, the Navy regained a considerable degree of balance against a waning Soviet threat.”

Conversely, Kagan cites the efforts of former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld to “transform” the services as flawed in both concept and process. He criticizes the recent focus on information technologies, with the attendant assumption that fewer forces will be needed as a consequence. Further, he questions whether the process of transformation is really advanced by grafting an “Office of Force Transformation” (since abolished) onto the Department of Defense, arguing that the services were in fact taking full advantage of information technologies for a decade before a “revolution in military affairs” was decreed.

On balance, Kagan gives the services good marks for their stewardship over the past twenty-five years as the nation’s guardians. The current war in Iraq, however, worries him, because the military did not adapt swiftly enough. He is too good a scholar to make sweeping assertions about American martial superiority. Instead, he argues that the process of adapting in order to win is the nation’s greatest strength.

Finding the Target will make an excellent textbook for those whose operational jobs have not left sufficient time to keep abreast of the changing strategic perspective in the services.

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Do nuclear weapons represent a source of stability in world politics, or does the acquisition of these weapons create incentives for established nuclear states or longtime rivals to destroy nascent nuclear weapons programs before they actually coalesce into significant strategic
forces? The answer to both key questions, according to Lyle Goldstein, is yes. The acquisition of nuclear weapons creates the incentive to prevent war, exacerbate existing rivalries, and produce crises, but over time even asymmetric nuclear balances tend to moderate enduring rivalries and calm more acute conflicts.

Goldstein’s primary purpose is to address the contemporary debate between “proliferation optimists” and “proliferation pessimists.” Proliferation optimists suggest that nuclear weapons will have a moderating effect on international relations. Because nuclear arsenals provide mechanisms for states to protect their fundamental security concerns while increasing the potential costs of war, leaders tend to be moderate when dealing with not only their own nuclear weapons but their opponents’ arsenals as well. Optimists also believe that governments everywhere tend to be good stewards of their nuclear capabilities, generally treating them as political instruments, not as an enhancement to their war-fighting capabilities. Proliferation pessimists, however, argue that a situation of mutual assured destruction (MAD), not nuclear weapons per se, is what induced caution between competing capitals during the Cold War. In the absence of MAD, they believe, states face mounting pressure to launch preventive war to destroy nascent nuclear weapons programs. New nuclear states, according to the pessimists, lack the resources, technical expertise, and stable governments that are needed to construct survivable nuclear arsenals, especially those that remain under negative control and in times of extreme stress.

Goldstein addresses this debate with a survey of the most significant international confrontations involving nuclear and nonnuclear states, exploring the incentives, perceptions, and judgments of nuclear-armed leaders as they contemplate the prospects and pitfalls of launching preventive war to disarm emerging nuclear powers. His comparative case studies span the entire nuclear age: from the U.S. reaction to the emergence of a Soviet nuclear weapons program, American and Soviet responses to the Chinese nuclear program, and the Israeli strike against Iraq’s Osirak reactor, to both U.S. counterproliferation wars against Iraq. His case studies reveal that although the leaders in dominant states often contemplate preventive war, a host of issues conspires to prevent them from launching strikes to destroy emerging nuclear forces and infrastructures.

Goldstein’s finding that preventive counterproliferation strikes are rare is offset by several observations that are not at all reassuring. Counterproliferation attacks have been contemplated from the start of the nuclear age, but actual attacks are a relatively recent phenomenon. Goldstein’s analysis suggests that the revolutions in conventional precision guidance and global reconnaissance capabilities have tipped the balance in favor of preventive war, although risks still remain. U.S. officers and officials, for instance, were deeply concerned about the prospect that Saddam Hussein might retaliate with chemical or biological weapons when it became clear that the regime in Baghdad itself was the target of coalition operations in 2003; nevertheless, members of the administration were ultimately undeterred by what they considered to be a credible threat. Goldstein concludes
with an even more disturbing observation: that world politics might be entering a period of pronounced instability as the proliferation of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems accelerates. More opportunities will soon present themselves to stop ambitious nascent nuclear states in their tracks.

Goldstein’s narrative is compelling, theoretically informed, well written, and well organized. His comparative study sheds light on the proliferation optimism/pessimism debate, even though his conclusions are unlikely to satisfy either camp. Skeptics might point out that his case studies are a bit cursory and lack documentary evidence drawn from the various capitals in question. To its credit, however, Goldstein’s work is relatively comprehensive and provides a global perspective on how preventive war dynamics play out among Western and non-Western antagonists. It also provides a chronological perspective on how the phenomenon of preventive war might, in fact, be changing. His work thus constitutes a significant and enduring contribution to the literature on nuclear proliferation, deterrence, and preventive war.

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An institution as central to the contemporary world’s political and geostrategic landscape as the United Nations is constantly in need of thoughtful, scholarly attention. Paul Kennedy delivers just this with The Parliament of Man. Kennedy, the author of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers and Grand Strategies in War and Peace, approves of the idea of the UN but is not blind to its failings. He believes that “since this is the only world organization that we possess, we need to make it work in the best way possible, in order to help humankind navigate our present turbulent century.” Consequently, while the book is mostly historical, a consistent tone of apology runs along with the narrative. It is a story, Kennedy writes, of “evolution, metamorphosis, and experiment, of failure and success,” but a story that is ultimately justified.

A solid introductory chapter traces the deepest roots of the UN back to post-Napoleonic Europe, but Kennedy very naturally spends most of his time examining events in the wake of World War I. Here Kennedy rehearses the prehistory of the UN from the advent of its predecessor, the League of Nations, through that organization’s failures and the consequent outbreak of World War II. While this chapter contains little in the way of new information or startling revelations, it is well written, succinct, and peppered with insights.

What follows are several thematic chapters on such topics as the working of the Security Council, the execution of peacekeeping missions, the idea of human rights, UN economic policies, and so on. Here one comes to appreciate the true breadth of the United Nations. Kennedy’s examination of the Security Council is especially timely, given the growing pressures for its expansion and restructuring. Kennedy’s account of the UN’s track record in peacekeeping operations (arguably its highest-profile role in much of the world) is prefaced...
by a keen observation, one that is rarely mentioned in more critical examinations and that forces us to take fresh stock of such missions: “The most astonishing thing,” he writes, “is that the UN Charter contains absolutely no mention of the word peacekeeping and offers no guidelines as to this form of collective action.” This will be news to many.

The greatest effect of this worthwhile volume is the appreciation one gains for the great complexity of the United Nations and, more to the point, of the tasks it faces. Kennedy also shows the institution to be worthy of a bit more sympathy than many are currently inclined to give it.

DAVID A. SMITH
Baylor University


Debate rages today in Congress and amid the public on the tolerable limits of coercive interrogation and torture associated with armed conflict, and the alleged complicity of military health care professionals in these purportedly nefarious activities. These allegations make this tome of ethical analysis a pertinent starting point for academics interested in contemporary issues affecting the practice of military medicine during war.

The author is neither a professional soldier nor physician but a former conscript in the Israel Defense Forces, and currently professor of applied and professional ethics in international relations at the University of Haifa. The book confronts multiple subjects of practical relevance, among them such issues as what patient rights caregivers must respect; how best to distribute scarce material and health manpower resources; which among the wounded should receive priority within the triage process (and the related question of what military utility should be assigned to certain casualties); changed priorities of informed consent and confidentiality among soldiers; the dilemma of torture, ill treatment, and the role of physicians; the legitimacy of physician contribution to the development of chemical and biological weapons; physician civil disobedience and assistance in draft evasion; and the widely presumed but equally debatable status of medical neutrality, impartiality, and immunity during war.

Michael Gross argues that medical ethics in times of armed conflict are not identical to medical ethics in times of peace. Military necessity, reasons of state, and the war effort impinge upon moral decision making and often overwhelm the axioms that animate medical ethics during peacetime. He repeatedly emphasizes that during war the everyday principles of biomedical ethics must compete with equally relevant and conflicting principles anchored in military necessity and national security, where the welfare of the individual has far less importance than the welfare of the state and the political community. During armed conflict, military necessity trumps the right to life, self-determination, and patient welfare. Physicians care for sick and wounded soldiers for reasons different from those applicable to other patients: soldiers are treated to preserve manpower and to protect the vitality of a collective fighting force. In fact, the entire range of moral decision making changes under the exigencies of war. Collective interests overwhelm individual
welfare, and this extends even to the moral authority of the military to enforce its regulations regarding administration of such agents as Anthrax vaccine to military forces, or to new but not yet fully recognized scientific discoveries. Equally provocative is the thesis that medical contributions to interrogation torture may be morally defensible under conditions that offer the possibility of preventing egregious harm to others. As a treatise addressing contemporary ethical issues in military medicine, this is a useful contribution. Unfortunately, the writer’s style at times intermixes elements of the arcane phraseology of the professional academic ethics community. “The uninitiated” must read and reread some passages if they are motivated to comprehend fully the ethical dilemmas being debated and dissected.

ARTHUR M. SMITH, MD
Captain, Medical Corps
U.S. Navy Reserve (Retired)


There have been many books published about the battle for Leyte Gulf. This book, however, is unique, because it is not only a narrative but also a critical analysis of the planning, preparation, and execution of that famous battle as viewed by both the Americans and the Japanese. Milan Vego, professor of military operations at the Naval War College and author of a textbook on operational warfare, is also a former merchant marine officer. He has tackled the subject of this work with much vigor and depicts the battle with clarity and in great depth.

The book is organized into eleven chapters. Chapters 1 through 5 show how both sides planned and organized for the battle, and chapter 6 discusses the background and operations just before the engagement. However, the heart and soul of the book are in the final section that depicts the battle itself. Vego begins by noting that in the early days of the Pacific War the Americans split their command arrangements, with General Douglas MacArthur in charge of the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) and Admiral Chester Nimitz commanding the Pacific Ocean Area (POA). This scheme worked well enough until the Leyte operation, when it produced much confusion over command relationships, leading to problems between Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey and Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, Commander Allied Naval Forces that almost lost them the battle. Vego is critical of the delays in communications between various American components. He concludes that the Americans relied too much on Japanese intentions—as interpreted via information gleaned from the MAGIC intercepts—and less on actual capability. He believes that the Americans’ strength was in their operational-logistic plans and programs.

However, Vego argues, the Japanese were even worse in comparable ways. Parochial competition between the army and navy cost them dearly. The Japanese had little intelligence that could compare with that of the Americans, and they had serious logistical problems that were never properly resolved.
Among the book’s strengths are the subheadings of each chapter, which allow the reader to skip around. Vego’s sixty-seven pages of notes are excellent, enabling the reader to delve deeper into the battle, and his bibliography is outstanding. There are sixteen appendixes showing the order of battle of the adversaries, as well as six excellent maps. Vego’s conclusion, while offering nothing new, does an outstanding job of summarizing the battle. Also, his summary of Halsey’s failure in the battle is superior. Professor Vego concludes that “the Japanese came close to accomplishing their mission not because of their skills but because of the mistakes that Halsey made.”

DONALD M. GOLDSTEIN
University of Pittsburgh


Christopher Tyerman, a lecturer in medieval history at Oxford University, offers this work at a crucial moment. With world attention focused as it is on the Middle East and on the social, political, religious, and military interactions between the Muslim East and Christian West, God’s War could not have come at a more opportune time, especially for those who wish to have a better understanding of this exotic and violent period. Over the past decade, the subject of the Crusades has become a popular one for writers, but Steven Runciman’s three-volume History of the Crusades remains the primary standard of comparison. Tyerman accurately, if perhaps with a bit of hubris, notes that Runciman’s work is now outdated and seriously flawed. What makes Tyerman’s work stand out is the extent of his knowledge of the entire crusading era and his ability to deploy that knowledge in a clear, concise, and generally readable manner in the course of a single (if massive) volume.

God’s War is reasonably if not totally comprehensive. The first four Crusades are covered in minute detail, the later Crusades less so. Tyerman, however, also discusses many related movements not normally considered as crusades, such as the Reconquista in Spain and Teutonic campaigns in the Baltic, and even the expansion of the concept of holy war to the conquest of the New World. This breadth of coverage makes up for an occasional lack of depth. At times the book does suffer from an overreliance on name-dropping, some of which is repetitive and, for the novice, confusing.

Tyerman stresses that one cannot know how the Crusaders thought or felt—making it ironic when he comments, as he frequently does, on what did or did not motivate them. This is peculiar, as one of the strongest points of the book is its explanation of how the movement originated and the ways in which the Crusades were products of the sometimes paradoxical social, religious, and political forces of the Middle Ages. Another strong point is his descriptions of the personalities of the Crusaders. Tyerman fleshes out the leaders, men like the Christians Godfrey of Bullion and Bohemond, Frederick Barbarossa, or Richard of Anjou, and the Muslim leaders Saladin and Baybars. These people are described from the standpoint both of their apologists and their critics and enemies, and thus as true three-dimensional
personalities. Through these descriptions, Tyerman creates after all a snapshot of how the crusignati and jihadi thought, and in particular how they were influenced by the concept of holy war.

Tyerman avoids the controversy of the influence of the Crusades on events in the Middle East today. He outlines the Christian concept of just war and holy war without assessing whether the Crusades were just. He describes the Muslim concept of jihad, yet does not pass judgment on the initial conquest or reconquest of the Holy Land by the Arabs. Additionally, he does not address Western guilt over the Crusades or the Islamic feeling of having been wronged. Only in passing does he mention a certain pope’s apology and a certain politician’s ill-timed use of the word “crusade.” In a word, he neither condemns nor apologizes for the actions and violence of Christians or Muslims but clearly lays out the social, religious, political, and economic causes and results of the Crusades.

For readers searching for a single-volume survey of the crusading movement, Christopher Tyerman’s God’s War is invaluable.

MARK K. VAUGHN
Naval War College


In this insightful and elegantly written set of essays in international history, David Reynolds ruminates on the causes, evolution, and consequences of what came to be called the “special relationship” between the United States and Great Britain during the Second World War and thereafter through the Cold War. Geoeconomically, this relationship originated with the fall of France in May 1940, which Reynolds treats quite rightly as the “fulcrum of the Twentieth Century.” Until then, British leaders had counted on France to contain Germany, with England making only a limited commitment of ground forces to the continent and relying on a powerful deterrent based on strategic bombing. In 1940, with the French knocked out of the war and England’s small army in ruins, whether the British could fight on against Germany’s Wehrmacht depended above all on support from the United States. Winston Churchill’s decision to continue fighting turned out to be the right policy chosen for the wrong reasons, because Franklin D. Roosevelt was initially unwilling to supply more than material aid and was later unable to bring Americans into the war until both Japan and Germany declared war on the United States. Shared hatred of a vicious enemy, a more or less common language, generally similar liberal political principles, shared intelligence, combined military staffs, summity, and the industrial prowess of the United States was to make the Anglo-American alliance perhaps more effective than any other in history.

Year by year, however, British influence within the Grand Alliance waned as American power waxed. In the spirit of Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt sought an alternative to traditional alliances in his vision of postwar international peace and security cooperation by means of
the “Four Policemen”—the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union—each of which would earn a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. Despite Roosevelt’s hopes of extending wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union into the peace, the ever more closed systems of government established within Soviet-occupied East-Central Europe increasingly induced both British and American leaders to begin to fear the USSR as the Second Coming of the Third Reich. This shared perception, fueled (somewhat unintentionally, Reynolds claims) by Churchill’s “iron curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri, in 1946, brought the two wartime allies ever closer together again. Fears that appeasement would merely whet the aggressor’s appetite for more then sustained the growing transatlantic consensus that the Soviet Union needed to be contained.

As the Cold War heated up, the British and the rest of Western Europe needed American power; Americans needed British bases around the world, as well as the legitimacy and self-assurance that the support of this ally, especially, might supply both at home and abroad. Although the *Pax Britannica* collapsed in the eastern Mediterranean in 1947, it was replaced rapidly and smoothly by the *Pax Americana*, as exemplified in the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with the especially close relationship between Britain and the United States serving as the foundation of transatlantic unity and cooperation. Henceforward, England would play Robin to America’s Batman, gambling that loyalty to the United States would enable it to punch above its weight. Loyalty would purchase Britain a disproportionate influence in American foreign policy, though some in England might occasionally wonder whether the price in national honor was too high, especially when prime ministers appeared to be mere “poodles” serving American masters.

Reynolds does not romanticize the special relationship. The Suez crisis of 1956 made it clear that Americans would not prop up declining empires; indeed, it was American policy to hurry them into their graves. Nonetheless, Americans were there when the British needed them, with satellite intelligence and other support, in the Falklands War. However, the Iraq war of 2003 suggests that sometimes Robin might be too loyal to the caped crusader, who needs to look before he leaps and benefit from wiser counsel from his most loyal ally. For all these difficulties, Reynolds shows that the current international order rests on common Anglo-American liberal principles and overlapping political cultures that shaped how both the British and the Americans defined their interests from World War II to the end of the Cold War and beyond. Though the relationship may always have been more special to the British than the Americans, Reynolds shows why it needs to continue to be especially close. Arguably far more than Roosevelt’s United Nations, Churchill’s union of English-speaking peoples saved civilization from barbarism again and again in the twentieth century. Our prospects in the current century require us to keep that union especially in mind.

KARL WALLING
*Naval War College*
This collection of nine essays on British naval thought from the eighteenth century to the present is both useful in itself and a fine testimonial to an individual significant in the field of maritime and naval historiography. Bryan Ranft (1917–2003) fought as a gunner in World War II and then went on to teach generations of British naval officers at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, England. For many years Ranft occupied a rather lonely position, academically speaking. Amateur naval historians like Richard Hough abounded but made no impression upon scholarship and methodology. The two modern giants Stephen Roskill and Arthur Marder were for various reasons not equivalent to the likes of Sir Michael Howard in developing military history. Naval matters were hardly taught in the academy; the Vere Harmsworth Chair at Cambridge University (Richmond’s former seat) had been long lost to colonial historians, and Greenwich itself was a service institution.

However, Bryan Ranft persisted in teaching, writing, and editing naval history. His output was not great; I count two of his edited works, The Beatty Papers and Technical Change and British Naval Policy, 1860–1939, among the best of a half-dozen volumes. By the early 1980s, however, Ranft was a visiting professor of naval history at King’s College, London, which was among the first of the United Kingdom’s academic institutions to recognize the stupidity of ignoring British and international naval history.

Within another fifteen to twenty years this subject would witness an escape from those scholarly doldrums, indeed a serious revival, particularly in such forward-looking universities as Exeter, Southampton, Hull, and London, which were at last recognizing their own cities’ deep maritime heritages. Many of the contributors to this volume teach, or have taught, in those very institutions.

Professor Geoffrey Till—in many ways Ranft’s natural successor—has edited a tight and coherent Festschrift, which hangs together in large part because all essays concentrate upon naval thinking and writing rather than operations or technology. It is difficult, then, to single out for special praise certain contributions, for they range from Nicholas Rodger’s chapter on eighteenth-to-nineteenth-century British naval strategic thought to Eric Grove’s equivalent piece regarding the close of the twentieth century. Readers might take special interest in the contributions by Jock Gardner and Richard Hill, longtime naval officers become significant authors of maritime and strategic matters.

There is a useful bibliography, but the index is rather thin. However, these days one is grateful to see such an item at all. This is, in sum, a most useful addition (volume 38) to the Cass series on Naval Policy and History, of which Professor Till is the general editor.

PAUL KENNEDY
Yale University

Alton Keith Gilbert, a retired naval officer, uses a descriptive survey method of research through letters, operational documents, fitness reports, personal accounts, and awards to chronicle the biography of Admiral John “Slew” McCain.

The book builds a strong sense of the character and tenacity of McCain and his ability as a warfighter through one of the most difficult periods of World War II. From his commissioning as an ensign to admiral, McCain was influenced by the Navy’s greatest leaders. The author describes the development of McCain as he progressed through his sea and shore assignments. The study culminates in a detailed description of the war in the Pacific and the tactics used, particularly when dealing with Japanese kamikaze pilots, under McCain’s operational leadership.

An intriguing aspect of this book is the detailed description of the political dealings among the Navy’s senior leaders. This allows the reader to understand some of the activity behind the scenes that ultimately shaped the outcome of the war. It is clear that McCain was a warrior’s warrior who literally worked himself to death: “After Japan surrendered on September 2, 1945, McCain flew back to his home in the U.S. and died in his bed the next day—perhaps from heart failure but more probably from exhaustion.” His dedication to the country, accomplishment of the mission, and loyalty to his superiors are constant themes of the book.

The extensive resources and the author’s personal experience as a naval officer make this a credible, historically accurate work. Gilbert’s style brings to life the experience of the Pacific War. In addition, specific data regarding the losses of personnel and equipment only enhances the understanding of the impact of that war on both the U.S. and Japanese forces. The bibliography is a great resource for anyone who desires additional information on the topic.

The only criticism I have relates to the title. The book comes up a little short on the actual leadership characteristics of McCain, and I found myself searching for those qualities in his style and character. Yet this is a must-read for anyone who desires to learn about another one of the great admirals of World War II.

THOMAS ZELIBOR
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Naval War College

Osborne, Eric W. The Battle of Heligoland Bight. Indianapolis: Indiana Univ. Press, 2006. 141pp. $27.95


After two decades of unrelenting publishing on the land war of 1914–18, it is nice to see attention being paid to the war at sea, for that effort ranged from distant blockades, mine warfare, unrestricted submarine warfare, and dashing destroyer melees, to the largest pitched surface fleet battle to that time. Both authors tell their stories with a passion for narrative, paying close attention not only to admirals but also to the “common sailor” at war. Both come well prepared: Osborne, of Virginia Military Institute, has published Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914–1919 (2004) and Cruisers and Battle Cruisers:

Osborne’s Battle of Heligoland Bight is solid naval history. On 28 August 1914 British cruisers, destroyers, and submarines descended into the Heligoland Bight and surprised German scouting forces, which lost the light cruisers SMS Mainz, SMS Koln, SMS Ariadne, and the torpedo boat V-187, as well as 1,251 officers and men killed, wounded, or captured. The British, in contrast, suffered damage to one light cruiser and three destroyers, as well as thirty-five officers and men killed and forty wounded. Beyond these losses, the importance of the battle lies in the fact that it reinforced the already timid stance of the German High Sea Fleet command.

Osborne’s two major contributions are at the command level and at the tactical level. Senior commanders, British and German, performed woefully. There was a lack of coordination with the forces at sea and among the forces engaged in battle. There were also problems with communication (delays in decoding messages and jammed transmissions) and an overall failure to provide commanders with intelligence on the composition and position of enemy forces.

Officers who today fear that in a “real” war the enemy may well deprive them of cybernetic capabilities must read this book. Heligoland showed what it was like to fight “blind” and under adverse conditions. Clausewitz’s “fog of war” was omnipresent, especially on the British side: battle signals were misread; major units put out to sea without notifying other commands; cruisers attempted to ram their own submarines; submarines made attack runs on their own cruisers; and destroyers engaged a Norwegian neutral, mistaking it for a German minelayer. The German command did not perform much better. It failed to appreciate the size of the British force and refused to recognize that it was supported by battle cruisers. It also hesitated to send out its own battle cruisers in time to assist. The fact that German battleships had to wait hours for high tide so they could cross the Jade Bar at Wilhelmshaven did not help matters, nor did the true “fog of war,” namely, a heavy fog that swirled around Heligoland all that day. In short, this is a superb book on the all but forgotten first surface battle of World War I.

Distant Victory, of course, has the advantage that it is about a well known battle, the greatest in history to that date. On 31 May 1916, off Denmark’s Jutland Peninsula, twenty-four British dreadnoughts and their escorts squared off against sixteen German dreadnoughts and their escorts—in all, 151 British warships against ninety-nine German warships. Butler relates the resulting battle in gripping, dramatic style. He has a keen eye for the bold narrative, whether speaking of a destroyer or a battleship, a commander or a gunner. He follows the traditional reading of Jutland, that it was a tactical German victory (fourteen British ships were lost to the Germans’ eleven, and 6,784 British casualties as against 3,058 German) but a British strategic victory, insofar as the High Sea Fleet failed to break the Grand Fleet’s iron grip on the exits of the North Sea. As the New York Herald trenchantly put it on 3 June 1916, “The German fleet has assaulted
its jailer, but it is still in jail." Unfortunately, Butler fails to draw on the greatest strategic lesson for the Germans: on 4 July Admiral Reinhard Scheer, the “victor of the Skagaerrak,” informed Kaiser Wilhelm II that further fleet actions would be futile and that only “the defeat of British economic life, that is, by using the U-boats against British trade,” could swing the balance in the war.

Lamentably, Butler’s lack of familiarity with German documents and recent historiography mars an otherwise interesting book. Apart from misspelled German words and ships’ names, there are major howlers. Thus Ludendorff is raised to the nobility as “von,” Hugo von Pohl in 1914 is listed as the High Sea Fleet’s chief of staff rather than as Chief of the Admiralty Staff in Berlin, Karl Doenitz is cited as a World War I “destroyer captain,” and German diplomatic and naval files are situated at Koblenz rather than at Berlin and Freiburg, respectively. Further, while one can accuse the German naval command of timidity, it seems unjust to ascribe “cowardice” to them. Hyperbole abounds. Did Jutland really “dictate” that “Germany would lose the First World War”? Was it “the decisive moment of the First World War”? Did it “decide” the “very course of the war”? Was the German failure to intercept British cross-Channel troop transports in August 1914 the “lost opportunity” that “ultimately decided the course of the war”?

Finally, Butler’s claims that “three generations of histories” have failed to look at the “strategic aftermath” of the battle and that they have failed for ninety years to ask why the Germans never again faced the Grand Fleet in battle, or why they turned instead to unrestricted submarine warfare, are not just in accurate but make a mockery of that scholarship. Careful editorial work could have averted some of this. Regrettably, it did not.

HOLGER H. HERWIG
University of Calgary


The man who was “first in war, first in peace and first in the hearts of his compatriots” is also first as a subject in the contemporary revival of popular interest in the founding fathers. In this work Peter Henriques has provided a concise, balanced, and scholarly companion piece to the more comprehensive recent books concerning George Washington. Rather than a conventional biography, Peter Henriques, a professor emeritus of history at George Mason University and a distinguished scholar of the vast collection of Washington’s writings, has provided an analysis of ten of the arguably most important issues and relationships Washington dealt with during his life. Especially for those familiar with Washington’s basic biography, these thoughtful and fair-minded essays will inspire further reflection on the character and career of the indispensable man of the American founding.

Henriques’s erudition and balanced judgment may be at their most effective in his consideration of the private Washington, including an examination of his beliefs on slavery and religion, and a reflection on his final illness and death. Washington, who can be justifiably criticized as a slave owner, in
Henriques’s view experienced a “tortuously gradual” evolution on slavery that mixed increasing moral consideration with ever-present economic assessments. Washington never publicly took a stance against slavery or called for its end, although his personal growth on the issue of slavery and race is impressive—in his will he ultimately freed his own. Henriques writes that Washington was a realist, a man who should be judged against the standards of his day, and notes that he made the unity of the new republic a higher priority than attacking slavery, an institution Washington came to write of as “the only unavoidable subject of regret.”

Perhaps the most moving chapter in this well written book is the last, where Henriques addresses Washington’s death. His detailed research reveals that Washington’s last day of life was excruciatingly painful, that orthodox Christian beliefs had no apparent influence on his actions during his final hours, and that important aspects of his character were highlighted by his behavior throughout this tormenting struggle. (Washington slowly suffocated to death over many hours, almost certainly from acute epiglottis, a virulent bacterial infection of the throat.) As Washington wrote some four months before he died, “When the summons comes I shall endeavor to obey it with a good grace.” He endured the attempted treatment from his doctors and an agonizing death with stoic courage, patience, and grace, completing his life with his honor intact.

Henriques’s accessible book illuminates Washington’s character through, in some measure, the lens of his honor and the importance to Washington throughout his life of preserving it. Realistic Visionary provides a trustworthy and insightful guide to a further understanding of Washington and confirms, in the words of his secretary, Tobias Lear, that “he died as he lived.”
IN MY VIEW

MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACKING?

Sir:

Professor Owens’s article “Rumsfeld, the Generals, and the State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations” (Autumn 2006, pp. 68–80) provides a welcomed counter-punch to Rumsfeld’s retired uniformed critics and rightly places Rumsfeld’s involvement in military planning in historical context. However, in criticizing the “generals in revolt” for overstepping their bounds, Owens unfortunately (and unjustly) gives Secretary Rumsfeld a near-free pass for his missteps in Iraq.

Owens aptly contextualizes Secretary Rumsfeld’s actions in light of a distinguished American tradition of civilian control of the military. As he notes, it is not unprecedented for a civilian leader to ignore military advice or to exercise a heavy hand in operational planning (Owens omits the helpful example of President John F. Kennedy, who ignored military advice in advocating the use of special operations forces in counterinsurgency operations). He also provides helpful perspective on why Rumsfeld might have dismissed military advice. The 9/11 Commission, along with several critics, has pointed out that senior military leadership has resisted deployment requests since Somalia and looked for situations where it would be assured victory; Iraq was far from such an instance. It is reasonable that a civilian leader might selectively heed military advice if he believes that his military advisers are not adequately considering his position.

Yet by focusing on the errancy of the generals’ public criticism, Owens loses sight of Rumsfeld’s missteps. Owens argues that Rumsfeld’s key mistake was that he was “much more optimistic than the facts on the ground have warranted” and that Rumsfeld “acknowledged changes in the character of the war and adapted to them.” Rumsfeld’s mistake was not that he was optimistic; it was that he was out of touch entirely with critical facts on the ground and did not exercise leadership once the consequences of his bad decisions were
apparent. Rumsfeld’s “stuff happens” attitude turned out to be a strategic miscalculation of the highest order. De-Baathification and the disbanding of the Iraqi military were likewise strategic misjudgments that flew in face of civilian and military advice. We now know that no one in the secretary’s office even asked the advice of General Jay Garner, who was at the time working to include both groups in post-Saddam Iraq before the decision was made to exclude them. These decisions were not products of “optimism” but were rather woeful misreadings of the realities.

To state that Rumsfeld “acknowledged changes in the character of the war and adapted to them” is also generous. Who can forget that Rumsfeld strenuously resisted calling the war “an insurgency” until the commander of U.S. Central Command had already contradicted him publicly and the facts were nearly indisputable? The onus rests on Owens to demonstrate how a leader who refused to call the situation on the ground an insurgency, who hesitated to reconfigure civil support elements, and who did not solicit advice or execute new strategies for the spiraling situation in Iraq “adapted to change” and provided an effective counterinsurgency strategy.

Owens rationalizes the folly of deploying with a smaller force as Monday morning quarterbacking, and he notes that there were potential consequences to a larger buildup, namely “losing the opportunity to achieve surprise.” Owens cherry-picks here—there were numerous foreseeable consequences of deploying a smaller force to Iraq, some of which were voiced to Secretary Rumsfeld prior to the invasion. This is not “hindsight”; it is fair analysis of a bad decision. As a tactical matter, the element of surprise was relatively insignificant in attacking Iraq. Saddam, like most viewers of CNN, had extensive warning during the slow buildup to war that the United States would attack. Regardless, by minimizing criticism of Rumsfeld as the product of hindsight, Owens creates a nearly impenetrable defense of Rumsfeld; it is difficult to prove a negative of how the invasion could have unfolded had Rumsfeld not made the decisions he did.

Finally, Owens attempts to save Rumsfeld’s legacy by arguing that “[his] critics have been no more prescient than he.” True, but Rumsfeld’s critics—by Owens’s own admission—were not the ones pushing to go to war. Lumping the generals with Rumsfeld gives the impression they all agreed with the secretary’s planning and eventual decision to attack, when, in fact, many officers were dumbfounded by the decision.

If Owens wants to position Rumsfeld’s meddling in war planning as part of the American tradition of strong civilian oversight, he should also hold Rumsfeld accountable for the profound mistakes made on his watch. By minimizing Rumsfeld’s mistakes, Owens implicitly justifies them as part of Lincoln’s
and Roosevelt's legacy of firm civilian leadership. This is both a disservice to the tradition of civilian-military relations and a poor reading of recent history.

BRIAN QUINN
Stanford, California

PSI AND UNCLOS

Sir:

In his response (“Is the PSI Really the Cornerstone of a New International Norm?” Autumn 2006, pp. 123–30) to my article on the subject in the Spring 2006 issue (pp. 29–57), Mark J. Valencia opines “that the implementation, if not the conception of the PSI, was and is seriously flawed” (quoting Valencia at p. 128). He fears that the primary goal of PSI is to stop vessels without consent, undermining the freedom of navigation in the process. To the contrary, the foundations of the PSI are the sovereign powers of nation states and their authority, as flag-nations, to provide consent for boarding and search of their vessels. Valencia forgot that PSI participants have already produced six bilateral agreements to facilitate WMD inspections at sea that “raise the percentage of vessels accessible to consent boardings to well over half” (Doolin, p. 36). The remainder of this rebuttal highlights other aspects of PSI.

PSI was initiated precisely because there is no blanket legal authority to interrupt a ship’s navigation for a WMD inspection and because the situations in which national self-defense could and should be used to seize WMD are extremely limited (see Doolin, pp. 29–31, on the So San incident and origins of PSI, and pp. 46–48 for Article 51). The strategy PSI uses to correct this gap is multinational cooperation. The 9/11 Commission recognized the potential of multinational cooperation and specifically recommended garnering support for PSI (Doolin, p. 45, for discussion and citation of the 9/11 report). PSI core members have done so, and “over 40 countries have participated in fourteen training exercises” (Doolin, p. 43; pp. 41–44 outline steps to improving interoperability among the expanding membership of PSI).
Contrary to Valencia’s assertion, PSI works within the United Nations system. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the framework for consensual boardings. President Reagan established the policy of the United States “to exercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the Convention” (A. R. Thomas and James C. Duncan, eds., Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, International Law Studies 79 [Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1999], p. 43). Although UNCLOS does not list WMD transport as an act prejudicial to the coastal state, Valencia failed to tell the reader that “any threat or use of force” violates innocent passage; moreover, three other provisions of UNCLOS Article 19 may also be used as authority to deem illegal WMD transport inconsistent with innocent passage. (Here I quote UNCLOS Article 19[2][a]. Article 19 establishes the regime of innocent passage; the other provisions that could be used as authority are 19[2][b], prohibiting exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 19[2][f], prohibiting the launching, landing, or taking aboard of any military device; and 19[2][l], barring “any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.”) Valencia ultimately concedes that coastal nations may criminalize and enforce laws against transporting WMD in their territorial seas and contiguous zones (Doolin, pp. 34–35, for a complete discussion, including the premise: “Weapons of mass destruction are by definition dangerous materials, transportation of which must be consistent with custom laws”). This is consistent with Valencia’s observations (pp. 124–25) that a coastal nation “would probably have to have laws criminalizing WMD transport” and UNCLOS Article 19 codification that innocent passage cannot be prejudicial to the coastal state. Indeed, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 calls upon member states to, among other things, perfect their legal systems and enforcement against WMD trafficking (see Doolin, pp. 45–46, for a complete discussion, mentioning that China supported UNSC Resolution 1540). But Valencia buried discussion of UNSC Resolution 1695 in an endnote: “UNSC Resolution 1695 of 15 July 2006 does prohibit all UN member states from providing to or receiving from North Korea WMD and related materials or technology, specifically including missiles” (p. 130, note 22).

It remains my prediction that “PSI activities, exercises and operations” will leverage UNCLOS and numerous conventions against WMD to make “maritime searches for WMD more common, the first steps toward a change in international practice” (Doolin, p. 50, elaborated pp. 50–51). PSI will continue to harness the collective sovereignty of its membership, and of our CNO’s thousand-ship navy, to execute mostly consensual (and more rarely nonconsensual)
boardings. As I asserted last year (p. 31), “Over time, PSI will make seizure of weapons of mass destruction at sea an international norm.”

JOEL A. DOOLIN

Dr. Valencia replies:

Doolin: “He [Valencia] fears that the primary goal of PSI is to stop vessels without consent, undermining the freedom of navigation in the process. To the contrary, the foundations of the PSI are the sovereign powers of nation states and their authority, as flag-nations, to provide consent for boarding and search of their vessels.”

This may be the present practice, although the secretiveness surrounding PSI interdictions prevents a conclusion one way or the other. However, it was not the original intent of its founders, and leading advocates and U.S. government policy makers may well still harbor such intent. Early on, John Bolton, then Under Secretary of State of Arms Control and International Security and the point man for the PSI, stated that “we are prepared to undertake interdictions right now, and, if that opportunity arises, if we had actionable intelligence and it was appropriate, we could do it now” (“US Interdiction Poses Legal Problems,” Oxford Analytica, 30 June 2003). He further asserted that the countries concerned had reached an agreement authorizing the United States to take action on the high seas and in international air space. Indeed, the United States insisted that the boarding of ships is permitted if there is “reasonable cause” (Virginia March, “US-led Group Takes to High Seas in First Drill against WMD Trade,” Financial Times, 13–14 September 2003, p. 5). On 2 December 2003, Bolton again asserted that the United States and its allies are willing to use “robust techniques” to stop rogue nations from getting the materials they need to make WMD—including interdicting and seizing such “illicit goods” on the high seas or in the air. These remarks were reportedly cleared by Secretary of State Colin Powell and senior White House officials (David Ensor, “U.S. to Seize WMD on High Seas,” CNN, 2 December 2003). And in October 2005, at a meeting in London of PSI core participants, it was agreed that the PSI is aimed at preventing transfers of WMD and related material “at any time and in any place” (“Chairman’s Conclusions,” Proliferation Security Initiative: London, 9–10 October, M2 Presswire, 13 October 2003).
The actualization of this intent was constrained only by the objections of core PSI participants. The United Kingdom was surprised by the U.S. interpretations and intentions. Its representative at the July 2003 Brisbane Conference said that all eleven participants agreed that any action taken under the PSI would need to be consistent with international law. Others in the PSI coalition felt that the United States was moving too quickly and too aggressively for them (“Japan Moves Forward to Hinder WMD Smuggling,” Asahi Shimbun, 18 July 2003; “Korea, Trade Top PM’s Agenda,” Sunday Mail, July 2003). Indeed, at the extreme there were concerns that the proposal could evolve into a multinational force roaming the seas and skies in search of transporters of illegal or undesirable weapons. To underscore this concern, Javier Solana, the European Union’s “foreign minister,” said, “The fight against terrorism, in which the EU is fully engaged, has to take place within the rules of international law” (Robin Wright and Henry Chu, “Bush Defends Israeli Strike,” Los Angeles Times, 7 October 2003). After the Brisbane meeting, a team from the eleven PSI nations was assigned to work on reaching a consensus regarding the relevant principles of international law.

Although the PSI’s operating principles include compliance with international law, some participants may still harbor intent to change it. This is because PSI effectiveness is constrained by the legal prohibition against interdiction of flagged ships and planes of North Korea, Iran, and other “countries of proliferation concern” without their consent. Indeed, the six U.S. bilateral boarding agreements that Doolin considers to be so important are likely to have little or no effect on WMD trade to or from these nations.

Doolin: “Contrary to Valencia’s assertion, PSI works within the United Nations system.”

The PSI was purposely conceived, initiated, and implemented without UN authority outside of the UN system. Indeed, Bolton argued that Annan’s insistence on the Security Council’s being the sole source of legitimacy in the use of force is “unsupported by over 50 years of experience with the UN Charter’s operation,” referring in particular to the non-UN-sanctioned U.S./NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 (John Bolton, “Remarks at Proliferation Security Meeting,” Paris, France). And Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that the PSI provides an effective way to deal with North Korean attempts to trade in WMD and that it does not need or require Security Council authorization (“Rice: U.S. Has Not Lost Patience with Six-Party Talks,” 27 April 2005).

In March 2004 the United States tried to obtain a UN Security Council resolution specifically authorizing states to interdict, board, and inspect any vessel or aircraft if there were reason to believe it was carrying WMD or the technology to make or deliver them. But Russia and China prevented a specific endorsement of interdiction and the PSI (Ralph Cossa, introduction to “Countering the Spread
of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Role of the Proliferation Security Initiative,” *Issues and Insights* 4, no. 5 [July 2004], pp. 1–6). Indeed, the text was agreed upon only after the United States accepted China’s demand under a threat of a veto to drop a provision specifically authorizing the interdiction of vessels suspected of transporting WMD, a cornerstone of the PSI. China also objected to any suggestion that the Council would endorse ad hoc frameworks like the PSI.

_Doolin:_ “Valencia failed to tell the reader that any threat or use of force violates innocent passage.”

The transport of WMD components, related materials, and their means of delivery does not in itself necessarily imply a threat of use of force against the coastal state. The other three provisions of Article 19 mentioned by Doolin are not relevant to transport of WMD, related materials, and their means of delivery.

_Doolin:_ “Valencia buried discussion of UNSC Resolution 1695 in an endnote.”

The note was added in press to acknowledge this most recent development. However, as the endnote said, the resolution does not authorize the use of military force to ensure compliance, and it applies only to North Korea. As it turned out, China, South Korea, and Japan declined to interdict North Korean vessels or aircraft at sea despite strenuous U.S. pressure to do so—either under UNSCR 1695 or the PSI. Their refusal to do so underscored the ineffectiveness of the PSI. Its effectiveness can only be enhanced if it and high seas interdiction are endorsed by the UNSC as advocated by a measure passed in March 2007 by the House of Representatives. Only then will PSI seizures of WMD at sea become an accepted international norm.
OF SPECIAL INTEREST

STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY

To commemorate the U.S. Air Force's sixtieth anniversary, the Air University has announced the inauguration of *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, a peer-reviewed forum for ideas on strategy, international security, defense policy, and the contributions of air, space, and cyberspace power. Prospective authors are invited to submit five-to-fifteen-thousand-word articles for consideration, in MS Word–compatible format, to strategicstudiesquarterly@maxwell.af.mil or via mail (please include disk) to Managing Editor, *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 36112-6427.
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